EverythingIsFine
Well, is eventually fine
I know what you're here for. What's his bias? Politically I at least like to think of myself as a true moderate, maybe (in US context) slightly naturally right-leaning but currently politically left-leaning if I had to be more specific.
User ID: 1043
I'm not positive it would start with GPS satellites, but with the current setup of space weaponry and capabilities it could escalate to that pretty easily. Also, it's hard to justify "we nuked (potentially) millions of people and broke a three quarters of a century long precedent" with "they made our maps harder to read".
Are you suggesting that they can do lots of non- or less-lethal things in their first strike, then? It's possible, but seems unlikely beyond some of the easy fruit like a smaller-scale cyberattack and internet shenanigans. The point of a first strike is to prevent a counterattack, decreasing overall risk. And militarily it seems quite plausible (in their view, which is what matters for their decision making) that they'd be able to prevent US intervention if they took out enough air and sea bases (and carriers, potentially) to buy them the ~2 weeks to do an invasion (would Taiwanese resistance be less if they saw that China beat the US and no aid is coming? Probably yes).
Re: grey-zone tactics, it doesn't have to look exactly the same. What if Zelensky had just lost an election to a Russia-friendly President who rolled over? Would he really be forcibly removed, or would the situation create just enough confusion to allow the tanks to finish rolling into Kiev? I think you underestimate Taiwan's geographic proximity, potential low points in governmental trust, support for China among the population and even political leadership who might stand to gain promotions under a Chinese takeover. What if they hold a sham vote, either among the people or in the legislature? Or even hold a vote, lose it, allege fraud, and use that as an excuse? False flag something? Stage a partial civil war with sleeper agents? Have commandos take hostages? There are a lot of options, and to emphasize this point, they might only need to work for a week or two, and dilute local resistance.
I agree that your scenario seems somewhat likelier than some of the others (though part of me wonders if Chinese military leadership gets too high on their own supply, they could do something 'illogical') - what do you see the world looking like if that happens, US weak response included? Do you think it's a sea change, or just another part of a slow slide towards something else? Personally, I think any Taiwan resolution has the potential to be the biggest geopolitical world event since the end of the Cold War, but I'm open to other perspectives.
this lack of control makes things much scarier.
Bingo, got it in one. A LOT of human behavior makes a lot more sense when you frame it as "wanting to be in control". Including believing things that imply control is possible. Add in some "fundamental attribution bias" and boom, you've explained a great deal of weirdness in our pyschology.
I mean, it's all about the definition of "legitimate". Democrat anti-legitimacy arguments were, as I understand, grounded in the theory that a foreign country allegedly deliberately manipulating the timing of media events (and/or Comey's actions) will mislead gullible Americans and thus decrease the "fairness" of the vote. That is, it's "illegitimate" in the sense that a counter-factual vote without intervention would have had a different outcome. I've always thought this was pretty darn weak, but I also think it's important to describe it accurately. It's a "illegitimacy" born of bitterness, even to people who use the word, not an "illegitimacy" as a factual debate. In popular parlance these are different meanings. I don't think that's slimy wordsmithing, it's just how people use the words, in a descriptivist sense.
Now, is claiming "illegitimacy" (in the two meanings) the same as "election denial"? No, mostly? Election denial, I feel like, is a meaningless phrase, even if I've used it once in a while as a sort of general gesture at a concept. Some people use it as "I would have won", an ego-saver among other things, while others use it as "I did win", and the two must be separated. Plainly both can be considered "denialism"! But both do not mean the same thing. I chalk this up partially to word-confusion. As I said, there are two separate concepts going on that are distinct, that our words aren't capturing very well, so I view this argument as silly (and the upvotes/downvotes as tribalism)
Stacey Abrams is a different issue, with a different debate about "voter suppression" that is much closer to the Trump case, and doesn't to me seem to be the same thing as Clinton-style denial.
Personally I think it's just a question of priorities. Simple as that. The bombings didn't get much mainstream sustained attention, didn't kill anyone, didn't even go off! All cases need personnel and time, and I'm positive the FBI has more cases than it has time and personnel. I know some very loud people wanted it to be a priority, but frankly I'm a bit iffy on that. It's not like there was a string of later, connected pipe bombings? So no imminent safety risk. (Also not read into the details of the case - were the pipe bombs actually capable of doing lots of damage? Or was it incompetently done?)
Well, having just visited Amsterdam, I was super impressed - until I realized that the population of Amsterdam is less than a million people. That's shockingly tiny! I'm not sure that the bike culture scales beyond that.
But overall I agree that IF you pair more mass transit with infill higher-density housing, you can definitely make portions of American cities into European-like ones. And then you can connect higher-density areas with something like, I dunno, BART or something. Critically, you still need to do the infill housing bit to make it work, though.
I saw a bit of discussion downthread about Taiwan, and as a resident doomer, that's like red meat to me. Plus, I recently saw this actually fairly good and accurate - but still incomplete - WSJ article about what an invasion might look like in terms of nuts and bolts. But talk about the actual mechanics of an invasion get all the attention, so let's talk about something different: what does the world look like after an invasion, assuming it happens?
Unfortunately to answer this question we do need to backtrack and still break down exactly the way in which this invasion happens. There are, essentially, 3 methods for invasion:
Option One: The First Strike. To oversimplify, because of the reality of the geographic and power arrangement, much like Pearl Harbor, a similar idea presents itself. If you can knock out enough American ships, bomb the island bases, bomb bases in Japan (possibly; also Korea, Philippines are possible), attack the GPS and satellite systems, accompany it with a massive cyberattack on both military and civilian targets, cutting undersea cables, and so on, you make a military response ultra-hard mode, giving China carte blanche to invade at their own pace with the wind at their backs. Lots of the details are untested, but there's good reason to think that China would be at least moderately successful at this, depending on how hard they want to commit (a big question). And unlike WW2, it's unclear that America has the industrial strength or the allies willing to pitch in to win a war if it drags on longer. It should be said that buildup to this is virtually guaranteed to be noticed in advance. On Taiwan proper, the ultimate goal, this manifests as an amphibious invasion similar to what's described in the article. It's an outright fight. (One I tend to think is overstated in difficulty, but that's beside the point)
Essentially, three outcomes. The US wins, China loses in the initial stages pretty significantly. China wins, takes Taiwan, does very well against the US (and possibly allies). Or, fighting drags on and WWIII kicks off. Whether or not Taiwan itself folds with a big or a small fight, or even wins, is within this WWIII-esque scenario, because a first strike virtually guarantees a war. It's conceivable China might try something smaller-scale, thinking America might take it on the chin, but we all know America usually punches back.
Option Two: The Slow Grinder. China, possibly taking advantage of local Taiwanese political developments and/or American weakness, blockades Taiwan. Sleeper agents, propaganda, and intimidation blanket Taiwan. America dithers whether or not to intervene, because that would basically mean that America was starting the war, over an island they never formally committed to defend with arms (it's complicated) very far from home.
Two outcomes. Taiwan and/or America capitulates is one possibility. Though I suppose it might matter who blinks first? Or, China's bluff is called and America breaks the blockade, China backs down. I think politically, actions short of a blockade but muscly moves have similar outcomes and so belong in the same general bucket. If the blockade turns into a fight, outcomes also collapse more or less to the first option, albeit with notably different starting assumptions in terms of a fight. I'm not going to call that out as a separate outcome for simplicity.
Option Three: The Sneak Attack. Yep, you heard that right. China has been doing more and more major military exercises. It happens sometimes that these turn into real invasions. Even with some intel, people often second guess this - Russia-Ukraine being an obvious example. It's plausible. Central to this case is the somewhat Chinese military competence, but mostly the degree of Taiwanese resistance. Personally, I think that any appreciable number of Chinese soldiers get into Taiwan, and the nation folds without much of a fight. Picture this: internet blackout. President killed in a sneak missile strike and/or assassination. Chinese troops both helicopter in by the hundreds from offshore helicopter carriers, land on beaches, use temporary piers to land even more. Civilians don't actually fight back much, due to bad equipment, poor training, and poor communication. China eventually overwhelms with numbers, and the US doesn't think it's realistic to land boots on the ground to retake. Most of the Taiwanese strategy hopes to deny beach landings, and if they happen anyways, it's a bit handwavy "urban warfare".
So. Two outcomes. Taiwan loses is clearly one, and one that I find likely in this case. It could also be that China embarrasses itself and fails abysmally in the landing, and then backs off, giving it up as lost. I'll count this as its own outcome, because a failed invasion could still collapse into a larger hot war outcome.
So, we have approximately seven outcomes across three scenarios: China attacks the US first, and either wins or loses quickly, or else the world experiences a longer war. A longer threat or blockade results in China backing down, or the US capitulating (or Taiwan itself). Possibly accompanied by a political settlement or backroom deal. And finally, China takes Taiwan or fails all by its own, quickly.
What does that mean for the world order?
What's striking to me is that nearly none of these outcomes are actually very good for the US, like at all. Even the "good" options! Being attacked and winning? We all know what 9/11 neurosis did on the US, this would be just as major a shift in the attitudes, if not more. I suppose a smaller, cowardly first strike (or a neutralized one) is plausible, resulting in a more 'meh' reaction, but I don't find it likely. China failing a sneak attack might be viewed as good, but I worry about that. China has, historically, not reacted very well to national humiliations. A loss just kicks the can down the road to some other issue, in my view.
The one truly "good" option is where China tries a blockade (or threatens one), and the US resolves the situation with diplomacy - without selling out Taiwan. It's just that... that seems wishful thinking. Have you listened to what China has been saying for literal decades? They are dead-set on taking Taiwan. Maybe they could be (fooled into?) thinking that Taiwan will eventually vote itself into becoming a protectorate or part of China, by its own internal political process. Accepting the status quo.
Of course, that's the whole pin in it, right? I'm taking for granted that a conflict happens, or that China at least makes some kind of move. But isn't that a reasonable base case? The "window" won't be open forever, and we all know how groupthink can take over organizations. On the other hand, it could be I'm excessively poo-pooing this option. Successfully solving the crisis with diplomacy, maybe an economic deal, could also be great for the world, with one less looming crisis over everyone's heads. Maybe it's an agreement to hold a vote in Taiwan once and for all to settle it. Dunno.
I should note that all of these assume a hostile Taiwan, but that's also not a solid, fully given assumption! It only takes a single friendly or weak President to sell out their own country and offer diplomatic cover for the takeover. The US would find it ranging from awkward to impossible to intervene 'against Taiwan's wishes' so to speak, even if it's only a cover and doesn't represent the people. Additionally, and very critically, we've seen a "little green men" approach work in Crimea, so never underestimate the value of plausible deniability and the wide variety of "grey zone" ops, paired with misinformation.
What do Europe and other Asian allies do? That's a wrinkle I didn't address. Might be meaningful. There IS, I suppose, one nice outcome where US allies help us out in the negotiations, or even in combat, and our ties deepen, creating an even stronger power bloc worldwide by virtue of shared goals and arms.
What about the scenarios that are bad for the US/Taiwan? Here's where things get interesting, and I'm curious to know your thoughts. China winning a first-strike, and abject US defeat is plainly fascinating. In a single stroke the world order is upended. Americans are now insecure at their place in the world, outraged that they were beaten, playing the blame game. Perhaps they re-unite and re-dedicate themselves to making a comeback in 10 years. But either way the hold is broken. De-dollarization probably accelerates, global trade is now China-dominated via increased sea and political and economic power. China now has a guaranteed seat at any world table it wants in any international incident.
China winning a lightning strike? Honestly I view this as somewhat status quo, believe it or not. The US might lose a little face, but we never like actually, fully guaranteed we'd defend Taiwan this whole time (strategic ambiguity). Think Hong Kong - protest, followed by quiet acceptance. I view this status quo-like state, to be clear, as mildly good for China. The biggest thing is that China would now have access to the crown jewels of tech: GPUs. That is a pretty big deal, even if you're an AI pessimist.
"WWIII" is... well, I have no idea. Worst case, nukes get exchanged (maybe half a dozen). Russia gets involved on China's side. Things spiral out of control as many countries get pulled into conflict (Japan, Korea, North Korea, etc all have opportunities). Abroad, the American distraction provides plenty of cover for other wars to start (Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, various African countries, all can act with temporary impunity).
At any rate, I'm curious if one of these post-invasion scenarios captures the attention of anyone else. The US has been the head honcho for so long, it's hard to imaging a world where they've been beat solid and perhaps even retreat into a new generation of isolation.
Even then I remember some cases where people fail to weight or tie it properly and it floats back up anyways. Few methods are totally safe.
Typically, people like this seem to over focus on a few more particular steps and have blind spots. Robinson was amazing at finding getting into a spot with a rifle, and had at least an immediate getaway, heck physically he seemed to have gotten away with it, but totally ignored/didn’t address the human element (family and roommate and discord). Luigi had a plan for a getaway, to minimize his face via a mask (at least partially), a detailed plan to evade capture in the first few hours by taking a variety of transportation to lose people, but ignored the gun. Or actually, there’s a case to be made that keeping it is smart. Lots of criminals are caught because they are seen in the act of dumping evidence, and usually criminals hope to avoid being caught and ID’d (thinking if they are caught it’s all moot) more than they hope to legally be exonerated openly.
His problem was that he continued to wear a mask in an area where masks were weird. And said mask was worn when he was photographed. He actually would have been better off taking the mask off! I think the anonymous tip is reasonable. Also, Bayes rule/selection bias. While I’m not sure how many other municipal cops got tip offs of various types that turned out to be false, I bet there were still a lot. We are only seeing the one tip that panned out.
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Broadly historically speaking? The Opium Wars left a century+ long impact on the national pysche. Even farther back, the Mongolian invasion was a huge deal. One they ended up (partially) whitewashing into a "Yuan Dynasty" as if it were just a normal thing. More recently? Online Chinese hypernationalist netizens have reacted very harshly to a wide range of perceived insults abroad. Sometimes encouraged by the government, but lately they have had to be restrained in some cases. There are a ton of media examples from the last 10 years.
Edit: and yes, as magicmushrooms said, humiliation implies national weakness which implies governmental weakness, and would indeed threaten the CCP's claim to legitimacy, crazy as it might sound to us here. That's partly why the "how" matters, because some resolutions can be "spun" better than others. Outright military defeat? Yikes. Collapse of the government is just as likely and scary as a vow of revenge, Versailles style.
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