Gillitrut
Reading from the golden book under bright red stars
No bio...
User ID: 863
But the prohibition on ex post facto laws is about laws. The supreme court is not very consistent about when its declared constitutional rules apply retroactively, but the answer is not "never." To the extent individuals have gotten citizenship by birth due to the fourteenth amendment (rather than an act of Congress) such citizenship would be open to retroactive removal by the court.
Yes.
I would object to that usage too! Rather say, the state commands people not to murder on pain of prison.
Even if none had been it is good to get rid of laws whose application would be unjust.
TIL that "convict a woman of a crime carrying a maximum sentence of life in prison" is a synonym of the word "ask."
I think agents of the state should have to identify themselves as agents of the state when going about the business of the state. And the particular agents doing the state's business need to be identifiable after the fact to the people they interacted with for accountability reasons. I don't think this an insane thing to say? Maybe I am just too radically libertarian. There are just a whole[1] pile[2] of articles[3] discussing the phenomenon of people impersonating ICE officers to commit other crimes. It turns out a standard like "if someone claims to be from ICE you gotta do what they say, even if they refuse to provide identification or evidence, on pain of committing another federal crime" is a standard that is open to abuse!
On the more general topic I think black bagging is a lot harder in a world where ~everyone has a video camera in their pocket. All the Dem politicians detentions or arrests I'm aware of had contemporaneous video within minutes of them occurring. Even in cases of AEA-related deportation attempts the news has gotten out in hours or less.
My radical proposal is the judiciary should have their own police force, independent of the executive, for the purpose of enforcing their orders.
1. Yes
2. Yes
3. I generally think 5-10 over is fine depending on conditions.
4. No. Maybe I am too used to roads with more than two lanes but I generally think traveling in lanes other than the rightmost is fine. Cutting people off or riding their bumper is permissible never, if practicable.
5. Yes, generally.
6. No
I cannot speak for others but at my own software company it would be a mistake to assume all the work we currently get done is all the work there is to do. We have a long and constantly growing backlog of things we would like to do to improve our product but must constantly prioritize due to much less capacity. If all our productivity doubled with AI the result would likely not be "the same work done with fewer people" but "much more work done with the same people."
I think this is easy. More single men are looking to date than single women. According to a PEW study from 2020 61% of single men were looking to date vs 38% of single women. There was pretty significant age stratification for women (61% of women 18-39, 29% of women 40+) but much less so for men (67% of men 18-39, 55% of men 40+). That does not get you quite to the extreme numbers in the OP but is surely part of the explanation. Add to that young men (under 50) are much more likely to be single than young women (51-32 ages 18-29, 27-19 age 30-49).
The population of single heterosexuals might be roughly equal (PEW reports both 31% of men and women report being single) but desire to get in a relationship in that pool is not symmetrical.
Can you say more about how Livelsberger was a leftist suicide bomber? According to the article you link:
On Friday evening investigators released a note found on the suspect's phone where he claimed to have major grievances about the country and military.
In one of the letters police say were found on his phone, Livelsberger expressed support for Donald Trump and the president-elect's allies, Elon Musk and Robert F. Kennedy Jr. He also expressed disdain for diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives and income inequality and expressed a concern about homelessness, according to the letters.
I don’t think it’s that crazy of a position. First, the problem with national wide injunctions without classes is the asymmetry of the outcome. 500 different plaintiffs can bring the lawsuit in different district courts. 1/500 needs to win if the judge gives a nationwide injunction. Contrast with a class where the plaintiffs are in fact bound by a loss.
If it is all going to end up decided by SCOTUS anyway this seems fine. Better one rule while we sort out the litigation than possibly 96. The government has the resources that individual plaintiffs certainly don't.
Second, the idea the government would in fact look for not yet born residents to impose something where there is direct SCOTUS authority is a hypothetical that is so far out there compared to the first concern because the government would quickly lose (eg new plaintiff would say there is a scotus case directly on point).
This is true if the hypothetical plaintiff has the resources to press their claim in court. Unless you already have an injunction against the government, in your own name or as part of a class, the government is free to force you to engage in duplicative litigation and drain your time and resources. The government, at oral argument, would not even commit to respecting a 2nd Circuit precedent in the 2nd Circuit!
There were both individual and state plaintiffs at oral argument, with somewhat different arguments.
I think there are situations where nationwide injunctions make sense, both legally and as a matter of judicial economy, and situations where they don't. Steve Vladeck has an article discussing this in the context of the Alien Enemies Act litigation. Whether you can sue as part of a class, what process is due, whether the proclamation is even valid, are questions that currently have a range of answers across several different circuits. What is the benefit of doing litigation like this, where lots of people are similarly situated with respect to the core legal issues? I think in cases where there is a facial challenge to a government policy it makes all the sense in the world for a nationwide injunction to be an available tool. If there is no set of circumstances where a policy would be constitutional, that shouldn't have to be litigated separately in 90+ cases spanning every district (or possible defendant) in the country. On the other hand, when challenges are more as-applied I think the question is trickier. That seems like a case more ripe for class certification and litigation, for similarly factually situated plaintiffs.
I guess I tend to agree more with Professor Frost that I'd rather err on the side of enjoining the government from carrying out a constitutional policy than permitting them to carry out an unconstitutional one.
ETA:
I'm working my way through the oral argument transcript from this morning and the government's position seems... incredible? It's their position that Article 3 and the Judiciary Act of 1789 do not give courts the power to issue nationwide injunctions, including the Supreme Court of the United States. Their view is any broad based relief must come via class action. Which brings me to kind of an odd question. Can persons not yet born be part of a class action? Otherwise it would seem the government's position is every new babe must file their own lawsuit (class or individual) to vindicate their rights or else risk the government being able to violate them.
So... Trump blinked? These are the tariff numbers we would have if Trump had just imposed the flat 10% rate on China he did on every other country. What benefit did the United States get out of this pause on trade with China? I guess Trump and his inner circle probably made a killing on insider trading this announcement.
Policy making I believe, the statute itself doesn't describe a process. I suspect the real question is to what extent the AG's determination (which requires finding a specific category applies) is subject to judicial review.
Yes. There is a process for Bondi to overturn the determination of an IJ and if that process had occurred before his removal, there is no question it would have been lawful.
8 USC 1231(b)(3)(A). An immigration judge, using the Attorney General's delegated authority, found Abrego Garcia would be threatened if removed to El Salvador and granted a withholding a removal. There is not even an allegation by the government or anyone else that they followed any part of the procedure for revising this decision before they removed him. See also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez.
Given he illegally entered the US and is a Salvadoran citizen why shouldn’t the US govt be able to send him back to his native country?
Because black letter US law prohibited it. An immigration judge issued a withholding of removal as regarded Abrego Garcia and El Salvador. If the Trump administration wanted to get that withholding removed there is a legal process, that they did not follow, to do that. The regional ICE field director submitted a sworn statement that his removal was unlawful. The government's own lawyer admitted it in a hearing before the judge. Whatever you think ought to be the case as a policy matter, the law straightforwardly forbade the Trump admin's actions.
I had discussed with /u/Gillitrut on whether this means individual habeas actions, but it seems like this order applies to the entire class, which is interesting.
I read some interesting discussion about this online. My recollection is that the usual issue with doing class action habeas is issues of similarity in the class. A class needs to have ~identical claims to be brought and habeas claims are usually about the particular conditions of an individual's detention. This case would face similar issues if the basis for class similarity was identification as a member of TdA (which is unlikely to be identical for every class member). However the theory I read for these cases is the class similarity is instead based on the question of whether there is actually the prerequisite "invasion" or "predatory incursion" required under the AEA. Since all class members are in an identical posture with respect to that question. Not sure that will work long-term but it's an interesting idea.
There's no way that Trump and his inner circle aren't insider trading on these tariff announcements, right?
More Congressional procedure shenanigans? We talked last week about some House rule inside baseball related to a proposed rule to allow new mothers to vote by proxy. I want to somewhat resurrect the topic now because it's also important for the ongoing tariff discussion. First some background.
On February 1st Trump declared a national emergency related to fentanyl and illegal aliens. This declaration was a necessary precondition to Trump's using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs on Mexico and Canada. There exists a mechanism (50 USC 1622) for Congress to terminate a declared national emergency. In particular 1622(c) describes the process for the joint resolution between the two houses. This joint resolution is subject to presidential veto, but can be overridden by a supermajority of both houses. Back on April 2nd the Senate passed Senate Joint Resolution 37 which was a joint resolution to terminate Trump's declared emergency on February 1st. 16229(c)(3) provides:
(3) Such a joint resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the appropriate committee of the other House and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days after the day on which such resolution is referred to such committee and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days after the day on which such resolution is reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
So, within 15 calendar days after Senate passage the resolution is supposed to be reported out of committee and then voted on by the House within 3 calendar days after that. There is, of course, a bit of a wrinkle to this (hence this post). Recall back to mid-March and the House Resolution 211. This resolution established the terms of debate for the concurrent resolution funding the government for the rest of the year. Section 4 of that resolution provides:
Sec. 4. Each day for the remainder of the first session of the 119th Congress shall not constitute a calendar day for purposes of section 202 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622) with respect to a joint resolution terminating a national emergency declared by the President on February 1, 2025.
Basically, the 15/3 day mandatory periods are put on hold for rest of the Congressional session (which I believe ends Sep 30th). Hat tip to Gabe Fleischer at Wake Up To Politics who wrote about this at the time. This is the same kind of thing Johnson tried to do (unsuccessfully) with the new mother proxy rule. Other House members have noticed and filed their own resolutions starting the clock on such bills again. Though whether they pass remains to be seen.
I bring this up now because I've read some reporting online (no links yet) that Johnson intends to do something similar with the actual Congressional budget, adding a similar provision to stop considering of any joint resolution ending the national emergency Trump declared on April 2nd that form the basis of his current tariffs.
The foregoing is, in a practical sense, a little academic. If a supermajority of the Senate and House wanted to end Trump's national emergencies they could. I suppose the key here is that these rules provide a kind of cover for people to be vocally against Trump's tariffs without having to go on record in opposition. Trying to get the average voter to understand the intricacies of Congressional procedure as opposed to "your rep voted for/against this bill" is a herculean task. This is also not the only way Trump's tariffs could end. He could change his mind (as I write this I hear announcements that we are increasing tariffs on China and changing all other countries to a flat 10% tariff). There's also a lawsuit that Trump's emergencies do not satisfy the "unusual and extraordinary" conditions of 50 USC 1701 and so are invalid.
- Prev
- Next
The true lesson here is to avoid the urge to extrapolate over hundreds of millions (billions?) of people from a single example!
Tina's commentary assumes that no one who lacks Sanchez's assets could have ended up with Bezos. What is the reason to suppose this? It is not as if his first wife, whom he was married to for 26 years, had this kind of appearance. Nor is it the case, so far as we know, that Bezos went through a bunch of similar looking affair partners before settling on Sanchez. As best I can find Sanchez is the woman he was unfaithful with that led to the end of his marriage. We could as well infer that Bezos would not have married anyone who was not a helicopter pilot, by the logic on display here. Going further, the fact that there are many other individuals who have these assets who (by assumption) would have been willing to date him suggests something further about Sanchez that she has and these others don't. This not to say Bezos doesn't like or enjoy Sanchez's appearance but it is far from clear it is either a necessary or sufficient condition for marrying him.
What is the reason to suppose Jeff Bezos' behavior and preferences are generalizable to all men? That Lauren Sanchez is generalizable to all women?
More options
Context Copy link