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TheAntipopulist

Voltaire's Viceroy

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joined 2022 September 05 02:32:36 UTC

				

User ID: 373

TheAntipopulist

Voltaire's Viceroy

0 followers   follows 1 user   joined 2022 September 05 02:32:36 UTC

					

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User ID: 373

Do 2. Most people are apathetic about most political issues, which means your concern about possibly being cancelled for not caring is almost certain to never come to fruition. Extreme ideologies like modern SJWism cannot force everyone to believe in them; the only way they keep power is by tolerating people who don't care one way or the other.

Doing 3 (i.e. silence to most people, then revealing your anti-SJW nature to people you trust) feels better because you can be honest about your real opinions to some people, but is very risky. Some people you trust might backstab you (sounds crass, but it does happen sometimes) or might simply get careless and let slip details about you with no ill intentions that still end up screwing you in some ways. Alternatively, those people you trust could get outed as anti-SJW themselves in which case you'll be tarred by association and might be forced to denounce them in tandem with everyone else, which feels awful. You can use sites like this one to let off steam instead (it's what I do).

1 and 4 (which are basically the same) are basically doomed to fail unless you relentlessly keep up with changing SJW jargon and shibboleths. If you don't then you'll get sniffed out pretty quickly by those who do, and fakers are generally viewed pretty negatively. You probably won't be cancelled outright by doing this, but people might avoid you and think you're weird which could hurt you in some ways. It also sucks to live a blatant lie.

Absolutely never, EVER do number 5. Maybe you have some degree of protection at a university, but plenty of people will dislike you nonetheless. It's not just being cancelled that you have to worry about, it's what people do behind your back as well. People could spread rumors that screw with your reputation, deprioritize you for promotions or other perks, refuse collaboration, or some people who you've barely interacted with could actively try to sabotage you. Initially you might think 5 is fine when nothing overtly bad happens, but sooner or later (maybe months, maybe years) you'll hear that somebody succeeded in hurting you without you even having realized it.

I've tried all of these strategies myself and I'm certain that 2 is by far the best.

I'm pretty far-right when it comes to gender discussions, but it's hard not to basically agree with this response. From men's perspective most women are vapid and a bad investment, but it's very easy to turn it to women's perspective say bad things about men too. It's not fair to simply demand one gender change their behaviors; any lasting resolution would need to come from compromise like somehow reinstituting traditional marriage structures.

What vague statements and perceived motivations am I "ignoring"?

What?

Well, "evidence" is probably the wrong word here as I said in my first post. It's referring to the vague statements and perceived motivations of the actors involved, like the stuff you posted 2 posts up.

I agree that the US certainly didn't like the pipeline, because it correctly grasped the dangers of dependency on Russian gas. A lot of the pro-Russia accounts like to treat Biden's "we will put an end to it" statement as an ominous threat or smoking gun, when it was actually referring to a secret deal where Biden agreed to remove sanctions on NS2 if Germany agreed to end the pipeline if Russia invaded.

You're selectively gathering statements that fit your preconceived notion of what you think happened, ignoring evidence to the contrary, and then passing the resulting conclusion on as established fact. If someone wanted to do that in the opposite direction and say that Russia sabotaged their own pipeline, it would look like this.

For the record, I certainly think it's plausible that the US could have bombed the pipeline, either as part of the secret treaty with Germany (i.e. with Scholtz's knowledge), or the US might have looked the other way as one of the anti-Russian Eastern European countries did it (Poland, Ukraine, Baltics, or some combination thereof). If we ever get more convincing knowledge of who did the bombing, I personally doubt that the operation will look particularly close to what Hersh has described here.

There's a response to this further in the Twitter thread.

Anyone who considers themselves a rationalist should have wide error bars on their conclusions for the pipeline bombing. Previously, there had been basically no evidence one way or the other as to who did it. People were just guessing based on their priors, which is fine, but being supremely confident in those guesses is bad epistemic hygiene.

This claim by Hersh is fairly weak evidence. The main problems:

  • Its only evidence is a single anonymous source. Journalists use anonymous sources all the time, but it still makes it less credible than someone who's willing to stake their reputation on the claim. Some of Hersh's previous claims (like his ridiculous Bin Laden story) used anonymous sources, but the claims crumbled under internal contradictions.

  • Most of the story is unfalsifiable.

  • One of the few bits that could actually be falsified, doesn't support Hersh's claim.

I'm not saying this claim is guaranteed to be wrong, but it needs a lot more evidence before it's convincing.

Of course I already see the people married to the opposite conclusion trying to discredit the journalist (on of the most decorated and impactful journalists of all time

Yeah, obviously, because how much you believe this story is based entirely on Hersh's reputation. Most of this story cannot be verified, so you're trusting that Hersh did his due diligence on this anonymous source to make sure they weren't a Russian agent or some nobody that was blowing smoke out of their ass. Hersh's previous work should be concerning in this regard. He's a journalist who seeks to attack US foreign policy no matter what. He'll always err on seeing the US as the Big Bad. Sometimes this leads to him being right like with Mai Lai, other times it leads him to be wrong like with Bin Laden or Syrian chemical weapons.

You're just more likely to trust him because he's claiming something that conforms to your preconceptions.

the woke seem to be predisposed to latch on takes like ... all blacks are criminals

In what universe do the woke subscribe to this take?

The term "war" generally means having many soldiers from both sides shooting at each other. Since there aren't NATO troops directly shooting at the Russians, the term "war" is indeed misleading. You could qualify it by calling it a "proxy war" which reasonable people could disagree on, but just referring to it as "Nato's war with Russia" is wrong.

The term "mercenary" refers to soldiers who fight for money. If they aren't paid, they'll refuse to fight. It was clear shortly after the onset of the conflict that the Ukrainian nation was going to fight regardless of whether the West gave them money. Sure, the money helped stabilize the economy and buy more arms, but Ukraine isn't fighting as part of a get-rich-quick scheme, it's fighting to survive.

You are mangling definitions to use the noncentral fallacy to try to inappropriately attach negative moral valence to political causes you disagree with. There's almost no practical difference between what you're doing here, and, say, wokists redefining the term "racism" as "power + privilege" to ensure that only white people can ever be "racist". Words have meanings, and we should all avoid abusing the dictionary to suit our political purposes.

The US never had a security guarantee with Ukraine, so this doesn't particularly impact the validity of formal security guarantees with NATO or countries like South Korea or Japan.

The prohibition on accepting members with ongoing disputes is another indicator that NATO doesn't want to deal with open conflicts. It's not indicative by itself, but it's another piece of evidence pointing to one side.

should act in according with your collection of beliefs

Viewing the situation from a neutral lens shows the vast majority of substantive Western (especially American) actions after 2008 and 2014 as long-term acceptance of Ukraine's status as not being part of NATO. Rejecting Ukraine's calls to join the alliance for almost a decade isn't "believing an adversary should believe according to your beliefs" as you accuse me of doing, rather it's very basic geopolitical signaling. If blocking NATO expansion near Russia's borders was the primary concern, Putin would have been much more focused on Finland and Sweden which NATO very much did want to join for a long time. Finland might have been perceived as having a more robust military than Ukraine, but in terms of likeliness of joining NATO, it's also far, far higher. Instead, Putin hand-waved the threat away when it materialized.

One could dismiss all past evidence and signaling regarding NATO and say they'd still leap to accept Ukraine if Russia experienced a moment of weakness; one could dismiss the larger threat of Finland and Sweden joining NATO by claiming Putin (mistakenly) thought Ukraine would be much easier to occupy; One could dismiss Putin's eventual annexation of Ukrainian territories as just a consolation prize. But it's hard to argue with Putin's own words written shortly before the invasion, which puts the situation into perspective: NATO expansion was a secondary issue at most, and the invasion was more about empire building. It was about "reuniting the Triune Russian people", i.e. making Ukraine subservient to Russia in much more than just policies towards NATO.

Any number of things could change with the passage of time, but this particular issue hadn't changed in three election cycles, and there was no domestic push for it to, nor was there any indication that there would be (e.g. Obama's "pivot to Asia", Trump's focus on China and friendliness to Russia).

The 2008 declaration's intentions died when Russia invaded Georgia, which is why Ukraine still didn't have a Membership Action Plan to join NATO almost a decade and a half after that declaration.

You're treating Ukraine's admittance to NATO as an inevitability. It never was, especially after the conflict in the Donbas got started, and then frozen. NATO's membership criteria explicitly prohibits admittance for nations with active territorial disputes. The West was in no hurry to help Ukraine resolve this dispute. Wars always carry big risks, and Putin didn't have to take them in Ukraine's case specifically for its admittance to NATO, because, again, NATO wasn't an option at this point, and hadn't been for over a decade.

Uh, because it sorta takes the wind out of the sails of the argument that Russia started the war to keep Ukraine out of NATO? NATO membership wasn't even an option for Ukraine when Russia invaded, and it hadn't been for over a decade at that point. The US wouldn't let them in.

This guy appears to be more of a normie than a policy wonk, so I'll not pretend like he's a steelman of Russian opinions or anything. Goodness knows there are tons of Westerners who'd have similarly silly views on certain topics. Coherent political views are a skill like any other, and very few people rigorously test theirs enough to go toe-to-toe with people who do, like on this site.

That said, his perspective of "this is a defensive war against NATO" is still silly. I've debated plenty of pro-Russian posters both here and on other websites, and one consistent point that they don't even try to defend is the inciting incident of this war, i.e. how there really wasn't one. Sure, there are plenty of long-term irreconcilable issues between Russia and the West. But as for what prompted Russia to invade now... well Putin just woke up one morning and decided he wanted to. That's it. Ukraine was not close to becoming a part of NATO, and probably won't even be able to join NATO even if Russia loses. The US and European countries implied through inaction that they were more or less OK with the frozen conflict in the Donbas stretching on indefinitely. More and more attention was being paid to China as the ultimate threat instead of Russia. Germany was happy paying billions of dollars for Russian oil and gas. Relations were frosty, but things were OK between the two sides, before Russia decided to flip the table over in its "defensive" invasion.

Fascinating stuff, as always.

Oh yeah, I completely forgot about Moldova. They almost certainly could have been next, given the situation in Transnistria and the fact that a decent chunk of the population is relatively pro-Russian.

Your first two points are just a Mearsheimer-esque restatement of the "blame the US for everything bad in the world" philosophy. It's "boo outgroup!" dressed up in academic jargon that paints equivalent actions from the US as evil and unjustified, while those originating from Russia are claimed to be reasonable and defensive.

The US-led democratic world order cannot be upheld by the US alone. It requires buy-in from Europe and democracies in Asia. A Russia that didn't become entrenched in liberal institutions like the EU was always going to try to reassemble the borders of the Soviet Union, as it's basically a geographic imperative. This puts it at odds with the democracies of Europe, which thus puts it at odds with the US. Sure, the Russia of today is corrupt, has a relatively small economy, and has deep institutional failings, but the same could be said of the USSR, which was still enough of a match to be the US's primary antagonist for decades.

Increased gas revenues are not a major benefit to the US. Obsession with US gas is an element of pro-Russian propaganda to try to insinuate that the US somehow baited Russia into invading as a dastardly ploy to get rich off Europe's weakened bargaining position. In reality, gas is only a tiny element of the US economy, the vast majority of Europe's new gas isn't coming from the US, and the primary reason Europe was vulnerable to Putin's gas blackmail in the first place was because German Greens decided to scrap the country's nuclear reactors.

The main advantage is that it pushes the US and Europe closer together, hampering efforts by China to split the alliance. It also weakens the US's second most pressing adversary, one which was almost certainly always going to try carve out a slice of Europe for itself no matter what. Putin just jumped the gun and did it before the US was distracted with a crisis in Asia which will almost certainly happen in the next 10-20 years. Better to get it over with now while the US's hands are free than have to deal with both simultaneously.

I don't necessarily think Estonia would have been next considering its explicitly under the American nuclear umbrella, but a place like Finland could have been plausible, especially if Ukraine went smoothly to free up the Russian army to deal with Finland before it could join the alliance.

Yep, that about sums it up.

Interesting perspective, but that's almost certainly attributing more coordination and Machiavellian aptitude to the organization than NATO actually has. It's still the traditional worry about "escalation", along with Germany's domestic politics making it a perpetual stick-in-the-mud.

Not who you responded to, but I'll answer anyways. It's certainly plausible that Ukraine successfully counterattacks, but hardly a forgone conclusion.

A stalemate around the current battle lines would be a draw of sorts, but more of a win for Ukraine than Russia. Remember that Russia's original goals were a complete decapitation of the current democratic Ukrainian government, and to effectively turn the country into a Belarussian-style puppet state. At the very least, they would have preferred to federalize the country to retain influence so it couldn't be used as (what Putin perceives as) a threat. That option is basically gone now, and even if Russia recaptures Kherson and even Kharkov they'd still have to contend with the rest of Ukraine, which will hate Russia for the next century. Ukraine might be economically and politically diminished to some degree in such a case, but that's still not a "win" for Russia in any grand sense.

I'm curious to hear what you think of his analysis on the Ukrainian counteroffensive at Izium.

It is obvious why Ukraine would want to dislodge Russia from Izyum. This would simplify and secure lines of communication to Slovyansk and greatly complicate the Russian push in the Donbas by freeing Ukraine’s northern flank. To achieve this, they are attempting a thrust toward Kupyansk, with the aim of cutting the line connecting Izyum to Belgorod in the north. This operation, I believe, is doomed to spectacular failure.

He wrote this on September 9th... and Izium fell to Ukraine two days later.

But I doubt I'll actually get a response. You linked a blatant propaganda account to claim Ukraine is doomed, and have refused to respond to anyone who's called you out on it.

From my discussions with Ukrainians and Russians, it was commonly understood before the war that Ukraine was actually far more corrupt than Russia was. It also doesn't have any resources like you pointed out. Belarus doesn't either, but it gets subsidized with cheap oil/gas from Russia to help its economic growth.

Corruption and the low growth it brings are difficult to change, but not impossible. And if there's anything to catalyze change, an existential war has to be one of the best. After the war, there's going to be a massive political push from Ukraine and likely the broader EU to get Ukraine entrenched in Western institutions like the EU and maybe NATO. A precondition for this is anti-corruption reforms, which could plausibly put Ukraine on the same path as Poland.

Turkey and Serbia's accession bids stalled because the political will to join the EU died out in both countries before they could join. That's not going to be the case in Ukraine.

The Baltic states are practically begging for immigrants, yet nobody wants to go there when they could go to richer countries like Germany, France, or the UK instead. There might be some limited "migrant burden sharing plan" that means a few immigrants end up in Ukraine, but I wouldn't expect a lot of them until Ukraine completely overhauls its economy and society.