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felipec

unbelief

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joined 2022 November 04 19:55:17 UTC

Freedom of speech maximalist who is anti-woke, anti-orthodoxy, anti-establishment, and anti-capitalist.

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felipec


								

								

								
								
								

								
							
					
 
				


				
unbelief

				
				
				

				

					1 follower  

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					joined 2022 November 04 19:55:17 UTC
				


				
					

					
Freedom of speech maximalist who is anti-woke, anti-orthodoxy, anti-establishment, and anti-capitalist.



				

				

				

				

				

					

					

					
					
					

					
User ID: 1796


					
					
					
				

			


					

						
							
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	 Hot Bump Top Bottom Old Controversial Comments
	



		

	






	

		
		

		
		
	

	

  







		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


Causation absolutely is available in Newcomb, because the statement of the though experiment describes the causation.




That causation is irrelevant.




It can also be demonstrated mathematically that two-boxing is "better", by showing that it is the dominant strategy.




That's like saying saying two-boxing leads to better outcomes if we assume two-boxing leads to better outcomes. It's circular reasoning.


You assume we have to ignore the probability of the predictor. There's zero justification for that, other than the fact that you want the result to be two-box.




No, you can't, because you have no satisfying way to operationalize Omega's prediction without breaking the causal structure of the thought experiment.




Yes I can. It is trivial.




And you asserted it wasn't a paradox, and your "proof" was that a different example isn't a paradox.




No. Each example is standalone.


    

  • If you choose an answer to this question at random, what is the chance that you will be correct? A) 25% B) 0% C) 0% D) 0%
    • 



That example is not a paradox, and the answer depends on the choice.




Hence, they aren't probability theory, and you can't appeal to "probability theory" without doing the work to establish that your questioned claims follow from probability theory.




My claims follow directly from probability theory.


If p=0.99, then it follows that:


(1/n) Σᵢ₌₁ⁿ Xᵢ → 0.99


This is pretty much a tautology in probability theory.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


Building your strategy on causal understanding is better than building it on correlation.




If causation is available, which in this case it's not. Even then I would argue that all the causation you think you know are nothing more than hypotheses directly reliant on observed correlation.




No, the conclusion you stated is incorrect.




It is demonstrably the case that one-boxing leads the better outcomes. It can be demonstrated mathematically and empirically.


I can write a computer simulation and compare the outcomes of one-boxers with the outcomes of two-boxers. The outcomes of one-boxers are always superior.


You "argument" against that is ipse dixit. "Nuh uh, it does not". That's not serious.




But your choice isn't information you can use to affect your choice.




Another ipse dixit. Yes it is.


Did you even read my essay? It starts with an example that shows the correct choice depends on your choice. I already proved you wrong.




Your ice cream example, as artificial as it is, works, because you can observe how much ice cream you ate and use that as a proxy for the time of year.




No, it works because all anyone needs is correlation, which is evidence of causation.




That's true, but neither stated rigorously (which you'd need for actual mathematical argument) nor very interesting, and it's not the claim that needed defending.




Probability theory is stated rigorously. I don't need to prove what has already been proven.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


It's what invalidates your argument, because it means you don't need to rely on correlation.




No it doesn't. That's an inverse error fallacy. a ⇒ b. ¬a ∴ ¬b I didn't say correlation was necessary, I said correlation was sufficient. If you have correlation, you can conclude b, that doesn't mean if you don't have correlation you cannot conclude b.




The point is that that doesn't allow for the conclusion you want,




I does allow the conclusion I stated.




The correlation between what?




Choice and prediction.




Mathematics is not a field where you just get to make claims without supporting them.




Yes it does. If x is more likely than y, that means a rational agent should expect x more than y. That's what mathematics tells you.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


In any case, if I know the causal effects, I can just derive the outcome.




That is irrelevant.




You should replace "b leads to better outcomes" with "b affects the optimal strategy" for this to be meaningful.




No wrote it "leads to better outcomes" because it does lead to better outcomes.




Because in Newcomb there's no information A




The correlation is the information.




Better outcomes than random, on average, not necessarily better than a different strategy that takes advantage of a causal understanding of the problem.




It is demonstrably better than all the other strategies.




You haven't done any work to establish I get worse outcomes.




I don't need to. It's a mathematical fact.




What needs to be available is knowledge about causation.




Otherwise you are going to ignore the causation. Which is precisely what I said.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


If you claim to be conditioning on Y and it's time 1 then that's a contradiction.




No it is not.




You are either lying, or have invented a brand new version of Game Theory and decision-making theory, which requires literal books to establish, not a couple of sentences at the beginning of a problem.




You didn't bother reading my essay, did you?


All this is explained very clearly in it.




When you say "Omega leaves and then you make your decision afterwards" you are saying "you are special."




Wrong.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


I just think a lot of 1-boxers do.




I don't think so. I haven't seen a single one-boxer make that claim.




I'm just trying to explain why I think 2-boxers are 2-boxers. They think "backwards causation is wrong so 1-boxing is wrong".




Yes, that is certainly one of the rationales of two-boxers. But that doesn't mean many one-boxers do actually believe that.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


Corporate want's you to find the difference between these two pictures and they are the same picture.




That's precisely the reason why the actual formulation of the problem avoided 100% accuracy: the prediction is almost certain, not perfect.


This whole thread is a red herring.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


But "there is no reasonable way for you to deduce how you would trick the oracle" is usually not explicitly spelled out in the original problem. It's just left unmentioned, and left as an exercise to the reader as to how or whether it might be tricked.




That is false, the original formulation of the problem says very explicitly: "all this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being's prediction about your choice in the situation to be discussed will be correct".


If the prediction "will be correct", then you cannot trick it. Furthermore, Robert Nozcik goes on to say "You have no reason to believe that you are any different, vis-a-vis predictability, than they are.".


This thinking precisely aligns with my hypothesis: two-boxers think they are special, they have free will, they have the ability to choose otherwise, they somehow exist outside the system, thy can be the exception regardless of how unlikely that is.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


I gave two examples where my strategy of analyzing the causation yields better results than yours.




No you did not. You assumed the better results given that you were right. This is circular reasoning.




It's definitely not as simple as just claiming your interlocutor is irrational without doing any work to establish that.




It is a mathematical fact that if a is correlated with b and b leads to better outcomes, using a as information tends to lead to better outcomes.


I use a and I get better outcomes, you don't use a and you get worse outcomes. I'm being rational. You are being irrational.


Saying "it's not that simple" is just false.




I haven't actually made a claim on what you should choose, only that you should reason from causation if available.




No, you are not only saying that, you are also saying that if causation is not available, correlation should be ignored.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


In my experience most 1-boxers are 1-boxers because they implicitly believe in backwards causation.




That is not not true. Two-boxers make that claim with zero evidence. I've been told I must believe in backwards causation because I'm a one-boxer.


Let me be clear: I do not believe in backwards causation, and I'm a one-boxer.




To be honest I don't really see that recursion had to do with it.




Then why do you insist in backwards causation? If a and b are correlated, that's all you need to know to make an informed decision, no backwards causation needed.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


Understanding the causality allows for a more successful strategy than just knowing a correlation.




No it doesn't. The answer is the same regardless.




For most purposes I could think of, I am indeed going to discount the correlation, because it's unlikely there's a direct causal effect between a and b.




Then you are an irrational person. It's that simple.




What? How so?




a⇒b,¬a∴¬b a) find causation, b) choose X.


If you find causation, then you choose X; you didn't find causation, you don't choose X. That's an obvious inverse error fallacy.




Correlation, meanwhile, tells us little if we already know the causation.




It's precisely the other way around. In the real world causation is merely a hypothesis, it's a tentative story you tell yourself. And the only reason you worked out a potential causation is because of the correlation.


Correlation is the only real information.




I'm not even sure how Newcomb is supposed to be analogous to the ice cream example.




There is a high correlation between the choice and the prediction. Ignoring that correlation is irrational.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


You have a 25% chance of winning $1,001,000...but a 25% chance of winning $0, and 25% chance of winning $1,000.




No. You are forgetting the correlation. The problem very clearly states that the predictor "almost certainly" will predict your choice. That means that for the 50% that you choose one-box, the predictor won't be filling the mystery box 99.99% of the time. And for the 50% that you chose one-box, the predictor will be filling the mystery box 99.99% of the time.


So the breakdown is: $1,001,000 (0.005%), $1,000,000 (49.995%), $1,000 (49.995%), $0 (0.005%).




Formally, if you with probability p pick both boxes, the alien with probability 1 - p fills the opaque box.




That isn't quire right because the predictor is not 100% accurate. If we assume the accuracy is 99.99% (q), then the probability that the predictor will fill the mystery box is (q)(1 - q). Close, but not quite the same.




The statistically optimal strategy is to always pick one box.




Correct.


But the real question my essay is trying to explore is why some people do not see that's the case. In my experience the reason why people choose two-boxes is that they completely ignore the accuracy of the predictor, and instead of assuming that q is close to 100%, they simply treat it as a completely unknown variable that could take any value, including 0.01, despite the formulation of the problem.


Why do they do that?


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


It behooves you to use more sunscreen because it's summer, not because you're eating ice cream.




You know that because I gave you the background of how I constructed my synthetic problem, but in the real world all you have is the correlation.




If you spend your summer holiday at the beach then you should use sunscreen, even if you eat little ice cream because the ice cream stand at the beach has been closed.




But to assume otherwise would be an inverse error fallacy. My question was in the form of a⇒b, I didn't ask anything if ¬a.




If you don't understand the causalities, or if you have no other information, ice cream is a proxy that lets you do better than random.




Which is all that matters.


Consider another study that finds a correlation between a) "the number of nesting storks in European countries" and b) "human birth rates". Are you just going to discount that correlation just because the causal network is not immediately available?




If you present a variant of Newcomb as "Omega is giving you a choice between two options, "two-boxing" and "one-boxing". People who picked "two-boxing" on average gain $1000, "one-boxing" pickers gain on average $1,000,000", then, sure, obviously B is the optimal choice.




That is literally what the original formulation of Newcomb's problem tells you is going to happen.




But if you add information about what the choices are, and the causal mechanisms behind the payout, then it becomes reasonable to analyze that, and the disagreement about actual Newcomb is pretty much about causality.




You are once again committing an inverse error fallacy.


The fact that you do not immediately see a direct causal link between the choice and the prediction doesn't mean that there isn't a causal network between the two. But more importantly: it doesn't negate the very real and undeniable correlation.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


If omega can be wrong then the entirety of the problem hinges on when/how/why it can be wrong.




No it doesn't. The entirety of intelligent agency relies partial knowledge, and you want to simplify Newcomb's problem to a problem of simply not having enough knowledge: "if only we knew how the system works then we could cheat the system".


The original formulation of the problem tells you explicitly that you have no reason to believe you will be any different, that is: you will not cheat the system.


It tells you explicitly your choice will be predicted almost certainly.




flip a very slightly weighted coin




The problem states that if you do that, Omega will put nothing in the mystery box.




Literally none of this is explained in the premise.




Yes it is.




It's not that I can't see a way for this to happen, it's that I can imagine a dozen hypothetical ways it could try to do this, and half of them let me two box anyway while half of them don't.




And these hypothetical ways violate what is very explicitly stated in the problem.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


I think the problem is just that people strongly dislike the idea that freewill doesn't exist, so much that they are recalcitrant to even accept it as a premise to a thought experiment.




Yes, but the issue is why. I contend there is a common cause why they don't believe in free will, and also why they are two-boxers.


They are committed to see themselves as outside the system they inhabit, in other words the opposite of embedded agency. And I think the reason why they have so much trouble understanding they are part of a system in which their decisions affect their decisions is lack of recursivity fluency.


Ask any two-boxer if they are able to imagine their choice to be causally linked all the way back to the beginning of the universe. I don't think they can.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					
As others pointed out: Yudkowsky is a one-boxer. Can you provide a single two-boxer that doesn't believe in libertarian free will? I doubt there's any.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


Two-boxers fundamentally disbelieve the premise - refuse to engage the actual hypothetical.




Of course, that was my conclusion as well. But the question is why.


I've discussed the problem with many two-boxers and all of them dismiss the high accuracy of the predictor on the basis that your choice doesn't affect the prediction. But they never bother to explain why that's relevant.


Even Robert Nozick in the original paper says if the decision doesn't affect the final state, then one should ignore the accuracy of the predictor. Why? Because that's what he was "lead to believe".


There is no reason to discount the correlation just because two-boxers don't see a direct causal link. That's why I devised the sunscreen problem: to show why it's irrational to discount a correlation on the basis of no apparent direct causal link.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


From this perspective, the blue/red debate is a misunderstanding:




But that's not true in my personal case. I truly would push the blue button, even that means I die. I would still do it out of principle. It's not rhetoric.




Could Newcombe's problem just be a misunderstanding?




It's not true in my case. I choose one-box because I truly believe that's what most likely to maximize my reward.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Recursive thinking, Newcomb's problem, and free will
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


The problem with Newcomb's problem is that it basically involves time travel




No it doesn't. That's what two-boxers claim in order to fit the problem into their view of reality, but that commits an appeal to incredulity fallacy.




Actual Newcomb's problem is basically the same as this in that decisions you make in the future affect things in the past, and the being making the boxes has to have time travel powers in order to guarantee a 100% success rate




That's not the Newcomb's problem: 100% success rate is never specified, it's "almost certainly". That means close to 100%, not 100%.


You are saying it's not possible for Omega to have such accuracy unless the future affects the past, but you don't provide any justification for that. You are basically saying: "I don't see how X is possible, therefore X is not possible". That is not a valid argument, that's an appeal to incredulity fallacy.


That is precisely why I devised my sunscreen problem. Your argument is the same as saying: "I don't see how efficacy against skin cancer and eating ice cream could be causally related, therefore they are not causally related".


Just because you don't see how Omega could predict your choice almost certainly without backwards causality doesn't mean that it can't.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Culture War Roundup for the week of December 8, 2025
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					
Yeah, but the problem is that Fuentes' style does require listening, so he was responding to what Morgan actually said. The audience is also listening to both. Morgan is the only one that wasn't.


That's why the little jabs that Fuentes did proved to the audience that Morgan wasn't listening, because he didn't respond or engage, he just continued with his script.


There's a reason why in 2025 people prefer the long-form podcast style: because it's harder to fake.


At the end of the day Fuentes' style feels much more authentic. Nobody likes Morgan's style anymore.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Culture War Roundup for the week of December 8, 2025
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					
Everyone understands sarcasm. Zoomers didn't invent it.


The problem is that Piers Morgan sees himself not just as vastly intellectually superior to Nick Fuentes, but in a completely different league. He underestimated Fuentes so much, he didn't even see the need to listen to him. He thought all he had to do is research, present the evidence, and it would be an automatic win. That's why he didn't even consider the possibility that Fuentes was being sarcastic.


Just consider the moment when Fuentes said the number of Jews that died in the Holocaust could have been 7, 6, 8 million... maybe 100 times more. If Morgan paused for a second to listen to what Fuentes just said, he would realize he was being trolled, but he didn't, because the possibility that he was going to be intellectually outmatched wasn't on his bingo card.


There were around 500k Jewish people in Germany at the time, so how could the number of dead be 600k?


I've seen this happen countless times. For example when Paul Krugman commented on a post by Scott Adams, underestimating Adams' intellect and not even considering the possibility that he was being trolled.


Overconfidence is a slow and insidious killer. Zoomers are just taking advantage of the Boomers' overconfidence, and having a laugh about how stupid it makes them look.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Culture War Roundup for the week of December 8, 2025
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					
You don't understand reaction strategy. Nick Fuentes doesn't need to explain anything, he just needs to say something provocative for other people to react. And that's exactly what happened.


If you watch reaction videos, pretty much everyone is saying the same thing: 1 in 100 is still pretty bad.


It's exactly the same when somebody makes a typo in a title. It's engagement baiting. "Oh, you got me, I'm so bad at spelling".


No, you just don't understand the moves that are happening.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Culture War Roundup for the week of November 3, 2025
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					
I have no affinity to any tribe, but it is a fact that illegal immigrants are violating the law, the blue tribe doesn't have any regards for the law (unless it suits them), and they have lied multiple times in the recent past. Given that context I don't see why anyone who isn't in the blue tribe -- including the red tribe -- should consider these "horrible stories" as having any credence.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Freedom of speech has been poisoned and we need to reframe it
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


I'm arguing that this is what flags mean to people.




That's not an argument, that's an assertion.




Implicit in the above statement is my evidence for it




Evidence is not proof.


What you are doing is literally the black swan fallacy. You assert that all swans are white, then you provide a post hoc rationalization for your assertion: here are some white swans. This is not proof that your assertion is necessarily true.


There's a well known method to solve the black swan fallacy, called falsifiability. Instead of looking for white swans, we should be looking for black swans. In this particular case we should be looking for evidence where people consider a particular flag to be the opposite of what you claim.


If you cared about truth, that's the evidence you should be looking for. But you are doing the opposite of what you should be doing: you are ignoring all the evidence that contradicts your assertion.




I have invited you to offer contrary evidence




Yes, but you have already spelled out exactly how you are going to dismiss it, and on what grounds.




The problem with claims of what they ought to do is that such claims are not necessarily bounded by reality.




Then why are you arguing that people ought to do these common inferences?




Will I? Why would I do that?




Yes, because you are doing a post hoc rationalization: you are starting from a pre-established conclusion, and selectively choosing the evidence that fits, and rejecting the evidence that doesn't.




Whatever meaning is ascribed, I'm going to argue that it needs to actually account for the common behaviors of those waving the flag.




So any evidence that contradicts your assertion must be rejected on the basis that it's not "common behavior". So by definition all swans are white, because all the black swans we find are "not common".




More generally, it's not clear to me that most people, or even any people, "know what they mean" themselves. Language is necessarily imprecise at the best of times, and often people speak carelessly, even about things they care deeply about. This is not a retreat to infinite subjectivity, just an acceptance that human minds are complicated, and introspection is difficult.




So when evidence supports your claim, you treat language as precise; when it doesn't, you appeal to its imprecision. That asymmetry reveals a confirmation bias.


Your assertion is simply unfalsifiable.


				

				

						

							

								
							

						


						
					

				
			


			

	


			
			
				

			
		

	






		

			
			
				Freedom of speech has been poisoned and we need to reframe it
			
		

	

	

	

		
			

			

				

			

		

			


				

					


That being said, while you've made it clear that you strongly disagree, you have given little explanation as to why, and you appear to have ignored the arguments I put forward.




You have not made any argument.


You are making claims that are completely unsubstantiated presuming they are true, just because you said so: ipse dixit fallacy.




Flags defend ideas by their very existence, because the purpose of a flag is to serve as a physically-tangible token of loyalty to an abstract idea.




That is an assertion without a proof.


Why do flags serve as a token of loyalty? Because you said so. That's not an argument.




And yet, people make such inferences commonly, you will not be able to stop them from doing so, and communication requires accepting this reality and working around it.




Stating what people do has no bearing on what people ought to do. Effective communication requires interpreting what the author of a message actually meant, not whatever people commonly infer.


This is the main problem with modern communication: people do not care what other people actually meant. I can provide you with a completely different meaning of the rainbow flag that millions of people agree with, but you are going to claim their interpretation is wrong. Why? Because you say so.