Capital_Room
rather dementor-like
Disabled Alaskan Monarchist doomer
User ID: 2666
But it would dissuade a good amount because the low hanging fruit would be eliminated.
Yeah, I'm pretty much always frustrated by "the law can't stop all [x]" arguments against a given law, because it's a fully-general argument against laws in general. No society has ever caught all murderers (indeed, in the current US, only about half get solved). No law will ever stop all thefts. And speed limits certainly don't keep huge numbers of drivers from speeding. Yet, few people if any ever use this to argue for doing away with laws against murder or theft. (I have seen a few libertarians use it to argue for doing away with speed limits, though.)
What matters is whether or not it deters enough people, not some unachievable ideal of total deterrence.
Likewise, on this issue, kids should be looking at porn, and they shouldn’t be using drugs.
I think you meant "shouldn't be looking at porn" here.
sees fascist takeovers as a constant possibility that requires extreme vigilance and action to avoid
Given the sizable fractions of Western electorates who, based on their placement on a social-axis-vs.-economic-axis "political compass," would likely vote for "fascism" if given the opportunity, why shouldn't they hold this view?
Naive because it it takes the most simplistic idea of something like "if people realized people of [race] were more genetically predisposed to [bad behavior], then of course that would lead to more bigotry and racial hatred and dehumanizing of people of [race]" without actually doing the sociological research required to justify such a belief.
Is sociological research really needed, beyond the examples of history? I'm reminded of a piece from "crunchy con" religious right-winger Rod Dreher where he first acknowledged that HBD — he specifically singled out Steve Sailer — is probably correct, scientifically; but then argued that we, as a society, must pretend it is not, actively censor it, and maintain instead a "noble lie" (Dreher explicitly called it that) of egalitarian blank-slatism, because it's "proven" that human beings simply 'can't handle the truth.' The proof being the Jim Crow South and, of course, 1930's Germany.
I seem to remember ame_damnee back at the old place once making a similar argument in response to someone asking whatever happened to 'the pursuit of excellence.' To draw attention to "excellence" would also draw attention to it's lack, and that, it was argued, automatically and inevitably leads to people donning jackboots and building death camps. Again, "the Mid-Century Germans," as some like to euphemize, are all the proof necessary to show what happens when the egalitarian veil receives the slightest puncture.
(Meanwhile, this ignores that the bulk of settled societies throughout human history were quite inegalitarian and believed in hereditary differences, without descending into coercive or genocidal projects of eugenic "improvement." For example, it's hard to find a philosophy more hierarchical and inegalitarian than Confucianism, but AIUI when eugenics came to China, the (greatly weakened) Confucians were pretty much in opposition. And in the West, the now-deleted third verse of "All Things Bright and Beautiful" persisted enough in cultural memory that I remember once hearing it performed in a Bob Hope movie. So there's something more needed beyond just "people are born different" to get to "therefore we must exterminate the lower orders.")
As Neema Parvini said in his New Years stream, the core of the dominant ideology of the present day is that we're still fighting Hitler, if only 'the little Hitler inside each of us.' Letting people "realize people of [race] were more genetically predisposed to [bad behavior]" led to Nazi's once, and we all swore "never again." So what more social science is needed beyond that?
do HBD advocates equally call for recognition of intra-racial HBD between classes
Count me as one of these; but then, I'm the "go back to explicitly acknowledging the hereditary nature of ruling elites" guy. Bring back terms like "good breeding."
Why not a colorblind meritocracy, where those who fail are harshly cast out regardless of race?
Actually a popular position in some of my IRL circles.
Which is rather...what we have in our current Capitalist Hellscape, n'est pas?
No, we don't. Not since Griggs and "disparate impact," anyway.
Two quality contributions, from me? I'm quite — pleasantly — surprised. Thank you to whoever all nominated those comments.
I am a bit surprised that the far right hasn't tried to appropriate (both ironically and seriously?) leftist talking points by calling it "the War of Northern Imperialism" and shouting about Lincoln's colonialism
Maarek of the Good Ol' Boyz podcast (mentioned in Vanity Fair's "Inside the New Right, Where Peter Thiel Is Placing His Biggest Bets" as 'autodidact Southern gamers') has, as his pinned Tweet, this joking comment from Nov. 2019:
Kicked out of the Richmond DSA for opening up the floor with a reminder that we are meeting on occupied Confederate land
Well, actually, in that case, it wasn't a pre-nup, but a "Marital Settlement Agreement," but AIUI, it's been cited as precedent to rule various pre-nups invalid.
Donna then brought this action for breach of contract in February 2000, seeking to enforce the liquidated damages clause of the agreement. On the first day of trial, the trial court, on its own motion, granted a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Manuel. Donna appeals from the judgment.
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[1a] The only question before this court is whether the agreement is enforceable. The trial court found that it was not because it was contrary to the public policy underlying California's no-fault divorce laws. That reasoning is sound.
In 1969, California enacted Civil Code section 4506 (now Fam. Code, § 2310), providing for dissolution of marriage based on irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. This change was explained in In re Marriage of Walton (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 119: "After thorough study, the Legislature, for reasons of social policy deemed compelling, has seen fit to change the grounds for termination of marriage from a fault basis to a marriage breakdown basis."
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[1b] Contrary to the public policy underlying California's no-fault divorce laws, the agreement between Donna and Manuel attempts to impose just such a premium for the "emotional angst" caused by Manuel's breach of his promise of sexual fidelity. fn. 1 The agreement expressly states the parties' "mutual understanding that any such breach of fidelity by one party hereto may cause serious emotional, physical and financial injury to the other." The agreement then imposes a penalty on the breaching party, in the event either party chooses to terminate the marriage "because of said breach." This penalty includes "liquidated damages for said breach in the sum of $50,000," over and above any property settlement or support obligations imposed in the dissolution proceeding.
The family law court may not look to fault in dissolving the marriage, dividing property, or ordering support. Yet this agreement attempts to penalize the party who is at fault for having breached the obligation of sexual fidelity, and whose breach provided the basis for terminating the marriage. This penalty is in direct contravention of the public policy underlying no-fault divorce.
To be enforceable, a contract must have a "lawful object." (Civ. Code, § 1550, subd. (3).) A contract is unlawful if it is contrary to an express provision of law, contrary to the policy of express law, or otherwise contrary to good morals. (Civ. Code, § 1667.) Here, where the agreement attempts to impose a penalty on one of the parties as a result of that party's "fault" during the marriage, it is contrary to the public policy underlying the no-fault provisions for dissolution of marriage. (See Fam. Code, §§ 2310, 2335.) For that reason, the agreement is unenforceable.
IANAL, but the court seems to be saying quite plainly here that since the California legislature made divorce "no fault," any contract between spouses that would function as restoring "at fault" divorce is contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable.
In my experience, a number of the "forget 'politics,' build parallel institutions" types — I'm especially thinking of examples like "seasteading" enthusiasts, or Balaji Srinivasan and his "network state" — tend to dismiss questions of their proposals' economic viability with vague, optimistic handwaving. Is this just due to optimism bias and wishful thinking?
Surely contract law would still allow for something in that class, if there were actually an appetite for it.
I'd again point to Diosdado v. Diosdado as at least hinting that, no, contract law, as currently instituted, probably wouldn't allow for that sort of thing — much as the court disallowed the pre-nuptial contract due to it being contrary to the state's "compelling interest" in no-fault divorce.
then democracy is a failed idea.
Only depending on how you define “democracy.”
You’re saying so more or less yourself in suggesting that the idea form of democracy is one in which voting is merely to tell the rulers whether or not they like them
Not my argument, but the view of someone who went by the handle “Ken’ichi” on TAC’s now-lost pre-Disqus comments sections.
Why bother with the fig leaf of voting if the people voting get no choices?
There’s actually several answers to this. And a note: it’s not no choices, it’s limited choices — at the very least, a “thumbs up” vs. “thumbs down.”
First, as noted, there’s the “dynastic cycle” argument. Perhaps the most classic of fall-back “motte” arguments for democracy is the “you can vote the bums out” argument. That is, that people have a way of expressing serious displeasure with the Establishment other than outright rebellion. It lets people unhappy with the system vent their displeasure, rather than letting it fester, hidden, until it explodes out. It lets the ruling elite know that they need to do something to avoid losing the Mandate of Heaven — whether that’s making reforms moving in the direction of the voters, or “educating” the masses until enough of them understand that the unpopular thing the government is doing is really for their own good, is for skilled experts to decide.
Which leads into the second reason — feedback is important. There’s a classic problem institutions can fall into, which is often illustrated in a greatly exaggerated form in fiction via the villain who “shoots the messenger” when brought bad news. When people downplay or omit “bad news” in reporting to superiors, said superiors end up with an overly-rosy picture of circumstances, and will end up failing to act until the disastrous reality comes crashing through the information bubble. You don’t want to become Visser Three.
Third, there’s the utility of elections as a civic ritual, through which we collectively enact our shared citizenship and identity. Consider this Psyche piece by Emilee Booth Chapman, this Rich Harwood essay, and this Graeme Orr essay (hosted on the Australian Parliament’s webpage). From that last:
Lawyers and government officials prefer to think in terms of analytical classifications or normative goals rather than messy things like culture. Figure 3 offers a diagram which I discuss with my students in the law of politics. It shows the various answers to the question 'Why do we have elections?' The diagram groups together the different concepts through which we can understand electoral democracy, and the goals that might drive regulation.
The top two quarters of the diagram are by far the dominant strains in official and academic thinking. Officially, we think about elections either as instruments of government or as triumphs of liberal democracy. Yet when you talk to the media, or follow conversations at parties, the bottom half of the diagram rears its head. The elections as charade view is a cynical, outsiders' counterpoint to the idea of elections as integrity mechanisms. My theme today however occupies the neglected other quadrant. It is the idea of electoral democracy as a 'secular ritual'.
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Don't get me wrong. Each of these perspectives is vital to encapsulate the ideal of free and fair elections. However, we—especially academics, bureaucrats, politicians and judges who study or shape the electoral process—rarely address elections from the experiential dimension. There are exceptions. Some historians have focused on early elections as communal events.6 Sociologists also sometimes consider the colour and meanings of wider political practices, like public demonstrations. In recent years, two insightful professors of politics, Ron Hirschbein and Stephen Coleman, have explored the rites and experiences of voting in the US and the UK.7
The study of electoral systems however has largely lacked this dimension. It has been fixated on the outcome of electoral democracy and not on the journey. It concerns itself with 'purposive goals' rather than the 'latent function' of elections, to quote from Professor Jean Baker.8 We purport to know a lot about elections, through abstractions, book learning and through quantitative studies of voter behaviour and electoral statistics. We do so without sufficient concern for knowing about the electoral experience, let alone how systems and rules shape that experience.
Cocooned in these instrumental and liberal analyses, we forget that elections are nothing if not grand social events, events whose configuration shapes our experience of electoral democracy. Elections are giant rituals. They are recurring political masquerades and festivals. Each election itself is then made up of lots of what I call 'everyday rituals': campaign activities, balloting, declarations of results, investitures. They are events whose rhythms, patterns and activities are either set or contoured by law and administrative institutions.
That experiential and social function of elections, of reinforcing the nation’s collective identity in the hearts and minds of the people, can remain even as their function as instrumental competitions for power is reduced; it does not go away just because the menu of options presented to the voters is sharply constrained. (And the abstract of Ora John Reuter’s “Civic Duty and Voting under Autocracy” seems somewhat relevant here as well.)
Fourth, there’s the resolution of conflicting values. We have here essentially two propositions in tension:
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We live in a “democracy.” Democracy is what makes our system legitimate, and democracy is the only legitimate form of government
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We can’t just let whatever person a plurality of the voters want have actual power in the government.
One way to resolve it is, as you note (and as I, personally, would also prefer), to reject #1. But another way is to note that they are contradictory only if you define “democracy” as “the voters get to elect who they want.” Thus, another way to resolve it is by saying that the “democracy” that legitimates our way of life must therefore mean something other than that. Such as the appeal to Rousseau’s “general will.”
I’m really going to have to recreate that essay, aren’t I?
“The people” never actually rule directly. Even in the “direct democracy” of Athens, the assembly was a small minority of the population of the city-state. The Iron Law of Oligarchy ensures that a society is always run by an elite class, even a democratic one. The difference, then, is to whose benefit do they rule? In past and present “undemocratic” societies, the argument went, the ruling class pursues only their own narrow class interest — under hereditary rulers, the government serves only the interests of hereditary aristocrats; under a military junta, the government serves only the interests of military officers; under a plutocracy, the government serves only the interests of wealthy “capitalists,” and so on. A democracy, then, is when the ruling class instead pursues the good of not only their own class, but of society as a whole — Rousseau’s “general will,” which is the best interest of the country as a whole, and thus definitionally never wrong.
My “steelman” analogy here is to consider individuals who need a “representative” to act on their behalf. Children, the senile, the mentally ill, and so on. What makes a parent, a legal guardian, a representative with “power of attorney,” a good representative? Well, one who acts to their own personal benefit, to the expense of the person they’re representing — one who embezzles funds, for example — is definitely a bad one. This is analogous to the “non-democratic elites” outlined above
But consider the opposite end. I’m reminded here of Bill Cosby’s “chocolate cake for breakfast” stand-up routine. If your kids answer the question of what they want for breakfast with chocolate cake, should you give them what they want? If a schizophrenic wants a doctor to open up their skull and remove the CIA mind-control chip beaming thoughts into their head, does a good guardian start looking for a brain surgeon?
No, a good representative acts in the best interest of the person they represent. A good representative respects their clients wishes… so long as it isn’t against their best interests. Here, the analogy to the overly-permissive parent or guardian is the sort of politician people like the essayist denounce as a “populist” (with or without the “authoritarian” modifier), and you or I might call genuinely democratic. Someone who enacts the popular will — which, per Rousseau, is just another “particular will” — instead of the “general will”. (As I once saw it put, the difference is that the “popular will” is the will of The People (plural) while the “general will” is the will of The People (singular).)
Note that there’s not a strict binary. It’s not “let your kids have chocolate cake or ice cream for breakfast” vs. “you dictate entirely what your kids will have for every meal, they get no choice at all.” You can let them pick which breakfast cereal they might want, or between pancakes and waffles, between oatmeal or French toast, and so on. You can give them a constrained choice among a menu of acceptable meal choices. Even an institutionalized schizophrenic, or an elderly person with senile dementia, has rights to some measure of choice around their activities, circumstances, treatment, and so on; but only when it’s not counter to their own best interests.
Hence, a “stage managed” “defensive democracy” with a strictly limited menu of choices for an electorate who, between public choice theory “rational ignorance” and Marxist “false consciousness”, don’t always know what’s in their own best interest, nor which potential representative is most skilled at determining what that societal best interest is.
Fifth, in line with above definitions, it’s also because they don’t see themselves as “an autocracy.” Even as he began the Roman Empire, Augustus didn’t see himself as ending the Republic, but as saving it, taking the emergency measures needed to end a disastrous civil war, and changing institutions so as to “fix” them and keep them “alive” despite increasing failures. Only centuries in hindsight did the scale of the transition become clear. And even then, there remained reasons why all the Caesars, no matter how much of a monarch they were in practice, used the title of Imperator and not Rex.
Which leads to point six, perhaps the most cynical one. Even if there had been in Rome an alt-Augustus who had wanted to kill the Republic and establish a monarchy, his best path for doing so would be pretty similar to that of the actual Augustus. It makes for an easier transition to preserve the surface forms of the old regime, even as you hollow them out and transfer actual power into the new forms. After so much “your vote matters,” it’s best to make sure any realizations that no, it actually doesn’t, spread through the population as slowly as conditions allow.
So, to tl;dr summarize, in answer to your question “why bother with the fig leaf of voting?”:
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It lets people safely vent their displeasure with the government, rather than start organizing for a violent revolution.
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It lets elites know how unhappy the masses are well before armed rebel bands begin making their way toward the capital.
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Even when it has little practical effect, it serves a psychological and social role as a communal secular ritual.
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Because at least some (probably most) of the people pushing this actually think they’re “saving democracy from itself” ̉— that is, they’re trying to salvage some workable definition of “democracy” while also avoiding what they consider the unacceptable failure mode of “populism.”
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And because even those who aren’t will still find the “fig leaf” makes the de facto transition to an autocracy go down more smoothly with the masses.
That said, I’m with you on finding “just have an autocracy of one sort or another and dispense with the voting” personally preferable.
In response to all the discussions below, I'd like to submit this Aporia piece on the Baby Boom:
The Baby Boom was the sudden rise in fertility, beginning in the late 1930s, of the wealthiest and most advanced countries in the world. It is often associated with the end of World War II, but actually began before then. These countries include the Anglosphere (Ireland, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia), the Nordics (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland), the wealthy continental European countries, occupied but victorious in World War II (France, Netherlands, Belgium), and the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland), which mostly lost World War II.
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Many theories of fertility decline claim that it is the inevitable result of various good things: technological advancement, wealth, education, science (through weakening religion), urbanization, individualism, and declines in childhood mortality. Since (almost) no one really wants to go back to being high mortality, low-tech, extremely poor, rural, and ignorant, the story goes, we simply need to live with it. There is good empirical evidence for all of these things mattering, but what the Baby Boom shows is that it is possible to have it all. You can have a rich, rapidly growing, technologically sophisticated, personally free and individualist, urban, long-lived and fertile society. There’s no need to choose between slow extinction and preindustrial poverty.
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There are several popular, but wrong, explanations for the Baby Boom. These come up in almost any discussion of the Baby Boom, so it is worth debunking them.
[1]. Generational income levels. In this model, popularized by Richard Easterlin, large cohorts lead to lower wages (relative to expectations) leading to low fertility leading to small cohorts leading to high wages leading to high fertility. This would be convenient, since it would suggest population would naturally reach an equilibrium and thus long-term population aging and decline is not a problem. It was plausible in 1978 when it was proposed, but has completely failed since then, with small, post-Boom cohorts across Europe having lower fertility than ever. It has also been refuted by showing that cohort effects (birth year) don’t particularly matter for the beginning of the Baby Boom, with it instead being explained by period effects (changes during the Baby Boom rather than changes in the years those who participated in the Boom were born).
[2]. Household appliances and antibiotics. In this model, recently popularized by Works in Progress, household appliances popularized after WWII reduce the costs of childbearing and antibiotics reduce the risk of various STDs as well as reducing maternal mortality. Since incentives matter, the story goes, easier and safer childbearing means more births. This would be very convenient (all we need is rapid economic growth, which we want anyways!) but has the twin problems that the size of the Boom was inversely correlated with appliance rollout and the beginning of the boom predates the fall in STDs. Also, this model predicts you should see Baby Booms in every country when appliances and antibiotics first spread, but that didn’t (doesn’t) happen. The vast majority of the world only had (or is having) a single demographic transition, rather than the double-transition pattern of the Boom countries.
[3]. Contraception failure. In this model, the Baby Boom is just a marriage boom combined with an inability to practice fertility control due to ineffective contraception. This would not be very convenient, since it suggests that the only way to revive the Boom is to imitate Ceaușescu’s Romania, which (almost) no one wants. The trouble with this hypothesis is that marital fertility actually declined in many Boom countries during this period, suggesting married couples got better, not worse, at controlling their fertility.
The Baby Boom is a Marriage Boom
The proximate cause of the Baby Boom is not a mystery. Almost all births during the Baby Boom were within wedlock, meaning that fertility was a function of (1) nuptiality and (2) marital fertility. In 15/22 countries (8/15 if excluding Southern/Eastern Europe, Ireland, and Japan), marital fertility actually decreased during the Baby Boom, meaning that the entire Boom is explained by more marriage. Only in the US, France, and Austria does marital fertility increase explain more than 15% of the Baby Boom, so when looking at it as a West-wide pattern, we can effectively reduce the Baby Boom to a marriage boom: more people getting and staying married at younger ages.
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So what caused this marriage boom? The answer appears to be a rise in young men’s status compared to young women’s7. The marriage boom can be explained almost entirely by a combination of female labor force participation (down), young male wages (up), and male unemployment (down).
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This model actually understates the case, because it uses total female labor force participation, rather than the relevant variable, which is labor force participation for young women. An overall decline in female labor force participation masks the fact that there was actually an increase in female labor force participation among older women (in part due to World War II; women who got jobs in factories while men fought often stayed after the war), which in turn drove down wages (and thus labor force participation) among younger women.
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Wages are not the only way to measure status. After briefly reaching parity at the zenith of first wave feminism, young men during the Baby Boom again greatly exceeded their female counterparts in educational attainment.
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Note that what matters here is relative gains, not absolute gains. Women did not make less money and were not less educated in 1960 as compared to 1930, merely less so in comparison to their male peers.
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What ended the Baby Boom?
In three words: second wave feminism. By this I mean the suite of changes referred to as the Sexual Revolution (no fault divorce, normalization of premarital sex, delegitimization of marriage as the normative form of the family), combined with a concerted political campaign to raise women’s relative economic and social status. Fertility in every Boom country, as well as in several countries that didn’t experience the Boom but had slightly above-replacement fertility (such as Italy and Japan), cratered within a few years around 1970 (the time of the social and legislative triumph of second wave feminism) to well below replacement, and never recovered. But what are the precise mechanisms?
The most common answer is the Pill, which made cheap, effective, convenient contraception widely available. But this is highly confounded with second wave feminism, because this movement pushed for its legalization. Where you see second wave feminism and not the Pill, as in Japan, you see the same decline around 1970, and no further drop once the Pill is legalized8.
I think the whole thing is worth a read for those debating here.
In almost every case, it leads to a nearly complete one-party system in which the people have very little control over the government.
And I've seen more than one person argue that this is not a bug, but a feature, as it were. In particular, there's the half-remembered essay drawing on Rousseau as to why real democracy is exactly that, just so long as the one party is led by technocratic experts who are best at divining the "common will"; and then there was a commenter at Rod Dreher's TAC posts many years ago who liked to argue that the highest and purest form of actually-existing democracy is Japan's "dominant party" system whereby the Liberal Democratic Party and the permanent bureaucracy are basically one entity, all real political competition occurs between factions within the party, mostly out of view of the public, and voting is reduced to a sort of "Yelp review" general feedback on quality of governance, serving mainly to prevent Chinese-dynastic-cycle-style disaster.
gives the voter a real choice.
But the question is: should the voter have a real choice? The entire argument here is that this is a bad thing, that it's bad for Our Democracy™.
Yes there’s a chance of voting for Hitler.
And we said Never Again. "Never" means never. What about the view that any chance of electing Hitler is too big a risk?
The thing is that a system in which there are lots of candidates running is harder to game for control.
And, again, the argument is that that's a bad thing; that the "gaming for control" is actually necessary for Our Democracy™.
greater levels of equality
terms like diversity and equality
Nomenym didn't say "equality," they said equity, which is not the same thing. To quote a passage repeated in various places:
Equality means each individual or group of people is given the same resources or opportunities. Equity recognizes that each person has different circumstances and allocates the exact resources and opportunities needed to reach an equal outcome.
(Emphasis added.)
You can see how trying to equalize all outcomes between individuals and groups and increasing diversity are goals at tension, yes?
Jesse Lee Peterson
Never heard of him. I'm just disabled and living on various government handouts (and currently fighting with Social Security over my SSI due to issues from the COVID days, along with them counting among my assets a bank account that literally doesn't exist).
Ah, thanks for clarifying.
although Russia is probably capable of stopping Russia
I think you made some sort of error here.
I've never seen a self-described "poor" person who 'didn't' have a smartphone.
I'm poor (particularly right now), and I don't own a smartphone — just a $8/mo. "Obamaphone" subsidized flip-phone that's something like a decade old.
Libertarianism does not say you have no obligations to others. This is a ridiculous strawman.
Have you read any of Bryan Caplan waxing about his "beautiful bubble"?
Seems kind of ill-advised that they're calling attention to the system being, "you can vote for whoever you want, as long as they're one of the state-approved choices".
Why? It's entirely in line with things I've been seeing for years now.
I recently saw someone on Tumblr trying to ground some of the more extreme left-wing fears by arguing that the worst case for a "Trump dictatorship" is that we become… Hungary. And I was reminded of something else I had seen recently — a screenshot of a Keith Olbermann tweet that presented exactly that as the horror scenario to be avoided at all costs: that we're still under threat of the end of Our Democracy and becoming an 'authoritarian' state "like Hungary or Poland." Yes, this was before the recent Polish election. Some undemocratic "authoritarianism" that was, huh?
What's wrong with Hungary, anyway? The answer I get, when I push back and get people to dig down, is that guys like Orbán aren't supposed to win no matter how popular with the voters.
Roger Kimball, in discussing Colorado, made a point similar to yours:
In fact, what they have just voted to preserve is not democracy but “Our Democracy™.” Here’s the difference. In a democracy, people get to vote for the candidate they prefer. In “Our Democracy™,” only approved candidates get to compete.
Well, for years I've been seeing people, from Curtis Yarvin to random YouTube comments, all make the same point about how you can't just let people "vote for the candidate they prefer," and all giving the same example why. So I looked to see if anyone had explicitly made that same connection in this case. The closest is Joe Matthews at Zócalo: "The Case for Taking Trump Off the Ballot." Just like banning the AfD, removing Trump is what "defensive democracy" demands.
To paraphrase Yarvin in a Triggernometry interview, we saw what happens when you let the people vote for the candidate they prefer without limiting it to approved candidates… 'in early-1930s Germany.' We can't ever risk "repeating the mistake Weimar Germany made when they let Nazis take office just because a plurality voted for them" (as one YouTube comment put it). If you don't limit the options to "state-approved choices" and let people vote for whoever they want… they'll vote for Hitler. Never Again. Never again can the masses be allowed to choose their own leaders unguided. If we are to be a democracy, then "democracy" must be defined as something other than that. (Like 'democracy is when elites enact the Rousseauan "common will" — as determined by a technocratic intellectual vanguard — whether the masses like it or not; and therefore the greatest threat to Our Democracy is a "populist" who will do the unthinkable and give the voters what they want.')
Matthews:
Blocking candidates or parties from elections doesn’t come naturally to democratically minded people. Nor should it—it’s a despot move. Autocracies and dictatorships routinely maintain and extend their power by blocking opposition figures from standing for office, such as when the Chinese government banned pro-democracy candidates in Hong Kong’s 2020 vote.
But then…
It is also why it makes sense for people around the world to examine how Germany, where the Nazi party took power through elections, reckons with those who threaten its democracy.
Or, from Tumbler user Eightyonekilograms:
I mean, I didn’t say there was an actionable strategy. Actually I’m pretty sure there isn’t one: for a societal system based both on laws and implicit norms (which they all are), you have to stop someone like Trump— someone who has no shame and no regard whatsoever for the law or the norms— before he gets any power. By the time you get to the point we’re at now, it’s way too late: all the options are bad. Either you disqualify him, which is flagrantly undemocratic and will be seen and reacted to as such, or you don’t, and now you’ve set up a ghastly incentive gradient. If there’s no punishment (whether legal or electoral) for attempting a coup, then there’s no reason not to try over and over again until you succeed. Which is not theoretical, it’s exactly what we’re observing now: Trump knows that punishment is unlikely, so he feels free to say he’ll be a dictator on day one, the Heritage Foundation isn’t even bothering to be secret about assembling the “Project 25” team that will put an end to that pesky democracy, etc.
(Emphasis in original)
So, yes, you do have to "save democracy from itself," even if that requires "undemocratic" measures like Colorado has taken.
Or so goes the argument.
The problem with "just literally walk out of the hood" is something that applies not just to African-Americans, but poor people of various stripes around the world: family. One of the major reasons given for why poorer people have poor spending habits is that if you are known to have any money available, your kin will come to prevail upon you as to why they need some. If you "make it big," every auntie and half-sibling and unemployed cousin is going to come begging for a little help. Unless you're willing to simply cut ties with your entire family — not an easy ask for anyone (save maybe the most atomistic of WEIRDs) — your success is mostly going to be eaten up by your extended clan, often making it not worth the effort.
Plus, there's also violence affecting family as well. You can work your way up, get into a top university, get married, become a respected judge or an english professor, live in a nice LA neighborhood, send your kids to private school… and then, one day, your nephew back in "the hood" in Philly has pissed off the wrong bunch and now has to come live with you for awhile.
They have to lose, and the correct play is to either hold position or escalate until that happens.
What if they can't lose. What if we "escalate" as far as we can, and still get crushed utterly?
My main reaction is that after all the sturm und drung about our sacred democracy, the people that want this are doing everything in their power to destroy the remaining legitimacy of Our Democracy.
How does one define "democracy"?
There was this essay I read about a year or so ago and have not been able to find again, that keeps coming to mind as various things I read keep reminding me of it. I've even been tempted to try writing up a reconstruction (with what "steelmanning" I can) and posting it here for discussion.
The essay mostly referenced Rousseau, particularly his "general will" concept, and distinction from the "popular will," to argue that not only are elections not a sufficient condition to have a democracy, they're not important to democracy — practically unnecessary — and too much emphasis on them is a major threat to democracy. The tl;dr of the whole thing was to essentially define "democracy" as single-party rule by an intellectual vanguard of technocratic elites who do what they think is best, no matter what the voters want, and treat all elections as merely advisory and non-binding; and that "populist" politicians who campaign on doing what their constituents vote for, and then — even worse — try to actually do it once in office — in other words, what most people think "representative democracy" means — are the greatest threat to "democracy."
it's hard to imagine the American right doing much other than the elephant from StoneToss routine.
Exactly. Like @The_Nibbler said above, "Red Tribe is just going to quietly go extinct."

One thing I’ve found interesting is a couple of responses in the "mainstream media." First, this AP piece, which was introduced on Twitter with:
(I once again thank Elon for the gift that is community notes)
From the piece itself:
That same “Republicans pounce” tone carries throughout. Little to no concern as to whether the accusations are true — even as they do note it is the sort of thing that would absolutely not be tolerated from an undergrad:
Instead, who is making the accusation is treated as what really matters. It’s very tribalist.
Another paragraph that stood out:
Note the historically backwards framing at the end there, in service of a tortured guilt-by-association-to-metaphor.
Also, an “everybody does it” defense, combined with a further assertion that accusations shouldn’t count if they come from The Wrong People™ who think “everybody does it”:
Next:
Would an undergrad get away with plagiarism if it was “an honest mistake”? Well, I went to Caltech, not Harvard, but the way the “honor code” was enforced vis-a-vis plagiarism and proper citations when I was there two decades ago, the answer was no.
I’m trying not to be “boo outgroup” here about mainstream “journalism,” but this all seems pretty partisan for something from an institution like the Associated Press that purports to be reporting rather than editorializing.
The other is this Forbes piece: “Claudine Gay Resigns From Harvard: Why Black Excellence Is Never Enough.” Exactly what “black excellence” Dr. Gay displayed, beyond being “Harvard University’s first Black president” is left unsaid. The author’s other two examples for comparison are Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson and Nikole Hannah-Jones. The fourth paragraph is what I’d like to highlight, particularly its end:
Note the “harms” Gay, Hannah-Jones, and Jackson suffered: Gay had to step down from being president of Harvard, but still works there in a highly-paid position; UNC initially denied Hannah-Jones tenure… before eventually granting it; and Justice Jackson… received criticism during her Senate confirmation hearing. That last is particularly notable — Jackson was confirmed. She’s on the Supreme Court.
The author, Janice Gassam Asare, seems to be offended that these women received pushback and criticism at all, and that these women — all quite well off and protected and very safe compared to most Americans of any color — aren’t even better off is proof that “misogynoir is never too far away.”
Again, the substance of the issue is waved away, in favor of making it about “the first Black woman [X].” Where in the first piece, truth comes second to partisan affinities, here truth is second to identities. In both, the focus is shifted away from Dr. Gay’s questionable scholarship, in favor of painting the outgroup as horrible for daring to point it out. How are things supposed to work, in a media environment like this?
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