gattsuru
2yr ago
I recall something similar happening when I last was looking for Minecraft launchers. One of them was reasonably recommended, but the latest commit had deleted a woke code of conduct. Ooo, scary—oh. He also booted anyone he thought was too left-leaning from the permissions. There goes the neighborhood.
To be fair to the broader Minecraft community there, launchers by necessity have to have the ability to run arbitrary Java code with a pretty minimal level of sandboxing: there's a lot of harm that can and has happened through supply chain attacks. Booting a lot of maintainers has been one of the warning signs for a GitHub compromise.
If you want a real spicy version, I'd point to how LexManos got kicked out of leadership roles.
I tend toward inclusionism in the Gwern sense: I can understand the problems that arise when not filtering for quality or subject matter focus, but I think on average the sort of people who moderate decisions about that tend to overcorrect. So I'm not sure how much value my opinion would hold. Even within that constraint, I think it depends on the purpose of the rule.
Is the rule against literal veneers? There's a reddit thing (eg) where people will throw a Pride or trans flag (sometimes with poorly-executed paint) onto something, charitably to celebrate Pride, less charitably for karma farming. This isn't in that set; even the lowest-quality story is still actually a story of its own, in the setting, if sometimes not especially good even by the low standards of BattleTech writing.
Is the rule about avoiding specific current-day events at the object level? The anthology doesn't have a bunch of stories set in the 1990s or 2000s, with some sprinkles of BattleTech flavor. ((This might seem like a bar set low enough for earthworms, but I'll point to If You Were A Dinosaur My Love.)) Masquerade and Old Wounds, Old Words are probably the weakest, since the main character's background as an arena fighter and recent war college graduate, respectively, more drive the story than actually show up in it. But Small is about infantry versus a Mech, Test Drive is about stealing a mech (even if one step involves squicking out some Clan-sphere bandits with the idea of 'free love'), and Dragon Slayer a set of Elementals (power armor) against a conventional mech.
I'd probably give Old Words as clearly acting as a proxy for political discussion -- a large part of the crux rotates around two characters discussing various terms for religious taboos, afaict all real-world ones rather than BattleTech ones -- and put down a maybe for Masquerade. I'd probably put 60% BattleTech as more than enough for a link, but I'm not the one making the call.
Is the rule to avoid unnecessary political discussion, when not necessary for the BattleTech content? I don't think any of the stories actually needed the LGBT stuff to be successful stories; Dragon Slayer in particular feels a little like it got crowbarred in, and Small you could miss if you were speed-reading. I'm not sure how interesting Old Wounds Old Words would be if stripped from any real-world historical context, but people do read LitRPG or learn how to speak Klingon. The anthology as-is would flunk it, but then again, so would a lot of writing -- firearms and military tactics as well as their real-world ramifications are pretty common in a setting like this, Clanners have a caste system that lends to some very obvious metaphors a lot of people touch -- and I don't think it'd be a reasonable rule.
gattsuru
2yr ago
I'm not sure how accurate the summary here is, but from a quick look at the anthology, I expect that the previous moderation team was not particularly focused on the 1988-rule at the time.
gattsuru
2yr ago
Woodworking as very white, conservative, and higher-income hobby has been a meme for a while, although I don't know how many actual woodworkers (eg Katz-Moses, Matt Estlea, etc) or even CNC spammers in the YouTube sphere care, and the smaller profile of the community makes it less relevant for the sort of people looking for status to hollow out and wear like a skin suit.
There's been some PRIDE-style stuff, both of the productive and defined-by-opposition variants (tbf, including my own attempts, though the stuff I can link isn't as rainbowy as the stuff I won't). But it's definitely less assumed that it's the sort of thing that Must Be Announced as in the broader Maker sphere, rather than someone's own personal interests.
gattsuru
2yr ago
You're more likely to have heard of it under the MechWarrior or MechCommander name (used for games, some books), as opposed to BattleTech (some RPGs, some books) or Battledroids (original tabletop game, largely dropped post-1986).
1: All posts must be BattleTech related
We allow anything, as long as it is talking about BattleTech. If you don't like something, downvote it or filter it out.
However, it is not appropriate to use BattleTech as a veneer to discuss the real world, politics, or current events in this subreddit.
The year 1988 serves as a line when it comes to judging whether a post is about BattleTech, or using BattleTech as an excuse to discuss the real world, politics, or current events. Users may attempt to rectify this deficiency by including additional statements focusing on and generating discussion about BattleTech (and likewise the more discussion about real-world events, the more it weighs against the topic). The farther away from that line towards the present a real-world event mentioned is, the more the topic is presumptively about the real world and not about BattleTech, and the higher the burden.
This covers everything from mechs painted in flag patterns, topical issues, and everything else real-world.
Battletech's a little weird because it's technically an alternate history/future setting, even if most players or readers (especially of the MechWarrior stuff) would be surprised to hear that. While the play focus is usually around giant robots fighting interstellar wars somewhere in the 3000s, officially the branching point was the fall of the Soviet Union in 2011, with the resulting differences in interstate politics leading to development of a functional fusion reactor in 2018 and (eventually) the titular mecha and faster-than-light travel.
It would be very rare for pre-divergence issues to end up relevant for a discussion, but it's at least imaginable: several of the Houses for Inner Sphere are both pastiches of and descended from real-world states. But a political discussion of an event that occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union doesn't really make sense from a lore perspective; the setting expects such an extreme divergence within just a few years that it's unlikely almost any specific event occurred in both cases.
((I don't know how effective this was.))
gattsuru
2yr ago
From the lower court decision:
But there were rumors that drivers would not work on August 19 (ed: the day of the strike and concrete loss). Because of these rumors, both Glacier and GLY wanted assurances from the union that the mat pour would be serviced if scheduled. At Glacier’s request, Ted Herb, GLY president, called Hicks around 12:35 p.m. on August 18 to discuss whether the drivers would be available that night and early the next morning to service the mat pour. Herb alleged that Hicks told him that “‘[t]he drivers have been instructed to respond to dispatch’” and that “‘[w]e have specifically instructed the drivers to respond to dispatch.’” CP at 1648. After Herb told Glacier of Hicks’s assurances, Glacier remained concerned about drivers servicing the mat pour, and it requested that Herb call Hicks again. Herb refused this request, as he was confident in Hicks’s response because Hicks had given him the same answer twice. Glacier never spoke directly with Hicks, and Hicks denies making these statements.
In Hicks’s deposition, he denied providing any instructions to drivers about when to return to work and specifically denied telling Herb that he had told drivers to report to work on Saturday, August 19. A driver testified that Hicks told the members to go back to work on Monday, August 21. For purposes of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to Glacier as the nonmoving party and thus accept as true that Hicks made the alleged statements.
That is, we don't know, and there is no strong evidence either way at this stage. Because Teamsters 174 were the group motioning to dismiss, the motion to dismiss was reviewed assuming Glacier's statements were true. The actual questions of fact would be reviewed during the later trial itself, to whatever extent is possible.
gattsuru
2yr ago
At least as a legal question, this case was not about whether the strike could happen, but whether the union could be held liable in a civil context for damages caused by the protest.
gattsuru
2yr ago
As other pointed out the issue wasn't about the strike per-se but rather whether the Union had deliberately damaged equipment and if so whether that damage was protected speech.
To be more precise, whether the state tort to recover damages was implicitly precluded by federal law. This implicates the NLRB's statutory right to strike (technically, "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,") rather than direct First Amendment principles; afaik, neither the SCOTUS question nor the lower court opinion rested on speech matters.
The surgical part is questionable, I don't think it's pushed quite as hard as most people fear, but isn't the rest of it... straight up the WPATH recommendations (linking Gattsuru's summary because I trust him and the version comparison highlights Jarjar's point IMO)?
To be clear, I think a fair read of v7 and v8 requires at least some graduated timeline from social presentation and hormone therapy to (some) surgical interventions (albeit 'suggested' as six months for adults in v8), rather than "immediately", and that in practice hormone therapy for now does tend to have a short delay after initial diagnosis. These standards do still leave the possibility that some people will either discontinue or stop at only social or social/hormonal therapy without surgical intervention (not explicitly stated as a non-binary thing, but it's sometimes a non-binary thing), though v8 does look to largely preclude a efforts to mitigate dysphoria without at least social transition.
It's a little messy because "[if] you spend a lot of time wondering if you might be trans, those are all pretty good signs that you are in fact trans" and "I had a gender crisis and end up back where I started" are things that absolutely common and compatible positions for a lot of the modern progressive movement. I think this is more a matter of failures of communication than a true or deep paradox, but in turn I'm not sure the social conservative complaints to an integrated syzygy of those two statements would look terribly different.
For parental rights... the situation depends a lot on jursidiction. Most cases tend to involve general Bad Parenting in addition to gender stuff, though it's hard to tell whether that's a legal principle or hard cases making messy law or simply divorce courts and child services taking the better part of valor.
I upvoted and agree with this NYSPRA post as a factual matter (modulo some technical uncertainties I listed in reply), and it’s not wrong as a prediction. But I think the difference in subject matter focus to Nybbler’s concerns illuminates a ton of the disagreement in this sphere.
gattsuru
2yr ago
Bruen has had some impact, although at some point I do need to point out some of the state legislative and lower court massive resistance as a response to huadpe (though in turn, I expect huadpe will point to the absence of any Kim-Davis-level j'refuse). The first Sackett v EPA and Masterpiece Cakeshop were pretty overt and intentional punts (as was Fulton v City of Philadelphia and a few other noticable ones); .
But, yes, agreed more on the object level, here. We already have a lot of very strong examples of racially discriminatory preferences being explicitly banned, and then people simply jumping to the next pretense, just as we have a lot of examples of 'successful' courageous court cases over religious discrimination that have simply resulted in a shell game.
gattsuru
2yr ago
No, as I have shown repeatedly, the definition of wetlands has not changed. Yes, the "borders have been subject to 50 years of nazel-gazing argument" but the definition has not.
The definition of wetlands has never been the relevant prong, and the OP you're stuffing words into never used the term and may not even have been aware of it. The borders of "navigable waters of the United States" is what determines the EPA's regulatory authority here, as made clear by the literal first lines of the decision.
Yes, but the question is, what, according to the EPA, makes the Sacketts property "waters"? The answer is that the EPA claims that property contains "wetlands."
No, because simply having "wetlands" or "waters" is (allegedly) not sufficient for coverage under the EPA's CWA claims. From the opinion:
At the time, the EPA interpreted “the waters of the United States” to include “[a]ll . . . waters” that “could affect interstate or foreign commerce,” as well as “[w]etlands adjacent” to those waters. 40 CFR §§230.3(s)(3), (7) (2008). “[A]djacent” was defined to mean not just “bordering” or “contiguous,” but also “neighboring.” §230.3(b). Agency guidance instructed officials to assert jurisdiction over wetlands “adjacent” to non-navigable tributaries when those
wetlands had “a significant nexus to a traditional navigable water.”6 A “significant nexus” was said to exist when “ ‘wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity’ ” of those waters. 2007 Guidance 8 (emphasis added). In looking for evidence of a “significant nexus,” field agents were told to consider a wide range of open-ended hydrological and ecological factors.
The EPA claims that these lands counted as "navigable waters of the United States" for CWA jurisdictional purposes because they were both wetlands and had a "significant nexus" to "non-navigable tributaries". And, notably, the court opinion here assumes that they are "wetlands" for CWA purposes. But even the relevance of a "significant nexus" is pulled directly from Rapanos, well after the 1980s, nor is it the sole change to definitions of "navigable waters of the United States".
((Nor is "wetlands" necessary: see the 2003 Guidance's [Tributaries of Tributaries] rule.))
In this case, the EPA's position required "navigable waters" to commute across several steps. To take the summary from the opinion:
According to the EPA, the “wetlands” on the Sacketts’ lot are “adjacent to” (in the sense that they are in the same neighborhood as) what it described as an “unnamed tributary” on the other side of a 30-foot road. App. 33. That tributary feeds into a non-navigable creek, which, in turn, feeds into Priest Lake, an intrastate body of water that the EPA designated as traditionally navigable. To establish a significant nexus, the EPA lumped the Sacketts’ lot together with the Kalispell Bay Fen, a large nearby wetland complex that the Agency regarded as “similarly situated.” According to the EPA, these properties, taken together, “significantly affect” the ecology of Priest Lake. Therefore, the EPA concluded, the Sacketts had illegally dumped soil and gravel onto “the waters of the United States.”
EPA evaluation of the Sackett property's CWA status depends not just on the lot being a wetlands, but also that it is "adjacent" to a tributary despite the presence of a wide road in the middle, and that it matters that the tributary feeds a non-navigable creek. A lot of these rules had changed, and that doesn't just matter for the Sacketts.
I do note that although the language you italicize re "All waters adjacent to a water identified in paragraphs (1)(i) through (v)" is not literally the same as it was in 1980, it does not appear to be substantively different, because in 1980 the regs said that waters of the US include "Wetlands adjacent to waters identified in paragraphs (t)(1)-(5) of this section."
Trivially "all waters adjacent to a water" and "wetlands adjacent to waters" is actually a pretty big difference!
Beyond that, the definition of "adjacent" changed, too, and remember that adjacency was required. Both definitions use "bordering, contiguous, or neighboring", but the 2015 version specifically said adjacency did not require they be "located laterally", and defined "neighboring" to include being within 100 feet of a high water marker (1500 feet in 100-year floodplains); these components were totally absent from the 1986 version. And that's just that one prong.
gattsuru
2yr ago
My claim is that the definition of wetlands has not changed, because that was the definition to which OP was referring, even if OP is too ignorant to understand that.
So you were stuffing words in his mouth while being wrong yourself?
As I stated in my initial response, navigable waters includes, but is not limited to, "wetlands", and the definition of "wetlands" has not changed.
No, again, "navigable waters" does not include all "wetlands" as an full set, and to my knowledge has never done so across 50 years of regulatory interpretation despite the best efforts of the EPA. And "navigable waters" (or "waters of the United States") is the relevant term that describes the limits of the EPA's jurisdiction for Clean Water Act purposes. The law and regulation prohibits discharge of pollutants on "navigable waters" of the United States, and these only include those defined in 40 CFR 120. You know, the thing that you've been quoting repeatedly for the definition of "wetlands"? Except it does not have, under its definitions of the "waters of the United States", a simple line of just "a) wetlands (all of them, really)".
It includes some wetlands, whose borders have been subject to 50 years of nazel-gazing argument. It does not include every wetland, nor does it in practice often act as the primary constraint on whether specific lands fall under the CWA.
And if "wetlands" does not include "any land on which there is any standing water at any time of the year," then what part does?
Well, for the 2015 version and for the very specific question of the Sacketts, "all waters located within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section where they are determined on a case-specific basis to have a significant nexus to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section", given that the Sacketts were within 4000 feet of Priest Lake.
For the 2022 one: "Intrastate lakes and ponds, streams, or wetlands not identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section: (i) That are relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water with a continuous surface connection to the waters identified in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(3)(i) of this section; or (ii) That either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of waters identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section."
For the 2023 one:
- All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation, or destruction of which would or could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
i. Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; or ii. From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
iii. Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce;[...]
- Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section;
There's a fair criticism that this is not literally any land with any standing water at any time of the year. There is not a fair criticism that the relevant parts of the regulation have stayed static, just because one part of one term has not been redefined. Wetlands (and in some versions, ponds) have had massive revisions in how connected they must be to other waters before they fall under the EPA (and Army Corp of Engineers) jurisdiction for CWA purposes, separate from whether they were literally wetlands (or, for some rules, ponds, and playas, and yada yada).
And, btw, what part of that 2015 reg is new, as opposed to a repeat of language that has been around for 40 years (such as, yes, the definition of "wetlands" on p. 37106)?
Literally the entire section I quoted. That's why I was quoting them, to contrast the differences. You can see the big sections I'm quoting, right? Not being obliterated by CSS issues or bad screen contrast? I tried leaving some as inline quotes in this post in case it helps.
Well, the definition that I cited is exactly the same now as it was in 1980, and is exactly the same as what the Court says it was a few years later. So unless they changed it, then changed it back to the exact original language, my inference that the definition had no modifications since the 1980s is perfectly reasonable.
The rule is not the simple definition of "wetlands", and the regulation you've quoted but not linked makes that clear when read in full:
(a) Waters of the United States means:...
(4) Wetlands adjacent to the following waters:
(i) Waters identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section; or
(ii) Relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water identified in paragraph (a)(2) or (a)(3)(i) of this section and with a continuous surface connection to those waters; or
(iii) Waters identified in paragraph (a)(2) or (3) of this section when the wetlands either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of waters identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section;
(with some later exceptions)
These regulations do not require merely whether the land is a "wetland" under the CWA's definition, because not all wetlands are covered; if they are not adjacent to (a)(1) waters (aka territorial, interstate, or interstate commerce), adjacent to relatively permanent waters with a continuous surface connection, or wetlands "significantly affect"ing (a)(1) waters.
More importantly, this component has changed: see 2020, where "adjacent wetlands" has its own separate definition section, or 1986 where the "waters of the United States" rule had a section for intrastate wetlands where "the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters" until they were largely invalidated by SWANCC v Army Corps) (focusing directly on the Migratory Bird Rule as a particular extension of the "affect interstate or foreign commerce" interpretation) and Rapanos.
The 2015 rule was... a bit of a clusterfuck, even in its final form (ed: with irrelevant sections excised):
... the term ‘‘waters of the United States’’ means:
(i) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(ii) All interstate waters, including interstate wetlands;[...]
(v) All tributaries, as defined in paragraph (3)(iii) of this definition, of waters identified in paragraphs (1)(i) through (iii) of this definition;
(vi) All waters adjacent to a water identified in paragraphs (1)(i) through (v) of this definition, including wetlands, ponds, lakes, oxbows, impoundments, and similar waters;
(vii) All waters in paragraphs (1)(vii)(A) through (E) of this definition where they are determined, on a case- specific basis, to have a significant nexus to a water identified in paragraphs (1)(i) through (iii) of this definition. The waters identified in each of paragraphs (1)(vii)(A) through (E) of this definition are similarly situated and shall be combined, for purposes of a significant nexus analysis, in the watershed that drains to the nearest water identified in paragraphs (1)(i) through (iii) of this definition. Waters identified in this paragraph shall not be combined with waters identified in paragraph (1)(vi) of this definition when performing a significant nexus analysis. If waters identified in this paragraph are also an adjacent water under paragraph (1)(vi), they are an adjacent water and no case-specific significant nexus analysis is required.
(A) Prairie potholes. Prairie potholes are a complex of glacially formed wetlands, usually occurring in depressions that lack permanent natural outlets, located in the upper Midwest. [geographically removed examples excised...]
(viii) All waters located within the 100-year floodplain of a water identified in paragraphs (1)(i) through (iii) of this definition and all waters located within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark of a water identified in paragraphs (1)(i) through (v) of this definition where they are determined on a case-specific basis to have a significant nexus to a water identified in paragraphs (1)(i) through (iii) of this definition. For waters determined to have a significant nexus, the entire water is a water of the United States if a portion is located within the 100-year floodplain of a water identified in paragraphs (1)(i) through (iii) of this definition or within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark. Waters identified in this paragraph shall not be combined with waters identified in paragraph (1)(vi) of this definition when performing a significant nexus analysis. If waters identified in this paragraph are also an adjacent water under paragraph (1)(vi) of this definition, they are an adjacent water and no case-specific significant nexus analysis is required.
wwwweeeeee, that's a fun read. But for a tl;dr, it required only that "wetlands" be used in interstate commerce, be interstate, be adjacent to interstate waters or those subject to the flow of the tide, or have a significant nexus to one of the above waters and be in either a 100-year floodplain or 400 feet of a high-water mark or be within certain geographic types (Idaho, mostly prarie potholes). (Some exceptions not relevant here.)
This isn't literally every place that has standing water, fair! There's a specific exception for puddles! (Slightly snarky of one.) But this very clearly isn't the 1986 rule, or the pre-1986 rule, not least of all it's specifically written to respond to Rapanos.
OP made a claim that "Biden's EPA . . . attempted to define the navigable waters of the united states to mean any land on which there is any standing water at any time of the year." What can that possibly mean, other than, other than a claim about what constitutes "wetlands,"...
Well, at the risk of stating the obvious, a claim about what is defined as a navigable water, emphasis added by you. Again, if your claim was that the definition of the navigable waters used against the Sacketts in 2007 predated the Biden administration, you're quite right! If you want to say that the term navigable is a bit of an afterthought that remains due to the history of 33 USC 1344, and the various rules really modified the definition of "waters" that navigable waters then used, sure, if perhaps procedural enough to be boring. But if your claim is that the definition of the navigable waters has not changed or that we care solely on the definition of "wetlands" no further limitations, than there's literally dozens of pages of NPM and Final Rule showing your error. And these definitions are at the crux of the case here.
gattsuru
2yr ago
To be fair, the enforcement action against the Sacketts started in 2007 (that is, the Bush admin); they were probably meant to cement down a post-Rapanos expansive rule that covered any waters with a 'significant nexus' to navigable waters. And Rapanos was, in addition to being the sorta guy that just made a delightful punching bag, also meant to cement down a 1989-era redefinition (ie, HW Bush or Reagan) that was nearly as broad, in turn.
gattsuru
2yr ago
There's a lot of good policy arguments in favor of more specific and expansive regulations for more specifically dangerous materials. There are even good policy arguments in favor of regulating large changes to water runoff, including those done by the safest construction sand and gravel -- you can fuck up a lot of ecology with a giant dam, after all, and even without a basement the typical house is a large dam.
Some of these regulations exist, either at the federal level in other laws, or in some or all states. But it is easier to redefine things.
gattsuru
2yr ago
To be fair, a lot of wetlands plants are pretty hardy, if only because the definition is so expansive. You're probably thinking cattails or mangroves that require regular inundation to thrive, but the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers includes a broader framework of plants that merely require highly hydrated soils, including some dogwoods and willows.
That frame of logic was part of the reasoning some previous short-lived attempts at very expansive definitions of 'wetlands' (eg, in the late 1980s, must have seven consecutive days water no more than 18 inches underground).
gattsuru
2yr ago
A bit. At the very least, there's a ton of history here crossing 50 years across multiple political allegiances and a lot of 'non-political' regulation well before the Biden or Obama administrations. But not as much as gdanning's response suggests.
The OP's claim was that :
Biden's EPA, which had attempted to define the navigable waters of the united states to mean any land on which there is any standing water at any time of the year.
Ignoring for now the nitpick that what the Biden (and Obama) EPA attempted and what made it into the final rule don't have to be the same thing, the Sackett property pictures in the lower court opinion seems to be a literal case of an environment where areas that had standing water only for a part of the year.
EDIT: to be clear, I think pushing back about it being certainly including any land which had any standing water for any time would be somewhat reasonable, but your implication that the current rule either a) had no modifications since the 1980s, or b) depended solely on the term wetlands, is not reasonable.
If the law isn't stopping the crooks/gang-bangers from carrying weapons, why should it stop you?
There's a pretty obvious answer, and I think it rounds a lot of the conversation. Trivially, the crooks and gang-bangers are a good deal more willing to shoot at the cops than I am; before that point, they've built a lot of their infrastructure and systems around evading or delaying police. Those are not things that only crooks and gang-bangers can do.
Do you want the broader conservative movement to start thinking in that framework? Because there's no particular reason to stop at merely ignoring the law when it's set against you: the logic very quickly leaps from un'lawful' concealed carry or fucking with their taxes to going full Goetz to infrastructure attacks that I'm pointedly not going to describe in detail here.
I likely don't have your capacity for red team considerations... but I'm not a Blue Triber; I have enough. But I also have seen what and how badly that goes for everyone involved, and it's a pin you can't put back in the grenade once it's an option for enough people.
I would like to find another solution, if one is available.
gattsuru
2yr ago
The site's google maps location is available here. The statute's definition to directly quote the opinion "the CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into only “navigable waters,” which it defines as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,” 33 U. S. C. §§1311(a), 1362(7), (12)(A) (2018 ed.)".
The EPA's ability to literally ever find standing water ever seem more an example of the problem rather than a defense, unless you think the Congress of 1972 meant to include happy meal toys in their concept of navigable, and not care whether it'd have to teleport through dirt to go anywhere.
Beyond stigma, some part of Pride was also about Raising Awareness, and in the literal sense rather than the crude fundraising schlock of a Pink Ribbon campaign, and there are still places where a slightly more useful understanding and awareness would be helpful. I've had a coworker gently inform me that a pilot wasn't always a woman, and this was probably meant well than an intentional break from norms, but a lot of his description still at best reflected a pretty bad misunderstanding of what happened there. And events like Pride, rather than movements like Pride, are slightly more useful ways to resolve this than actually revealing my power level to a coworker. The trans stuff is more overt, simply because most people didn't know at all about trans stuff a decade ago, a lot of it's very private, and it's still something that's really outside the realm of discussion for most normies, but it's not the only place.
But more generally, something something parades are civil rites. Quite separate from any overt or direct political goals, there are benefits to having open-air Schelling Points for celebrations.
((And, yes, some people are using them to make often ham-fisted attacks on their enemies or to be annoying.))
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