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MadMonzer

If you're talking to me, my preferred pronouns are you/your

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joined 2022 September 06 23:45:01 UTC

				

User ID: 896

MadMonzer

If you're talking to me, my preferred pronouns are you/your

4 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 06 23:45:01 UTC

					

No bio...


					

User ID: 896

I completely agree, for me that book diminished the characters of both Bean and especially Ender, gutted the emotional impact of Ender's journey, and twisted the entire narrative of Ender's Game into a lame-assed Xanatos-style manipulation by proxy. Weak.

Doesn't Ender think that the plot of Ender's Game constitutes him being the victim of lame-assed Xanatos-style manipulation by proxy? The setup for the Speaker/Xenocide/Children trilogy is Ender's struggle to atone for/undo the xenocide he was the unwitting tool of.

Artillery is responsible for ~70-80% of casualties in the current war for Ukraine, to give you an idea of its importance.

True in terms of running totals since the beginning of the war, but as of now both sides are claiming 50%+ of casualties going forward are from drones.

The impetus behind the Holocaust remembrance industry comes from American Jews. So I would expect Holocaust remembrance memes like the soap to be more prevalent in the US than they are in the places where it all actually happened.

Carbon Monoxide vans were used to gas disabled people before the Holocaust proper got going. They were indeed an inefficient method of execution, but they were quiet and the Nazis cared about discretion. (There is a reason why there were no death camps in pre-war German territory).

Department budgets are like this entrenched Gordian knot and without a strong disruptor I don't see how they can be moderated.

Non-defence discretionary spending is the easiest part of the budget to cut, grows slower than the economy over the medium term, and has been successfully cut several times, most recently the Obama-era sequestration.

You don't need DOGE to cut the discretionary budget - you need DOGE to make sure you still have a functional government after you cut the discretionary budget. And the so-called DOGE being led by Elon Musk as a private citizen with the ear of the President is noticeably not doing that. And if you are serious about cutting waste, fraud and abuse, you start with military procurement and Medicare - not with Politico Pro subscriptions and Bloomberg terminals.

I assume Senator Rick Scott will take the lead in fighting Medicare fraud - he has considerable experience of the area, having bilked Medicare for $2 billion as CEO of Columbia/HCA. The leading healthcare expert in Trump's OMB, Don Dempsey, has similarly relevant expertise, having been the head lobbyist for the Medicare Advantage providers who are the worst leeches in the system.

The Mafia tick the "Christian" box on the census, but most accounts of the initiation ceremony where you become a "made man" say that it is explicitly blasphemous. So the Mafia being fake Christians is a much easier case than some of the others in this list.

Crimea is lost if Ukraine controls the land access via Kherson and Melitopol and enough of the coast to be able to shell the Azov bridge. That is definitely achievable through a local rout or successful encirclement maneuver that leaves the Russian army in Russia proper and in the Donbass intact. I don't know if Putin survives that outcome.

Taylor "did not come out the winner" foremost because the Holocaust Narrative, which also essentially began in the 1960s, provided a strong motive and moral impetus for rejecting any sort of Revisionist treatment of WWII. The Holocaust narrative is the reason WWII Revisionism has been delayed for so long.

The Holocaust narrative was not dominant in the UK in the 1960's (as I have pointed out elsewhere on the Motte, it couldn't dominate in the countries that suffered most from WW2 until the survivors of Hitler's main crime - namely aggressive war - were no longer with us) and didn't figure in the debates over Origins. Google books gives the following word counts from the original edition of the book:

  • Jews: 4
  • Auschwitz: 0
  • Holocaust: 0
  • Gas: 5 (2 of which relate to Mussolini's use of chemical weapons in Abyssinia)

Compared to the discussion of geopolitical themes not relevant to the Holocaust

  • Hossbach: 15
  • Versailles: 56

This is, of course, exactly what you would expect in a book about the origins of WW2, given that the Holocaust was planned and carried out well after the war started.

The debate which Taylor did not come out the winner of was a debate among professional historians about questions amenable to the usual techniques of historical research - most notably "What was the status of the so-called Hossbach memorandum presented to the Nuremberg Tribunal as evidence of a long-term Nazi plan for conquest in Eastern Europe?" AJP Taylor throws a lot of shade at the authenticity of the memorandum, which if definitive would directly refute his argument, but modern researchers with access to archives that were secret in 1961 have been able to validate it. (As with the Downing Street Memo in the lead-up to Iraq, you can still argue about just how definitive the draft minute of a high-level meeting prepared by a relatively junior note-taker actually is)

The point I am trying to make here is that "revisionist" accounts about WW2 and Hitler's political/military strategy have never been suppressed in the way that "revisionist" accounts of Nazi racial policy and the Holocaust are. The evidence for the proposition "WW2 happened because Hitler was a madman bent on world domination by military aggression" and both sides of the debate on it are out in the open, and I can be reasonably confident of the establishment position for roughly the same reasons that I am reasonably confident of the establishment position on the half-life of Pu-239 or the year the dinosaurs died out.

The military history community, of course, doesn't even consider Nazi-sympathetic views revisionist - it prides itself on being able to separate the concepts of "competent/incompetent general" from "fought on the good/evil side". "Rommel was a world-historically great general", "The Wehrmacht was the best military in WW2 and only lost due to weight of numbers", and "Hitler was an effective strategist whose only mistake was overambition" are all just one side of a debate. There is a reason why military history of WW2 is a gateway drug to the higher-IQ forms of Holocaust denialism and such-like. (See David Irving)

The wider Holocaust exhibition at the Struthof concentration camp in Alsace (which, unlike the rest of France was actually annexed by the Reich in WW2) didn't mention soap when I visited c. 1993 - and it had a detailed breakdown of the financial value of a dead Holocaust victim based on actual camp accounts (I didn't cross-check the signs against the original documents in the glass case, but anyone bilingual in French and German could have done).

The various Holocaust museums in Berlin didn't mention soap when I was there c. 2015.

I suspect this is a US/Europe thing.

It was claimed 4 million were killed in Auschwitz until the 1990s

This is mildly silly, in that the claimed total (based on the demographic impact of the Holocaust) was and is 6 million, and there were multiple camps, so the numbers wouldn't add up if Auschwitz was 4 million.

I can confirm that the number in the schoolbooks before the 1990's revision was 1.5-2 million because I learned history from the old books. (Technically the numbers are for the whole Auschwitz-Birkenau complex, including people worked to death in the work camps as well as people gassed deliberately in the extermination camps).

This article on the official Auschwitz museum website implies that the 4 million was always a blatant Soviet lie, the first serious estimate was about 1.5 million when western historians got access to the archives in the early 1980's, and revised further to 1.1 million based on better research done by the museum staff. As far as I can see the issue is that record-keeping was much worse at the outlying camps than at the main Auschwitz and Birkenau camps, so people kept using the Soviet numbers for longer for want of a better alternative.

"Nazis and Soviets are roughly equally bad, and the only reason why we were allied with the Soviets is that Hitler was stupid enough to declare war on both of us at the same time" isn't a particularly revisionist take - it was what Churchill thought at the time. "And if Hitler had invaded Hell, I would have made similarly favourable remarks in the House about the Devil."

"Was it right choice for High Elves to join fight between Orcs and Ogres, and if so, on whose side?

The Americans didn't get a choice - Germany was already at war with the USSR when their ally attacked Pearl Harbour and they declared war on the US. The British were fully prepared to oppose both (the USSR and Nazi Germany were allies under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact at the time we declared war) but lacked the resources to do so after our French ally collapsed.

As far as I can see, everyone is a bit of a heel on Twitter except for a small number of people who I know personally, and whose tweets are so suppressed that I can't even rely on finding them in the "Followers" view. The algorithm wants to show you some combination of professional controversialists and people who pump out lowest-common-denominator slop for their preferred tribe of morons.

AJP Taylor, who was basically the official Court historian to the British liberal elite at the time (he was commissioned to make numerous BBC documentaries and wrote the 1914-1945 volume of the “official” Oxford University history of England) wrote a revisionist account of the origins of World War II in 1961. There was a vigorous debate at the time, and Taylor did not come out the winner.

WW2 revisionism has been moving down the intellectual food chain ever since.

Of course, we are only talking about revisionism re. The Axis here. The big revision of WW2 history concerns the Allies, and in particular the idea that they were somehow motivated by a desire to stop the Holocaust.

In the case of the US (and, I suspect, most other NATO countries) it is the usual disruptive technology threatening incumbents problem. The culture that is the USAF sees it as a jobs program for fast jet pilots. Hence drones replacing fast jets is existential to the USAF.

My understanding was that Russia was getting their drones from China.

My suspicion is that Ukraine now has the third-largest military drone industry in the world (after China and Turkey). But the main thing that Europe loses if we surrender Ukraine and end up confronting Russia later is a large, competent, battle-hardened army.

The whole point of my argument is that very visibly phasing out free support for Ukraine (while continuing to offer paid-for support) unambiguously forces the decision, under circumstances where Europe has more to lose than the US if support for Ukraine ceases. If the US was following my approach and Europe didn't pay up*, then US support for Ukraine would cease at the end of the phase-out period and Europe would be faced with the even more visible choice between ponying up and watching Ukraine lose.

* Note that Europe has, in fact, been paying about 60% of the financial cost of supporting Ukraine, although this is arguably less than our "fair share" given that it is our backyard and not yours.

Now the US has forced Europe to put up or shut up, the bond market thinks that Germany is going to borrow a lot of money to pay for rearmament, and the usual suspects on the British left are freaking out about Rachael Reeves looking for welfare cuts to pay for rearmament. So Europe acting collectively to defend Ukraine is likely - but in our timeline it is going to be implicitly anti-American in a way which could have been avoided by smarter US policy.

The Taliban's US-backed opponents were also accused of drug trafficking, rather more credibly.

Consider that David Cameron agreed to a referendum on Brexit he did not want because of the internal politics of his party. He was reliant on the euro-sceptic wing and so was forced into calling for a referendum he explicitly campaigned against.

This is probably incorrect - at the time Cameron agreed to the referendum there weren't enough Brexit-supporting Tory MPs to force the issue, and the grassroots have very little ability to change the direction of the Conservative Party other than by selecting the candidate for an open seat. The conventional wisdom in UK politics is that Cameron promised the referendum to stop the Conservatives leaching votes to UKIP and losing seats to Labour as a result. If so it didn't work (UKIP did well in the 2015 general election) and wasn't needed (UKIP's performance didn't cost the Conservatives many seats - in fact they won a surprise majority). Dominic Cummings claims that this was obvious if you actually spoke to UKIP-curious voters and that promising the referendum was an unforced error.

Does it take a complete cynic to think Newsom didn't come to this position honestly, as opposed to sticking his finger in the wind?

Absent evidence to the contrary, I would assume that someone with no personal stake in the issue and enough of a brain to be an effective California machine politician came to the position "Men should not compete in women's sports" because it is obviously correct, and the position "Men who self-identify as women should compete in women's sports" as a cynical attempt to appeal to a locally powerful activist group.

I assume this regardless of which order they assume the two positions in.

Little green men are just Russian troops out of uniform. That isn't soft power, it's hard power deployed perfidiously.

I agree that Russian social media troll ops look like Voice of America in reverse if you don't start with "democracy good" biases.

If I'm advising a hypothetical DeSantis administration (i.e. accepting the basic premises of MAGA foreign policy thought, but ignoring Trump's personal beefs with Zelenskyy and apparent mancrush on Putin) then my strategic analysis is along the lines of:

  • Ukraine is in Europe.
  • The aims of US policy in Europe are (1) to encourage the Europeans to pay more of the cost of defending Europe [unspoken - from Russia] and (2) to prevent Europe (and the EU in particular) from developing the ability to act in a coordinated way contrary to US interests. This is hard because these aims are almost but not quite contradictory.
  • In particular, Taiwan (and containing China more broadly) is worth more to the US than Ukraine (and containing Russia more broadly), but this matters less than you think because a land war going on right now and a possible naval war in the future draw on different weapon stockpiles with different supply chains.
  • The so-called "rules based international order" is valuable to America, most importantly because it discourages nuclear proliferation. A world where Putin gets what he wants because he is a nuclear madman and DeSantis isn't is a world where a lot of countries are going to build nukes, and a few are going to act like nuclear madmen.
  • Russia's goal is to subjugate Ukraine (probably by installing a pro-Russian puppet government similar to Lukashenko in Belarus). Putin has been explicit about this. "Neutrality" is a furphy - a "neutral" Ukraine would not be able to avoid subjugation without some kind of western security guarantee which Russia would consider a violation of neutrality. In the failed Istanbul negotiations, Russia was far more concerned about "neutrality" than territory, and their idea of neutrality incorporated an explicit treaty commitment by the USA, the UK, and France not to intervene if Russia attacked Ukraine again. Note that from a European perspective, a "neutral" Ukraine is also one that wouldn't be able to prevent Russia crossing its territory in order to attack other European countries.
  • The key known unknown is Putin's intentions after subjugating Ukraine. The Mearsheimer view is that Russia wants to incorporate Ukraine into their sphere of influence, that this is reasonable because Ukraine is a natural part of the Russian sphere of influence, and that once Russia controls its natural sphere of influence Russia will not, for realist reasons, want to engage in continued aggression. The Putler view is that Russia is engaging in what lefties call "imperialism", Paradox players call "blobbing", and academics with sticks up their asses call something like "opportunistic expansionism". 200 years of Russian policy suggest that Russia sees its natural sphere of influence extending at least as far as the Vistula, and public statements by Putin administration officials are consistent with this, as is Russia's campaign of cyberattacks, election interference, WMD terrorism etc.
  • If the Putler view is correct, then failing to defend Ukraine is a mistake. It is a survivable mistake for the US, but a catastrophic one for Europe. (To paraphrase Churchill, if we appease Putler in Ukraine then the US will get dishonour, but the EU will get war).
  • Apart from Putin's intentions, there are no important secrets here. The Russians, Ukrainians, Europeans, Chinese etc. all know the same things we do. In particular, the Europeans know that Ukraine is near-existential if the Putler view is correct.
  • A strategic deal with Russia is not worth it if it means throwing Europe under the bus, because Europe is an order of magnitude more valuable as a trade partner and as an ally against China.

And the resulting policy recommendation is:

  • In the early days of the war, support for Ukraine is cheap and there is an outside chance of solving the Russia problem (if Russia either cuts and runs or offers a reasonable deal once it becomes clear that they can't win quickly). The Biden policy of providing cheap help like intel, and older weapons which were going to be replaced in the next 5-10 years anyway was a good one.
  • Once it becomes clear that this is a long war, and that support for Ukraine is going to start coming out of the budget rather than existing idle resources, the goal is to maintain a leading role while dumping the economic cost on Europe. So say, first quietly and then loudly, that the US is happy to continue helping Ukraine, but after some reasonable period of time (3-6 months) they are not going to do so for free. Then follow through - based on the above analysis the Europeans will grumble, but pay up. The US should chip in enough to retain a seat at the table - say 10-20% of the cost.
  • Engage in some performative show of strength in the Pacific to make clear that this is a pivot and not a bugout.
  • Support the European-funded response. Sell anything the US can produce that Ukraine wants on normal commercial terms. Encourage US arms manufacturers to prioritise orders bound for Ukraine (which is at war) over orders for the US (which is not). Share intel if you already have it or can acquire it cheaply. If Musk refuses to provide Starlink service to the AFU on normal commercial terms, then he doesn't get US government contracts.
  • Support the economic war against Russia, particularly in ways which directly promote US interests. (An energy-rich America is an economic competitor to Russia). Drill, baby, drill. Tank the oil price. Build out LNG export capacity. Name and shame the German businessmen who are trading with Russia via Kyrgyzstan.
  • Points about public diplomacy which shouldn't need saying but apparently do - don't lie for the benefit of a domestic audience, because everyone can see you lying. Don't take sadistic pleasure in selling out Ukraine, because it strongly suggests you would sell out Taiwan as well. Don't endorse Russophile right-populist parties in western Europe. Talk like you are leading a coalition, stamp US flags on US-made weapons the Germans are paying for, etc. etc. - the whole point is to gain the benefits of leading the free world while shirking the cost.
  • What is the win condition? We were seeing it in January/February this year. The combination of the cumulative impact of sanctions, the increasingly effective Ukrainian drone war, and the lame-duck Biden administration's decision to allow Ukraine to use western weapons to attack targets on Russian territory means that Russian logistics are falling apart. (The west, on the other hand, has near-infinite logistical capacity). If Russia doesn't come to terms while they can still supply the army in Ukraine, then the army is destroyed and they lose everything including Crimea - so they probably will.
  • If Putin does come to terms, offer face-saving concessions (Ukraine in the EU but not NATO, possibly international recognition of Russian rule in Crimea if they still control it) but not substantive ones.

Trudeau being bought by the Red Chinese is plausible but unlikely. Cartels infiltrating the Mexican government would be less surprising than Pope Francis coming out as a Catholic.

But you are sanewashing Navarro here. What he said is that Trudeau had been bought by the Mexican drug cartels. I would eat my hat if that turned out to be true.

Did Barrett "slide left" or was she always a centrist who Trump picked because she was a woman who was sound on abortion?

I don't know the answer - her Wikipedia article implies that her legal scholarship was strikes-and-balls formalist.

Sierra Leone is less genetically homogenous than other similar-sized African countries because it is where the British released the slaves seized by the West Africa Squadron. This points against a genetic basis.