Shrike
10hr ago
The only evidence here
This isn't how evidence works. The photos I posted are evidence, they are just not necessarily conclusive evidence (as I myself pointed out).
There are other, non-conclusive reasons to think that the US is using gravity bombs well inland. For instance, WSJ is reporting that the spectacular strikes on Isfahan last night were reportedly carried out using 2,000-pound gravity bombs, likely from B-2s. Hesgeth announced that we are sending B-52s on overland strikes.
We know this because we've seen pictures of them posted and published many times.
I would like to see photos of MQ-9s operating over Iran from the last month, please link.
When it comes to manned aircraft, however, we see none of those photos anywhere but the extreme outliers of Iranian territory.
The fact that we aren't seeing cell phone photographs of tactical aircraft that can operate at night and cruise at tens of thousands of feet from a country with an internet blackout doesn't really mean much.
Check your camera roll: do you have any pictures of airliners cruising at 40,000 feet? If you do, they are almost certainly from the contrails, and you can almost certainly barely make out the airliner. Now imagine an aircraft that is smaller and faster at a similar altitude taking deliberate steps to avoid leaving a contrail. If someone did post pictures of them, you would dismiss it as having less evidentiary value than all of the other pictures I flagged for you, and I wouldn't blame you! Unless you have specialized equipment, you really won't catch meaningful pictures of aircraft operating at altitude.
This is doubly true if they are operating at night, which they may be primarily for the deep strikes, particularly against fixed targets.
You might be correct that most US strikes are using standoff munitions. I doubt this - at this point, given the reported sortie tempo, I suspect most strikes are using gravity bombs, although we might have an interesting discussion as to whether or not e.g. the JDAM-ER is a gravity or standoff weapon. But if you are correct, I do not think it would be because your timeline isn't flooded with pictures of US jets doing strafing runs over Tehran.
Russian helicopters are regularly prowling Ukrainian territory and are photographed constantly.
Why would the US send helicopters to do a job that tactical fixed winged aircraft can do better at less risk? Not only are rotary assets vulnerable to pretty much everything bigger than a handgun, their short range and (typically) lack of in-flight refueling mean that they would not be able to reach as far inland as tactical jets, and they would need to be based closer to Iran, making them even more vulnerable to being hit on the ground than fixed-wing aircraft are already (although expeditionary basing might counterbalance this), and they use smaller munitions with less range than US fixed-wing assets can use. The Russians have lost massive amounts of helicopters and attack aircraft tearing around at low altitude doing rocket runs for precisely these reasons. At least the Russians have a target list (mechanized formations) that helicopters are suited for; helicopters aren't really particularly well suited to find ballistic missile launchers or to hit hardened targets.
air superiority looks like
Technically, the definition of air superiority is "That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force" and air supremacy as "That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference" (page 2). I think the US has met the terms of not only air superiority but also air supremacy: Iran's opposing air force is incapable of effective interference. Both definitions are focused on the air battle. For the sake of argument, I suppose we could grant the US air supremacy (since the Iranian air force is not contesting the battlespace) but not air superiority, which would be an odd conclusion.
In contrast, Russia still has to deal with the Ukrainian Air Force, although I think they have have, at a minimum, achieved a "favorable air situation" (page 5).
It wouldn't surprise me if US planes very briefly cross into Iranian territory to drop bombs near the borders or coastlines, but I've seen nothing to think it's a regular occurrence or deep penetration of Iranian territory happens ever.
Do you think the US didn't hit Iranian enrichment facilities in Fordow and Natanz with gravity bombs last year, or do you think that Iranian air defense effectiveness has increased since then, despite a month of attacks on their air-to-surface weapons? Would those strikes not count as a "deep penetration" of Iranian territory?
To clarify a bit, my own belief is that the US believes it can deploy gravity bombs from tactical jets at acceptable risk over some portion of Iran, and is acting on this belief by doing so. Exactly what portion of the country is unclear to me, although it likely depends on the airframe. I do not believe the risk of operating over ~any portion of Iran has been reduced to zero and it would not surprise me if there were still portions of Iranian territory that were considered too risky to deploy gravity bombs against. However I do suspect that at this point in time more low-end weapons (e.g. JDAMs) are being employed offensively than high-end stand-off weapons (e.g. JASSM).
Shrike
1d ago
"Nefarious plot" is a very apt way to describe "cooking the heads of US intelligence personnel with a sound cannon."
Shrike
1d ago
No effect longterm when a student self-learns grit in a module.
I think these sorts of studies are really interesting but "giving kids a module on grit" is going to give you only limited information on the effects parents will have on their children over the course of a childhood.
But hey, let's get into them. Your first study I think is shaky in the sense that it relies purely, as far as I can tell, on subjective teacher ratings rather than even a cursory objective standard - and the study itself notes this problem. But regardless, it controls for environmental effects:
Such non-causal sources may be both genetic and environmental. For instance, the association may be due to common genetic influences (pleiotropy: the same genes affect multiple traits; MacKay17), or due to a rearing environment that is conducive to both cognitive and non-cognitive influences on school performance.
So if OP is trying to create a rearing environment that is "conducive to both cognitive and non-cognitive influences on school performance" this study, if it managed to control properly, would screen it out. Or in other words, if I'm reading it correctly, it doesn't say much if anything about the question at hand.
(It also says "it is well established that self-control and grit predict academic outcomes" so I stand by my claim that if you can choose this, you should.)
Finally, I think that 4.4% is not bad. If someone gave you a button and said "push this and you'll score four percent better on every test you take for the rest of your life, no downsides or other side effects" it would be obvious to push it.
Your second link says that grit is associated with positive life outcomes and can be influenced through school interventions:
Given the importance of grit for individual success and its apparent malleability through school-based interventions, it is natural to consider it as a promising target of education policy. Nevertheless, not all interventions scale up well. Several interventions are effective when implemented in smaller groups under strict quality control, but ineffective when they are offered universally under potentially less favorable conditions, so evaluations of scaled up version of programs that were effective at a smaller scale are of great academic and policy importance.
Needless to say, the OP's intervention is going to be implemented in a very small group; presumably he has no need for it to scale, unlike the people who wrote the study:
We ask whether improvements in students’ behaviors and academic achievement can be obtained through simple, inexpensive, easily implementable at-scale school-based grit interventions and the extent to which these programs can help to reduce achievement gaps of disadvantaged students.
Regardless, the study found small impacts for students at large and substantial impacts to Roma minorities. I agree with the authors:
This is remarkable given that our intervention was not particularly intensive, consisting of only one session a week for 5 weeks, and ended over a year before some of these impacts were measured.
(I will confess I only read through the end of the second section of this paper before posting because it is 44 pages long and I only had to read 5 pages to see that it was saying that at a very minor classroom intervention had lasting positive effects particularly for students whom could be expected to do poorly.)
Just like the other finding, this is a no-brainer if there are no downsides. Nor do either of these studies suggest that self-control and grit cannot be taught, particularly by parents over an extended period of time. For the state, there are probably going to be trades offs or financial costs to teaching these to children.
But OP is going to have to raise his kids one way or another. It seems to me that he might as well raise them to believe in grit and self-control. Even if the benefits on GPA and income are minor, developing a healthy internal locus of control can hedge against depression and anxiety, which is a good enough reason to encourage it in children.
Shrike
1d ago
there’s no compelling evidence that activating “hard work” (in contrast to simply work)
Okay. I'm not really sure we have any real difference of opinion here, since by "hard work" I don't necessarily mean "psychologically difficult." For instance, in my example above, Carlsen probably likes chess, people who shoot in rifle tournaments typically like shooting rifles, etc. But the truth remains that for lots of things (like, to use another one of my examples, test prep) people often don't like doing it, but they will be better off if they do.
When you squint at what an elite performer
I mean, I don't really know why the bar here is "elite performer." The OP said he wanted his kids to learn about achieving success through hard work. He didn't say "I want my kids to learn that through hard work they could achieve anything they want."
Usain Bolt is at an extreme tail and we shouldn't teach our kids to emulate him (at least not specifically, unless they also show extremely rare promise as athletes). I want my kids to be able to sit down and do test prep (even if they don't want to) to get a better grade than the one they could already have gotten. I don't particularly care if they are a world-class marathon runner.
Shrike
1d ago
The OP is specifically asking for advice on how to influence someone's early life, so (in theory) even if it's entirely correct that 100% of one's ability to do hard work is unchosen, OP could still succeed at giving his kids the ability to do hard work.
I think, intuitively, that it is common sense that you can choose to work hard, at least to a limited degree. I think most people have the experience of buckling down on an important or time-sensitive project, and easing up or even slacking off when things are less urgent (or when there's less external pressure), even if there's still work to be done. And so if you conceptualize "working hard" as choosing to buckle down relatively more and ease up relatively less, I think it's hard to argue that you can't "choose to work hard."
The question of whether or not choosing to do that consistently pays off commensurate to the effort is a much more interesting one and I think sort of depends on your goals. But it seems fairly clear that below a certain threshold of hard work (failing to study at all, to show up to work, etc.) you will suffer. And I think above a certain threshold of hard work, you will probably suffer too (if for no other reason than you need to sleep!)
Shrike
1d ago
Iranians are complaining that the US is dropping mines in Shiraz, about a hundred miles inland. As far as I can tell, these air-dropped mines don't even have wing kits so their range is very limited. Here's pictures of Israeli F-16s (not stealthy!) kitted out with cluster bombs, which likewise are not short ranged weapons. Here's the DVIDS link to images from Epic Fury, and here's a B-52, an F-18, an F-16, and an F-15 loaded up with gravity bombs.
You can of course wave away the DVIDS photos as head-fakes but when combined with the mines it seems pretty reasonable to believe that the US is doing strikes inland.
Shrike
1d ago
The notion that “hard work” is a toggleable feature in humans which has a role in their success may be a useful glue to keep poor people quiet and make the wealthy feel even prouder, but it is the least proven of all the possible factors of socioeconomic success.
I don't think you need a study to show this. Try:
- entering a marathon, boxing tournament, or other physical contest without practicing
- taking a test without any preparatory work or background knowledge
- shooting in a rifle tournament without any prep
And see how you compare to people who put the work in.
Or take the time to speak to someone who's worked at a test prep center - contrary to what you might hear in the IQ reductionist space, test prep works (or at least that is what I have been told by someone in the biz). Similarly, look at professional classical musicians or Olympians: they don't succeed without practicing a lot.
Certainly there might be exceptions (savants, people with unnatural size and strength, etc.) but for most people your odds of success improve via hard work.
Magnus Carlsen
Isn't it correct that Carlsen's father was a chess fan who introduced him to the game at 5 and he's been competing since he was 8?
I definitely think that something like innate talent or genius matters, particularly around the tails, but if you can choose to be a person with an internal locus of control who believes in hard work you should prefer this as long as you can temper it with the understanding that there is not a linear connection between hard work and success.
Shrike
4d ago
I tend to agree with what you've said here. I will offer two notes: firstly, from what I can tell, Russia has historically been extremely leery of giving Iran anything that could actually hurt Israel). I am not sure, however, if this would rule out bulk Shaheds. Also, there is no reason Israel can't just build their own Shaheds. The US does it. So it's possible (if unlikely) that in 2036 the Gulf region is just "everyone has 500,000 Shaheds" which would be sort of funny in a dark way, I suppose.
Shrike
4d ago
Ukraine was already providing that?
Yes, it is, but when the Arrow missile program was launched in the 1980s that was not really anticipated.
We also haven't been able to test Standards in Ukraine, and we have in Israel.
it's nowhere near enough to replenish them quickly
Just on the Navy front, on some quick Googling, the reports are that we're looking to increase production of the SM-6 and SM-3 to a combined total of 600/year. At 100 SM-3s annually, that would allow us to replace our stockpile of around 400 in just four years. At 500 SM-6s annually, that would allow us to replace our stockpiles of 1500 in three years.
As I pointed out in my other post to you, we're increasing Patriot production to 2,000 year, which is pretty eye-watering as far as interceptors go.
especially given we'll need quite literally an order of magnitude more to 1v1 China, which is a credible threat that again, we were supposed to be pivoting to!
Yes, one of the first things I said about this war was that that was a likely fail state.
And now he's throwing that away... Why again?
Well, I am kicking around some theories, but I'm saving them for a top-level post I will never write at this rate.
Shrike
4d ago
There's a reason we are bombing their industrial defense production. And, from what I can tell, there's good reasons at this point to think that Israel will just keep bombing those production facilities, particularly if Iran does not agree to an arms control agreement.
But let's assume that "mowing the lawn" doesn't happen. Wanna see me do some really sloppy analysis?
Iran first started producing ballistic missiles in the mid-late 1980s, so completely destroying their production entirely sets them back by 35 years of infrastructure and production. However, that's a naive estimate, because part of what's difficult about ballistic missiles is accumulating the knowledge to build them. I think we can assume that the US and probably more especially Israeli are attacking that accumulated knowledge, but it's more difficult to do that than it is to blow up a bunch of static buildings.
One estimate I found guessed that Iran could build 300 ballistic missiles and an eye-watering 10,000 Shaheds per month in peacetime.
This works out, in a very, very simplistic evaluative way, of Iran having the capability to build the facilities to produce about, let's say, 10 ballistic missiles per month every year, building up from 0 in 1990 to 300/month today.
It's a bit harder to evaluate the Shahed, but let's just say that they started the program in 2016, since there is at least some evidence of it being used in 2019 (they may have acquired blueprints for a similar design around 2004 but I like 2016 since it gives us a nice round ten years). That suggests it takes a mere 1 year to build out the capability to produce 1000 Shaheds per month.
So if we assume for the sake of easy math that Iran has to rebuild their ballistic missile program entirely from scratch and progressively ramps up manufacturing, we find that their ballistic missile production ramps up like so:
Year 1: 0 stockpiled, 0 production capability
Year 2: 0 stockpiled, 120 production capability
Year 3: 120 stockpiled, 240 production capability
Year 4: 360 stockpiled, 360 production capability
Year 5: 720 stockpiled, 480 production capability
720 sounds like a lot, but the US will have built 3000 Patriots in that time at 2026 production levels plus the excess Patriots manufactured as the US ramps up from 600 produced to 2000 produced per year between 2026 and 2033. It's unclear to me what the Israeli production rates are, but 200 annually of Stunner and Arrow-3 doesn't seem insane. So in 5 years it seems plausible that the Israeli or even a fraction of US interceptor capability will be able to handle the bulk of the Iranian ballistic missile threat.
Shahed numbers will be considerably higher, however, since our estimate is that they are 100 times as easy to produce. So in five years, we can expect 72,000 Shaheds, right around the 80,000 my source gives as an estimate of Iran's stockpiles at the start of this conflict. But, BAE is producing 25,000 APKWS guidance kits per year, and last year a new Iron Dome facility opened in Arkansas that is supposed to be able to produce 2,000 Iron Dome rockets per year. That works out to around 125,000 APKWS and 10,000 Iron Dome rockets to intercept the 72,000 Shaheds.
NOW, I don't think there's really any reason to think that the US will divert every single one of their APKWS to Israel, but there are a lot of cheap anti-drone systems coming online now, like the Martlet (which is expected, I think, to be sold to countries in the Gulf, although perhaps not Israel) and Iron Beam, and this doesn't take into account other defenses (like conventional air-to-air missiles or even the 30mm on Apaches). So it doesn't seem impossible that even against Shaheds, in 5 years there will be a lot of cheap defenses proliferated in the region.
Obviously, this is a VERY CRUDE TOY MODEL that is likely significantly off from what we will see in real life. It doesn't take into account cost, either, and from what I understand Iran in particular is under some financial strain at the moment, although they also are building relatively cheap offensive weapons. But the fun thing is that you can plug in whatever numbers you want (e.g. 500 baseline ballistic missiles and 2000 baseline Shaheds in stockpiles, or a residual production capability, or larger production numbers for the US+Israel to represent increasing Patriot and APKWS production, etc.) and see how the math works out.
While I don't think this is "realistic," I do think it suggests that Iran in 5 years will probably be less capable than they were at the start of this fight as regards ballistic missile stockpiles. Meanwhile we can anticipate advancements both technologically and in production from anti-missile systems over in the next 5 years. So there's actually at least some reason to think that the balance of power in the region will shift if Iran's production capabilities are significantly reduced.
Shrike
4d ago
What is the upside here again?
"Live weapons test zone" is probably considered more of an upside by American MIC types than you would think. In particular systems like Arrow and David's Sling (which are both co-developed by major American arms manufacturers) are helpful to the US as they increase our technology and (at least secondhand) experience with ballistic missile interception, which is very important to maintaining the relevancy of the US military pretty much everywhere, as ballistic missiles are now a pretty widespread technology.
The US buying Iron Dome (which is now also being co-produced by American contractors) to fulfill their point-defense needs is an example of that dynamic running full circle.
Shrike
4d ago
Evangelicals have high birth rates, but also low retention rates into adulthood.
No, this isn't true at all. Evangelicals have the best retention rates among Christians, about three-quarters retention (and this includes evangelicals who switch to other Christian traditions, so the number of people raised evangelical who remain Christian is even higher).
Gays have lower fertility than straights, so surely we will have no gays at all within a few generations!
Ha ha, but while we're here, gays are significantly more likely to be party to a teenaged pregnancy than straights, so if the gay gene is real and gets flushed out of the gene pool, it's likely because of abortion, not because of their sexual preferences.
Shrike
5d ago
thé highly religious have a replacement birth rate.
Awesome. The source I grabbed had the number bouncing around a bit, but it's also a few years out of date.
Shrike
5d ago
in general progressive movements do tend to win out over more conservative ones
I think it's important to remember, when assessing this, that it's easy to skip over progressive defeats, because what's "progressive" is measured by what is progressive today and not what was always considered progressive. Few people remember to count temperance or eugenics or removing the age of consent when evaluating the progressive k/d ratio because those ideas lost out and quickly became no longer progressive.
Shrike
5d ago
I would love to optimistic here, but i simply don't see it.
I have good news for you!
Lets all face the music, Conservative America is simply going the way of the dinosaurs. We have a declining birth rate, religiosity is going down the toilet, marriage rates are going down toilet.
Nah. Religiosity seems to be leveling off and irreligiosity is holding steady or dropping. You flagged an article from 2019 on changing support for gay rights, but later studies are showing that the popularity of gay marriage may have peaked and its decline is driven by young Americans. And in Conservative America, the number of children is growing, driven by higher birth rates and the migration of families to Red States in the post-COVID timeframe. The highly religious have many more children than the irreligious, near replacement, and non-denominational/Pentecostal Christian denominations (who tend towards political conservativism) are likely to continue growing given current trends.
I don't think we should extrapolate wildly and irresponsibly from current trends now any more than we should have in 2010, or that things are all gravvy (for Americans writ large, or conservative Americans, or religious Americans, or what have you) but Conservative America is very far from dead, and is arguably the part of America that is furthest from dead.
Shrike
5d ago
You neglected eleven days ago to specify what kind of situation would make you say that the five week special operation is going poorly.
I think you have me confused with Shakes. I'm gonna have to get a real pfp or something!
"we got the Iranians to attack our allies with missiles" is not much of an achievement
You know, when you put it like that, you would sort of think the hostile-to-Israel types around here would favor the war more, wouldn't you...
Anyway: I think the operation so far has made progress in its goals: Iranian regional influence has been blunted. However, so far, I have not seen any evidence that the US has yet maximally degraded the Iranian strike complex. Today's CENTCOM briefing assessed that over 2/3rds of Iran's military production capabilities have been destroyed, for instance, so it seems clear that even US public-facing assessments are that Iran's capabilities are degraded but not destroyed. It seems possible to me that the US could reach something much closer to a systematic destruction of their capabilities the course of additional weeks or perhaps even days, although I think the Iranians are adopting a reasonably savvy defensive posture. As I said, without nonpublic information it is difficult to evaluate.
Shrike
5d ago
I'm not sure if you're ignorant or being actively disingenuous
Well I would like to think I'm more ignorant than disingenuous...
the passage on 2/14/2025 was covered by the initial ceasefire that didn't stick.
Oh good point, but in my defense, you specifically said
The Houthis agreed to stop attacking the US Navy, which were the only "US vessels" that even attempted to cross the Bab el Mandeb during Trump's term.
...which wasn't quite right.
So once again, you're proving my point.
Your point is that Rough Rider "does not represent any kind of influence on Houthi behavior," but the Houthis and the US reached an agreement (that cut the Israelis out) on May 6, 2025, when there was no Gaza ceasefire, correct?
and on the contrary, Lloyd's List reports that the ceasefire did basically nothing to increase traffic.
Lloyd's measurement (which only includes larger vessels) excludes ships that Admiral Gryparis might have included, but both articles did agree that traffic was still lower than pre-blockade numbers.
Lloyd's List reported in early September (so before the Gaza peace plan) that traffic was increasing, although incrementally, with August traffic increasing by 10% over July. Again, definitely lower than pre-blockade numbers, but the trend, I think, indicates that the May truce did nudge the behavior of shipping.
Regardless, what can't really be contested is that yanking Bibi's leash was more effective in opening Red Sea traffic than fighting the Houthis was.
This might be the case, although I suppose there's more than one direction to nudge Bibi - the May 6th agreement between the US and the Houthis happened the day after Israel began airstrikes on Yemen, right?
Israel is infinitely more pliable to American pressure than Iran or Yemen.
I really doubt it's infinitely more pliable. I understand the point you are making, it's just unclear to me exactly how pliable Israel is at the end of the day.
Similarly, the path to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open ran through preventing Israel from starting an unwinnable war, not in committing American forces to said unwinnable war.
In the short term, certainly. Over an indefinite period, as I said previously:
Because Iran is engaged in proxy warfare with the Saudis and Israel, we have no particular reason to believe that the US departure from the area would cause the regional crisis to cease, nor do we have a guarantee that Iran wouldn't do things such as blockade the Red Sea or Straits of Hormuz. In fact we know that Iran did this sort of thing in the past during their war with Iraq!
Of course it's reasonable to point out that that's a theoretical risk, whereas this is a real one.
Shrike
5d ago
until they are no longer able to reliably launch large, AD penetrating countervalue volleys any claim of victory on the basis of having degraded said capabilities is clearly hollow.
I tend to agree. But it's difficult to verify the current levels of Iranian munitions: smaller salvo sizes might indicate munitions destruction or merely conservation; larger salvo sizes might indicate healthy munitions levels or a use-it-or-lose it mentality.
So the war might end with the US claiming to have exhausted Iranian munitions stockpiles, when in reality the Iranians have thousands of missiles left. On the flipside, the war might end with the Iranians claiming to have barely felt it, when in fact the their final salvo in the war was their last gasp.
It's possible that the war will end in a way that makes it easy to determine the winner, but it also seems plausible to me that the war will end with both sides claiming victory and the real measure of that victory will be measured in subsequent behavior over years or decades.
Shrike
5d ago
Anyone that's actively launching missiles in a war is effectively "depleting their stockpiles."
Indeed, and as I said, the US depleting its own stockpiles is a big risk case in this war.
Iran still hasn't even begun launching it's most advanced ammunition, has the largest repository of missiles in the Middle East
I'd be interested in how you can be certain of that, and which specific models you believe they are holding back.
so it's not as if they used up their stockpile putting on a fruitless light show everybody else.
Yes, I agree with this. But because Israel and the United States pulled the trigger, they have the first mover advantage, which means that most likely this arsenal was less effective than it otherwise would have been.
Shrike
5d ago
Hmm. As I've said elsewhere, I tend to model people as rational actors, and I still think there's value in rattling the saber for Iran. But obviously alienating their potential allies more than their foes is a questionable strategy. Is there a good source you can share on the disparate impact?
Shrike
5d ago
Who is “we”, exactly?
Sorry, I could have been more specific. I meant Americans, particularly educated ones.
I don’t think there’s a ton of overlap between the circles who most criticize American hegemony and the ones which compare everything to Roman history.
Maybe you are correct. I definitely think there's a certain strain (maybe moreso on the right?) of people who at least opportunistically pattern-match contemporary issues, e.g. declining birthrates and the GWOT, with the decline of the Roman Empire.
Shrike
5d ago
The war has definitely depleted Iranian munitions stockpiles (even if we assume that US efforts to strike those stockpiles were 0% effective, which they were not, and all of that depletion is from launching them at all and sundry.)
The US said that (besides self-defense) preventing Iran from projecting power and completing a nuclear weapon were its primary objectives on March 2.
Destroying their navy and missile inventory is a means of preventing Iran from projecting power.
Without inside knowledge of how effective US strikes are, what Iran's stockpiles look like, etc. I cannot tell exactly how effective this has been, but it definitely seems like Iran's ability to project power has been negatively impacted.
Fair enough, I suppose. I'd still like to see that picture of the MQ-9 over Iran, and I will trade you this picture the Twitter OSINT guys geolocated today, pinpointing this B-52 carrying gravity bombs over Saudi Arabia.
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