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Felagund


				

				

				
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User ID: 2112

Felagund


				
				
				

				
1 follower   follows 17 users   joined 2023 January 20 00:05:32 UTC

					

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User ID: 2112

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Who cares if the model is accurate?

A lot of people. For one, everyone who is outside the organization and thinks it is accurate, and depends on it as a guide to truth. For another, those in the organization who visualize themselves as trying to predict, which, there are undoubtedly some.

I think there's still space for plenty of candidates to have a chance.

Could the concerns about Iran have distracted from Crooks? That is, he's clearly not Iranian, so maybe don't waste too much time and effort on him if that'll cause you to miss out on the Iranian threats? Combine that with general incompetence, and that seems not a crazy explanation, maybe?

My guess is that he wanted a civil war, and thought this would make one.

It was pretty funny, but yeah, very obviously not him.

And especially his critics will be sensitive about COVID, it's not like he's fighting Republicans at the moment.

Free Speech is a spook, an incoherent concept that collapses the very instant it drifts outside the bounds of a rigidly-coherent values environment. To the extent that it has significant meaning, it has never been tried, and to the extent that it has been tried, it has had no significant meaning.

Can you elaborate?

More context, perhaps?

Okay, I find it fairly believable that women who choose to go into math might have a higher floor. My sense is that the cliche that women like people more, men like things more, is, generally speaking, true, and accordingly, at an equivalent level of ability, differences in tastes would produce the effect you describe (under the simplistic model of people going into a field based on how much they like doing the thing combined with how good they are at it). I don't expect this would carry over more broadly, in other fields and with other groups? Surely a lot of the discrimination going on elsewhere is wrong?

I think I don't have a good enough picture of what harms you see affirmative action as repairing.

But let's consider this from a different angle. Instead of what we have been doing—looking at efficiency, or those discriminated against—now consider the social effects upon those in groups which have been favored. Now in their every achievement, their bosses, colleagues, customers—no one is quite sure whether they earned it, or whether they were merely the beneficiary, at least until they show themselves manifestly worthy. (And so racism becomes warranted.) And themselves, even. Should they not themselves hold a touch of skepticism as to whether they are the equals of their colleagues, whether they are there on the merits, until it be proven? Their social accreditation, whether that be degrees, whether that be hiring, whether that be accolades, whether that be promotion—all of this is of less probative value. Why infantilize these people in this way, instead of treating them as your fellow men? Why treat these people as tokens, rather than as equals?

Regarding immigration, I don't think it's quite hereditarianism (in that it's not necessarily racial, but rather in reference to set of American people). It's more nationalism. But point taken, immigration is a big deal.

I don't know if anyone else of you like to read /r/supremecourt, but if you do, does it feel at all like it's drifting leftwards? They do their best to be fair.

Maybe also twitter and discord?

This is probably the best definition of evangelical that I've seen. (And accurate regarding dispensationalism.)

Preserving a more formal and technical dialect is useful. It makes more sophisticated conversation a little easier, and keeps the past accessible. At the very least, it's important to maintain technical vocabulary within fields.

The actual motivation, of course, is so that you don't look stupid.

I know McWhorter's argued that there's been substantial celtic influence as well.

I don't expect it to drop inflections any time soon (at least, in American dialects. I imagine there are places which have already lost them). I think most of the loss came as a result of cross-contact between various cultures—Britons, Saxons, Norse, French—leading to a variety of dialects, with features from simpler dialects winning out over time. On the other hand, English now looks more standardized and stable, and I imagine the influence of online media to be a force gravitating people towards more standard dialects.

That's mostly conjecture, don't take what I said too seriously.

Eigenrobot.

The idea of eternal progress is largely a Christian one.

It is?

The western form of linear time does not solely see it in such things. If the point is merely the linearity (as opposed to cyclicality) of time, you see that in the sentence immediately prior to that I quoted before. If the point is that it's linear with a good ending, well, that is a little better of a match, but Christianity is decidedly unclear about whether things will be getting better or not prior to the return of Christ. On the other hand, you can see a sort of enlightenment-style linearity in Aeschylus' Oresteia, several hundred years before the coming of Christ, where the cyclical vengeance of the furies is tamed and put an end to by the enlightened and civilized gods of Athens.

Of course, I don't imagine Aeschylus was the direct precursor of modern progress—I think that's probably closer to being a result of technological growth and advances in scientific knowledge giving people the often accurate sense that they knew more and could do more than all who came before them.

You undervalue the past. True, we stand on untrodden ground. Never before has even this conversation across who knows how many miles been possible, for one. And yet, I do not think it is utterly uninformative. The world will not repeat itself, but you may see some pattern here or there crop up again.

I think you also undervalue whatever is not material comfort and progress. Our social relations make up a huge portion of our lives, and that is not so unambiguously better. Further, it is just not the case that everyone, everywhere, at all times, really cares only about material comfort. Your tacit assumption as much is, I think, part of our milieu. The continued existence and growth of the Amish are a living monument, I think, that people do not all value a comfortable life.

What would a society that cared about these sorts of things (social goods) do? Encourage marriage and children. Encourage general integration with society, especially in person. To the extent possible, reduce welfare and dependency. Reduce profligacy; promote austerity, at least in regard to economic activity devoted to comfort. As to government action, reduce spending, especially on welfare; seriously consider taking an economic hit to start to work on the debt. Make people responsible for things, instead of hiding it behind bureaucracies. Ideally somehow figure out how to stop being so wasteful in military spending, while also being more prepared to handle powerful actors. Actually put a stop to the Houthis messing up global shipping.

I think your final paragraph, from a brief glance, might have misunderstood what he is doing. He seemed less to be setting out an ideal of "this is the life to which we must retvrn" so much as saying that the right does not encourage certain sorts of ambition enough, and so large classes of society have been ceded to the left. This is correct, and has been noted by left-leaning commentators. He prescribes not settling.

That said, you have a point—no one really has a vision of what things should be like. I think the desire for some sort of action and striving that you point to and question has something to it—Aristotle was gesturing at something real when he characterized eudaimonia as an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue—but it must be to some end, some purpose. This, I think, is where a lot of people see value. In the struggle, in their achievements that they have toiled over and after—that, they can be pleased with. People value being relied upon, necessary, to be making a difference. We are often happier in the breathless pursuit of a thing than in the possession of it. But the solution is not toil for toil's sake, as you rightly seem to gesture at. We do not value pointless work. And there hardly seems to be any terminal value that people are content with. Science fiction, I suppose, will often seek endless exploration of the universe. But why? To what end? Because we couldn't think of anything better to do? What is the chief end of man?

Ecclesiastes is a good book.

My main concern (aside from constitutionality) with this is that it seems like it might lead to more politicization. Currently, in theory, any president could appoint more justices, but the risk of big political swings is tempered by justices choosing to resign sometimes under favorable presidents, which reduces the chance of any given president changing the court's composition too much—they mostly replace justices with somewhat like-minded justices. On the other hand, this would mean that for every election, the president would get to appoint two justices independent of the retiring justices' leanings. This raises the salience of supreme court picks to presidential candidates, which only serves to politicize the court further. Now every election they would need to talk about court picks, and those picks will often matter.

The proposal only had 1 as a constitutional amendment, not 2 and 3.

Term limits would probably be struck down, without an amendment—the constitution specifies that they serve "on good behavior", which is implicitly a life term.

To what extent the Supreme Court can review the constitution is an interesting question. People often read Marbury as an assumption of judicial power, but Michael Stokes Paulsen has argued, fairly compellingly, that what they described there was both necessary, and not exclusive to the judiciary—all branches of the government, at least in all offices that take the oath, are bound to interpret and uphold the constitution. Hence Lincoln was correct in his refusal to recognize Dred Scott—it was wrong; the supreme court only decides the meaning of the constitution as appled to the particular case or controversy in question (in that case, Dred Scott himself), and he as the executive has the duty to follow the constitution as he sees it.

I think this probably matches how Thomas and Gorsuch think the court should act.

I'm not following the gridlock part. Wouldn't there still be an old number of justices?

Enforceable means making a weapon to take justices they don't like off the court.

There is an amendment currently proposed, as follows.

No officer of the United States, including the President and the Vice President, or a Senator or Representative in Congress, shall be immune from criminal prosecution for any violation of otherwise valid Federal law, nor for any violation of State law unless the alleged criminal act was authorized by valid Federal law, on the sole ground that their alleged criminal act was within the conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority of their office or related to their official duties.

This is very bad, stripping all immunity, not merely limiting it. This would allow Congress, for example, to make vetos illegal. The court raised the example in the immunity decision that one of the charges against Trump could arguably be applied to any example of deliberate underenforcement of the law, which there tends to be some form of under every administration (e.g. immigration). In effect, it will be impossible to legally carry out the office of the presidency, and presidents will be free to bear grudges against their predecessors. Further, this includes immunity in the exclusive and preclusive powers, which even the liberal justices conceded would make sense—now Congress can set rules on when they can be vetoed? This dramatically harms the separation of powers. (Roberts notes also that no immunity would incentivize clinging to power.)

I'll note also that while the immunity ruling went too far in places (the evidence portion?), it left a lot of space, from the extreme of absolute immunity for all official conduct (which, evidently, one justice, at least, wanted) to Barrett's reading of it, which seemed always to take the most limited stance the opinion allows. It had to be written in such a way to satisfy all the people signing onto it. You can bet that if this case returns to the court after lower courts decide that Trump is not immune on the remaining questions (fake slates of electors, speeches, pressuring Pence), you will have at least four justices siding against Trump, with a pretty good chance of Roberts or Kavanaugh siding with them. That is, this is not indicative of a general principle that they're going to side with Trump.

I think it's worth taking seriously Roberts' own statement that this was intending to set forth generic principles, not ruling separately for Trump.

I don't know that I quite follow what you are saying. You seem to be saying that the courts are treating the presidency too deferentially, and so he needs to have immunity stripped. But do you have any indication of deferentiality besides the recognition of immunity (I think I've indicated why that can't be generalized)? Then your position seems closer to being that any form of immunity grants the president too much power. That is, your position on immunity, at least insofar as you articulated it here, does not seem contingent on how the courts treat him.

My expectation is that we see the immunity consistently read in the narrowest manner, making this not that impactful.

1 is bad, it puts each former president at the mercy of his successors, as there are several broad statutes that would apply to common presidential decisions. It also grants Congress too much power, radically changing the constitutional order. Reducing immunity? Fair enough (though I imagine we'll see the courts limit it on their own). Eliminating it? Another thing entirely.

2 is bad, as it will increase politicization. They already try to avoid the luck factors by often resigning under favorable presidents. This forces supreme court to be top of the mind for every election.

Those are a partisan hit job, and badly misrepresent things.

In any case, it would be obvious if you read Thomas that he's not being swayed. He's clearly one of the most principled justices, in that he cares most about what the Constitution actually says. See, for a recent example, his Netchoice opinion, where he weakens his own agreement with Alito's pseudo-dissent by saying he thinks Zauderer might have been wrongly decided. If that's not the impression you get of him, your ratio of reading slander:his opinions might be out of whack.