This weekly roundup thread is intended for all culture war posts. 'Culture war' is vaguely defined, but it basically means controversial issues that fall along set tribal lines. Arguments over culture war issues generate a lot of heat and little light, and few deeply entrenched people ever change their minds. This thread is for voicing opinions and analyzing the state of the discussion while trying to optimize for light over heat.
Optimistically, we think that engaging with people you disagree with is worth your time, and so is being nice! Pessimistically, there are many dynamics that can lead discussions on Culture War topics to become unproductive. There's a human tendency to divide along tribal lines, praising your ingroup and vilifying your outgroup - and if you think you find it easy to criticize your ingroup, then it may be that your outgroup is not who you think it is. Extremists with opposing positions can feed off each other, highlighting each other's worst points to justify their own angry rhetoric, which becomes in turn a new example of bad behavior for the other side to highlight.
We would like to avoid these negative dynamics. Accordingly, we ask that you do not use this thread for waging the Culture War. Examples of waging the Culture War:
-
Shaming.
-
Attempting to 'build consensus' or enforce ideological conformity.
-
Making sweeping generalizations to vilify a group you dislike.
-
Recruiting for a cause.
-
Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.
In general, you should argue to understand, not to win. This thread is not territory to be claimed by one group or another; indeed, the aim is to have many different viewpoints represented here. Thus, we also ask that you follow some guidelines:
-
Speak plainly. Avoid sarcasm and mockery. When disagreeing with someone, state your objections explicitly.
-
Be as precise and charitable as you can. Don't paraphrase unflatteringly.
-
Don't imply that someone said something they did not say, even if you think it follows from what they said.
-
Write like everyone is reading and you want them to be included in the discussion.
On an ad hoc basis, the mods will try to compile a list of the best posts/comments from the previous week, posted in Quality Contribution threads and archived at /r/TheThread. You may nominate a comment for this list by clicking on 'report' at the bottom of the post and typing 'Actually a quality contribution' as the report reason.
Jump in the discussion.
No email address required.
Notes -
There's not really any way to "solve" the issue of states having divergent interests, but "Iran exporting an ideology hostile to most of its neighbors" has caused a lot of grief and it's pretty clear that Israel is not the only regional power who wants them to stop. One might be tempted to suggest that removing their capacity to project power would solve the underlying issue.
After the operations you named, the Houthis agreed to stop attacking US vessels, and so far have not resumed (even though the United States is attacking Iran.) This might be a good argument that (US objectives having been achieved) the current strikes on Iran are a mistake, but it doesn't seem like a great argument that the US does not have the ability to influence Iranian/Houthi behavior by force, or that Iran's decision to arm proxies and support them in a blockade against neutral shipping was, in fact, a good idea.
Well, first off, Gaza is not a sovereign state. But secondly, even though it isn't, any country who wishes to go to war with Israel over it may do so.
Yes, that's how it works, more or less. Blockades impose a cost on neutral countries, and neutral countries may then decide if it serves their interests to use military force to attempt to set things right.
This is true in the narrow sense that Wilson didn't go to war over it, but he did raise a stink about it, and the British bent over backwards to make sure it didn't cause substantial financial distress to the United States and avoided killing Americans.
The US choices in that war were the Germans (unrestricted submarine warfare) and the British (will pay you for the cargo they confiscated). The US choices in this conflict are the Israelis (won't interfere with your shipping, unless maybe it's going to Gaza, which the United States does not recognize as a state) and the Iranians/Houthis (long track record of trying to shut down access to global waterways).
The Houthis agreed to stop attacking the US Navy, which were the only "US vessels" that even attempted to cross the Bab el Mandeb during Trump's term. This does not represent any kind of influence on Houthi behavior because they had been offering such a "deal" since the very start of operations and if anything represents a climbdown from the US, which ultimately left the blockade in place and missiles continuing to fly at Israel.
What I would say isn't a good idea is repeatedly letting the whole world see the hard limits of American power as some mid tier power grabs control of key international waterways and squeezes while the President impotently screams and issues a half dozen contradictory statements ranging from "It doesn't matter, high oil prices are good" to "We'll bomb all their power plants" to "We'll send in the Marines". This whole affair seems like a combination of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Suez Crisis, neither of which were "good ideas" with positive consequences for the countries involved.
Well currently it seems like neutral countries are choosing to pay the Ayatollah Toll rather than try to take the Strait by force so I'd say that's not a great sign for the wisdom of this operation
The statement from Oman was that "In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping" so I don't think this is correct. The US government indicated the same.
This is incorrect also; it was publicized that Maersk sent a US-flagged vessel through this January.
This is an article from April 10, 2025, referencing a blockade that started in 2023 and a bombing campaign that started March 15, 2025.
Yes, the blockade is currently so in place that traffic noticeably increased and Maersk resumed transiting the Bab al-Mandab.
Sure, the jury is going to be out on this war until it is concluded (and perhaps for some time after that.)
Man, Trump snatching Maduro has really set insane expectations for the duration of military operations. I'm going to have a stroke if I get on here to read about the Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2030 or whenever and people are declaring it a failure when it's not over after 3 hours.
Anyway, if you read up a bit on US doctrine, you'll see that against a large regional threat like Iran, the doctrine will be to systematically dismantle larger threats before moving to smaller ones, a process that is both imperfect and time-consuming. Possibly US operations will fail in this area, but I think it is too soon to judge - the US is unlikely to move ships into the Strait until it has sanitized the area thoroughly, which is such an exhaustive process that I would not be surprised if the US reached a political solution to the problem before achieving a military one.
No, that came after the Gaza ceasefire, which is what actually caused the Houthis to end their blockade. I thought it was pretty widely publicized that the Houthis tied the continuation of their blockade to a ceasefire in Gaza. I guess that would explain why you're the only person in the world who thinks Rough Rider was a success.
Which kind of proves my point: instead of wasting billions on an ultimately pointless campaign that exposed the limits of American military might, Trump could have pulled the leash on Israel and forced them into a ceasefire to get the same result months sooner.
Trump is the one who said it would take 3-5 weeks and from where I'm sitting it looks like if anything Iran's hold over the Strait is stronger than it was before the war. They're literally running all of the ships through their territorial waters and extorting them for cash.
Out of curiosity, if Trump negotiated an identical "deal" to Iran that he got from the Houthis and Iran continued to charge tolls or outright block everyone besides the US Navy would you still consider that to be a success?
The maritime.gov statement that I linked to went into effect 2/14/2025; the Gaza ceasefire (the one that stuck, anyway) didn't go effect until the fall.
Reporting from before the Gaza ceasefire but after the Houthis ceasefire also indicates that traffic levels through the strait rose.
Now it is correct that the Houthis said they were continuing to target Israeli ships, so, as previously discussed, it is fair to point out that it did not lift the blockade entirely. But it does not seem correct to say that the US actions had no influence on the Houthis.
He in fact did pull the leash on Israel, resulting in a ceasefire early in 2025, with the result that Israel broke the ceasefire after accusing Hamas of giving them the runaround.
Yes, and I think that was "optimistic" if we intend to pursue the war to a full military conclusion.
Probably not if that was the only understood benefit from the war, successful wars don't conclude with no success besides restoring status ante bellum. (I suppose technically the scenario you benefit might be part of a hilarious galaxy-brained play by the United States to increase its leverage on the global market.)
Now, you can have a successful punitive expedition without any territorial changes or what have you.
I'm not sure if you're ignorant or being actively disingenuous here but the passage on 2/14/2025 was covered by the initial ceasefire that didn't stick. So once again, you're proving my point.
and on the contrary, Lloyd's List reports that the ceasefire did basically nothing to increase traffic.
Regardless, what can't really be contested is that yanking Bibi's leash was more effective in opening Red Sea traffic than fighting the Houthis was.
Right, he could have kept the leash tight instead of allowing the Israelis to take actions that harmed his interests for basically no benefit. Israel is infinitely more pliable to American pressure than Iran or Yemen.
Objectively, the path to opening the Red Sea ran through Tel Aviv, not Sanaa or Tehran. Similarly, the path to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open ran through preventing Israel from starting an unwinnable war, not in committing American forces to said unwinnable war.
Well I would like to think I'm more ignorant than disingenuous...
Oh good point, but in my defense, you specifically said
...which wasn't quite right.
Your point is that Rough Rider "does not represent any kind of influence on Houthi behavior," but the Houthis and the US reached an agreement (that cut the Israelis out) on May 6, 2025, when there was no Gaza ceasefire, correct?
Lloyd's measurement (which only includes larger vessels) excludes ships that Admiral Gryparis might have included, but both articles did agree that traffic was still lower than pre-blockade numbers.
Lloyd's List reported in early September (so before the Gaza peace plan) that traffic was increasing, although incrementally, with August traffic increasing by 10% over July. Again, definitely lower than pre-blockade numbers, but the trend, I think, indicates that the May truce did nudge the behavior of shipping.
This might be the case, although I suppose there's more than one direction to nudge Bibi - the May 6th agreement between the US and the Houthis happened the day after Israel began airstrikes on Yemen, right?
I really doubt it's infinitely more pliable. I understand the point you are making, it's just unclear to me exactly how pliable Israel is at the end of the day.
In the short term, certainly. Over an indefinite period, as I said previously:
Of course it's reasonable to point out that that's a theoretical risk, whereas this is a real one.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link