I appreciate you taking the time to engage seriously. That said, I think there’s a key distinction you’re missing.
First, it’s natural that I focus more on China’s actions. I’m Chinese. If a war breaks out across the strait, it could directly disrupt my life, my plans, my family’s future. Of course that weighs more heavily on my mind than the tragedy of Ukraine, which, while terrible, doesn’t immediately threaten me.
Second, I think you’re conflating very different dynamics under the umbrella of the “security dilemma.”
• Ukraine reaching out to NATO was a small country trying to secure its survival against a regional hegemon.
• U.S. deployment in Taiwan would be a global superpower extending military infrastructure directly into another major state’s core security zone.
These aren’t symmetrical. The actors, scale, and power dynamics are fundamentally different. Equating them as the same type of rational move erases the imbalance of power involved.
Lastly, when you frame Western support for Ukraine in terms of “the tangible security benefits of thousands of dead Russians,” it exposes a very narrow view of security—focused on enemy casualties rather than long-term strategic stability.
Real security gains aren’t about counting corpses. They’re about shaping the regional balance, undermining adversaries’ capacity for future aggression, and stabilizing your own influence network.
If we can’t differentiate between those layers, any discussion about security dilemmas risks collapsing into just “whose kill count is higher,” which I think we can both agree is an inadequate model for understanding international relations.
Last week’s issues: I delayed sending a birthday gift due to anxiety and emotional avoidance. No point in self-blame now—just need to act.
This week’s goals:
Must complete:
1Send the delayed birthday package.
2Systematically think through (and possibly write about) the Western romanticization of Japanese and Korean culture, and my personal discomfort with it.
3Book a dentist appointment regarding my wisdom tooth issue (growth spotted, no pain yet, but CT scan shows problematic angle).
Optional tasks:
1Watch Adolescence.
2Avoid burgers and fried chicken for the week.
3Buy a new t-shirt.
4Apply for a Korean 5-year visa
Notes: Small tasks, but after weeks of spirals and hesitation, any forward motion is valuable.
It seems like there’s a misunderstanding of what a security dilemma actually is. It’s not limited to last-resort existential threats or nuclear contexts.
The term refers to a recurring structural problem in international relations, where one state’s defensive measures are perceived as offensive by another, leading to escalation—even if both sides claim defensive intent.
This applies to all levels of military posturing, not just existential brinkmanship. Arms shipments, base placements, even rhetoric can trigger this.
Just so we’re on the same page, here’s a straightforward summary from the Wikipedia entry:
A security dilemma occurs when the actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security.
If you think this only kicks in at the nuclear threshold, I’d seriously recommend rereading the foundational IR literature, or even just that page.
It’s funny you bring up robots. Personally, I’d rather consult a logic-checking tool than rely entirely on one worldview expressed in one language formed by one country’s political myths.
Some of us are navigating ideas across six languages, including dialects that evolved in parallel to Western nation-state concepts.
I’m not offended that you think that’s less legitimate than cowboy-tier geopolitics— just mildly amused that you thought “Texas is freedom land” was a mic drop.<3
Thanks for your response. Just to clarify upfront: I absolutely do not support war or military unification. War is cruel and costly, and I don’t wish it on either side of the strait. That said, I think your framing of the issue significantly underestimates the real factors involved and oversimplifies the strategic logic behind PRC’s position.
First, reducing China’s stance to merely “hurt feelings” is, frankly, a strawman. The Taiwan issue isn’t just an emotional matter—it’s deeply tied to historical legitimacy, national identity, and decades of unresolved civil war politics. You may disagree with the PRC’s claims, but characterizing them as purely irrational makes real understanding impossible.
Second, to suggest that U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan would have “almost literally zero” impact on China’s national security is factually incorrect. Taiwan sits on a crucial chokepoint in the First Island Chain. It’s not just about Taiwan’s own military capabilities; it’s about the strategic potential of allied deployment, surveillance, and missile systems within striking distance of China’s eastern seaboard.
Third, the idea that Taiwan poses no “regional threat” misses the point. No one claims Taiwan is projecting power—but its role in the regional power balance is not about direct aggression. It’s about access, influence, and containment mechanics that any state actor would care about in that geographical position.
Lastly, invoking the U.S. experience with the Iraq War as a vague parallel while simultaneously denying China any strategic reasoning feels disingenuous. If Americans can be misled into supporting intervention based on complex narratives of fear, security, or nationalism, why assume other nations act out of mere irrational pride?
I grew up in China and recently became an adult, and I’m trying to understand these issues from both sides. But a good-faith discussion starts with acknowledging that states—yes, even authoritarian ones—often act from layered, strategic motives, not just unhinged emotion. Painting China as incapable of rational calculation doesn’t just weaken your argument; it reflects a refusal to take seriously a major geopolitical actor. If you’re older than me and still think national defense decisions are made based on ‘hurt feelings,’ maybe you should be less confident in your worldview and more open to reading some actual IR theory.<3
Your analysis is very structured, but I think there are two points where you might be overstating certain factors. First, regarding nuclear deterrence: while Russia certainly possesses a powerful nuclear arsenal, nuclear weapons are generally regarded as a last-resort measure, not a practical tool for day-to-day security competition. Unless we are talking about a full-scale conflict — something on the level of a World War III — nuclear deterrence does not effectively address concerns over border security or the loss of geopolitical buffer zones. Moreover, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council have nuclear weapons, yet this has never entirely eliminated regional anxieties.
Second, I think your argument reflects a fairly strong American-centered perspective. After the Cold War, the U.S.-led international order did indeed mitigate traditional security dilemmas, but that system has not been equally safe or fair for all actors — especially for states facing the direct expansion of U.S. influence and alliances. From Russia’s point of view, NATO expansion has not simply been a matter of extending norms; it has appeared as a tangible existential threat. Whether or not we find that perception reasonable, it undeniably shapes their strategic behavior.
Of course, I agree with your observation that symmetry isn’t always present, and that state actions aren’t purely rational — but I see those more as additional nuances rather than the main points of contention.
Thank you very much for offering another perspective. However, regarding the part about Taiwan and China, I would like to offer some corrections and additional context.
While Taiwan may not have been historically as integrated with mainland China as Ukraine was with Russia, Taiwan was formally incorporated into Qing China’s territory in 1683 and remained so until it was ceded to Japan in 1895 after the First Sino-Japanese War. Thus, Taiwan does have significant historical connections to China.
In more recent history, during World War II, the Kuomintang (led by Chiang Kai-shek) and the Chinese Communist Party (led by Mao Zedong) temporarily cooperated to resist the Japanese invasion. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, a civil war broke out between the two sides, ultimately resulting in the Communist Party’s victory and the Kuomintang’s retreat to Taiwan.
Although the PRC initially emphasized the goal of peaceful reunification, over time, shifts in domestic public opinion and strategic considerations have led to increasing support among the general populace for the use of force if necessary. That said, the official position of the PRC still emphasizes “peaceful reunification” under the “one country, two systems” framework.
I’m someone who grew up in China and have just recently reached adulthood, so there may be gaps in my understanding due to my environment and limited experience. If there are any inaccuracies, omissions, or misinterpretations in what I have presented, I would genuinely appreciate any corrections or further discussion. Thank you!<3
Considering how much of current American culture war debates revolve around national identity, sovereignty, and international influence, it makes me wonder: are conflicts like Russia’s move into Ukraine and China’s posture towards Taiwan fundamentally rooted in the same security dilemma, rather than pure expansionism?
I’ve been thinking about the deeper drivers behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s stance on Taiwan.
For Russia, Ukraine joining NATO would have meant that a major military alliance would sit directly on its border, severely shrinking Russia’s strategic buffer zone. Similarly, for China, the growing U.S. military presence around Taiwan raises a direct security concern.
Since U.S.-China relations have deteriorated, there has been increasing discussion about the possibility of the U.S. deploying missiles or even establishing a permanent military presence in Taiwan. Given Taiwan’s geographic position, major Chinese cities like Fuzhou, Xiamen, and even Shanghai would fall within the range of intermediate-range missiles.
This makes the Taiwan issue not purely about nationalism or ideology, but also about very tangible security calculations.
In 2024, U.S. defense reports indicated a rising focus on “hardening Taiwan” against potential Chinese action(https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/19/2003375866/-1/-1/1/2024-NDS.PDF”
China has repeatedly emphasized that foreign military deployments in Taiwan would cross a “red line”(https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-us-should-stop-official-exchanges-with-taiwan-2024-03-05/)
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I do use GPT-chan to help polish my grammar and phrasing, yes. But the core of what I post—my arguments, references, and even the scattered little complaints I can’t seem to edit out (like “Does ChatGPT remind itself not to binge and purge?”)—are all mine.
There are two main reasons I rely on it:
1.My English level isn’t quite strong enough to support long, technical, terminologically dense replies.
2.Even if my native language were English—or if, say, we were all in a parallel universe where this forum ran in Chinese—I would still use GPT for polishing. Why? Because TheMotte has a very specific house style: cool, articulate, often high-context. My natural voice is more like Natsuki from DDLC—filled with interjections, emotional fragments, and too many emojis. In this environment, that just looks immature.
As for the idea that I’m “a Chinese person critical of the West”—that’s… funny. I looked back over my old posts and realized I’ve barely said anything explicit about my views on the CCP. I hint, I sidestep, I use passive framing. Why?
Because being ambiguous on sensitive political topics is… a habit.
If I were the kind of idealist who loudly denounced the system and believed I could change society, I imagine my neighborhood police station would’ve flagged me as a “person of interest” by now, waiting for the next National Congress to invite me in for tea. (That’s a joke. I think.I hope.)
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