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Shrike


				

				

				
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joined 2023 December 20 23:39:44 UTC

				

User ID: 2807

Shrike


				
				
				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2023 December 20 23:39:44 UTC

					

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User ID: 2807

it doesn't teach you about what actually happens, about real behaviour in the West.

The values most people act on, including woke people, Marxists, and a/antitheists, are downstream of Christianity and the Bible. If you came back to the West after being gone for a few millennia, the questions you would ask (besides "what's a cell phone?" and "does anyone have a Latin-English translator?") would be things like "wait, why can't I buy a sex slave at Wal-mart?"

And the answer to that has nothing to do with cell phones.

That is not happening today! Nobody is waging war for Christianity in a Western country.

It's 2026, the weapons of war are a laptop and a Westlaw subscription.

Quantity is its own quality, as is known.

This I do agree with.

turned out trivial today

You're more confident in this than I am, which is interesting.

I am not sure the US has even retained its peak capabilities in mine-sweeping, but we'll see.

The US put ships through despite recent reports of mines being deployed, which tells you something. How much, I am not sure.

Are you for real. Their aircraft from 1986 is destroyed.

My sentence is expressing the fact that their ability to destroy ships with aircraft in the strait the year 2026 is not qualitatively different from their ability to destroy ships with aircraft in the strait the year 1986. It has nothing to do with whether their aircraft from '86 are still surviving or not. In a Strait scenario, a Shahed is not really qualitatively superior at destroying ships than the smart weapons technology Iran had purchased from the US during the Cold War, including strike fighters with precision-guided weapons and radar-guided anti-ship missiles.

The main advantage, I think, is quantitative: they have a lot of Shaheds, which are cheap and simple to operate.

Or do you think there was an expectation that as soon as the US fails to topple Iran by killing some dudes, we'll enter this morass with strait blockade?

While I think the exact degree to which they would be able to achieve this against US defenses was murky pre-war, I definitely do not think that US defense planners did not anticipate the possibility or fail to correctly assess that Iran had the ability to threaten strait traffic. The US government gambling that Iran wouldn't rather than that Iran couldn't seems much more likely to me.

(And again, Iran's actual capability to "close the strait" has been demonstrated to be marginal, so if the US Navy warplanners assessed that they would be able to clear the strait and escort ships through in the face of Iranian defenses, they were probably correct for a certain degree of risk - it would not surprise me if the Pentagon got the capability assessment of Iran more or less right but fumbled or failed to consider as outside of their area of competency the question of what degree of risk would be acceptable to the civilian market.)

I highly recommend reading up on some of the US Navy's problems with Iranian and Iraqi mines in the area to get an idea of the background and mindset the US military would be going into this with. The Iraqis laid a big minefield in the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War and successfully hit a cruiser and an amphibious assault ship (basically, a pocket carrier). Those are essentially next-bests if you can't actually hit a real aircraft carrier.

On a quick Google, initial mineclearing operations in the Persian Gulf took nearly two months to clear lanes for shipping and mopping up took the better part of a year after the war concluded. So that gives you an idea of "how long will it take to clear the strait of mines" baseline the Pentagon would be operating from (although I suspect they have fancier tech now).

Their control right now is qualitatively different, they can flexibly threaten ships, do it on and off, and importantly even while the USN is around and the country is getting bombed.

Iran's ability to use aircraft to attack ships in 2026 is not qualitatively different from their ability to use aircraft to attack ships in 1986. If anything it is quantitatively different.

From your own link

(The point of this link was to reference the fact that Iran has been kicking around the idea of tolling the strait for years).

And I agree with Smith that they didn't know it would, and indeed thought it wouldn't.

Why would you think this? The fact that Iran could substantially disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been known and discussed and acknowledged publicly for decades.

Are any of those media Christian beyond that?

Although the Project Hail Mary title is a play on words, the movie itself takes the time for a pretty on the nose and fairly-needless-to-the-plot discussion about belief in God, which I would say is far from a shallow reference.

Mainstream Hollywood films with a fairly overtly Christian message aren't actually all that rare (see Unbroken, Silence, Hacksaw Ridge, etc.) and for every one of those there are two that take Christian ideas seriously, even if it's in more subtle ways. I was recently watching the Fallout show and one of the characters reaches for the Golden Rule, not as part of a come-to-Jesus sideplot, but because it's an important moral principle - obviously not one unique to Christianity, of course.

Which of course is far from unique to Marx!

I tend to agree with Noah Smith of all people that "Before the war, Iran didn’t control the strait, simply because it didn’t realize it could. Drone technology had advanced to the point where Iran was able to shut down Hormuz, but Iran didn’t know that until the U.S. attack forced it to try the risky and desperate move of actually shutting down the strait."

Well, Noah Smith (at least judging by this paragraph) is wrong to frankly an almost unbelievable degree. Iran has been aware that they could threaten to close the strait since the 1980s (at least), because you don't need drones to do that when you have mines. There was a major flare up where they specifically threatened to do so during the Obama administration. And they have been kicking the idea around of tolling the strait seriously since 2019 (at least).

That the US saw it fit to sign on to this shows that the US is really weary of the war and willing to end it on net unfavorable terms.

I think if the US was really desperate to end the war we wouldn't keep striking Iran.

Marx is more relevant than the Bible to Western thought today

In terms of "books to read to understand modern culture" Marx is less relevant than Harry Potter.

The Bible is still far and away the most important single book you can read to understand modern culture (including Marxism/socialism, which is a post-Christian ideology).

I don't dodge it, I just deem it to be a cope.

I would agree that it's a cope to point to it as a success if the other elements of the settlement end up poorly for the US, but if the US had said "our only goal is to sink the Iranian navy," the operation would be a success goals-wise (not necessarily a strategic victory in the big scheme of things, since succeeding at dumb goals can be bad). So if that was a goal, it ought to be counted.

It's a cheap way to pad the metrics by announcing a thing you're confident about as the goal.

And omitting it is a cheap way to overstate your case and obscure the actual outcomes of the war, the same as when pro-Trump people omit the damage done to US bases by Iranian ballistic missiles.

Iranian objectives, on the contrary, were to survive, preserve the status quo, and hopefully improve on it by getting sanctions relief.

Wouldn't you say that Iran also intended (and quite plausibly still hopes) to establish a strait toll regime as a war goal? I would agree with you if you said that it was a stretch goal or seemed like part of a motte-and-bailey play, but don't you think that was also on their bucket list as a war objective?

Agreed that this is very premature given previous fake-out "deals".

On this we agree.

allows me to say that Iran won.

This is where I disagree. I actually think it's too soon to rule out a Venezuela-like ending to this thing, for Iran. Not that I would bet on it, necessarily. I think both countries are basically going to try to get as much as they can out of the post-MOU bargaining and possibly they are both betting that the other guy will blink on some things they really want.

If, say, negotiations break down and the US resumes high-intensity strikes, that'll be a separate arc. I'm not saying Iran won forever.

And maybe this is why I disagree: from my point of view, the MOU is a temporary ceasefire instrument to be replaced by something more permanent or (as Trump and I think also Iran) have warned, a return to war.

I am noticing how, when you make your list of Trump's different objectives, you dodge away from the actual text from Trump that I provided as a reference point to an incomplete ("various explanations...including") Wikipedia summary so that you don't have to concede that the United States dealt a severe blow to Iran's ability to project naval power, an objective that was reiterated by Hegseth on March 2 in case you just thought it was a one-off.

But most of your evidence for a resounding Iranian victory is the same evidence there is for a resounding American victory: namely, extrapolation from the MOU (that may not hold) onto a final state that has not been achieved yet and could resolve in a way that is relatively favorable for either Iran or the United States. I think your argument is passable enough: it seems very plausible to me that Trump got in deeper than he anticipated and was looking for any out that let him save face and was willing to settle for something he could have mostly gotten via conventional negotiations. But it also seems plausible to me that the US will be able to notch some Ws in the post-MOU negotiations on top of the degradation of Iranian military they have achieved. It also seems quite plausible to me that negotiations will break down and we'll see the resumption of military strikes in earnest.

As I said previously, "[i]t's possible that the war will end in a way that makes it easy to determine the winner, but it also seems plausible to me that the war will end with both sides claiming victory and the real measure of that victory will be measured in subsequent behavior over years or decades."

We're in the "both sides claiming victory" stage now and I think saying anything "clear" at this stage is premature.

I haven't read the relevant books but I get the distinct impression that Tolkien definitely took the time to hammer out a lot of the PERSIA stuff, too.

Trump himself has said, when justifying the peace deal

Are the things Trump claims when he is justifying his actions trustworthy or not?

We can get pedantic about what exactly "closed" means

That's...why I'm here.

I don't think that really matters in assessing the success of "America" or "Trump & Hegseth" as strategic actors.

The context of the conversation had to do with achieving war aims which is a separate-but-related question, since achieving war aims can actually be really bad if your war aims are strategically stupid. The ability to achieve war aims is a question of military capability, and whether or not military capability is exercised successfully is a different question from whether or not it is being exercised wisely.

So: there's a difference between the economic considerations of Iran's ability to threaten transiting ships and their military capabilities to threaten ships. In a discussion about Iran's military capabilities Iran's military capabilities matter. And their military capabilities are sufficient to credibly threaten ships passing through the strait, but insufficient to reliably follow through on that threat. This indicates that they have imperfect ability to complete the kill chain required to strike ships transiting the strait, which is more directly relevant to a discussion of Iran's military capabilities than the degree to which civilian shipping is willing to take on the risks of a transit. For people who think about conflicts in terms of things like kill chains, sensor webs, and material capabilities, that's an important distinction that tells you something about the military capabilities of Iran (and the United States).

It's the difference between saying that German U-boats targeted Allied shipping, imposing a grievous economic cost, and saying that they "closed the Atlantic for the duration of World War Two." It is entirely possible to point out the success of unrestricted submarine warfare without exaggerating its effectiveness.

Trump stated directly: the restrictions placed on the strait of Hormuz worked to force Trump to make a deal.

I did not claim otherwise. You said things that were either untrue or, I am arguing, misleading. I think you can make your case without doing that.

For the record, you're definitely not mentioning all of the US losses there - the US lost or suffered damage to lots more aircraft (including even some that Iran managed to shoot down despite what seems to me to be a pretty anemic air defense performance, and others they hit on the ramp with missiles) and Iran seriously damaged or degraded a lot of American military facilities.

I actually tend to think that the facilities isn't a big deal, especially if Trump Venezuelizes Iran (what are we gonna use them for?) but it's not like Iran didn't get in a few solid punches.

The ability for Iran to project power has not been meaningfully reduced in any way that is testable

From Wikipedia:

Power projection (or force projection or strength projection) in international relations is the capacity of a state to deploy and sustain forces outside its territory.

Perhaps you're unfamiliar with how the term is used, but when it comes to power projection Iran's navy (which I don't think anyone seriously contests was "meaningfully reduced") is much more relevant than their ballistic missile arsenal (which was also "meaningfully reduced," if only because they launched off such a large portion.)

they still possess the naval/missile capability to shut the Strait of Hormuz

"Shut the Strait" is self-contained motte/bailey inasmuch as it suggests that Iran has much more complete control over the Strait than they actually do (nobody denies that cargo ships successfully passed through the Strait under the nose of Iran, do they?), thus successfully spreading a misleading idea, but if challenged the person using it can always say that they mean Iran has the ability to threaten traffic there (which is also true), not that Iran actually shut the strait, making it tedious to address, even though it may mislead the underinformed.

For this reason, I wish you (and everyone else on here) would stop using the phrase and switch to more precise language instead.

clearly an admission of defeat relative to any claimed early-war objective

This assessment seems very far from defensible to me.

Trump on February 28 in his speech articulating the rationale of the attacks [excerpts]:

Our objective is to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime, a vicious group of very hard, terrible people.

It has always been the policy of the United States, in particular, my administration, that this terrorist regime can never have a nuclear weapon. I'll say it again. They can never have a nuclear weapon.

They rejected every opportunity to renounce their nuclear ambitions, and we can't take it anymore. Instead, they attempted to rebuild their nuclear program and to continue developing long-range missiles that can now threaten our very good friends and allies in Europe, our troops stationed overseas and could soon reach the American homeland. Just imagine how emboldened this regime would be if they ever had and actually were armed with nuclear weapons as a means to deliver their message. For these reasons, the United States military has undertaken a massive and ongoing operation to prevent this very wicked, radical dictatorship from threatening America and our core national security interests. We are going to destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground. It will be totally, again, obliterated. We are going to annihilate their navy. We are going to ensure that the region's terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world and attack our forces, and no longer use their IEDs or roadside bombs, as they are sometimes called, to so gravely wound and kill thousands and thousands of people, including many Americans.

And we will ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon. It's a very simple message. They will never have a nuclear weapon.

Finally, to the great, proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand. Stay sheltered. Don't leave your home. It's very dangerous outside. Bombs will be dropping everywhere. When we are finished, take over your government.

From the MOU:

The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in paragraph seven, with the minimum methodology to be down blended on site under the supervision of the IAEA.

I think it's completely reasonable to:

  1. Question whether the objective of preventing Iran from procuring a nuclear weapon will actually succeed
  2. Interrogate the degree to which the United States accomplished all of its objectives; there seems to be (at best) mixed or conflicting evidence that the US succeeded in anything that might be characterized as "raze[ing] [Iran's] missile industry to the ground" or "totally...obliterat[ing]" Iran's military or preventing their proxies from acting.
  3. Suggest that the cost/benefit ratio was not in the favor of the United States, insist that the war went poorly for the United States, or otherwise criticize the decision to go to war or the outcomes or assess that they indicate US weakness relative to Iran

I criticized going to war with Iran before it happened on here. I still think it's too soon to tell how things are going to fall out, so I've been withholding judgment, but my preliminary assessment probably wouldn't be viewed as exactly a pro-Trump gloss.

However, I think you are badly mistaken if you to look at a US declaration of war that emphasizes "no nuclear weapons," look at an MOU where Iran agrees "no nuclear weapons" and then claim that the MOU is "clearly an admission of defeat relative to any claimed early-war objective."

...you can still own a cannon of the type used back then (at least under federal law).

Let's test your hypothesis. When specifically do you mean by "today"? and why?

And what difference does that make to anything?

I think it makes your argument worse, not better. Sure, maybe as measured by the stingy metric of financial balance in the general treasury, the benefits of gay men as a whole outweigh the costs, but "[w]hen their lifestyle does turn harmful" the (financial) cost isn't almost entirely borne on the group of people who opted in; it's disproportionately likely to be borne by society.

(To be clear, from what I can tell, realistically the group of people opting in to HIV risk can be diced finer than "gays.")

The hard numbers I've quoted (with citations) are fucking chump change. A few hundred billion dollars? Then we'd be talking real money. Or a nice week in Tehran. Where exactly are the additional costs that are being imposed on the general populace? I'm sure they exist, but I don't think they sum up to very much

You're shifting the goalposts here. It's as if you said "the horrible impact of dragons being able to breathe fire is almost entirely limited to dragons" and then I pointed out that no, dragons mostly don't fight each other, they are more likely burn down people's homes and steal their gold, and you said "well they mostly avoid populated provinces and steal from monasteries, so the general treasury is not really impacted" which I am sure is a relief to our lord the king (supposing for the sake of illustration that we're court wizards or something I guess) but doesn't really mean you were right to say that dragons breathing fire is mostly something that isn't a human concern now does it?

I'd presume that if you found an actual logical flaw in my argument you would have pointed it out.

You said "[w]hen their lifestyle does turn harmful, the fallout lands almost entirely on the people who opted in" during your assessment of the damages of HIV in this specific context of gay men. I think that's misleading: the fallout of HIV is very expensive, and society picks up some of that tab. And furthermore (as you doubtless also know) HIV is not randomly distributed across the population (nor is it distributed evenly across the population of gay men). People who get HIV are more likely to be materially disadvantaged, not less, so the taxpayers are more likely to pick up the tab.

I don't consider this a logical or process flaw in your argument so much as a factual or directional mistake.

These are a lot of words to say that "spreading HIV actually costs the taxpayer a ton of money and even the best way that we know how to reduce the costs still costs a ton of money and all things considered it would be better for society if people didn't engage in risky behaviors that spread HIV."

And yes, this is also true for a lot of other things - simple overeating is a much larger drain on the taxpayer than HIV, and you shouldn't pretend like that doesn't have negative externalities either.

When their lifestyle does turn harmful, the fallout lands almost entirely on the people who opted in. A virally suppressed person on antiretrovirals transmits HIV to sexual partners at a measured rate of zero.

Who pays for these antiretrovirals and other PLWH costs?

Maybe I did a poor job of communicating.

I think the government coming out and saying "we have a crashed non-human craft, any of you eggheads want to come look at it?" it would generate a lot of research interest, don't you? Even saying "yeah okay UFOs are real and we don't know what they are, but we need help figuring it out" would probably garner some interest from boffins, right?

The government sources OP are referring to have been conducting a coordinated pressure/PR campaign that can be interpreted in a few different ways, but one possible goal of the campaign is to get the government to admit to the above (and they basically succeeded on the second half, and have gotten some corresponding interest from boffins, which has been pointed out elsewhere in this thread).

Just pointing out for the sake of thoroughness that this is an argument against interstellar visitors, which =! UFOs.

Neither KH-11 nor Topaz are stealth satellites of the low-observable Misty line, although objects believed to be stealth satellites have been tracked by amateur astronomers.

Atomic Rockets (on the page you linked to) has a pretty good write-up by Matterbeam on stealth in space, but I recommend reading up on his treatment of a hydrogen streamer.

It's certainly true that, given sufficiently proliferated sensor technology, "there's no stealth in space." But it's also true that, given sufficiently proliferated sensor technology, there's no stealth anywhere, whether it's submarines or stealth aircraft. Keep in mind the question for stealth is not "can remain invisible at any arbitrary range," it is "can you disrupt the hostile kill chain enough to gain an advantage?"

In the real world, sensors aren't sufficiently proliferated, which is why there are submarines, stealth aircraft, and yes, stealth satellites.

you can do many things in space, but not hide.

This is entirely wrong btw, the US government has stealth satellites in orbit right now.

(Atomic Rockets is a great resource though).