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Culture War Roundup for the week of December 12, 2022

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Setting aside projecting one's own viewpoint of someone else's interests onto them, the key point of the armor procurement is likely tech transfer and modernization away from Warsaw-pact era templates with an eye for future European market competition. The Ukrainian purchase Korean tanks has indicators of a technology transfer and local production deal, with the potential for a future Europe-based tank co-development program between Poland and Korea that could try and compete in the European market.

In general arms procurement, the seller wants to make the tanks at their own home, and keep the techs involved to themselves, while the buyers want the tanks made in their home, and to get technology transfers. The major western tank producers- US, UK, France, and Germany- have export-variants, but are generally tight-fisted with technology transfers. In the European military market context, the German Leopard 2 is the main legacy main battle tank of Europe, and has a preponderance of scale, but with modernization techs controlled by the German industry. The Koreans, by contrast, have a low-key reputation of being a bit more flexible with technology transfer concessions as their way to try and break into other markets, and Polish government's press on their priorities indicate Polish manufacturing base was a key priority. Add in that one of the model purchases is a model which allegedly hasn't even finished the design phase yet, as well as some floated discussion of future joint ventures, in the context of the European market dynamics where many military sales in most European countries must de facto come from another European country outside of technology-specific offerings...

In the near term, the immediate purchase of Korean tanks is more akin to a ring-swap replacement of the legacy Soviet-era T-##s the Poles still have. These Soviet tanks remain a major part of the inventory, but are long-term dead ends. These are almost certainly going to be sent to Ukraine in some form or fashion in the next year, when an infusion of armor would simultaneously give Ukraine armor and maneuver capacity and reduce the Polish logistics burden. Whether you agree with it or not, the Poles believe helping the Ukrainians throw the Russians out entirely is a major national interest, and playing a key role in doing so is almost certain to get them far more reconstruction access and integration for longer-term alignment for the post-war. Your evaluation may differ, but in consideration of future transfers, the immediate purchases is a substitution for 'good enough' tanks in the interim, but also the hook to open/expand the longer-term benefits.

In the medium term, Poland- which while it's had a large tank industry hasn't had exactly a modern one- will likely receive Korean technology transfers as part of the manufacturing/maintaining the current and future design tanks. The Korean technology transfer will be used to modernize Poland's own military industrial base, increasing its competitiveness inside the European market and abroad and reducing dependence on the primary European tank supplier, Germany, for non-warsaw pact tanks. This is, on its own, raising another competitor for the Koreans, but the opening purchase and Korea's own strategic prioritization is a 'worth it.' The Koreans get market access into Europe, expand production lines and logistics support that could be used to support Korea in case of a future conflict disrupting South Korea's domestic supply lines, build internal rapport with a fellow American ally, and so on.

The longer term prospect, more tentative and possible than decisive, is the prospect for Korea and Poland to do future joint armor/APC/combat vehicle design projects in the future, with the goal of competing with established European producers. The Koreans on their own would have virtually no hope of breaking into the European arms market, where many domestic procurement pressures are for European-production lines, but a 'Polish' vehicle could easily become a standard in parts of Europe, especially if it comes with the sort of integration/technology transfer that the Germans and French resist. In turn, joint ventures could also have variants aimed at other regions, whether the South Koreans and the Poles could work their separate lines of influence when lobbying for the sale on joint projects that- because of tech alignment and shared base- both would split the profits. This is all tentative, but possible, if developed on the basis of a techs-for-tanks transfer.

I buy your industrial development argument but they're also buying modern Abrams from America. While they're hoping to do some local production with the K2, it seems very much like they're scrambling for more firepower now. They're also buying Apaches, howitzers and so on.

Whether you agree with it or not, the Poles believe helping the Ukrainians throw the Russians out entirely is a major national interest, and playing a key role in doing so is almost certain to get them far more reconstruction access and integration for longer-term alignment for the post-war. Your evaluation may differ, but in consideration of future transfers, the immediate purchases is a substitution for 'good enough' tanks in the interim, but also the hook to open/expand the longer-term benefits.

The Poles clearly see this as a priority, they're paying a heavy price for a great deal of firepower. The Polish economy is not especially large. Their 1500 tank plan is very ambitious, significantly more than Germany, France and the UK combined. It's a ridiculously powerful army for a non-nuclear power. It does not particularly matter if Poland has 500, 1000, or 5000 tanks as far as self-defense is concerned. If the Russians are at war with Poland, the key factor is nuclear weapons. Why do they need 'good enough' tanks in the interim? Do they think that Putin is deterred from attacking Poland by the marginal addition of 200 Abrams?

The Koreans get market access into Europe, expand production lines and logistics support that could be used to support Korea in case of a future conflict disrupting South Korea's domestic supply lines.

Are you saying that the Koreans hope to import parts from Poland in case their own factories get blown up by the North Koreans/Chinese? If South Korea's domestic supply lines are in danger, I think Poland will be last on their list of priorities.

I buy your industrial development argument but they're also buying modern Abrams from America. While they're hoping to do some local production with the K2, it seems very much like they're scrambling for more firepower now. They're also buying Apaches, howitzers and so on.

The Abrams are for defense of a different part of Poland than the Korean tanks. Broadly speaking, Abrams are for the flat plains leading to the capital region, and less heavy, more rough-terrain tanks are for the more restrictive terrain areas.

This also comes back to 'just because you don't think a current threat is valid doesn't mean others don't.' Projection of one's views onto others, and all that.

The Poles clearly see this as a priority, they're paying a heavy price for a great deal of firepower. The Polish economy is not especially large. Their 1500 tank plan is very ambitious, significantly more than Germany, France and the UK combined. It's a ridiculously powerful army for a non-nuclear power.

Not really. 1500 tanks is only ambitious relative to the multi-decade draw-down by Germany, France, and UK since the Cold War. Much larger tank armies were managed by relatively more modest economies during the Cold War. Moreover, the Poles are doing this from a pretty modest procurement perspective- they're not approaching this tank force as in addition to a world-class major airforce, navy, and what have you that traditionally dilutes budgets. The Poles are structuring their military to bring the armor and the close-air support, which very nicely compliments the Americans bringing the Air Force, Navy, and rapid-reaction but limited capability ground forces to a contingency.

It does not particularly matter if Poland has 500, 1000, or 5000 tanks as far as self-defense is concerned. If the Russians are at war with Poland, the key factor is nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons haven't been a decisive factor in any war since the invention of nuclear weapons, including the only war in which nuclear weapons were used. They haven't even been key in mitigating western aid to Ukraine, let alone stopping multiple major and embarassing operational defeats that have rendered Ukraine a strategic disaster.

Why do they need 'good enough' tanks in the interim? Do they think that Putin is deterred from attacking Poland by the marginal addition of 200 Abrams?

The Polish use for a tank army is less for if Putin attacks Poland, and more if Putin were to try and attack the Baltic states to Poland's immediate NE, were Poland would be the only realistic force beyond American immediate buildup able to interven in a Baltic scenario. While Russia is many years from being able to threaten Poland, smaller Baltic states don't need Ukraine-war sized forces to be threatened, and here we come back to projecting one's own judgement of the probability of such a thing from the regional actors' perspectives.

The development of a Polish tank industry is less for Russia, and more of creating a non-German/French arms supplier in the EU. This is a matter not only of profit, but supporting the creation of an eastern-European block that won't be dependent, and thus can't be held hostage to, German/French supply line influence in occasions where German/French interests would be willing to sacrifice eastern European interests, as was repeatedly tried in recent years. Poland's development is generally consistent with a nation trying to set itself up as a regional power able to counter-balance other regional powers. It doesn't need to out-produce Germany, it needs to keep the neighborhood from becoming dependent on Germany.

If you REALLY wanted to be paranoid, the Poles may also be preparing for post-Russian security concerns centered around future attempts to centralize the power of the European Union, but that's far more hypothetical than probable motive.

Are you saying that the Koreans hope to import parts from Poland in case their own factories get blown up by the North Koreans/Chinese? If South Korea's domestic supply lines are in danger, I think Poland will be last on their list of priorities.

Poland doesn't need to be on their list of priorities. Poland just needs to be part of the American alliance network and able to fly highly-valuable supplies in relatively short order in case of crisis, thus helping the higher priorities.

A key lesson of the Ukrainian war, besides that nukes don't decide conventional wars, is that no one nation can run a high-intensity war on their peacetime buildup. The Russians started a medium-scale war with an entire superpower's stock of military surplus and depots, and started running out of operational stocks of precision munitions in the first two months, and tapping their contingency stocks until the point of buying Iranian drones in lieu of cruise missiles. Even the US is seeing real dips in select categories of munitions, and it's not even directly involved. Whether you stockpile PGMs that go out in weeks, or dumb-rounds that are exhausted in months, high-intensity makes support needs immediate.

But another key lesson is that while no one can beat the logistics strength of the American alliance network, compatibility matters. The Ukrainians spent the first months of the war dependent on Warsaw Pact systems and aid delivery, first because it was all they were familiar with and then because it was all they could shoot. Trying to incorporate new artillery systems and ammo trains- even when made available- has been a real hurdle. Speed of integration can have operational relevance, both in immediate pre-war buildups, but post-war resupplies.

Sharing common production systems is what clears this hurdle, and is a key strength of being mutual members the American alliance network. In theory, the French and the Germans have been trying to do this for some time with their European Strategic Autonomy proposals for a common EU procurement, but 'Buy European' has tended to be 'Buy French/German,' and French/Germany wrangles have delayed numerous projects past the point of relevancy. What Korea has achieved is that someone else really will be maintaining a lot of compatible tanks, and is probably going to be more willing to part with armor (parts) than the Germans.

Nuclear weapons haven't been a decisive factor in any war since the invention of nuclear weapons, including the only war in which nuclear weapons were used. They haven't even been key in mitigating western aid to Ukraine, let alone stopping multiple major and embarassing operational defeats that have rendered Ukraine a strategic disaster.

Nuclear weapons are like the sea to fish. They dominate the power structure wars are fought in, post-WW2 at least. There's a reason Libya and Iraq got hammered by the US but North Korea didn't. There's a reason no two nuclear powers have fought anything more than a few skirmishes, limiting the intensity of their wars. There's a reason the US and the other nuclear powers are so keen on nuclear non-proliferation. If nuclear weapons weren't decisive, they wouldn't care so much about them. If nuclear weapons weren't decisive, Russia wouldn't have dared to infringe upon NATO's interests in this war, since they have vast conventional superiority.

I suspect that the Yom Kippur war is the strongest example you have of nuclear weapons not helping defend a country. Yet when Israel threatened to use nukes, the US quickly moved to fly in huge quantities of military aid. They didn't care about the wrath of the Arabs causing hundreds of billions of damage to the US economy via oil prices. The superpowers put huge pressure on their clients to end the conflict in a stalemate before nukes could be used, they didn't let the conflict fester as in so many other wars. Nukes don't need to be used to be decisive in controlling the situation. If they were used, they would be even more powerful.

The Polish use for a tank army is less for if Putin attacks Poland, and more if Putin were to try and attack the Baltic states to Poland's immediate NE, were Poland would be the only realistic force beyond American immediate buildup able to interven in a Baltic scenario.

If Russia attacks, going for a fait accompli, why should the US end the war even if the Russians sweep through the Baltics in 48 hours? It makes the US look totally pathetic if they don't come in and retake that ground eventually. While I maintain that nuclear weapons are dominant, they favor defense over attack. Russia's nuclear threats to defend its army occupying the Baltic aren't as credible as NATO nuclear threats against Russian nuclear first use. Furthermore, Russia has only attacked non-NATO members in conflict with Russian minorities. Even if the Baltics get into a spat with their Russian minorities, they're still in NATO. It would be an incredibly risky and provocative move to attack the Baltics. It'd be a far more aggressive move than invading Ukraine.

Poland just needs to be part of the American alliance network and able to fly highly-valuable supplies in relatively short order in case of crisis, thus helping the higher priorities.

I'm afraid I still don't understand why Korea would care at all about such a niche scenario. They plan for some kind of highly-urgent crisis where the Koreans suddenly need more ammunition, so they fly it in from Poland? Why not just plan ahead and buy your own ammunition from your own companies before hand, store it in your own country and keep the airlift capacity for moving things you don't make like US forces or Patriot batteries? There certainly has been a syndrome where NATO countries don't bother to produce ammunition, Russia has been firing off entire years of US artillery production in weeks. But surely the simplest cure is just to produce munitions and spare parts for the weapons one designs, builds and operates!

What if the crisis strikes quickly and there's no time to airlift supplies from Poland, through hostile airspace, to South Korea? What if Poland needs its supplies because it also faces a crisis? What if South Korean defence industry needs some more cash? I agree that the Koreans want to open up markets but this is too far.

Perun came to much the same conclusion with some additional minor comments about why Poland might want a large conventional military force rather than just relying on NATO/Nuclear options. Essentially +1 to above.