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Small-Scale Question Sunday for September 13, 2026

Do you have a dumb question that you're kind of embarrassed to ask in the main thread? Is there something you're just not sure about?

This is your opportunity to ask questions. No question too simple or too silly.

Culture war topics are accepted, and proposals for a better intro post are appreciated.

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That's all fine at first, but doesn't it collapse into "Nothing is comprehensible, so believe whatever you will."?

I am pretty sure that all humans do in fact believe whatever they will. That is, Belief formation is unavoidably a product of acts of the will, of choices made.

I used to think that beliefs were formed at least somewhat deterministically: you accumulate evidence, and the weight of the evidence eventually forces your mind down a channel. Then I spent a couple decades arguing logically with people, and realized that humans do not actually work this way.

Near as I can tell, there are three ways to form a belief:

  • You can accept (or reject) a belief proposed to you by others uncritically. This is a willful choice.
  • You can examine the proposed belief based on evidence. "Evidence" is an infinite class, and not one of the smaller infinities either, so it has to be pruned to a vanishing fraction. This pruning is a choice. Then it has to be weighed, and the metrics of the weighing are a choice. Then you can either draw a conclusion or go looking for more evidence, and this is also a choice.
  • If you want something deeper, you can use Axioms. Axioms have a shape, and some sets of evidence fit within them, and others don't, so this provides a more rigorous way of selecting and pruning evidence. But there are infinite axioms, and while you can have interplay between evidence and axioms, you still have to choose both your axioms and the evidence to test them against, making it, again, a willful choice.

People speak of motivated reason. But we reason for reasons, to accomplish some goal, and so it seems to me that all reason is motivated. This does not mean that reason is useless, only that its usefulness has an observable upper limit. It seems to me that those aware of this are better able to operate within those limits than those who believe their reasoning is not motivated, that their beliefs are not choices but rather deterministic machinery. One of the best ways to lose the ability to make good choices is to cement the belief that you aren't making choices at all, but are only a set of gears grinding out the mechanistic results of cause and effect.

But making from that the leap to the benevolent God who cares about each of individually, to an afterlife, to Jesus the Son of God, or any other specifica of any given faith, I can not.

Are you looking at this as a set of facts that compel belief mechanistically, or as an option that can be chosen? If the former, then I'm confident you will never find it, since it doesn't exist for this or any other belief. If the latter, the furthest I'd say is that it is clearly possible since I've done it myself, but whether it seems like a good idea to you is a very different question and one I obviously cannot answer.

What I keep circling back to is this - If there were a God who cared about each of us individually, who speaks to us, he'd do so unmistakably, impossible to overlook or misunderstand.

My theory is that compelling belief would violate peoples' ability to choose to love or not love him freely. I do not expect this theory to be compelling to others, though.

Not through vague signs, interpretations, exegeses, the words of supposed son and and prophets handed down through two millenia of misrepresentation, mistranslation and lost context.

I don't think the texts have actually been misrepresented, mistranslated, or had their context lost. I would rather not sidetrack into a tangential issue, but the short of it is that, from what I've observed, the evidentiary basis for this sort of argument was generated by the same intellectual cultures that gave us the Sokal hoaxes, Professor Arday, and all the other fruits of the Academy, and by similar methods.

It all seems too flimsy and accidental, too much held together by the transparent desire for God to be so.

I believe in God because I want to believe in God, straight up. When I didn't want to believe in God, I didn't believe in him. Belief in God is an Axiom, and axioms are chosen, not compelled. I appreciate that there's a ton of cultural baggage and associations that say it isn't supposed to work this way, but in perfect honesty, I think it's the cultural baggage and associations that are wrong. I've had versions of this conversation a number of times here, and I always emphasize the same point: I am not under the impression that I am going to convert my opposites to Christianity, but I really would like to get people to take a serious look at how beliefs are formed in the general case, both because I find the question fascinating, and because I think it provides significant insight into a lot of otherwise-mysterious aspects of human behavior.

I will just add that a hugely underrated aspect of belief formation is your friend group and social circle. (Thankfully a professor of mine mentioned this to me relatively early in my life, and I have been blessed in some other respects as regards my career and geographic placement).

Who you are around shapes who you are, including your beliefs and your moral values. Your friends and whoever you spend time interacting with control your own personal Overton Window. Certainly many people are capable of withstanding the compulsive power of Overton Window but it's not generally a bet you want to take or a position you want to place yourself in. Bad company corrupts good morals. And you make a choice as to whether or not you spend time with bad company.