@Shrike's banner p

Shrike


				

				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users  
joined 2023 December 20 23:39:44 UTC

				

User ID: 2807

Shrike


				
				
				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2023 December 20 23:39:44 UTC

					

No bio...


					

User ID: 2807

And Morlock's not even a crusader-PFP-tradcatholicism-is-my-identity type, from what I can tell. N=vibes but I get the sense that some form of integralism is pretty popular in those corners despite being (at least in the more hardcore varieties) contrary to church teaching and potentially even doctrine in 2026.

I don't think theological liberalisation or even a loss of faith among Protestants necessarily entails a decay into centralised power.

No, you're mistaking me: I am saying Mainline Protestants had a lot of power in America for a long time, but theological liberalization split them and the (conservative) splitters by default didn't have institutional control. Here, this comment explains more of what I am getting at.

if anything, I'd say libertarianism is the more fundamental ideology that was hallucinated into existence as a way of dealing with religious fracture.

Libertarianism is famously hard to define but the traits that are shared by libertarian-leaning Americans predate the fundamentalist-mainline split.

I wouldn't say things like homesteading, having solar panels, raising cattle, hosting your own git server, self-custody of your Bitcoin, etc., have any particular rooting in Protestant theology itself

WELL THIS IS AN INTERESTING QUESTION and what I would say is that the theology and culture are all caught up together. To grossly simplify things, there's a good argument to be had that the libertarian tendency in the United States is in no small part downstream of the British Isles and specifically the borderers. Now, Christianity in the Isles were always distinct from the mainland. Check in on the Scottish clergy and you'll find them doing things like "illegally seating an excommunicated guy as king." It's not particularly surprising that if you check in on them a bit later you find that their theology is, if not "libertarian," skeptical of tyranny and ("papish") centralized authority. I think the culture and theology accelerated each other; necessity is the mother of invention and all that.

As for whether theological liberalism resulted in a loss of power, I mean, kind of? But the Jews who are actually in power are not the sort who take the Torah particularly seriously.

  1. I didn't say anything about the Jews, I am only talking about Protestant Christians
  2. I am not arguing that theological liberalism inherently leads to a loss of power. I am saying it split Christianity in the States.

And the Catholics in power today... well, as has been questioned on this very forum: "Is the pope Catholic?"

Power is downstream of institution-building. I have had an unusually high amount of exposure to institutions of both Protestant and Catholic origin and I have every respect for Catholic institution building. They are very smart, very serious, and their approach to the world helps them avoid some pitfalls that Protestants often fall into, in my opinion. Protestants are extremely likely to want their organizations to be a fully confessional community, which has serious advantages but cuts Protestant entities off from the talent of other faith groups. This is easiest to see in their universities: Catholic institutions are typically quite happy to hire talented professors and staff of all or no faith, while conservative Protestant schools often restrict staff to those who share their faith. This has real benefits but narrows their talent pool, sometimes fairly dramatically.

I mean, do they? Are the Twitter Tradcath Brigade staunch religious liberty advocates and fans of Dignitatis humanae?

"BEHOLD the power of my FULLY ARMED and OPERATIONAL Fulcrum!"

Yes, I think conservative Protestants were likely under pressure from three different directions

  1. that they were getting outflanked in the institutions
  2. the institutions were genuinely doing stuff that was inimical to their culture and beliefs and in some cases also really bad
  3. there's long been an anti-institutional conservative-libertarian-borderer-frontiersman cultural streak in the United States that many Protestants were also a part of

For all of these reasons, chunking the ring into Mount Doom instead of trying to continue to wield it began to look increasingly attractive. I think the degree to which Protestants actually bailed out of institutional competitiveness is likely overstated, but I wouldn't say it's not real.

Protestants have no will to power in the sense of large state or quasi-state institutions

I think that this is downstream of the grievous damage that Mainstream Protestantism did to itself and the United States when it started dabbling in theological liberalism. Since mainstream Protestants controlled the institutions, their liberalization kicked off a withdrawal by theologically conservative Protestants. The conservatives ended up with the numbers and zeal, but didn't inherit the institutional capacity (although they have been working to build it back up).

To American Protestants, the dream is to be self-sovereign and free not merely from control by the centralised state, but free even from dependency on it in the first place

I am pretty libertarian and so sympathetic to this desire, so I'd interrogate to what degree this is actually a problem. But I definitely don't think it's inherent to Protestantism (and fwiw you see much less of this sort of thinking, from what I can tell, among the Reformed Protestants).

The Protestant case would be that the Catholic investiture of absolute interpretive and governing authority in the institutional body of the church is a kind of idolatry.

And this is a newer position of the Catholic church, too. St. Augustine very specifically says that the church councils can err (contrasting their fallibility with that of Scripture); even the Catholic church admits that the pope's authority was not something that was universally acknowledged or understood in the early church, but rather "gradually interpreted as a prerogative that was his because he was successor of Peter, the first of the apostles" and papal infallibility was only defined dogmatically in 1870 or so.

I've never understood this specific type of Catholic triumphalism. Not only did the Catholic church pretty much entirely fail to conserve early Christian culture, or the universal church (where Western insistence on changing the Nicene Creed drove a split with the East), or pre-Reformation Catholic culture, or European monarchy (and attempts were made!) it also fails to convey its own teachings to its own members. The supposed authority of the Church yields a Catholic lay culture that is poorly catechized and where the overwhelming majority of weekly churchgoers oppose the church's own teachings. This might be a tolerable situation if the church was trading off quality for quantity, but (at least in the US) the opposite is happening: Catholicism is shrinking.

I highly recommend reading Barna or other pollsters on these sorts of things. The first thing that you realize when you start to look at the numbers is that Christians really need to be better catechized. The second thing you realize is that the denominations that, stereotypically, don't know what the word "catechism" means are doing a better job at it than Catholics (somehow).

What is she doing here?

I think it's a bit more complicated than this, at least for Founding-era Americans: plenty of people didn't like Catholics and public schools at the time in most places (where they had been established) were probably going to give you generic Protestantism as a baseline, but at the federal level there was pretty clearly an interest in making sure Catholics (which were a substantial minority - recall Maryland was set up as a Catholic refugee colony) were able to serve in federal office and were not persecuted by the federal government.

The New Testament condemns sexual activity outside of marriage, mistreating slaves, and deviant sexual practices. It doesn't say something like "sex slaves are banned" because the things it explicitly enjoins rules out sex slavery. (True, I suppose a first century Christian could buy a sex slave and...treat them in a chaste and kind manner, but at that point I'd say they were a former sex slave.)

It's as if I said "I think using force to harm other people outside of the due process of law is wrong" and you said "you'll notice that Shrike never condemns murder."

The fact that we're having to go over the basic sexual ethics of the largest religion on earth instead of arguing about anything Marx said is frankly a better refutation of your argument than anything I've said here. (Although I will say that it's making me want to suggest the Didache should be on a school reading list rather than anything that's technically from Scripture.)

Furthermore, there's nothing in the bible about not having sex slaves, not buying sex slaves! [...] That's just in the New Testament.

The New Testament is a pretty important part of the Bible, yes.

it doesn't teach you about what actually happens, about real behaviour in the West.

The values most people act on, including woke people, Marxists, and a/antitheists, are downstream of Christianity and the Bible. If you came back to the West after being gone for a few millennia, the questions you would ask (besides "what's a cell phone?" and "does anyone have a Latin-English translator?") would be things like "wait, why can't I buy a sex slave at Wal-mart?"

And the answer to that has nothing to do with cell phones.

That is not happening today! Nobody is waging war for Christianity in a Western country.

It's 2026, the weapons of war are a laptop and a Westlaw subscription.

Quantity is its own quality, as is known.

This I do agree with.

turned out trivial today

You're more confident in this than I am, which is interesting.

I am not sure the US has even retained its peak capabilities in mine-sweeping, but we'll see.

The US put ships through despite recent reports of mines being deployed, which tells you something. How much, I am not sure.

Are you for real. Their aircraft from 1986 is destroyed.

My sentence is expressing the fact that their ability to destroy ships with aircraft in the strait the year 2026 is not qualitatively different from their ability to destroy ships with aircraft in the strait the year 1986. It has nothing to do with whether their aircraft from '86 are still surviving or not. In a Strait scenario, a Shahed is not really qualitatively superior at destroying ships than the smart weapons technology Iran had purchased from the US during the Cold War, including strike fighters with precision-guided weapons and radar-guided anti-ship missiles.

The main advantage, I think, is quantitative: they have a lot of Shaheds, which are cheap and simple to operate.

Or do you think there was an expectation that as soon as the US fails to topple Iran by killing some dudes, we'll enter this morass with strait blockade?

While I think the exact degree to which they would be able to achieve this against US defenses was murky pre-war, I definitely do not think that US defense planners did not anticipate the possibility or fail to correctly assess that Iran had the ability to threaten strait traffic. The US government gambling that Iran wouldn't rather than that Iran couldn't seems much more likely to me.

(And again, Iran's actual capability to "close the strait" has been demonstrated to be marginal, so if the US Navy warplanners assessed that they would be able to clear the strait and escort ships through in the face of Iranian defenses, they were probably correct for a certain degree of risk - it would not surprise me if the Pentagon got the capability assessment of Iran more or less right but fumbled or failed to consider as outside of their area of competency the question of what degree of risk would be acceptable to the civilian market.)

I highly recommend reading up on some of the US Navy's problems with Iranian and Iraqi mines in the area to get an idea of the background and mindset the US military would be going into this with. The Iraqis laid a big minefield in the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War and successfully hit a cruiser and an amphibious assault ship (basically, a pocket carrier). Those are essentially next-bests if you can't actually hit a real aircraft carrier.

On a quick Google, initial mineclearing operations in the Persian Gulf took nearly two months to clear lanes for shipping and mopping up took the better part of a year after the war concluded. So that gives you an idea of "how long will it take to clear the strait of mines" baseline the Pentagon would be operating from (although I suspect they have fancier tech now).

Their control right now is qualitatively different, they can flexibly threaten ships, do it on and off, and importantly even while the USN is around and the country is getting bombed.

Iran's ability to use aircraft to attack ships in 2026 is not qualitatively different from their ability to use aircraft to attack ships in 1986. If anything it is quantitatively different.

From your own link

(The point of this link was to reference the fact that Iran has been kicking around the idea of tolling the strait for years).

And I agree with Smith that they didn't know it would, and indeed thought it wouldn't.

Why would you think this? The fact that Iran could substantially disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been known and discussed and acknowledged publicly for decades.

Are any of those media Christian beyond that?

Although the Project Hail Mary title is a play on words, the movie itself takes the time for a pretty on the nose and fairly-needless-to-the-plot discussion about belief in God, which I would say is far from a shallow reference.

Mainstream Hollywood films with a fairly overtly Christian message aren't actually all that rare (see Unbroken, Silence, Hacksaw Ridge, etc.) and for every one of those there are two that take Christian ideas seriously, even if it's in more subtle ways. I was recently watching the Fallout show and one of the characters reaches for the Golden Rule, not as part of a come-to-Jesus sideplot, but because it's an important moral principle - obviously not one unique to Christianity, of course.

Which of course is far from unique to Marx!

I tend to agree with Noah Smith of all people that "Before the war, Iran didn’t control the strait, simply because it didn’t realize it could. Drone technology had advanced to the point where Iran was able to shut down Hormuz, but Iran didn’t know that until the U.S. attack forced it to try the risky and desperate move of actually shutting down the strait."

Well, Noah Smith (at least judging by this paragraph) is wrong to frankly an almost unbelievable degree. Iran has been aware that they could threaten to close the strait since the 1980s (at least), because you don't need drones to do that when you have mines. There was a major flare up where they specifically threatened to do so during the Obama administration. And they have been kicking the idea around of tolling the strait seriously since 2019 (at least).

That the US saw it fit to sign on to this shows that the US is really weary of the war and willing to end it on net unfavorable terms.

I think if the US was really desperate to end the war we wouldn't keep striking Iran.

Marx is more relevant than the Bible to Western thought today

In terms of "books to read to understand modern culture" Marx is less relevant than Harry Potter.

The Bible is still far and away the most important single book you can read to understand modern culture (including Marxism/socialism, which is a post-Christian ideology).

I don't dodge it, I just deem it to be a cope.

I would agree that it's a cope to point to it as a success if the other elements of the settlement end up poorly for the US, but if the US had said "our only goal is to sink the Iranian navy," the operation would be a success goals-wise (not necessarily a strategic victory in the big scheme of things, since succeeding at dumb goals can be bad). So if that was a goal, it ought to be counted.

It's a cheap way to pad the metrics by announcing a thing you're confident about as the goal.

And omitting it is a cheap way to overstate your case and obscure the actual outcomes of the war, the same as when pro-Trump people omit the damage done to US bases by Iranian ballistic missiles.

Iranian objectives, on the contrary, were to survive, preserve the status quo, and hopefully improve on it by getting sanctions relief.

Wouldn't you say that Iran also intended (and quite plausibly still hopes) to establish a strait toll regime as a war goal? I would agree with you if you said that it was a stretch goal or seemed like part of a motte-and-bailey play, but don't you think that was also on their bucket list as a war objective?

Agreed that this is very premature given previous fake-out "deals".

On this we agree.

allows me to say that Iran won.

This is where I disagree. I actually think it's too soon to rule out a Venezuela-like ending to this thing, for Iran. Not that I would bet on it, necessarily. I think both countries are basically going to try to get as much as they can out of the post-MOU bargaining and possibly they are both betting that the other guy will blink on some things they really want.

If, say, negotiations break down and the US resumes high-intensity strikes, that'll be a separate arc. I'm not saying Iran won forever.

And maybe this is why I disagree: from my point of view, the MOU is a temporary ceasefire instrument to be replaced by something more permanent or (as Trump and I think also Iran) have warned, a return to war.

I am noticing how, when you make your list of Trump's different objectives, you dodge away from the actual text from Trump that I provided as a reference point to an incomplete ("various explanations...including") Wikipedia summary so that you don't have to concede that the United States dealt a severe blow to Iran's ability to project naval power, an objective that was reiterated by Hegseth on March 2 in case you just thought it was a one-off.

But most of your evidence for a resounding Iranian victory is the same evidence there is for a resounding American victory: namely, extrapolation from the MOU (that may not hold) onto a final state that has not been achieved yet and could resolve in a way that is relatively favorable for either Iran or the United States. I think your argument is passable enough: it seems very plausible to me that Trump got in deeper than he anticipated and was looking for any out that let him save face and was willing to settle for something he could have mostly gotten via conventional negotiations. But it also seems plausible to me that the US will be able to notch some Ws in the post-MOU negotiations on top of the degradation of Iranian military they have achieved. It also seems quite plausible to me that negotiations will break down and we'll see the resumption of military strikes in earnest.

As I said previously, "[i]t's possible that the war will end in a way that makes it easy to determine the winner, but it also seems plausible to me that the war will end with both sides claiming victory and the real measure of that victory will be measured in subsequent behavior over years or decades."

We're in the "both sides claiming victory" stage now and I think saying anything "clear" at this stage is premature.

I haven't read the relevant books but I get the distinct impression that Tolkien definitely took the time to hammer out a lot of the PERSIA stuff, too.

Trump himself has said, when justifying the peace deal

Are the things Trump claims when he is justifying his actions trustworthy or not?

We can get pedantic about what exactly "closed" means

That's...why I'm here.

I don't think that really matters in assessing the success of "America" or "Trump & Hegseth" as strategic actors.

The context of the conversation had to do with achieving war aims which is a separate-but-related question, since achieving war aims can actually be really bad if your war aims are strategically stupid. The ability to achieve war aims is a question of military capability, and whether or not military capability is exercised successfully is a different question from whether or not it is being exercised wisely.

So: there's a difference between the economic considerations of Iran's ability to threaten transiting ships and their military capabilities to threaten ships. In a discussion about Iran's military capabilities Iran's military capabilities matter. And their military capabilities are sufficient to credibly threaten ships passing through the strait, but insufficient to reliably follow through on that threat. This indicates that they have imperfect ability to complete the kill chain required to strike ships transiting the strait, which is more directly relevant to a discussion of Iran's military capabilities than the degree to which civilian shipping is willing to take on the risks of a transit. For people who think about conflicts in terms of things like kill chains, sensor webs, and material capabilities, that's an important distinction that tells you something about the military capabilities of Iran (and the United States).

It's the difference between saying that German U-boats targeted Allied shipping, imposing a grievous economic cost, and saying that they "closed the Atlantic for the duration of World War Two." It is entirely possible to point out the success of unrestricted submarine warfare without exaggerating its effectiveness.

Trump stated directly: the restrictions placed on the strait of Hormuz worked to force Trump to make a deal.

I did not claim otherwise. You said things that were either untrue or, I am arguing, misleading. I think you can make your case without doing that.

For the record, you're definitely not mentioning all of the US losses there - the US lost or suffered damage to lots more aircraft (including even some that Iran managed to shoot down despite what seems to me to be a pretty anemic air defense performance, and others they hit on the ramp with missiles) and Iran seriously damaged or degraded a lot of American military facilities.

I actually tend to think that the facilities isn't a big deal, especially if Trump Venezuelizes Iran (what are we gonna use them for?) but it's not like Iran didn't get in a few solid punches.