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MadMonzer

If you're talking to me, my preferred pronouns are you/your

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joined 2022 September 06 23:45:01 UTC

				

User ID: 896

MadMonzer

If you're talking to me, my preferred pronouns are you/your

4 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 06 23:45:01 UTC

					

No bio...


					

User ID: 896

He may be popular, but his popularity didn't open up any political space for a non-Trump right-populist candidate. The MAGA voter base appear to want the aesthetics of Trumpery as much as they want the right-populist policy substance.

In a hypothetical open field (say Trump had a heart attack in 2021), I think De Santis was the clear favourite in 2024. He is still a serious candidate (I think Abbott would be a narrow favourite) in the hypothetical where there is somehow an open Republican primary in 2028. But the question in this thread is whether he has any chance against a Trump-endorsed candidate, or an incumbent JD Vance if Trump is dead. He didn't run a good campaign in 2024 because there was no good campaign a right-populist could run with Trump in the race. And I think he faces the same lack of political space against any serious Trump-endorsed candidate in 2028.

Even if the DNC formally endorsed the decision, I think Harris and not the DNC chose Walz. I find Harris picking Walz as pushback against a underhand media campaign just as plausible as the DNC doing so.

To be clear, I'm assuming that these people would have to compete against Vance running with a Trump endorsement.

I agree that Vance has the status of "most likely endorsee" now, but Trump is not known for sticking with decisions in the face of events. Trump could decide to endorse a dynastic successor, he could try to run for a third term (which Vance would have to discredit himself with the median voter by playing along with until Trump agreed the game was up). More likely, they could just have a falling out. Trump switching his endorsement to Rubio because Vance didn't clap loudly enough is totally in character.

My wild-ass guess probabilities, conditional on Trump not being dead or unconcealably senile by summer 2028 are:

  • Trump doesn't make an unequivocal endorsement because he is still talking about running for a third term (either seriously or as an ego trip) or butthurt about his inability to run for a third term 25%
  • Trump endorses a family member 10%
  • Trump endorses Vance 30%
  • Trump endorses Rubio or someone else with a similar profile 10%
  • Trump endorses someone who isn't on the radar now 20%
  • Trump does not make an endorsement and calls for a real primary 5%

I agree with you that if an apparently-compos mentis Trump endorses a non-family member then the Republican primary is basically sown up. DeSantisism is right-populist substance but without the reality-TV sideshows Trump generates, and there is no appetite for it among Red tribers in the country. I think this applies even if the endorsee is an obscure MAGA state legislator or a TV personality with no political experience. Even if Trump does endorse a family member, I think the MAGA vote is strong enough that the endorsee still has a >50% chance of winning a Republican primary.

As for Vance himself, I don't see him leaving a Senate seat to be VP for four years before going back into private life.

A significant part of the upside for Vance is the chance that he will become President because Trump (who will be 82 when he leaves office) dies or has a disqualifying medical event that can't be covered up leading to the 25th being invoked. This is a good enough shot at the White House that an ambitious politician would take it even if there was zero chance of a 2028 run.

Shapiro was such an obviously good pick (popular, moderate, highly increases chances of winning an important swing state) that not selecting him his strong Bayesian evidence that being a Jew is considered electoral poison by the DNC. If he's the nominee, leftist anti-Semitism becomes a major campaign issue and major source of internal strife for the Democrats.

Why? The case for Walz was that he was the most left-wing candidate available that could LARP as a regular guy. Shapiro is only an obviously good pick if you see Harris as too left-wing for the median voter and want to balance the ticket with a centrist. Choosing Walz over Shapiro is the obvious thing to do if you are running a left-wing base mobilisation campaign, which is what the Groups wanted Harris to do. It is also the obvious thing to do if you think you are the candidate as a result of a centrist coup and need to shore up credibility with the left (which is what the campaign staffers Harris inherited from Biden did think).

P(Walz as VP|Harris is too left-wing) and P(Walz as VP|Harris is afraid of anti-Semites) are both close enough to 100% that Walz as VP is not strong Bayesian evidence for one over the other. It is Bayesian evidence for both of those theories over something like "The Democrats are sensible moderates at heart, but too incompetent to communicate this to the voters", but if your prior on this in summer 2024 was still high enough for it to be worth collecting evidence against it then I want some of what you are smoking.

Particularly the paid agitators from out-of-town who wear masks to cover their faces.

The Romans thought "a bunch of Romans deciding for themselves what to do" in the Senate or the assemblies was a holy ritual, or at least something where the special protection of the Gods was necessary and where certain ritual forms had to be followed in order to ensure that protection.

The analogous idea that the operation of American democracy has a special relationship with Divine Providence not shared with a group of pubgoers arguing over whose round it is was part of proto-Blue Tribe civil religion since the Colonial era, and remains so modulo changes in the Blue concept of divinity. It was generally accepted by proto-Red elites at the time of the Founding as well - both Washington and Jefferson talk like that a lot.

I don't think whether Newsom has actually committed any specific federal crime is going to be a major factor in whether or not he draws the attention of federal law enforcement.

I think the issue is that it works iff the police obey the order, but that if they don't then it is instadeath for the regime's credibility. The chance that police (or troops) will refuse to fire on their own countrymen engaged in a protest half the population finds sympathetic is high enough that governments don't normally want to risk it.

One of the advantages of a large multinational empire is that you can post troops from province A to keep order in province B, so the troops don't see the locals as their own countrymen. This doesn't work in nation-states, but the same general approach applies - this is why Singapore uses Ghurkas as riot police.

GA or NC might start to be in play

They already are - Biden carried GA in 2020, and Obama carried NC in 2008. GA is about one point redder than perennial tipping-point state PA and NC is 2-3 points redder.

And they aren't going to get less in play - the extra EV each GA and NC are gaining is due to Democrats moving there.

On the bigger point, losing by 1.5% (popular vote) or 1.7% (tipping point state) would only suggest a defunct party if it happened under unusually favourable circumstances (like Neil Kinnock not quite beating the Tories in 1992 despite a recession and the Poll Tax debacle). That the Democrats came that close despite running a zombie and doing a last-minute switcheroonie for the ultimate Affirmative Action candidate suggests a party that can win if it avoids unforced errors.

Focussing the budget conversation on highly visible wasteful spending (as the late, great PJ O'Rourke called it, "balancing the budget by cutting Helium funds") has become pathognomic for saying you want to make large cuts when you don't actually plan to.

There is waste in the non-defense discretionary budget, because there is waste in everything. There may even be marginally more waste in the non-defense discretionary budget than in the average large private-sector organisation. But the idea that America is 30 trillion dollars in debt because of waste in the non-defense discretionary budget is simply false, and the man who says otherwise is either a moron or a liar.

Medvedev was keeping the seat warm because Putin was constitutionally barred from a third consecutive term, not because he was aging out and his son was too young to take over. Everyone knew that Putin, who was only 56, would be back.

I would call it the Goh Chok Tong strategy after the man who was de jure PM of Singapore from 1990-2004. His political opponents (notably including The Economist newspaper, which was having a pissing contest with the Singapore authorities over censorship at the time) said that the country was actually run by Lee Kuan Yew (nominally retired, but still attending cabinet) and his son Lee Hsien Loon (as deputy prime minister and heir apparent). The joke was that Singapore was run by a Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Goh. Teaching a heretical position on whether the power of the Holy Goh proceeded from the Father alone or the Father filioque was punishable by career-ending cancellation and crippling lawfare.

The difference was that LKY was 67 when he retired the first time, and only 81 when he retired for real and Lee Jr replaced Goh as Prime Minister. Trump will already be 81 when his second term ends.

Since other people are bragging, I also called this one.

The interesting point is what happened at DOGE. Musk didn't have to call out Trump over the budget and may pay a price for doing so, so we can reasonably conclude that he is genuinely worried about spending. But he didn't run DOGE like a man who is genuinely worried about spending - he ran DOGE like a caricature of someone who wants to look like they are cutting spending without actually doing so. (In particular, he never went after the waste/fraud/abuse in Medicare or military procurement.)

My candidate theories:

  • Conspiracy. DOGE was never meant to be about cutting spending - it was always about purging wokists from the civil service and defunding the pro-establishment left NGOsphere.
  • Cock-up. Musk was in effect high on his own supply as a result of spending too much time on MAGA Twitter and had actually convinced himself that the right-idiotarian theory of the budget was correct. He expected to find an order of magnitude more easy cuts (wokestupid, fraud, obvious waste and inefficiency etc.) than he did.
  • Kayfabe. DOGE was meant to produce the impression of big cuts that could provide political cover for the big giveaways in the BBB without actually cutting the big popular programmes,

In the conspiracy and kayfabe theories, Musk is willing to play ball when Trump tells him that he isn't actually going to be cutting spending because his businesses benefit more than most from a friendly government. Ramaswamy doesn't because he is now an asset manager, not a CEO of an operating business.

What is the track record of 'everything Musk does fails' in the grand scheme of things?

The issue is that the relevant reference class is arguably "everything Musk does since he became a druggie". Until Grok, the last thing a Musk company did that didn't suck was the Tesla Model Y launch in 2019, and that was a minor variant on the 3 - the last difficult thing was the Falcon Heavy in 2018. Since they we have seen the Cybertruck (yuck), the 2nd-gen Roadster (not), the Semi (kinda), the 25,000 USD Tesla (just cancelled), FSD (based on non-standard meanings of "full" and "self" and about 5 years behind Waymo), Starship (subject to rapid unscheduled dissassembly), a deeply underwhelming Boring Company, and Twitter ending up bailed out with XAI's VC money. Oh - and DOGE breaking things without actually cutting spending.

So the case for "Musk has lost the secret sauce" is quite strong. The case for "Musk still has it" is being made by people who are already calling Starship and FSD as successes. The case for "Musk has mostly lost it, but is investable anyway" is that one Grok makes up for a lot of flops.

The bull case for Tesla is based on a pivot to a new AI/robotics business that doesn't exist yet. (Even Tesla bulls don't think the core automotive business is worth more than about 5x10^11 USD), so enough people still believe that Musk can do it again to keep buying the shares.

I've lived in cities with emission norms, and even diesels are allowed in as long as they're relatively new. London and Paris might have gone literally zero emission, though I've never had to drive in either so can't confirm, and they'd be an exception.

EVs are exempt from the London Congestion Charge (to be replaced with a 50% discount from next year) and get discounts on residents' parking permits in most boroughs. But there isn't anywhere EVs can go where petrol or diesel cars can't. But the direct subsidies to EVs are lower in Europe than in the US - the big difference is that the running cost advantage of an EV is larger because petrol is more expensive here.

Essentially all minicabs on London streets (including Ubers) are hybrids - a quick check of the stats suggests that EVs are about 20% of the UK new car market and hybrids about 25%. Note that fleet purchases are (unusually by global standards) 60% of the market in the UK - this is part of why Tesla's market share is so low - they don't put much effort into fleet sales.

It is worth noting that the change to the first post is large, and load-bearing. The 25 points began with the union of all Germans, not all German citizens - it was a specific pledge to incorporate Austria, the Czech Sudetenland, the Polish Corridor etc. into the Reich. @AvocadoPanic could have said "All Americans" instead with the implied dog-whistle that Albertans are included, and it would have been closer to the original and still relevant to MAGA policy.

SSCReader said it was 56%?

My source is the CNN exit poll as reported on Wikipedia. I'm happy to defer to someone with a better data source.

The Catalist report has a reputation for being more accurate than exit polls, but the free online version doesn't include the sex/age crosstabs. Matt Yglesias did a Substack post based on what is presumably the paid version of the report and says that the big picture was a mostly-uniform swing apart from the big swing to Trump among Hispanics and (to a lesser extent) Asians.

That's fine. I just have issues with calling that "greater problems attracting young people".

I don't think we disagree here.

I can't advocate anyone legally able to CCW to go to a Gaza-focused protest without CCW.

I can't advocate anyone able to avoid it going to a Gaza-focused protest at all. "Don't go near political protests" is standard travel advice offered by every country about every country for good reasons - and essentially nobody in the West has a stake in Gaza that makes it worth protesting about.

Isn't this completely false? Last I've seen they had trouble attracting young women, with young men flocking to the in droves.

"Droves" is an exaggeration - Trump won 18-29 men 49-48 per the 2024 exit poll, which is about the same margin he won the electorate as a whole by. He does better with the middle-aged than the young among white men and women, though not among ethnic minorities. The gender gap is only marginally higher for the young than the middle-aged and only marginally higher in 2024 than 2020 - the massive youth gender gap reported e.g. here didn't show up at the ballot box. What did happen is that Trump lost the youth vote (of both sexes) less badly than the Republicans normally do in a close election.

The place where right populism really is an old man's game is the UK. Reform's vote is younger than the Conservatives, but not by much.

My read is that the MAGA is in the middle of the pack in terms of right-populist movements ability to appeal to young men. Looking at the exit polls for the 1st round of the Polish presidential election, the total right-populist vote (PiS+Confederation+Crown) is flat by age but the young voted for the kekkier right-populist parties whereas the old voted for the more traditionalist PiS. The 2024 French legislative elections showed the Left winning the youth, RN winning the middle-aged, and Macron's party winning the old. The same picture applies to the 2025 German elections.

The reason detached single-family units are important is because they deliver the ability to personally develop. With a condo you're not actually doing anything; you're not doing maintenance on your mechanical devices (unless you're fortunate enough to have a garage or driveway, of course), you're not really able to store anything, you can't do anything loud (no instruments, etc.), it's more difficult to entertain people, etc. The same thing applies to townhouses to a lesser degree.

This led me down an interesting rabbit hole - I am aware of the importance of the myth of the garage startup in Silicon Valley, but also that the main lines of mentor-mentee and exited founder-investor-founder genealogy run back to Fairchild Semiconductor via companies that were not founded in garages or, mostly, by garage tinkerers. A quick fact-check finds Wozniak denying that Apple was actually founded in the garage (the tinkering that led to the Apple I happened inside the house - it sounds like the garage was just used to store inventory), that pictures of Jeff Bezos founding Amazon in his garage show a room that had not been used to store motor vehicles for a very long time, and that the Google garage was commercially rented space which happened to be a converted garage. It looks like the last significant tech company founded in a space which was primarily designed to store motor vehicles was HP in 1939. Nvidia is often referred to as founded in a garage, but it was actually founded in a spare room in Curtis Priem's townhouse.

In other words, the point of the Silicon Valley garage isn't the idea of the garage as marginal space - it is that it was normal for middle-class Americans to have more square footage than they actually needed, giving space to work in. A spare room, something it is perfectly possible to have in a townhouse, or even in a condo if you live like middle-class Continental Europeans or super-rich New Yorkers do, works better as a home office/workshop than an unconverted garage. And the surplus of square footage is something that you don't get by insisting on sprawl zoning in a place as rich as Silicon Valley - nobody thinks that the next generation of Silicon Valley founders can afford SFHs with garages in the Valley, and it is notable that the only reason that the Apple founders had access to the garage in the first place was because Job's parents had bought the house it was attached to before Silicon Valley became Silicon Valley.

The even more important point is absence (or, in the case of California, lax enforcement) of laws against running businesses out of private homes. The canonical place to found a 21st century startup is a Stanford dorm room. Under UK charity law, that is illegal in a Cambridge College room.

Exactly. The inner-ring suburbs of western European cities that were affluent c.1900 (mostly western ones - Holland Park, St John's Wood, Neuilly-sur-Seine etc.) never stopped being. My impression is that the same is true of most ex-NYC commuter towns.

This pattern implies that the problem is the broader problem that makes US cities other than NYC unable to police themselves, and Americans resort to ways of living that don't need policing.

More safety procedures

Although we are well past the point of diminishing returns (except, possibly, on the roads), this was the opposite of bullshit during the time period you mention. Workplace deaths dropped by an order of magnitude between 1900 and 1970 and another order of magnitude between 1970 and the present.

Getting as much work done in the same number of hours, but with fewer dead workers, is a real improvement.

The liberal otoh detests aella’s education (“abuse”), yet finds she ended up fine (”sexually liberated”) .

Nobody on either side of the aisle wants their daughter to grow up to be a whore, even an expensive one. The School of Hard Knocks needs no policy waivers to award Aella's parents an F for parenting.

Something is just off in the first world

It happened very fast too. There have always been minorities who are loudly disgruntled with good reasons (particularly older people in declining regions), but in the noughties and even the early teens the dominant outlook was Thatcher/Blair/Reagan/Clinton style optimism. By 2019 (even pre-pandemic) if you weren't some kind of doomer you stuck out like a sore thumb as either an out-of-touch establishment tool or a Silicon Valley investor talking their book.

In the UK, you can date the change to somewhere between the 2012 Olympics and the 2016 Brexit referendum. The US isn't very different.

Given the timing and speed of the shift, I am inclined to blame algorithmically-curated social media.

This sounds like the hillbilly Oresteia.

And, more significantly, Joe Biden was implementing the surrender agreement signed by Donald Trump in Doha in 2020.

The Deep State thought they could prevail upon Sleepy Joe to rat out of the deal, but I don't think they had any plans to win the war if they had done so. I don't know how much of the badly botched pull-out was Biden administration incompetence and how much was Deep State sabotage.