sodiummuffin
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This is an example of how results based on "controlling for confounders" are inherently dubious for complicated fields like social science. Fundamentally the researchers are coming up with a list of potential confounders (which must be legible across many individual cases, available to the researchers, etc.) and assuming that anything left after they're controlled for must be whatever signal they're looking for. I recommend this SSC post as a classic example of this, in which a study on the impact of bullying controls for bullies targeting unpopular disadvantaged kids using the Bristol Social Adjustment Guide. In this case this is what they controlled for:
The model presented in Table 6 includes only case characteristics that would have been known by judges and jurors: the number of prior convictions; the number of victims (included here as a binary variable for one victim/multiple victims); the nature of the defendant’s plea; the number of applied aggravators (as determined by the judge or jury); the number of mitigating circumstances identified; the number of defenses offered; and whether the victim was held hostage. (We also tested the significance of a concomitant sex crime and whether the victim was a law enforcement officer; neither of these factors was found to be a significant predictor of sentencing outcomes and are not included in the model shown below).
This misses nearly all the details of the case. They count the raw number of official "applied aggravators" but not what those aggravators are. They count the number of prior convictions but not their severity, the number of mitigating circumstances and number of defenses but not what those are or how convincingly they are argued. They check whether the victim was held hostage for some reason but not other similar specifics (chosen controls tend to be arbitrary and vary widely across studies on the same subject). The people making the decision have all the details that a set of controls can't possibly encompass, and we know the controlled factors differ by race, yet any systematic difference in their decisions is assumed to be a product of racial discrimination rather than everything they didn't control for.
Imagine a study trying to determine if the date of birth on a birth certificate is a biased indicator of age. Group 1 is stereotyped as being older than Group 2, does this influence the date written down when they're born? Naturally the study controls for age, with a multiple-choice question to choose an age range ("[B]: 20-29 years old"). They find that, while Group 1 does pick older age ranges, even after you control for age [B] respondents in Group 1 have an earlier date of birth than [B]s in Group 2. In fact, a later more sophisticated study outright asks for age, and finds that 25 year olds in Group 1 have an earlier birth date than 25 year olds in Group 2. Needless to say, this is a perfectly expected result even without any birth-certificate bias.
Interestingly, after controlling for race of defendant, the number of mitigating circumstances is no longer a significant predictor of decisions to impose death.
In other words "race" and "number of mitigating circumstances" correlate strongly enough that if they didn't put "mitigating circumstances" in their model any difference in sentencing from mitigating circumstances would be assumed to be due to racism. Naturally they don't consider whether the same thing might be happening with factors they didn't control for.
Second, the regression results indicate that case characteristics explain only a small proportion of the variation in the case outcomes analyzed here. Specifically, case characteristics alone explain only 9% of the variation in prosecutorial decisions regarding whether to seek death and 20% of the variation in juries’ sentencing decisions.
Unexplained variation documented in the results presented here suggest that other extra-legal and social factors –not captured by our statistical models – are playing an important role in death penalty case dynamics.
Interestingly their conclusion calls the variation not explained by their model "extra-legal and social factors". I don't think it's really "extra-legal factors" when the jury makes decisions using methods more complicated than "count up the number of applied aggravators".
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A summary of her original written statement to police was just released today. Her statement to police does not allege that she was unconscious or was forced to have sex or take ketamine. She describes her refusals as being respected:
And them stopping as soon as she said that she no longer wanted to have sex:
This is how she describes the ketamine use:
I'm guessing that her going to the police was under the idea that intoxicated sex is rape even if she verbally agrees. However that does not actually constitute rape under New York law, which is why no charges were filed. Note that, for those who classify drunken sex as rape regardless of the law, reading the statement summary makes it seem like some of the other participants were probably drunker than her:
In other news, per TMZ one of the accused was just fired from his job at Wells Fargo.
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