naraburns
nihil supernum
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User ID: 100
This is not enough effort. Please don't post like this.
Some quick googling shows that it's not an issue limited to the liberal justices (also here and here), so it seems unfair to single out Jackson.
You are the one who asked about Jackson, specifically. If you think that was you being unfair, uh, okay? But I'm not sure what you want me to do about it.
Let's take a look at what Google has netted you.
The author suggests:
This problem was on full display earlier this month, when the Supreme Court heard arguments in Gill v. Whitford, a case that will determine the future of partisan gerrymandering — and the contours of American democracy along with it. As my colleague Galen Druke has reported, the case hinges on math: Is there a way to measure a map’s partisan bias and to create a standard for when a gerrymandered map infringes on voters’ rights?
Now, already I'm thinking this is not going to show us that any of the justices are bad at math; my guess is that the justices just don't think math is the standard of analysis (which is probably good, in general the Court should see the Constitution as the standard of analysis). We get some quotes from various justices:
Gorsuch: “It reminds me a little bit of my steak rub. I like some turmeric, I like a few other little ingredients, but I’m not going to tell you how much of each. And so what’s this court supposed to do? A pinch of this, a pinch of that?”
Breyer: “I think the hard issue in this case is are there standards manageable by a court, not by some group of social science political ex … you know, computer experts? I understand that, and I am quite sympathetic to that.”
Roberts: “It may be simply my educational background, but I can only describe it as sociological gobbledygook.”
First of all, these are from oral argument rather than opinions, so that's probably an important difference to keep in mind. Second, these are not examples of anyone doing math poorly, but examples of justices wondering whether "throw some math at it" is really an adequate answer in a constitutional case. These are the kinds of arguments you often hear from people who are quite good at math, Cathy O'Neill's Weapons of Math Destruction being probably the most famous case.
The article goes on to talk about McCleskey v. Kemp, a 1986 case.
McCleskey cited sophisticated statistical research, performed by two law professors and a statistician, that found that a defendant in Georgia was more than four times as likely to be sentenced to death if the victim in a capital case was white compared to if the victim was black. McCleskey argued that that discrepancy violated his 14th Amendment right to equal protection. In his majority opinion, Justice Lewis Powell wrote, “Statistics, at most, may show only a likelihood that a particular factor entered into some decisions.” McCleskey lost the case. It’s been cited as one of the worst decisions since World War II and has been called “the Dred Scott decision of our time.”
But again--no one is doing math badly here. The Court said in effect "we're deciding your case, not solving for X." It might well be better for the Court to defer to statistical analysis, we can certainly have that conversation... but if you think the Court should defer to (correct) statistical analysis, then the evidence is that you do not want Justice Brown Jackson on the Court, because either she's bad at math, or she will prioritize "math" that confirms her biases without bothering to check it. Perhaps this is true of some other justices!
Then the article goes into this "negative effect fallacy" song and dance. I cannot possibly write a thorough response to the whole Enos paper here. But one of the cases they mention is Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC, et al. v. Bennett. This article says:
The state provided money to publicly funded candidates to match private contributions. The plaintiffs wanted to strike this policy down, claiming that it had negative effects on private political speech. A team of political scientists used quantitative techniques to assess this claim (see here and here), and they found no evidence to support it. Roberts, writing the majority opinion, briefly mentioned these findings but dismissed them, declaring “it is never easy to prove a negative.” His argument appears to be that it was inherently hard for the plaintiffs to show that the state’s matching scheme had negative consequences for free speech and that we should, therefore, ignore the statistical evidence that found no relationship. However, there’s no reason that negative effects are harder to quantitatively detect than positive ones, and Roberts’s statement is based on a blatant logical fallacy.
So I went to the text of the case and found the language used there:
While there is evidence to support the contention of the candidates and independent expenditure groups that the matching funds provision burdens their speech, “it is never easy to prove a negative”—here, that candidates and groups did not speak or limited their speech because of the Arizona law.
The statistician's response is, "no, that's fallacious, look, we ran some numbers through some models and we think it likely that groups did not change their speech as a result of the law." But again, I don't see Robert's doing math badly, I see him rejecting a particular framing in which mere statistical projections are substituted for positive evidence in cases where people assert their rights have been violated. This is an argument about how strongly we should rely on statistics in interpreting the law, not a case of "statistics done badly." Roberts can be entirely on the wrong side of this argument and still not be bad at math.
(There is a parallel situation in criminal law in connection with "beyond a reasonable doubt." Courts have sometimes attempted to attached confidence percentages to that phrase, and have always been told that they cannot. It's not "guilty beyond 80% credence." It's just the phrase.)
Ultimately,
Enos and his coauthors proposed “that courts alter their norms and standards regarding the consideration of statistical evidence”
So this is definitely a policy dispute, not a question of how good anyone is at math.
The Hill article does make a more direct attack on Roberts' mathematical abilities:
According to Roberts, “the 685 instances identified amount to a very small fraction—less than three hundredths of one percent—of the 2.5 million civil cases filed in the district courts in the nine years included in the study. That’s a 99.97% compliance rate.”
That was bad math, resulting in an overstated compliance figure, because it used the wrong denominator.
Hold up, though. Why is it the wrong denominator?
The total number of civil cases over nine years is completely irrelevant to the calculation of a “compliance rate” because there was never any reason for recusal in the overwhelming majority of those matters (either because the judge owned no stocks or because there were no corporate parties involved). . . . Substituting a corrected number for the exaggerated “2.5 million” figure would have revealed a much lower compliance rate, by more than an order of magnitude.
Ah. So his math was fine, actually. He's just picking comparison points that paint the judiciary in a better light than the comparison points preferred by its critics. A similar criticism is made regarding judicial pay:
In what was probably a first for a chief justice’s report, Roberts included three color-coded graphs, one of which purported to show how badly judges’ pay had lost ground in comparison to law school deans. While federal district judges had earned slightly more than the Harvard dean in 1969, they had fallen far behind by 2006.
But the devil was in the baseline. Federal judges had just gotten a huge pay raise in 1969, which only temporarily made them better off than deans. If Roberts had chosen 1968 for the starting point, a year when judges earned less than deans, the comparison would have lost its punch.
Sneaky Roberts! But yet again, "Chief Justice Roberts's bad math" appears to criticize his laundering arguments using numbers. There's nothing wrong with the numbers, from a strictly mathematical point of view. They just paint a different picture than his critics would prefer to paint using the numbers they choose. That's not to say there's nothing objectionable happening here! But it's a very different problem than having someone who doesn't notice (or doesn't care) when wildly implausible numerical claims come across their desk.
My guess is that, if someone went over SCOTUS cases with a fine-toothed math comb, we could find other instances of justices doing math poorly. But combined with other things she has said and written, I find it difficult to conclude that Jackson is anywhere near smart enough to do good work on the Court. In the alternative, perhaps she is smart, but just casually dishonest in service to her radical political aims. I think this is also true of Sotomayor. I also think Roberts and Kavanaugh are not especially bright, but Roberts is both a capable managerial type, and clearly feels bound by traditional principles of jurisprudence in ways that Jackson and Sotomayor do not.
But that is perhaps too much text. TL;DR: You are the one who asked about Jackson, specifically, so if it bothers you that she's being "singled out," I guess bear that in mind next time you ask a question.
Regardless, you have no data on how often justices uncritically cite factual claims, including stupid ones, so you have no basis for your claim other than your own preconceptions.
The basis for my claim is decades of reading SCOTUS opinions and listening to oral arguments. I gave just one specific example in answer to @cake's question. You responded with an irrelevant take on how often people cite amici. Jackson's opinion paints a false picture, reminiscent of common leftist confusion about how many unarmed black men are killed by police each year. Your white-knighting that does not improve Jackson's intelligence or her arguments.
the evidence you cite does not distinguish her from the norm
It does, in precisely the way I claimed. Not in the way you took it, which was wrong, which I have explained; sorry I can't explain it better, but I'm not sure it matters because I can't actually tell whether you have failed to understand, or are only pretending not to understand.
I hope no one reading this thread overlooks the parallels between your error and Jackson's, and the particular way you both approach your respective errors.
Justices uncritically citing statements in briefs is all too common, but it is not a phenomenon that is unique to any particular justice, nor to justices of any particular political persuasion.
Irrelevant. The question is not whether, or how often, justices uncritically cite statements from amici. The question is whether the statements they write, cited or no, are so obviously stupid that someone at the level of Supreme Court Justice should be smart enough to at least suspect them, and thus perhaps examine them more closely. To be either so stupid or so partisan as to fall prey to "too good to check" is a serious flaw in a jurist. Justice Jackson really does seem to just be kind of stupid, but as I note above--it's possible she's just very good at being dishonest. Given the evidence before me, I don't see any other plausible alternatives.
Yeah, without knowing these people personally it really is impossible for me to say with confidence. I've interacted with some pretty high profile people over the last few decades, and in my experience the "upper echelons" of American life include a surprising number of obviously-not-that-bright people, even though very-obviously-bright people are over-represented in their ranks. Really plainly stupid people are rare among millionaires and billionaires and successful politicans and lawyers and academics and so on... but listening to partners from multi-million dollar law firms fumble soft-ball questions from sympathetic appellate justices is always a sobering experience. To say nothing of reading arguments from SCOTUS justices who apparently can't even do high school math! It really goes to show that if you do something for long enough, and happen to be in the right place at the right time, eventually people will assume you must have some merit--and then they will give you more "merit."
Basically this SMBC comic but extended beyond graduation speakers, to all paid speakers, to all lawyers and politicians and academics and the whole damn PMC, I guess. It seems fruitless to complain about it because it appears to just be human nature, and so presumably adaptive in some way.
But there does seem to be a genuine asymmetry where right-wing jurists are still trying to, at minimum, pay some lip service to reason and principle and the actual empirical facts that underlie our successful intergenerational institutions... while left-wing jurists embrace "winning is the only thing that matters" via the postmodernist deconstruction of those institutions. Whether they're doing so deliberately, or inadvertently as a result of uncritically absorbing their political milieu, in the end scarcely matters. This has always been my objection to the political left, even though I am often more aligned with the vision of the left than the right. If I can only make sense of your jurisprudence by assuming that you are either stupid or dishonest, then it makes very little practical difference which of those things you are.
The example I see getting kicked around a lot is how insanely bad Jackson's dissent in the Asian discrimination cases was. Her commentary about black babies and black doctors was just a complete hash, as if neither she nor her clerks have even a rudimentary grasp of statistics. Innumeracy is not a good look, especially when you pile it on top of her infamous failure to define "woman."
In fact Sotomayor's legal reasoning is noticeably weak, and Jackson makes her look bright by comparison. That this encompasses two-thirds of the Court's left wing can make this sound like a partisan dig, but in fact Kagan has no trouble holding her own (though I have seen speculation from both the right and the left that she has taken to "phoning it in" when she sides with someone they don't like). Judson Berger's "Weekend Jolt" from National Review last week had this to say:
Importantly, Roberts retains an ability to influence the conservative wing of the Court sheerly through his position as chief justice. (As such, he may assign controversial opinions to himself if he joins the majority.) But one other thing that deserves emphasis . . . is how intellectually outgunned the Court’s liberal wing is relative to the conservative side. It’s not merely a matter of numbers so much as a stark matter of judicial ability and temperament. Elena Kagan is a genuinely brilliant liberal justice with the ability to persuade those in the conservative majority as to the soundness of her views, but she has of late seemingly been phoning it in. Meanwhile Sonia Sotomayor is (to put it generously) notoriously lacking in the “intellectual outreach” department, and Ketanji Brown Jackson, though she may develop on the bench, is at this early date depressingly outmatched rhetorically and argumentatively even by Sotomayor.
So then it can seem like a race/HBD thing except of course that Thomas is black and seems to do fine. That may be substantially a matter of accumulated experience, at least in comparison with Jackson. But also, when it comes right down to it, he's no Scalia.
I do have an alternative explanation, but I'm not sure whether it's more charitable, or less. There is a tradition on the political left that leans in to the who/whom divide. As long as you're fighting the right bad guys (or in other words, attacking the right targets), truth is not only irrelevant, it might actually be something you should actively reject. Representative Cortez famously placed being "morally right" above being "factually correct", and was defended by the media on that. As a life-appointed justice, Jackson could very well be calling a deer a horse for all to see; what are we going to do, impeach her for it? By enshrining false claims about American racism into the canon of SCOTUS jurisprudence, she launders those claims into respectably citable assertions for generations of scholarly grifters.
So like, pick your poison? Jackson might just be so immersed in critical legal theory that she just looks like an idiot to people who think that intelligence is measured by one's grasp of empirical facts--when actually she's more Machiavellian, an "idiot" only to her enemies and a great manipulator of the levers of power for her friends. On this interpretation she is also a horrible justice who should never have been allowed anywhere near SCOTUS, but so long as she minds her Ps and Qs, she will never be removed and so the criticism is now moot. All anyone can do in response is vote Republican and pray.
On the other hand... she might just in fact be an idiot. Occam's Razor suggests that we should probably peer past the pomp and circumstance of pretending that the political appointment process is in any way meritocratic, and just call a spade a spade. And if this is that case, why, she should never have been allowed anywhere near SCOTUS, but so long as she minds her Ps and Qs, she will never be removed and so the criticism is now moot... ah. Looks like elections have consequences, and appointing justices explicitly for the color of their skin and the shape of their genitals does, too. And once that's done, there's surprisingly little anyone can do to fix it.
What is it that you actually want to know? I feel like this is a very "so you're saying" comment from you. You gave three specific examples of "not-identitarian differences" and I argued that, no, those are all identitarian differences. So you conclude from this, somehow, that I think "the political universe essentially breaks down into 'liberal individualism' and 'everything else'." But what does that even mean? The whole universe does break down into 'my cell phone' and 'everything else,' but you could replace 'my cell phone' with anything else that exists and the statement would still be true. I don't regard individualism versus identitarianism as the only or even necessarily the most important way of categorizing political views, but I do think that the far left and the far right are culturally radical in the same basic way: both tend to explicitly prefer the destruction of their outgroup/elevation of their ingroup over steps toward coexistence.
I do personally endorse a strain of liberalism that rejects interest aggregation, which has some role to play here, but you do not appear to be asking me questions in an effort to really understand my position--you appear to have some objection in mind. I would prefer, and suspect you would find it more fruitful, if you would just speak plainly about what it is you want to say.
Are these not legitimate differences?
I'm not saying there's no difference, I'm explaining what the difference is.
Differences that aren't reducible to the target of their identitarianism?
One can target identities in both "pro" and "anti" ways. The problem is the targeting of identities. Liberalism historically focuses instead on individuals.
The alt right is opposed to medical gender transition in general, and especially hormone therapy for children, while the SJW left supports both.
The targets of identitarian favor/disfavor in this example are transsexuals. In my experience, regular people are typically pretty horrified by the idea of adults mucking about with the sexual maturation of children, and I think the polls bear me out on this--transing the kids has been a losing proposition for the left everywhere it has managed to become a salient election issue. By singling out adult transsexuals for special identitarian recognition, the otherwise-anathema views of transsexuals become the orthodoxy of the far left, and even creep into mainstream Democrat politics under "arguments are soldiers, you must support our troops," even though a large percentage of the left sees this as too much. This is very reducible to identitarianism.
The alt right thinks women should be encouraged (through both informal cultural means and formal policy) to be housewives, while the SJW left thinks that women should be encouraged to build independent careers.
Both groups approach women as a category, rather than as individuals. The far left doesn't just think women should be encouraged through both informal cultural means and formal policy to build independent careers, the far left thinks that it is objectionable for a woman to stay at home and raise children. (Often, the far left objects to people even having children, much less raising those children themselves.)
The alt right was opposed to mandatory Covid vaccination, while the SJW left supported it.
For a lot of SJWs this was downstream of disability-as-identity. I know I read about at least one lawsuit floating the idea that employers not mandating vaccination should be considered an ADA violation (where the relevant disability might be obesity, or bad immune systems, or other risk factors). And of course, to some extent anything the far left supports, the far right automatically rejects, and vice versa--at the extremes, your place in the extreme becomes the most central identity of all.
So I would say that all of these differences between the far right and far left are reducible to identitarianism.
Ah. If that's what we're talking about, I will cheerfully insist that I've been saying "the only difference between the alt-right and the far-left is the approved targets of their identitarianism" for at least as long as Hlynka has been on that train.
I'm afraid I don't know what you're referring to, though it sounds like maybe asking you to explain would potentially violate your concern.
Ex Nazis who become Twitter SJWs just seem to have something off in their brains to me.
It's super consistent behavior, though; they like attention and they found a larger audience, or they tend to follow the crowd and the crowd changed directions, or, less charitably but perhaps more accurately, they like to bully others and they found a less costly way to be horrible.
I grew up in a religious community. I was always unorthodox, and was treated poorly by a lot of people who were regarded as "upstanding" for their piety. I expressed doubts about God as a kid, so no one is surprised to hear me say such things as an adult. But the same individual people who were most likely to mete out social punishment for my little heresies are still the people most likely to mete out social punishment for my heresies, only now they're various shades of woke and my heresies are political instead of theological.
Whether they've stayed in the faith or separated from it, basically all of them are ultra-orthodox woke advocates now (mostly for LGBT issues, but depending on their circumstances also for a rainbow of disabilities, with autism--or "autism"--and obesity being common pet projects in addition to the usual vapid strains of so-called anti-racism). The ones who haven't blocked me on their social media feeds are still the same bullies they've always been (I assume the same is true for the ones who took the step of blocking me, but I can't guarantee it). No amount of hair dye or piercings can hide the fact that they are still doing everything they can to punish independent thought or questioning of the party line. That it's a different party line is irrelevant except, perhaps, as a "born again" bona fide. As the Wizard sings--"the most celebrated are the rehabilitated..."
Freddie deBoer's "Planet of Cops" tells the story well, though I don't think he ever quite twigs to the shared identity of the conservative cops he complains about, and the woke cops he sees as imitating them. When he criticizes religious conservatives as natural cops, he memorably cites William Burroughs:
William Burroughs summarized the whole social conservative movement perfectly as “decent church-going women with their mean, pinched, bitter, evil faces.”
And my response is: it's still the "decent church-going women" (and, often, men), they still wear mean, pinched, bitter, evil faces. Often, literally the same actual people. They just left their old church and joined your new, political not-a-church.
Ex Nazis who become Twitter SJWs are some of the most internally consistent people in the world. If feeling morally superior to others and reveling in hating and even seeking the extermination of the right people is something you enjoy, the difference between Nazis and Twitter SJWs is little more than a palette swap.
What makes you say that?
The incredibly heavy-handed immigration narrative, the incredibly heavy-handed anti-corporation narrative, the incredibly heavy-handed healthcare narrative, the incredibly heavy-handed...
Well, I don't mean to belabor the point, but like... have you seen Elysium? Other than the guns, it's basically "American Leftist Narrative: The Sci-Fi Movie."
I think the White Man's Burden poem is pretty clearly sarcastic, even if some people took it seriously. Kipling is saying that white people shouldn't be killing themselves in order to civilize anyone else.
While the poem can certainly be read that way (death of the author and all that), Kipling himself really can't. Rather, Kipling saw imperalism as a kind of noblesse oblige, especially in connection with Western influence on humans around the world. In addition to this poem, Kipling directly addressed then-governor Teddy Roosevelt on the matter of the Philippines:
Now, go in and put all the weight of your influence into hanging on, permanently, to the whole Philippines. America has gone and stuck a pick-axe into the foundations of a rotten house, and she is morally bound to build the house over, again, from the foundations, or have it fall about her ears.
For Kipling, empire-building was a matter of "you broke it, you bought it." A nation simply cannot stand on the world stage, in trade or military or diplomatic matters, without inadvertently impacting humans outside its borders. Some of those humans, not being the subjects of powerful nation-states themselves, are rendered horribly vulnerable to the resulting externalities. The responsible thing to do, then, is to take those humans under your collective national wing (says Kipling). Like children, they may whine about it, but it really is for their own good. And like a sullen teenager, you might whine about it, too, but that's the price of a seat at the grown-up table: you have to clean up your own messes.
In my experience, contemporary "decolonizers" hate the poem because it comes very close to illustrating a common contradiction in their worldview. Decolonizers actually agree with Kipling, at least 90% of the way. Every single demand that wealthy nations "redistribute" wealth is a demand for empire-building, for wealthy nations to take vulnerable nations under their wing. But such demands are routinely accompanied by insistence that no cultural demands be made, no changes be wrought, no missionizing of religion or appropriation of culture or...
But those are just the organic things that happen when wealth is "redistributed." Send dollars to Samarkand, and those dollars will be most effectively spent on importing American goods, American workers, American culture, whatever. Send food, and you will put local farmers out of business. Send military supplies, and you will empower a warlord. Buy their sand for manufacturing, and they run out of beaches; refuse to buy their sand, and their children go hungry. As Thomas Sowell says: there are no solutions, only trade-offs.
He's not saying it's wrong for white people to rule, but rather that white people shouldn't rule in a way that doesn't benefit themselves.
No, he's saying that it's time for America to grow up and start doing the hard work of a mature empire: the thankless task of bringing the Enlightenment (and, you know, Christianity) to the many humans who were still enslaving each other, engaging in cannibalism, and dying of curable diseases in their mud huts. The "white" part, on which people of course focus inordinately today, is just a historical accident. It's the "white man's burden" because literally no one else had taken it up. Here's a more modern rendition (circa 2012 because G7 doesn't fit as well). It came out a bit sarcastic but you can hopefully imagine someone writing it earnestly, and understand how such a person might be the modern day equivalent of Kipling on this matter.
Take up the G8's burden-- Send forth your currency-- Offshore your workers' lifestyle Across the migrant's sea. Build schools and homes and fact'ries, For someone else's child, But keep their culture vibrant! It must not be defiled. Take up the G8's burden-- You owe the world your wealth. It's your fault they are weeping, Your fault they're in poor health. Your Western ways are costly, Too costly to ignore, And so you must export them To every other shore! Take up the G8's burden-- Too long you have denied Your global obligations, Your diplomatic pride. You're lucky, and you're privileged (And a xenophobe at heart), So give some folks asylum From the conflicts that they start! Take up the G8's burden-- Not "colonial" in nature-- Instead a kind of penance For your melting of that glacier, For your raping of the landscape, For your scorching of the skies-- For those who strove to prosper Owe to others now the prize. Take up the G8's burden-- It's time to pass the buck, To burn your blue-necked workers Because--who gives a fuck? Comes now, to rate your credit (Expecting not your thanks) The only voice that matters: The judgment of your banks!
I'm asking why it's not enshrined into the law itself, not just debates surrounding it.
Gotcha. I do think the answer is purely political, though. It might be smart to enshrine such a consideration into the law (it might not, too, but it might!). But as a general rule legislatures do not pass laws because it is smart to do so. Legislatures pass laws for all kinds of reasons, but the main one is "because certain people asked for it," where "certain people" may be constituents, or special interest groups, or friends and family, or Hollywood, or...
There are other reasons, of course, but the point is that there are many good ideas we do not adopt simply because no one stands to personally benefit sufficiently that there is what is sometimes called the "political will" to do it. Sometimes lawyers get together and do the meta-legislation of crafting proposals with the ostensible purpose of improving the operation of the legal system. The most famous of these are probably the "uniform code" recommendations crafted by the Uniform Law Commission, but even these often end up being quite political in their development and adoption.
As a purely practical matter, I suppose it might also seem like a waste of time to craft pre-emptive hypotheticals when the point of a lawyer is often to draw distinctions between like cases. Since hypothesis space is infinite and no two cases are ever exactly alike (this is the challenge often posed by reliance on "precedent"), it's not at all clear that crafting pre-emptive hypotheticals would actually help anything.
@naraburns have lawyers considered something like this?
What--sunset provisions? Sure. Congress often passes laws with expiration dates. They're usually laws aimed at funding something-or-other, but the idea of a law that expires is a totally normal one. The badly-misnamed PATRIOT Act is one famous case where big chunks of the law were supposed to go away as the apparent emergency of Islamic terrorism was beaten into submission, but Congress kept renewing various objectionable chunks of that law and I think eventually made many parts permanent (or, as permanent as law ever is).
I think what you're maybe missing, though, is the "separation of powers" doctrine. Congress is supposed to be the legislative branch of the federal government, and also the political branch. American courts of law are supposed to fulfill two basic functions: interpreting the (politically-crafted!) legislation from an objective or "non-political" perspective when disputes arise, and safeguarding individual rights against legislative overreach.
American courts are actually pretty good at fulfilling that first function. It's the second function where stuff gets weird. Personally, I think this is largely a matter of having a Constitution written by natural law theorists, that is still the "final word" on government activity in a nation where almost no one even understands natural law, much less believes it to be true, much less believes it to be divinely appointed. The Supreme Court is thus routinely accused, often with compelling evidence, of just making shit up about what the Constitution supposedly "says" or "implies" or whatever. And these accusations come from both the Right and the Left, but of course since people tend to treat their arguments as soldiers, those accusations rarely get leveled by anyone whose ox isn't being actively gored. This makes the Court a kind of "super legislature," any time it can be persuaded that the Constitution somehow demands yet another thing no one has ever before believed the Constitution to demand.
But maybe your question was referring more to this:
Give answers to pre-emptive hypotheticals.
Congress does a lot of this, too, during its various hearings and debates. But due to the "cases and controversies" clause limiting (at least in theory) what questions the judiciary can hear, American courts are generally not able to issue such "advisory opinions." Even so, shenanigans with the cases and controversies clause are also definitely a thing.
Fridged wife was black, kid is halfway between, FYI.
I saw that movie, not two months ago, and I had to go check IMDB because I thought you were bullshitting me.
People get conspicuously upset when I say things like "I often fail to notice race unless it is highlighted in some way," but here we are.
Sorry to do two posts back to back, but the Fourth Circuit has dropped a steaming pile of dog shit on my front porch and I'm kind of mad about it. (Is that too heated? Honestly I feel like I'm soft pedaling it.)
Porter v. Board of Trustees of North Carolina State University is a case on academic freedom and speech by government employees. Stephen Porter was a tenured professor of education in the university's "higher ed" program. His statistical research on higher education has dealt at times with questions of faculty and student body demography. After complaining that
NC State’s diversity initiatives resulted in “abandoning rigorous methodological analysis in favor of results-driven work aimed at furthering a highly dogmatic view of ‘diversity,’ ‘equity,’ and ‘inclusion’”
he found himself removed from the higher ed program for being "insufficiently collegial." He sued. And now, barring a reversal by SCOTUS, he has lost. More from the article:
In the 2006 case Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court held that when government employees speak “pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” But, critically, Garcetti made an exception for faculty at public institutions engaged in “speech related to scholarship or teaching.”
The Fourth Circuit’s decision considerably narrows this exception, effectively placing faculty speech about shared institutional governance and decision-making beyond the First Amendment. The court reasoned that Porter did not speak as an academic, but rather “in his capacity as an employee,” concluding Porter’s speech “was not a product of his teaching or scholarship” and is, therefore, “unprotected.”
This analysis suggests that the Fourth Circuit has quite perplexingly decided that "intramural" speech does not qualify for the Garcetti academic exception. Essentially, in the Fourth Circuit, academic freedom apparently extends to lectures and publications, but not "when professors speak and write as citizens of the campus community and officers of an educational institution." This is an especially awkward position, however, when the professor in question teaches and researches higher education specifically. Imagine being free to make assertions about higher education policy in the classroom and in your writing, but not being free to repeat those things at a faculty meeting, or to university administrators! The author also notes that this may reflect a circuit split with the Ninth, which is good news for any planned appeal.
But the age of that split (the Ninth Circuit case was decided in 1976) also highlights how much the American Left has changed in the last 50 years, and how right-coded Free Speech has become--even, maybe the speech of tenured university professors (who are of course overwhelmingly left-identifying). As one commenter over at Brian Leiter's blog observes:
It seems to me that the dissent attends carefully and sensibly to the relevant facts but that the majority does not. On page 43, the dissent offers this explanation for the majority’s failure:
“My friends in the majority ... have developed a new ‘bad man’ theory of the law: identify the bad man; he loses. ... The majority’s threadbare analysis willfully abandons both our precedent and the facts in search of its desired result. ... that cynicism breaks new ground.”
A second commenter adds further context:
Curiously, the two judges in the majority (Wynn and Thacker) are Obama appointees, whereas the one judge in dissent (Richardson) is a Trump appointee. As the preceding comment observes, the argumentation in the dissenting opinion is far better than that in the majority opinion.
Leiter himself then weighs in on Richardson:
I see that Judge Richardson is a UChicago Law graduate (before my time), who clerked for Judge Posner.
Posner, of course, is the father of the Law and Economics movement, which is not universally embraced by conservative lawyers but is very often a right-coded jurisprudence. So here we have a flip from the stereotypical expectations, with leftist judges constraining the academic freedom of a tenured university professor (as well as government employee freedom of speech generally--they give a narrower interpretation than the conservative Supreme Court furnished in 2006!) and a right-wing judge dissenting.
Naturally, most analysis seems to agree that this is a results-oriented decision; the "real issue" is not academic freedom or freedom of speech at all, it's the total inviolability of the gospel of DEI. Porter committed a heresy, and got slapped down for it, and the high priests of the church of DEI confirmed his punishment. All other details are irrelevant. This does not mean Republicans are now going to be the champions of academic freedom, or that Democrats have abandoned that position. It's just pure, unadulterated who, whom, as the dissent seems to grasp.
I hate when judges add fuel to the cynical fires of "there is no principle, there is only power." I have seen judges choose principle over their preferred results. I know that something like reasoned objectivity is broadly achievable, if we value it. But it seems to be happening less and less, and certainly the forcefulness with which DEI has been rammed down our collective cultural throat seems best described as oppressive ideological totalitarianism.
This is a good example in part because it reminds me of the first time Miles Morales took over for a dead Peter Parker, back in the Ultimate Marvel lineup in 2011. The whole Ultimate Marvel Universe was aggressively jumping the shark at that point, but I remember my biggest gripe was that Morales had these new electric powers? It was reminiscent of the Red/Blue Superman moment for me, since I mostly enjoyed Ultimate Spider-man to that point. But saying anything about it mostly just got me called a racist.
I didn't even think to try sorting.
But I see it on Bump and Hot, but not New (my default). Curiouser and curiouser!
Thanks for letting me know! (I still don't--not on any browser, not logged in or logged out, not on my phone versus my desktop... it's very strange!)
@ZorbaTHut, I've approved this post but it doesn't seem to be appearing on the front page. Possibly I am being too impatient with something or other! But for the moment, at least, it seemed worth mentioning.
there's a great-replacement-adjacent but ultimately pro-western eregore flexing its wings
This seems right to me. I think that the Hamilton/Moana/Encanto analysis is interesting, and perhaps I should expand my thinking to focus more on the idea of the "successor." There are surely many movies about white men passing some torch or other to their biological sons, and a "great replacement is real (but please inherit our political traditions!)" could be a natural evolution of those tropes, in an era that tries to downplay heritage (only, at times, to get hoist on its own petard, as in the case of Rey Palpatine).
What counts as deliberate agenda pushing?
Hard to say--movie people don't usually come right out and say "I am pushing an agenda here" (though sometimes they do). But I think it's fair to engage in some pattern recognition on the matter, however inescapably speculative it might be.
That said, Elysium in particular does not seem at all coy about agenda-pushing in other ways, and the same is true of Otto and Snowpiercer, so it doesn't seem like a stretch to imagine these scripts were agenda pushing in this way also.
Speaking of inverted examples... aren't "The Black Guy Dies First" and "Vasquez Must Die" tropes for a reason? Genuine question, I haven't been tracking death/saviourhood ratios by race.
Black Dude Dies First has largely fallen into Discredited Trope territory, I think. Vasquez Always Dies is more interesting, but both of these have the same problem as I observed with the "white savior" trope and its cousins. Based on conversation in this thread I think that focusing on death was me getting too attached to one particularly dramatic, but not essential, feature of the phenomenon I'm trying to grip. To fully invert the trope, we need a non-white person (really, a woman, but--) having their humanity restored in some way by a relationship with a young white person (ideally, a boy) to whose flourishing future they then dedicate their life/resources/etc., possibly by dying. The best examples that have been called to my attention so far are two Denzel Washington movies, Book of Eli and Man on Fire.
(D&D Honour Among Thieves did have the Hispanic barbarian woman as the only casualty of the finale. White guy protagonist then spends the one-use resurrection tablet on her instead of his white wife as he was planning, because he realized she's practically the real mother to his white daughter now and he cares about her as a platonic friend more than his wife).
This isn't quite the phenomenon I'm after, I think, but "choosing your daughter's Hispanic barbarian surrogate mother over your long-dead wife" is in the same neighborhood, thanks.

Well, I was more interested in kind of "situating" the justices, it was not my intent to be deliberately unflattering or anything.
But I do wonder whether it's actually a "poor bar." Scalia was an exceptionally capable jurist, but he does have peers in the profession--and even peers outside the profession who would likely make excellent justices. The problem is that the political nature of the appointment now often prevents such people from being appointed. In particular, Robert Bork was a much better choice than Anthony Kennedy, for example, and given Kennedy's penchant, especially in his later years, for flights of poetic fancy instead of hard-boiled legal reasoning, America would very likely be a better place today had Bork joined the court.
That said, though, while I do think it's still a little early to declare that either Gorsuch or Barrett are on Scalia's level, they are at least plausibly in the neighborhood. So it's not impossible to get good jurists on the court. But in the case of Jackson, President Biden didn't even try. He wasn't looking for a great jurist or even an obviously competent one. He made a purely political, explicitly affirmative-action pick, with totally predictable results.
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