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muzzle-cleaned-porg-42


				

				

				
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User ID: 1018

muzzle-cleaned-porg-42


				
				
				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 08 14:27:44 UTC

					

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User ID: 1018

You can basically say this about almost any state that existed for several centuries

There are plenty of the oldest states with centuries (heck, millenia) of continuity that have not done anything interesting for a century or two. (Switzerland. Sweden. Denmark.)

But let's grant it true for great powers and aspirants. The realist argument of international anarchy doesn't really favor any side: as long as any country has sought keep or obtain greater status by periodical war, the neighbors of the same country have been wary of such attempts, or they have been its willing dominions, or its already conquered unwilling puppets. In international anarchy, it is natural for Russia's neighbors to seek to preempt Russian actions (unless Russia can win them with soft power).

In any mass communication, the irony is like any subtext -- it is usually lost after a couple of steps unless you filter for audience to people who get the subtext. Internet hastens this process, but it is present in all youth cultures. Nobody knows if the kid puts up the poster ironically or as a statement or they like the person in the poster, their internal motivations and rationalizations are lost to the observers. How much of the Elvis craze or Beatlemania or Lisztomania or any altCoin was 'dead serious' right from the beginning? I think quite likely most people start participating first jokingly, not so seriously, perhaps ironically because of all the excitement and "cool kids are doing it too" effect. But after you have collected enough inertia in the movement, tribal group dynamics take driver's seat and then it is serious.

Suppose some youngsters adopt saying inshallah ironically. Next they adopt the non-ironic positive cultural signifiers (excessively shaking hands and having sharp haircuts?) Soon the shared cultural context is wholly mixed to point you can't tell lapsed Muslims from the lapsed Christians and Western atheists. The Westerners themselves no longer can't tell which parts they are doing ironically. Nothing ultiamtely wrong with it I suppose, that's how cultural exchange looks like. Not infeasible that if by that point Islam as practiced by the non-lapsed Muslims is still the same puritanical form as it is currently known, it will be the stronger evangelizing force and cultural attractor.

Not the only possibility, though. Religious space is field of constant competition and evolutionary pressure. Wouldn't be surprised if the competitive forms of Christianity or the dare you call it the secular state religion of rainbow flag will adopt features that make them competitive.

Isn't "service for the duration" the default assumption mostly everywhere? Only powers fighting far-off wars of little importance can afford to send soldiers on limited combat tours.

Thus it's really telling that this historical event and this historical event alone, unique amongst even genocides, it is DEMANDED that schools teach it happened AS MORAL MATTER, that unbelief is the ultimate sin.

We don't treat Holomordor this way, nor the killing fields, nor the plight of the Armenians, Hell in America and Europe you can argue that the Native Americans actually didn't have it that bad, or that slavery was the equivalent of the Russian serfs or just having a job, without being imprisoned in Austria or Germany.

This doesn't really compute. Claims about Armenians or Native Americans or the slavery in the US never had been a politically important topic in Austria and Germany. After the war, the arguments to the effect "Nazis were actually good guys / or better than the other guys in charge now / and all claims of their wrongdoings are lies" were politically important.

The equivalent question in the US context would be, dunno, debates about teaching evolution and creationism in the schools? There have been substantial efforts to have only one of the two included in the curriculum by disagreeing partisans. Extremely partisan behavior can be observed: many an internet atheist argued that teaching evolution is the truth, thus it is moral imperative to teach it happened (and equally imperative not to teach creationism). If given the power, some people would mandate it by law. Despite their moral posturing, the scientific evidence from archeology through biology to genetics is overwhelmingly supportive of the evolution.

They all claim that "resettlement" secretly became "extermination" but they cannot say who, when, where, or why the change, or point to any documentary evidence that this is something which actually happened.

This is untrue. There is evidence of various resettlement plans that were first considered. There is evidence some of the plans were found impossible or infeasible to implement (such as Madagascar plan), thus they were not implemented. Lublin plan was partially implemented. If you argue that every Polish Jew was resettled to Lublin, you should explain why (all) the Polish Jews could not be found in Lublin after the war.

I think they did. Eyewitness accounts is more reliable, especially concerning matters very unreliably transmitted by archeological evidence. Answering a question like yours, however, requires careful interpretation.

Concerning the question of Carthaginian child sacrifice: According to their press releases, archeologists from Oxford, presumable better positioned to interpret the evidence, argue that the literary evidence supports the archeological evidence. I also note that the press release mentions that other archaeologist disagree on the matter, and I have no expertise to evaluate their claims other than common sense.

As I wrote in my other reply, the delay is quite common. As a comparative example of unrelated WW2-era atrocity, Wikipedia article about Korean comfort women suggests that the Korean-Japanese debate and activism about comfort women in particular (opposed to Korean forced laborers and compensation in general) gathered steam in the 1980s and 1990s.

You don’t need to be a politician at 22 to be a politician at 60. They can go on the safer career paths (honestly prefer politicians with outside politics experience).

Sure. And my point kinda was, any random kid is going to better served by realistically geared aspirations and fully generic "how to be successful in life, at the margin" kind of lessons (less about becoming the president or going to Harvard, more about conscientiousness, habit forming, reading the room to observe true unwritten rules). If the kid has the special something to become the president, he/she will stumble upon that path by their own talents (or perhaps you already possess much more meaningful resources to help them than aspirations only, such as a trust fund or networks).

Truth is in a meritocracy especially with intelligence being highly hereditary you would expect the longer that meritocracy exists that elites would largely come from some form of elites (in Americas case it’s going to be dominated by the PMC or top 20%). The only way you get elites from the lower class with intelligence being hereditary is [...]

Unrelated, but there may be something wrong with that model, depending on how do you quantify "largely" and all the rest of the details. An example of a possible mechanic to consider: Consider differential birthrates in social strata. Suppose a fully deterministic hereditary model of genetic eliteness and the meritocratic elite has relatively less children than non-elite classes. Then, due to dwindling applicant pool, either the size of elite gets smaller each generation, or the brightest sons and daughters of plebeian background must be given opportunities to enter. Alternatively, if the meritocratic elite has relatively more kids but size of elite stays the same, in a couple of generations, there will be large class of nearly elite upper middle class class just below the threshold, with nearly the same genetic background as the members of elite. Due to random variation, some kids of this non-elite upper middle class again would have the merits to become elite again.

Consider also the vast majority of theoretical papers that have been published but you didn't read. Why people read seminal papers and vast majority of other published papers lie forgotten? Usually the papers that become seminal have special something that makes them useful and applicable in practice, and that applicability is discovered by testing against the reality. In experimental sciences, the testing against reality comes from running and reporting formal experiments. Sometimes in the form of explaining past observations and experiments. In engineering, people might not bother reporting experiments, but they integrate the useful results and principles in their products (which usually must be functional in the physical reality). In pure theory land, the mathematical proofs take the place of experiment (very difficult to come up with, often difficult to verify).

I will use exactly the same justification progressives use in favor of censorship and against freedom of speech: information should be open and accessible to all, but only experts should be allowed to comment and be given a platform, lest we suffer from a misinformation contagion propagated by the undereducated.

The issue is that internet made the line between private communication and public communication even murkier than before.

I imagine the process is like this. Step 0. Information is open and accessible, but only vetted experts are allowed to opine on public platforms. Step 1. Me and my friends want to chat about the expert-verified opinions. We set up a private Discord server / Facebook group / Telegram-thing / what young people use today. Step 2. If we are very good (discussion is information-dense, or entertaining, or got some popular people involved), at some point the extrovert friend shares the invite link to his/her friends. Suddenly our group has hundreds of lurkers. Is it still a private discussion group? Step 3. Rinse and repeat. When you hit thousands of members, congratulations, it is a major newsletter.

(Steps 2-3 were accelerated in the old Web of blogs and forums.)

Initially it doesn't feel like you are setting up a major media platform. Most of them never become big. Is there a point where it makes sense to ban them?

1.) Yes, one suit. Plus two non-suit, more sport-ish jackets. None of them fit very well since I have progressively lost weight after every time I bought the item, but one of the jackets is not outright ridiculous. But I have several trousers / jeans / shirts / sweaters / shoes that make possible all many combinations from casual to smart casual and business casual; they do fit okay and the best ones very well. I pay attention that the quality of material; generally, good quality natural fabrics look better than any synthetics.

2.) Not quite. Suit has not been worn for several years; I am too lazy to sell it. The one jacket that is not bad gets out approximately twice a year for important but non-formal family events (birthdays, Christmas). I get invited and accept invite to weddings or otherwise formal events once per decade (that is why the suit is out-of-date). At work, most people below the senior level are very casual, so usually the casual must come before the smart in "smart casual". In most situations I find myself, the well-fitting shirt or sweater and pants alone puts me in the upper quintile.

It absolutely is a red flag if you are yourself accustomed to sorting and matching your socks when you do laundry.

If you do the laundry, you have to match both your own and the other person's. (And that is going to be difficult if they never do it on their own initiative. Makes also more difficult to match your own socks. Adds entropy.) If you don't do the laundry, expect to find a closet full of mixed socks, and if you don't like it that way and want to have it your way, congratulations, you have now an extra chore because you have to do the laundry.

In my limited experience, any everyday friction items like "how to organize socks" are much more important deal-breakers for a relationship than difference in political opinions or many of the "values".

On this forum, the idea that Russia is some sort of right-wing paradise has been debunked many times.

True. Yet the arguments that amount "it doesn't make sense for Ukraine to fight, the peace would be a better deal for them" keep coming back in some form of other. The level of benevolence of Russian masters directly contributes to calculation of the cost of the peace.

It can’t be dismissed as silly propaganda

The evidence presented can be dismissed as silly propaganda. The original comment had a link to tweet with evidence that consisted of some claims and 4 photos presumably from Tinder. Same level of evidence would have been present before the war. Claims "go to any bar in Europe" are cheap.

At minimum, one would need statistics to prove it. (Recollections of experiences with/observing presumed hookers in MENA countries and engaging in hypotheses about cultural factors of mountain Slaves does not count as interrogating the evidence.) How many of Ukrainians in Europe are women? Apparently approx 4 million. How many relative to respective demographics stayed in Ukraine? Apparently there was 12 million women aged 14-54 in Ukraine in 2018. Assuming everyone of the 4 million were women from the 12 million, it is a Large fraction, but not all or a majority. More exact statistics would be needed, because I presume there are kids and grandmas included in the 4 million. How many of the women of relevant are single, and how many are engaging in low-grade prostitution, how many are engaging more chaste forms of dating? Evidence not easily found. How many of sex workers are voluntary versus coerced? Evidence not easily found.

True enough, if it happened today, or next year. But who knows about 2030, or 2035?

Russo-Georgian war happened in 2008. The war in Donetsk started in 2014. The current war started in 2022. As far as the political climate is concerned, a great many things may change in 6 years.

"Comparatively democratic" is intended to be read literally, as in, comparatively more cratos in the hands of demos than in other parts of Europe. Not as, it was democratic as 20th century had democracies. But lack of serfdom since early Middle Ages, continuous presence of institutions for deliberative, representational decisionmaking, and right to participate (in the said institutions) granted to large part of population, all of that, it is the traditional social capital argument.

The long gowns and unkempt beards are extremely unattractive for the average white/western person.

It sounds like you think all Muslims look like Taliban elders from the videotapes from 00s? Even the Taliban government today don't look like that. Beards: kempt.

In Europe, Muslim men recognizable as recent arrivals are sharply dressed, serious about their hair and beard and clothes. The style is perhaps weird mix of the 80s, 90s and 00s, but it definitely is a style and increasingly has been converging with the overall weirdness that is style in anno domini 2024, so it is difficult to tell who is the trendsetter here. Muslim women recognizable as Muslim women wear hijab or niqab (or random variations of long dress and head scarf that may or may qualify as a hijab.)

Although I realize there's a pathway from ironic to non-ironic, as famously happened with "based".

Far too common than people acknowledge. A leas this is how high fashion seems operate: first the select few wear something weird or outdated ironically or jokingly. The next day, it is the trend.

they're the same people that middle class families in 1900 employed to change diapers

I am uncertain. I have not survey data to back me up, so maybe I am fooled by fictionalized portrayals, but I'd imagine a 19th century nanny (/ domestic servant doing nanny-adjacent tasks) coming from a lower-class background could still be a conscientious, quite functional person: live very "clean", possibly both she and employer finding it acceptable for her to live in a room room in employer's home, likelier than not to go church every Sunday morning and act with moral fiber of believing the sermon in her everyday tasks. In contrast, I have hard time imagining I could find a working class let alone genuine underclass person who is both still poor enough to accept the limited salary a person who is not a quite comfortable indeed can pay and yet trustworthy enough of a person to let them in my home. On the other hand, in context of the late 19th century, it is much easier to imagine to able to find that sort of person from "lower classes", considering how during the time frame in question, domestic service was still one of largest forms of employment, especially for women, considering the whole national population. Today a capable, conscientious woman has many other equally or better paying and certainly more respected jobs to consider.

Conscription, like all laws restricting individual liberty, can be societal equivalent of Ulysses tying himself to mast.

Very few people really want to go fight in a war. Yet the consensus may be that all men are needed to fight or the war is lost and the war ought not to be lost.

ten to twenty years from now it will be generally accepted that Mistakes Were Made

I wish we had RemindMeBot? And is your prediction that general sentiment is "Mistakes Were Made"? Or is it the general sentiment that some particular group of people are too stupid to vote? They are not the same claim. The latter seems to be generally shared sentiment about the political outgroup in the US politics since I can remember, so I am uncertain how it can be verified. Perhaps you intend a more specific claim about responses about stupidity that is more strong than more than stable trend of everyday political animus?

Nevertheless, I don't think observable presence of either kind of sentiment would tell much about the objective facts of the war. Watching MAS*H, made 20 years after the Korean war, the generally accepted sentiment of the producers of the show is that the Korean war was a mistake (naturally the show was for a large part about Vietnam, also thought a mistake). I don't think the evidence proves that either war was a mistake. South Korea is clearly a victory for all of mankind, only complicated by their later problems with their birth rate. Vietnam is more difficult to assess. There were faults in execution of the war, both strategically and on home front, but containing the Communism probably was not one of the mistakes. The domino theory worked, sort-of. Who knows what would have happened in SE Asia if North Vietnam would have had a shorter, more victorious war. What if Second Malaysian Emergency would have started earlier and turned out differently? Would Singapore had been the success story it has been?

In general, if the overall American mood during "Freedom Fries" moments are not the most rational, it is mostly information about the state of American mood than anything objective. The consistent prediction is, the American mood ten years before or after "Freedom Fries" is equal in its rationality, no matter its current polarity or valence.

Concerning casual discussion: The amount of death during the course of human history is of such magnitude, any discussion about it will appear nothing but casual or callous in comparison. Also an isolated demand.

The line of thought goes, simplified, their society had elements that share commonalities with a modern conception of democracy (mid-lower level social landholding had some minor but existent social and economic power, the freemen had rights recognized by everyone in the "everyone knows that everyone knows" way, the ideas how the decisionmaking institutions are supposed to work). Thus it is a confound: perhaps the democratic commonalities contributed to weird by-the-books behavior. And these democratic elements formed social capital (knowledge and preconceived ideas how to do things, transmitted intergenerationally) making it easier to run democracy!20thcentury in ethos, not only rubberstamping the correct procedures in the books approved by philosophers. The idea that ethos part is important in other democratic societies is not exactly a new idea. ^1

Naturally all this is comparative. From what I gather, they Nordics were corrupt (still are corrupt, just less in comparison than some other countries), the amount of corruption waxed and waned depending on the politics. Also, we know of the corruption because the peasants suffering from its effects mounted numerous legal complaints registered in the legal system, existence of which is somewhat positive sign.

Or do you think Ben would nod approvingly if Mexico went full Carolus Rex

I don't know about Ben. I would grant the possibility that Mexico could be a better place after 200 years the state running the show as the supreme gangboss, not tolerating other bosses that those serving him, applying principles of consistent governance, basing his powerbase on the free small-mid-sized enterprises against the high capital. But 200 year long experiments are difficult to run and the economic situation of the lucrative narcotics trade is difficult to square.

Narcotics is bit like the resource curse: You get lots of profit that don't require investments to rest of the local economy which would result in long-term benefit to rest of the society. Not only that, the resource curse profits are much higher and more concentrated than what others can made from rest of economy. The outsized profit, concentrated, makes it possible to hire armed enforcers to enforce control and continuation of profitable business in the hands of its current owner, and make any problems to go away.

^1: Tocqueville writes about the mores of American democracy:

The manners of the Americans of the United States are, then, the real cause which renders that people the only one of the American nations that is able to support a democratic government; and it is the influence of manners which produces the different degrees of order and of prosperity that may be distinguished in the several Anglo-American democracies. Thus the effect which the geographical position of a country may have upon the duration of democratic institutions is exaggerated in Europe. Too much importance is attributed to legislation, too little to manners. These three great causes serve, no doubt, to regulate and direct the American democracy; but if they were to be classed in their proper order, I should say that the physical circumstances are less efficient than the laws, and the laws very subordinate to the manners of the people. I am convinced that the most advantageous situation and the best possible laws cannot maintain a constitution in spite of the manners of a country; whilst the latter may turn the most unfavorable positions and the worst laws to some advantage. The importance of manners is a common truth to which study and experience incessantly direct our attention. It may be regarded as a central point in the range of human observation, and the common termination of all inquiry. So seriously do I insist upon this head, that if I have hitherto failed in making the reader feel the important influence which I attribute to the practical experience, the habits, the opinions, in short, to the manners of the Americans, upon the maintenance of their institutions, I have failed in the principal object of my work.

Also Nordics/Protestants being stuck up by-the-book types was a stereotype well before Europe started moving towards democracy.

Less decisive historical observation than one may think, as the confound of comparatively democratic power structures in the Nordics goes all the way back before the French revolution. Things were meetings of free men since before the middle ages. When the Swedish realm adopted European style Riksdag of estates, they had a fourth estate of free land-owning peasants.

I think there is a deterrent effect, and there should be deterrent effects for all punishment, but that the deterrent isn't strong enough for capital punishment to justify it, and it is mostly about revenge and satisfying vindictiveness.

I think the "anti-revenge" argument proves too much. It ultimately depends far too much on how much deterrent effect there is.

Most acts of violence are done in heat of the moment or otherwise irrational decisions: thus deterrence effect must be small, as the people who are committing illegal violence are not weighing their options and consequences rationally. And in fact, despite the all might of the (Western, developed) judicial system, most (Western, developed) countries have still some amounts of criminality. I acknowledge it is a point of contention, but let's assume for the sake of the argument that deterrence effect is small-to-negligible. Thus, any punishment worth its name is unjustified as deterrence, as deterrence doesn't happen to meaningful extent.

If there is no meaningful deterrence, and the idea of revenge is verboten, what reason remains to administer any punishment at all? If we are talking about a criminal who is a high-risk repeat offender, there is still argument that we should incapacitate to prevent them committing further crimes. However, not all people are like that. Some want to commit one, specific murder. Or some goody-shoes comes and argues they have a very good method to "rehabilitate" them (or prevent committing any more crimes, which is functionally same thing), and it involves electronic monitoring ankle bracelet, perhaps sniffing their internet traffic, and perhaps soon, AI. (Thus, they'd have a system of no other punishment than what is necessary to monitor they won't do it again.)

Thinking about this, I came to conclusion that justice as a concept must involve retributive elements, that is, a form of revenge, or it is not justice. A method that prevents the perpetrator from committing more crimes does nothing to the victim of their previous crimes. It is fully defenseless in the face of fait accompli: when crime has been committed, it can no longer be prevented. There either can be retribution or no retribution: admittedly is retribution is weak of ghost of justice as it can not make the crime undone, but it is still more than nothing, because acknowledges the pain of the victim (as it is administered in relation of the crime) whereas preventive methods won't ( as they focus on the future of the perpetrator), neither do deterrent methods (because they are concerned only with deterring other people, and the method of deterring crimes may turn out to be unrelated to the crime itself).

Finally, the system of no justice that I outlined is not fantasy, but the Nordic model slightly exaggerated. Yet it is proving impossible. According to their stated principles, Norwegians should let Anders Behring Breivik out as soon as their relevant officials are reasonably sure he is no longer danger to society or rendered harmless, as he has already sit the 10 year mandatory sentence they had in the books. Practically, by their stated philosophy, they should: after a hypothetical release, Breivik would be under constant monitoring, probably would not have chance to commit nor organize any further acts of terrorist violence, and he is getting pretty old. Yet they can't bear themselves to do it, and twist themselves into all kinds of legal knots that are not very believable as written but taken seriously because everyone involved deep-down knows it would act of injustice to let him walk free again. (I agree that he should sit for life, or should have faced capital punishment long ago. The Norwegian unwillingness to administer their law according to its written intentions shows they apparently also think their chosen system is illegitimate, in this case. And if it doesn't fit in this case, why not the other cases?)

Rand had a paper to the effect that The golden ratio for hostile occupations of conquered people is 1 soldier per 50 civilians... that's what was used in Germany after WW2 and Kosovo, America's 2 successful occupations.

Agreed with the general direction of your argument, but nitpick concerning post-war Germany: Firstly, the presence of the Soviet zone with Soviet occupation methods provided an additional "good cop/bad cop" dynamic. Secondly, it's not like the West German state was built ex nihilo without any relation to pre-war regime (probably it would have been impossible as everyone who strove to be someone had no option than associate with pre-war regime or become resistance fighter, a heroic but also often a dead-end career choice; random google result.)

The point is, replicating the feat that was "post-war Germany" would require more than 1 to 50 ratio of soldiers, but also a big stick in form of a "worse option" (better yet, a common enemy) and a buy-in from the prominent members of civil society and state apparatus. The case for post-war Japan had many similarities; less sure about post-war South Korea, but they had a military dictatorship. Conclusion: If wants to run an occupation with sheer force only, counting sufficient soldiers, one would need to study other case studies, from someone else's books. Maybe Soviet methods, which generally worked for maintaining the Soviet control for some time (at a cost which they finally were no longer willing to pay, thus not lasting a full century).

And all of the above is ignoring the difference between fighting a state or a polity (who have state-like-goals) and fighting a drug enterprise (which have other kind of goals). What good is sending 2m soldiers to fight the War on Drugs in the enemy territory if the enemy general's reaction is "many potential customers have moved closer to supply, saving on the logistics costs"?