Skibboleth
It's never 4D Chess
No bio...
User ID: 1226

Short answer: they do change the rules, frequently. HEMA has no unified ruleset. The trouble is that it's very hard to create a ruleset that can't be gamed - introduce a solution to one kind of tactical double and you likely create another (or incentivize some other kind of bad behavior). Insofar as you can they tend to have other problems.
People do occasionally do "first blood" tournaments with mutual loss rules precisely to try and circumvent this situation, but they have a number of practical issues. They tend to exacerbate the problem of low quality judging in HEMA, since a single poor call isn't just disadvantageous, it's decisive. There's also the more prosaic issue that if people are going spend hundreds of dollars traveling to your tournament, they are generally going to demand more than a half-dozen exchanges. The result is that first blood tournaments are usually sideshows.
Trump acts all tough and doesn't back down publicly, but China actually doesn't back down.
Something that was always apparent if you paid attention but has become increasingly hard to ignore: Trump is not a master negotiator. He plays one on TV.
You're still talking about the object level impact of the tariffs. I'm talking about the ability of the state to translate will into action when the action involves short term pain.
Willingness to endure pain is not an independent quality - people are more willing to endure pain for an achievable goal they believe in and less willing to endure pain merely to prove that they can.
The tariff proposal elicited a sharp, widespread negative response because it was incredibly stupid and self-destructive. There's never going to be much of a constituency for chopping off your own foot to look tough, and the Trump administration has done a terrible job selling the idea that these tariffs would be a positive force for American manufacturing (probably because they're actually terrible for it).
The motte would be stronger if the bailey wasn't full of people actively dismantling it. US "industrial policy" has been overwhelmingly aimed at protecting jobs and incumbent firms from competition, not preserving or building capability.
Hilariously, this negatively impacts domestic US manufacturing, since it is now massively more favorable to import finished products over importing materials and manufacturing in the US.
My prediction is that we're going to end up with a swiss-chess-like set of trade barriers that mostly has the effect of negatively impacting American firms and the overall economy, but isn't disruptive enough to cause real economic disaster.
The crackpot theory would be that the dumbassery is the point - the Trump administration doesn't have the ability to engage in deportations on the scale it desires without spending a bunch of money building a large and invasive immigration enforcement apparatus that will alienate the general public. What it can do is terrorize immigrants with an arbitrary and capricious enforcement regime in which you may be irretrievably sent to a black hole prison, regardless of your notional legal protections. This serves the dual purpose of providing a spectacle for hardcore nativist voters and creating an atmosphere of fear that will encourage immigrants to leave and discourage more from coming.
However, per my flair I think this is probably giving them too much credit and they are simply incompetent and view things like due process as an obstacle design to protect criminals.
That would make significantly more sense. I'd gotten too used to people sarcastically calling June 2020 that.
Why would 2020 be a discontinuity and not, say, the Civil War (or the Civil Rights era or the Great Depression or...)?
edit: misunderstanding, though I don't know that it radically changes my point
you wouldn't want them to be anyway
I agree, which is why I'd really rather the Trump administration stop trying to pilot the US into the ground. I quite like the state of affairs where the US is on top - though I am admittedly biased by being American - but I don't think that means it is the only possible state of affairs under which 'globalization' persists. OP is right to observe that China presently depends on international trade, and a world where the USN isn't securing freedom of navigation is one where China is likely to feel compelled to step up to secure its own interests.
I think it's important to note that the traditional requirement for HEMA is a source. For example, we do not generally consider people doing Viking combat reconstruction to be doing HEMA because we have no sources for it. The reconstructors are working in (notionally) accurate reproductions of the historical weapons, but they're ultimately guessing as to how they were used. HEMAists are... still guessing, but they're guessing with a reference to historical texts. Sometimes the texts are very straightforward, sometimes they are borderline useless (cough, Talhoffer).
The "main" disciplines of HEMA are, in rough order of popularity:
- longsword - if HEMA ratings tournament count is any indication, roughly as popular as the rest put together. Typically divided by whether you study German or Italian sources.
- rapier (and dagger) - overwhelmingly draws from various Italian sources, though there's a growing body of people looking at Spanish sources. Somewhat unusually for different schools of swordsmanship with similar weapons (where the differences are often relatively small or relate more to tactics/philosophy than specific techniques), Spanish and Italian rapier are quite different. There are sources from other countries as well, though they're often derivative of one or the other.
- saber - though this seems to be gaining popularity rapidly and I wouldn't be surprised if it ends up overtaking R&D.
- sword and buckler (a buckler being a center-gripped shield roughly the size of a dinner plate) - tends to be split into arming sword and sidesword, though you can find sources discussing using a buckler with a number of weapons.
There are a number of other disciplines as well, though generally less popular (and some are amalgamated into one of the categories above for competitions, e.g. many saber tournaments won't bat an eye if you show up with a broadsword/backsword). Messer, broadsword, sidesword, singlestick, arming sword, sword and targe/rotella, and more I've probably forgotten. Also worth noting that many of these distinctions are modern. It's not clear that historically people would have seen much of a distinction between what we now call sideswords and rapiers, nor is it uncommon to find sabers referred to as broadswords.
Many of the older sources have significant gaps in what they cover - either due to the fact that they're incomplete or because they're not intended for new fencers and thus don't spend much time talking about the basics of how to fence. More recent (as in 18th/19th century) often have the opposite problem: they're extremely barebones systems that are meant to train someone who has never held a sword to bare minimum competence in bare minimum time. And virtually none of these sources assumed you'd be using them as a primary source of instruction - even the Saber for Dummies manuals are meant to be reference material for instructors.
Modern HEMA is unlike its historical counterpart. We use different equipment, different rules, and have different social mores* around fighting compared to the original practitioners. There's also just the reality that many techniques become less effective as your opponent becomes more skilled and everything collapses down to fundamentals like distance, timing, and tactics.
The result is that if you're trying really hard to win tournaments, you're going to be less strict about adhering to the sources. You're going to mix-and-match systems and incorporate things from other martial arts or modern fencing. You're also going to end up constrained by the rules in ways that affect your fencing - a scored match is an artificial construct (a "real" swordfight is never going to have a situation like "I'm down by 1 with two seconds on the clock, better dive head first across the ring"), certain historical techniques are constrained or off limited (e.g. S&B tournaments tend to restrict or disallow buckler punches for safety reasons), and you may game afterblow rules in ways that would be insane in a serious sword fight ("I'm going to leave myself wide open and go for an uncovered afterblow" is something nobody would do if life or limb were on the line but might make perfect sense if you've got a lead and just want to burn time off the clock).
*the people whining about hand snipes might actually have a point, historically, for example, and there's some reason to think thrusting was considered semi-off-limits in certain contexts.
It's not clear to me why the US abdicating global hegemony leads to the collapse of globalization. It seems much more likely to me that China steps into the void.
Trump’s strategy might be to prep the U.S. for that collapse.
Don't make me tap the sign. The pump-and-dump theory is more plausible than a scheme to prepare the US for global economic collapse (especially because if you were prepping for that, you'd want to be tightening trade relations with your big neighbors to the north and south, not pissing them off).
This seems to be diven by torrent of fake news articles
Can you clarify what's fake about these news articles?
One of the great things about setting the bar at "economic apocalypse" is that you can back off to merely raising prices a bit while failing to achieve any your stated goals and still claim victory.
Tariffs are basically affirmative action for American companies to compete with foreign ones
If only. If this were serious industrial policy it might have a glimmer of defensibility. Targeted tariffs combined with policies to enforce export discipline might make sense if you were really into having a manufacturing export-based economy. You're still making Americans poorer for the sake of your manufacturing fetish, but you can at least argue strategic reasons for it.
What we're getting is pretty much the opposite of that. The domestic economy is being categorically fenced off from foreign competition, there will be retaliatory tariffs, and American firms are going to be stuck trying to source everything domestically or paying an exorbitant markup to suppliers. The result is going to be less competitive producers subsisting off a captive market. American companies are not going to have to compete with foreign ones domestically, and they're certainly not going to be competing internationally.
I can't figure out to what extent Americans realize how off-putting their rhetoric is for people on the outside.
You will not go far wrong if you assume the average American voter is only tenuously aware that people in other countries exist. It's a little hyperbolic, but the reality is that Americans just don't think about international affairs that much.
Too drunk on power to care, or actually believe themselves to be victimized
Por que no los do? A major part of Trump's appeal is that he synthesizes a bullying affect with a sense of righteous victimization. Trump tells his supporters America is getting screwed and they eat it up even as Trump gears up to try and mug the rest of the world.
The tax cuts will pay for themselves :V
Trump has said for years that the military is in shambles and needs to be repaired
He's not entirely wrong. The US military has spent most of the last twenty five years busy with counterinsurgency ops, which has left its conventional warfare capabilities in a rough spot. Though the problem is really specifically the Navy.
I'm not interested in the US federal government using tax money to create an even bigger military stick to shake at the rest of the world
Don't worry, the plan is to cut taxes as well.
American casualty tolerance isn’t near what it was in Vietnam, and even that became too much toward the end.
"Casualty tolerance" (or lack thereof) is overrated. What matters is whether or not the populace believes the war is valid and winnable. What did in the Vietnam War was not that the casualties were unbearable but that the American public increasingly believed they were dying for nothing - that the cause was bad, the war was unwinnable, and the government was lying about it.
The problem with war with Iran is not that America can't bear taking casualties. It's that the constituency for war with Iran is John McCain's ghost. For most of the country any number of casualties is too great because the USG doesn't have the credibility to pick that kind of fight.
Trump made tariffs a cornerstone of his campaign, and he's acting on that, so there is nothing to expose.
It's exposed Trump apologists. After years of his defenders insisting we should take him seriously but not literally, it turns out he's a malicious idiot and we should have taken him literally.
It's easier to undermine a policy when the whole point of the policy is to favor some companies/sectors more than others, vs. just setting-and-forgetting a tariff rate.
This is contrary to the industrial policy rationale. The justification being offered for tariffs is to favor some companies/sectors more than others.
"Yes-chad", I might say to all that. Yes, I want to destroy the degenerate, consumerist, metastasized economy. Yes, I don't want cheap garbage from foreign countries. America needs harsh medicine.
One recent point of hilarity is that while there's been a movement of people on the left taking onboard traditional right-wing critiques of left-wing economic policy, there's also been a surge of right-wingers adopting what are essentially leftist degrowth arguments with a trad gloss.
I'm fairly sure consensus within the discipline is that corporate taxes mostly fall on labor and consumers. They're politically popular because tax incidence is illegible to most voters.
Having a lever is more control than not having it, even if you never decide to pull it.
"Undermined by lobbying efforts" is a fully generally problem for any policy. It can happen just as easily with tariffs.
Probably because during the campaign (and now, for that matter) it was routine for Trump defenders to pretend that he wasn't going to do it, that it was just big talk, take him seriously not literally, etc... Encouraging people not to believe Trump was (and is) standard practice.
"Of course he's not going to do it, that's ridiculous" -> "He said he was going to do it, what are you complaining about?"
More options
Context Copy link