ApplesauceIrishCream
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User ID: 882
ApplesauceIrishCream
10mo ago
There was no "flip," is the point. There was a multi-decade trend across the South from one-party Democrat control to mostly one-party Republican control, but this trend happened at different rates in different states, and even more so, in different electoral contexts. Bill Clinton represented the last major effort at retaining the South in Presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 (and his running mate was even from a different Southern state!), and for all that--and Ross Perot's third-party candidacy--he only got about half the Southern states. In 2000, Al Gore did not win a single Southern state, not even his home state of Tennessee.
Let's take a look at the state governments:
Alabama's governor's mansion flipped from R to D to R to D to R in the 90s and early 2000s, and has only been solid R since 2003. Both houses of the Alabama state legislature were controlled by the Democrats from the end of Reconstruction until 2011 (!...also, this pattern will recur), and they have remained in Republican hands since then.
Arkansas' governor was a Democrat to start the 90s, then a Republican from 1997-2006, a Democrat until 2015, and a Republican since. Both houses of the state legislature were controlled by the Democrats until 2013 and Republicans thereafter.
Florida's governor was a Democrat (with a couple of Republican exceptions: one in the 60s and one in the 80s) until Jeb Bush took over for the Republicans in 1998, and except for some weirdness in 2010 with Crist, has remained Republican since. The state legislature was split in the mid 90s, with the Republicans taking over the Senate a couple years before adding the House in 1997.
Georgia's governor's mansion and state Senate flipped from solid Democrat to solid Republican in 2003, and the state House in 2005.
Kentucky and Louisiana still have not solidified as one-party Republican states--both have had repeated exchanges of power in the governor's mansion over the past three decades (and are currently controlled by Democrats). Kentucky's Senate went R in 2000, but the House did not go R until 2017. Lousiana's state legislature was solid D until 2011, and solid R since then.
Mississippi started the 90s with an R governor, succeeded by a Democrat in 2000, and back to R from 2004 to the present. Except for a brief exchange in 2007, the Democrats controlled the state Senate until 2011, and the House until 2012, while the Republicans have controlled both since then.
Missouri started the 90s with an R governor, went D in 1993, R in 2005, D in 2009, and back to R in 2017 until the present. The state Senate was solid D until 2001, and the state House similarly until 2003, and the Rs have maintained control of each since then.
North Carolina currently has a D governor, and the Republicans have only held the governor's mansion for a single term (2013-2017) since the early 90s. Aside from a short span in the late 90s (1995-1999) when the Rs held the state House, the Ds held both the state Senate and state House until 2011, and the Rs have controlled both since then.
South Carolina's first Republican governor since Reconstruction was elected in 1974. Since that time, both Rs and Ds have been governor, though the R's current winning streak goes back to 2002. The state House went R in 1995, and the state Senate in 2001, and have remained in R hands since.
Tennessee started the 90s with a D governor, switched R in 1995, back to D in 2003, and back to R in 2011. Except for an oddball period in 1996, Democrats held the state Senate until 2005, and Republicans since then (though there was split control in 2007-2008). The state House was solid D until 2010, and solid R since then.
Texas elected its first R governor since Reconstruction in 1978, and exchanged parties back and forth until George W. Bush was elected in 1995. In the past 28 years, Texas has had three governors--Bush, Perry, and Abbott--all Republicans. The state Senate went R in 1997, and the state House followed in 2003.
Virginia has had split control of the governor's mansion and both houses of the state legislature across the past three decades in various configurations. Currently, the governor and state House are R, and the state Senate is D, but if the state is going to solidify its political lean, that will happen in the future. The governor and state House were last D two years ago, and the state Senate was last R four years ago.
So while Republicans mostly control the state governments of the South today, in most cases that takeover happened in the last decade or two. A heavily recurring pattern--particularly in the houses of the state legislatures--is persistant control by Democrats lasting a century or more, followed by a switch to persistant Republican control at some single point within the last 30 years.
Paralleling this development is the regional decline in racism. The South of 50 years ago is not remotely like the South of today in terms of race relations. For example, multiple states in the South have elected racial-minority candidates in statewide races, though in general, those candidates have been Republicans.
ApplesauceIrishCream
4mo ago
Says me, on the basis of a vast amount of American political history, and the knowledge of what happened in Massachusetts in the 2000s. The usual process for filling a Senate vacancy is the appointment of a replacement by the Governor, and that appointment lasts until the next even-year November election. This is the well-known procedure in most states, both now and for the past several decades at a minimum. There are exceptions; they are unusual.
In 2004, Massachusetts had a Republican Governor (Mitt Romney, as it happens) and a Democrat supermajority in the state legislature (an odd combination, but not unheard of in Massachusetts). Anticipating the vacancy of John Kerry's Senate seat if he won election to the Presidency that year, the legislature amended the procedures for filling a Senate vacancy over Romney's veto, stripping him of his appointment power, and calling for a special election to fill the vacancy temporarily. As far as I'm aware, the legislature definitely had the power to do exactly that, but it was also an obvious political power play, and calling such "(legal) shenanigans" is defensible.
This power play did not pan out as expected. First, Kerry lost the Presidential election in 2004, so no Senate vacancy was had. Second, Romney was succeeded by a Democrat, Deval Patrick, in the 2006 gubernatorial election. Third, Ted Kennedy provided the next vacancy by dying in office in 2009. Shortly before his death, Kennedy persuaded the Massachusetts legislature to re-empower the Governor to appoint a temporary replacement pending the results of the special election. While Patrick could (and did) appoint a Democrat to replace Kennedy, the people of Massachusetts picked a Republican, Scott Brown, in the special election. Brown's election dropped the Democrats' Senate majority from 60 to 59, triggering the next round of drama in DC.
Had Massachusetts followed the "usual process" in filling the Kennedy vacancy, Patrick's nominee would have continued in office for several more months until the next general election in 2010, maintaining the Democrats' 60-vote Senate majority for that period. That this did not occur was the ironic result of political gamesmanship on the part of the Massachusetts state legislature.
ApplesauceIrishCream
3mo ago
A couple of months ago, @zeke5123 started a discussion about secession and the right to self-determination, and suggested that such a right was likely contingent, rather than absolute. In response, I wrote an analysis of the most famous writing on the topic of secession...and then posted it just after the following week's CW thread went live, which was very poor planning on my part. I hope the following is sufficiently interesting to justify a repost.
I've remarked before that I think the American Revolution should be more properly understood as an example of secession, not revolution. After all, the most famous document promulgating and defending the American position is the Declaration of Independence, and the choice of title is appropriate.
The part that comes before the famous "We hold these truths to be self-evident..." is the following:
"The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."
This is a document about secession and self-determination. Next is the really famous bit (I'm adding numbers in brackets to highlight an internal list):
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, [1] that all men are created equal, [2] that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, [3] that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."
A clear statement of fundamental principles, but one key point later on is that Jefferson isn't claiming that these principles are a departure from English tradition, but that the Crown has been egregiously violating English tradition. The list doesn't end at three items:
"[4]--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, [5] --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."
"Alter or abolish" covers many potential approaches, from reform to secession to complete revolution. Which approach is justified in which cases?
"Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.
This, I think, is the start of the answer to your question--the right of self-determination in terms of fully reforming/seceding/revolting must reach a threshold of severity in terms of provocation. The reasons matter, and the weight of tradition matters. "Light and transient causes" are not enough, and so:
"But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."
When there is a longstanding pattern of abuse aimed at fundamental liberties, some variation of reform/secession/revolution is justified, and even morally compulsory. Note that Jefferson is not merely concerned with rejecting the old, abusive system, but also the necessity of replacing the old system with a new government that will properly "secure these rights." He is justifying a transition from a very bad system to a better system--tearing down the old and stopping at anarchy is not acceptable.
"--Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world...."
What follows is a bill of particulars, listing the offenses of the British Crown according to Jefferson, which amount to "a long train of abuses and usurpations...evinc[ing] a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism...." The details of this list are instructive, but outside the scope of this comment. After the list, Jefferson argues that the leadership of the American States has done its due diligence, and tried to fix the situation by attempts at reform, before proceeding to secession:
"In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
"Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our Brittish brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends."
We have appealed to both the Crown and the British People for redress; neither provided it. As a result, we're walking away from this toxic relationship, but we're not going to kill your cat out of spite--we just want to go our own way. Note that Jefferson doesn't merely say that the behavior of the British Crown has been grievously bad, but that the American representatives have been particularly patient and prudent--there's an implied standard of conduct for the secessionists that continues in the final paragraph:
"We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."
Jefferson wraps up with the final requirement for secessionists who are doing things correctly--you need to make your case. Not just that the suffered abuses have been so terrible, but also that you've tried lesser means and are only escalating when those means have failed, and that your judgment and restraint are being offered for consideration to both "the Supreme Judge of the world" and "the opinions of mankind." Are your reasons sufficient, or just "light and transient causes"? Do you have a plan for self-government, such that you can responsibly join the community of "Independent States"? Have you "Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms" and are you confident in the "rectitude of [y]our intentions"?
Any secessionist or revolutionary worth their salt will answer yes to those questions with confidence--such is human nature. But Jefferson clearly isn't claiming that 'we've investigated our own motives, and found them acceptable,' he's appealing to God and man to be his judges.
In my view, Jefferson adequately makes his case as to the justice of the American secession from Britain. I think other secessionary movements are a mixed bag--some meet the various thresholds of behavior and others do not. In this framework, there isn't an unfettered "right to self determination" by a given identifiable subgroup of a larger political unit, but extreme cases may present a duty to reform an abusive government, or seceed from it, or overthrow it.
ApplesauceIrishCream
5mo ago
Underdog analysis can also be complicated by questions of scope--are we talking about Israel vs. Hamas, Israel vs. Hamas + the wider Islamic world that funds them, or Israel + its supporters in the US vs. Hamas + the wider Islamic world? The homeless guy vs. Mr. Rogers scenario doesn't quite capture the dynamic of group vs. group when each side has debateable membership.
That said, I don't favor underdog analysis as a particularly useful lens, though clearly others disagree.
ApplesauceIrishCream
3d ago
"Proportionality" is in fact an important concept in international law contexts, but it's nearly always misrepresented by the legacy media, either due to ignorance or malice or both. Properly used, it refers to the scope of collateral damage that is permissible when seeking to eliminate a legitimate military target--the excess damage must be proportional to the military value of the intended target. It has literally nothing whatsoever to do with being "proportional" to the damage caused by the other side.
ApplesauceIrishCream
8d ago
The other responses you've got are mostly correct, but I'll elaborate on a few points. I've written a bit about the process before here.
@VoxelVexillologist is correct to point out Roberts' automatic seniority as Chief and its consequences, but the case is complicated by the fact that the right-ish portion of the Court has six Justices, not five. Roberts is certainly inclined to write more moderately than Alito, but if he writes too moderately, Thomas/Alito/Gorsuch/Kavanaugh/Barrett can form a majority without him. Dobbs is an exceptionally high-profile example of exactly that.
Recusal is more of an issue for a new Justice, but still pretty rare unless the new Justice was a very recent Solicitor General (or other high-ranking member of the Justice Department, including the AG). The Solicitor General is the number two guy at Justice and has the special responsibility of representing the US in court--he usually does so personally before the Supreme Court, and delegates to staff in lesser cases--so he'll often be involved in litigation strategy of multiple cases that later appear before the Supreme Court.
Each Justice has exactly one vote. The way any given Justice may punch above or below his weight is based entirely on his personal relationships with the other Justices (this is much more likely to be a negative factor; you don't get to the Supreme Court with a weak ego) and the persuasiveness of his arguments, most often in writing. My personal guess is that Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett are very slightly more advantageously placed than average, and Roberts and Jackson are slightly less than average.
@pigeonburger is right about how the majority opinion of the Court is initially assigned, but not the dissents. All dissents and concurrences are not assigned; they are written by any Justice who chooses to do extra writing. There was a recent case where Kagan registered her dissenting vote on the outcome, but neither wrote a dissent herself nor joined another opinion, so her exact reasoning is unknown. This is perfectly valid; it's just much more common that Justices are inclined to explain themselves, both to their colleagues and to posterity.
One point often missed is that in a given Term--and indeed, in each month--every Justice writes as close as possible to exactly the same number of majority opinions. This may seem unintuitive, but remember that the most common voting outcome in any given case has always been 9-0, and still is. Naturally, the more conservative Justices will be more likely to write for the majority in controversial decisions today, but that just means that Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson are more likely to be assigned the 8-1 or 9-0 cases. This practise is intended to make sure that each chambers is carrying its weight in terms of the essential work of the Court. As I said above, though, dissents and concurrences do not factor into load-balancing--those opinions are entirely discretionary on a Justice-by-Justice basis, and are purely extra work.
ApplesauceIrishCream
5mo ago
I find it ironic that as recently as 2005, the most culturally-prominent example of the Confederate battle flag was widely recognized as a pure expression of regional pride, and not at all a racist symbol. As it happens, that example isn't as much of a tangent as you'd think.
It's important to realize just how $Current_Year this iconoclastic movement is.
ApplesauceIrishCream
1mo ago
Sadly, Christopher Tolkien died on Jan. 16th, 2020. The silver lining is that he never had to see Amazon's desecration of Middle Earth. RIP to JRRT's first and best editor.
The generation after Chris has been...less protective of their grandfather's literary estate.
ApplesauceIrishCream
8d ago
No, there is a hard limit of 10 years, which is two and a half terms. If you as Vice President got the promotion in the first half of your predecessor's term, you are only eligible for one more full term. If you got the promotion in the second half, you're eligible for two more. Lapses do not reset the clock.
This is the rule for the President specifically--the governorships of various states have a variety of different rules, some of which do include a limit on consecutive terms, where a lapse can reset the clock.
ApplesauceIrishCream
8mo ago
I think a related suggestion might be plausible, but there's a complication.
In the US, the bulk of the pro-life movement is religious, specifically Christian. There are certainly many individual exceptions, but the major organizing groups are either church-affiliated or formally secular but largely staffed by Christians. Where abortion is concerned, the Catholic part of the movement and the Evangelical Protestant part are entirely on the same page, but there is no similar agreement on birth control. Opposing birth control is part of Catholic dogma, while Evangelicals generally have no moral problem with contraceptives, so long as they are used within the context of otherwise proper sexual ethics.
That said, Evangelicals very much support the right of Catholics to follow their consciences on the issue, even if they differ on the object-level question. Catholic opposition to taxpayer-funded contraceptives is a given, and Evangelicals usually have other ideological reasons for opposing "free" stuff. So you'd likely have very minimal organized Christian support for taxpayer-funded contraceptives.
However, Evangelicals (and many American conservatives in general) have supported a related measure for pretty much the exact reasoning you lay out above--rescheduling oral contraceptives from prescription-based to over-the-counter. I would not expect Catholic support for this type of measure, but at least it doesn't raise the same conscience issues as direct subsidy.
ApplesauceIrishCream
11mo ago
An intended irony--Jefferson was a brilliant and creative man, but consistency was not among his virtues. See also his criticisms of centralized federal power, until the topic became "Louisiana is temporarily available at a low low price, act now!"
ApplesauceIrishCream
3mo ago
Yet it is pretty common in online arguing to see people say some version of "they were traitors who tried to break up the Union and they got what was coming to them".
Well, yes, that's the argument that secession is never justified, which Jefferson rejects. What I'm claiming here is that the question isn't solvable at the meta level--you must engage with the object-level dispute concerning why this group wants to secede from the larger polity.
Jefferson's bill of particulars (the section that I skipped past, but is available in the link to the original) bears a remarkable and not-at-all-accidental similarity to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. When the early Americans were debating whether to ratify the Constitution, which would create a more centralized authority than that created by the Articles of Confederation, a common concern was avoiding the abuses of the previous system under the British Crown. Each of the first eight Amendments instructs the new federal government that it is not allowed to abuse the people in the following ways, which were all things that the Founders had suffered in living memory. The Bill of Rights isn't a random collection of priorities generated by philosophical musing, but a set of very practical, real-world concerns during that period.
At the object level, the American Revolution was about whether comprehensive and systemic violations of what later became the Bill of Rights was sufficient to justify secession.
Also at the object level, the American Civil War was about whether actual or potential violations of Southerners' right to own slaves was sufficient to justify secession.
If the argument above is correct, and justified secession is contingent on the object-level dispute, then I see no inconsistency in describing the secessionary movement that gave rise to the American Revolution as justified, and the secessionary movement that gave rise to the American Civil War as not justified. In my view, this is an easy call, though different people may form their own opinions as they wish.
ApplesauceIrishCream
5mo ago
Catwoman is a particularly interesting example of race-swapping, because her actresses were white, white, black, white, black, white, white, and mixed black/white. The first black Catwoman was Eartha Kitt, in the final season of the Adam West Batman TV show, taking over from Julie Newmar (TV) and Lee Meriwether (movie). Catwoman was white again when Michelle Pfeiffer played her in Batman Returns; then back in black when Halle Berry played her in Catwoman; white with Anne Hathaway in The Dark Knight Rises; still white with Camren Bicondova in Gotham; and most recently split the difference* with the mixed black/white Zoe Kravitz in The Batman.
In the live-action versions, Catwoman has firmly established a pattern of inconsistency on the question of her race. Eartha Kitt's portrayal was still part of the original live-action Batman franchise, and was long enough ago that if it was influenced by politics, it wasn't modern politics. (Plus, Kitt could chew the scenery with the best of them, and the Adam West era was extremely camp.) Berry and Kravitz can be fairly described as continuing the legacy of Kitt, rather than an appeal to Modern Audiences (/echo effect); there hasn't been a one-way racial ratchet, as Catwoman has switched back and forth multiple times; and given that Gotham is a major metropolis (no pun intended), any ethnicity is reasonably plausible.
*Technically, for the second time. Halle Berry is usually described as a black actress, but she's the daughter of an interracial black/white couple, like Zoe Kravitz.
ApplesauceIrishCream
23d ago
The central thesis of HBD is that differing selection pressures produce divergent results between populations, and intelligence is one of the features that vary in this way. It's a pretty straightforward example of evolution, broadly understood.
The very word evolution means "change." Why would anyone consider a process of evolution to be static, immutable, unchangeable?
HBD does not claim there is no path out of the conundrum you observe. I'm not saying there are easy fixes--though I believe there are a great number of small policy changes that might produce results on the margin--but I'm baffled by the take that "HBD = nothing can change."
The way for average black IQ to rise is for black women to choose intelligent black men to father their children. This is not impossible.
ApplesauceIrishCream
3mo ago
I guess I'll make the obligatory cynical post pointing out the fact that the Declaration of Independence wasn't really a legal document, but essentially just a very eloquently worded piece of Patriot propaganda, primarily meant to rally stateside on-the-fence loyalists and potential overseas allies over to the cause.
Certainly, I agree.
It was not, as many now seem to want to interpret it, an actual good-faith attempt to justify their cause to the British government. (Basically an "open letter" to the crown. Most of the grievances were incredibly exaggerated, bordering on fabricated, which the actual British government would have realized; the drafters didn't care, because again, it wasn't actually intended for that audience.)
I agree that the Declaration was not an attempt to persuade the British--either the Crown, Parliament, or the British people--but it did not claim to be that. As Jefferson himself explicitly notes in the Declaration itself, those appeals had already happened, and the colonists did not find the prior responses to be tolerable. The entire point of the Declaration is a statement that the colonists were past the point of making their case by petition, and intended to resort to force of arms instead.
However, as much as Jefferson's dramatic flair is clearly in play, I think an in-depth review of the period shows that the British abuses were real, pervasive, and relatively severe compared to the expectations of the average British citizen. It's trendy to be cynical about the motivations of the Founders; this cynicism is badly misplaced.
Just as the South did; it's not prominent nowadays for obvious reasons, buts there's plenty of equally eloquently written justification for secession by the moral and philosophical heavyweights of the Southern Cause.
Some of those writers dodge the issue (others embrace it), but the central issue under dispute was slavery, full stop. Yes, there were absolutely other political disputes between the South, broadly, and the North or the West, but none of them held a candle to the central dispute over slavery. Take away slavery, and there would not have been a secessionary movement. It was both a necessary and sufficient cause of the Civil War.
Yes, the American colonists succeeded at seceeding, and the Confederacy did not; that's a fact of history. However, when we're evaluating other secessionary movements in different times and contexts, I think it's much more useful to realize that the American colonists were fighting for free expression, the right to self-defense, the sanctity of the home against intrusion, the rights of the accused and convicted, etc., while the Confederacy was fighting for the right to own slaves. If your modern movement bears more similarities to the first, then I will probably agree that it's justified; more like the second, and no.
...the only real moral justification to the American Revolution, or secession, or whatever you want to call it, is the fact that they won the military conflict.
I completely disagree. 'Justification' is an appeal to morality, and I reject the idea that successful efforts are justified, and failures are not. One who robs a bank and gets away unpunished is not morally justified in his theft.
ApplesauceIrishCream
3mo ago
This may result in minor damage to Obama's influence within the Democratic Party, since he was very supportive of Gay throughout this process. (Alternatively, it may be evidence of his influence weakening.) I'd be curious as to whether the plagiarism or the anti-Semitism was the decisive factor, as there are significant examples of each that the Party does not consider to be disqualifying.
My guess--for what it's worth--is that a faction within the Party found Gay's defense of anti-Semitism to be seriously objectionable, and tried to get her ousted on that basis before she could do more damage to Harvard's institutional reputation with elite employers. When this failed, the considerable evidence of her plagiarism was leveraged instead. Plagiarism is considered the highest of high crimes within academia, in theory (and even occasionally, in practice!), so Harvard decided it could not weather the purely academic hit to its reputation as well.
ApplesauceIrishCream
3mo ago
My expectation is that Jackson's jurisprudence will be most similar to Sotomayor's on the current Court, though with the usual caveat that this is a condensed model, and even justices that are close to each other will still come down on opposite sides of some cases. This sort of left-to-right mapping tends to be most predictive in high-profile cases where the issue is graspable by non-lawyers, but more obscure areas can produce lineups that appear to be almost random.
It's also important to note that the most common lineup has not changed--it is still 9-0.
In a different context, this is "rubber-duck debugging." Sometimes putting yourself into a context where you need to make the problem concrete by explaining it out loud in detail is enough to track down the error or resolve a conflict of priorities.
Edit: @FCfromSSC beat me to it.
ApplesauceIrishCream
8d ago
Both dissents and (except in unusual cases[1]) concurrences have zero legal weight as precedent, though this needs a little further unpacking.
Formally, the Opinion of the Court is binding on lower courts, and is precedent to be followed or rejected by future Supreme Courts. The wiggle room is that a lower court may argue that an existing Supreme Court decision is distinguishable from the current case because of [reasons]; that explanation may vary wildly in ingenuousness. The Supreme Court has a fancy legal doctrine called stare decisis, which means that it's more important to be consistent than correct, though some Justices (Roberts) are bigger fans of the doctrine than others (Thomas).
Every opinion of any type can affect future legal development to the extent that the arguments therein are persuasive to future Courts. If a Court decides that a prior decision was in error, it may overturn the precedent by a simple majority, just like every other decision. Often, the dissents in the original case may provide the rationale for a later reversal, though the Court tends to change its institutional mind by individual retirement and replacement, rather than a particular Justice reversing his earlier opinion (though that too has happened).
Also, there is no formal difference between a 9-0 decision and a 5-4 decision. Both carry the full authority of the Court, so a 5-4 decision may overturn a 9-0, hypothetically. Informally, though, every judge can do the most basic of math and realize that a 9-0 decision is less likely to be overturned in a future case than a 5-4.
[1] You can have a situation where the Court splits 4-2-3 or the like on a given case, where the 4 and the 2 may agree on the outcome of a case (and the 3 disagrees), but they do not agree on a reasoning. The case would be resolved as a 6-3 decision as to the outcome, but with no reasoning, as no opinion carried a majority. That said, the lower courts would treat the 4 opinion as a strong hint, since it's the closest to a majority, even though the logic is not formally binding. The Justices try to avoid this outcome, if possible.
ApplesauceIrishCream
1mo ago
There's so much "it gets worse." On the one hand, they slip in references to at least medium-deep lore with no show-internal explanation, so only fairly invested Tolkien fans will even recognize that a point was being made, but on the other hand, you've got major lore-breaking points shoved in your face right and left that are obvious to more casual fans. (Was that a bit of casual flirting between Galadriel and Elrond? Did I just throw up a bit in my mouth?)
Like introducing a fourth Silmaril to support the 'origin' of mithril through philosophical dualism that is completely anathema to Tolkien and his works...and never once mentioning Feanor. Or the famous motto of the Numenoreans, "The sea is always right." Or the infamous teleporting armies problem straight out of GoT S8. Or the greatest smith of the Second Age having to be handheld through the concept of "this is an alloy," and the importance of (fuck me) and I quote "coaxing" metals together instead of "forcing" them.
They actually have disguised-Sauron describe his little "alloy" tip to Celebrimbor as "a gift." That only lands if you know that Sauron is supposed to be disguised as Annatar, the Lord of Gifts, BUT HE ISN'T! Who is that for?! The only thing I'm left with is that the Easter eggs hidden in the show are intended as calculated insults to fans of Tolkien's actual work. No presumption of charity can or should stand against the mountain of contrary evidence.
@FarNearEverywhere is welcome to her claim on the blood of the showrunners, but I would at least like to watch.
ApplesauceIrishCream
4mo ago
Assuming every Senate seat is filled, present, and voting, conviction and expulsion requires 67 votes, not 60. I don't think either party can get to 67 without either a reasonable fraction of bipartisan support or a truly enormous political upheaval (60 is difficult, but possible). In Biden's case specifically, the only way he gets expelled is if a big chunk of Democratic leadership decides to remove him; even in that case, I strongly believe they would engineer his resignation instead.
ApplesauceIrishCream
4mo ago
So, the members of the Court vote at conference, and the senior member of the majority side gets to assign the opinion (Roberts, as Chief, automatically has seniority, which is relevant if he's in the majority). The justice so assigned then writes an opinion, and so does any other justice that wishes to. Those opinions are circulated, and each other justice signs on to whichever opinion they choose, in whole or in part. Often, these opinions--especially the assigned-majority opinion--go through multiple drafts, which generally affect how much the other justices are willing to endorse. Once the process works its way out, you get final drafts of the various opinions, each with a holding (A wins/B wins) on the outcome of the case, and with the full or partial endorsements of the other justices.
After all of this is done, you can evaluate which side won, and which opinion holds the authority of the Court. If a majority of the participating members of the Court vote that side A wins, then that side wins. If there's a tie (possible with recusals or other absent votes), then the lower court decision stands. In terms of reasoning that holds precedential effect, look for any section in any opinion that is endorsed by a majority of the Court voting in the case. In particularly split cases, there may not be a reasoning that commands a majority at all, in which case the precedent is "side A wins, no specific reasoning controls."
Hypothetical: a case is heard, and at conference the vote is 6-3, with the three liberal women in the minority. Roberts assigns the opinion to himself. Following the drafting process, the Chief's opinion (A wins) is joined by Kavanaugh; Sotomayor writes for herself, Kagan, and Jackson that B should win; and Gorsuch writes for himself, Thomas, Alito, and Barrett that A wins, but on a different rationale than Roberts. In this case, A wins; there is no controlling rationale; but lower courts would give the most weight to Gorsuch's opinion as it has the most support, even if it isn't binding precedent on them.
The justices usually try to make sure that the hypothetical above doesn't happen, because it's not very useful guidance to the lower courts. It can happen, though, if the split between Roberts/Kavanaugh and Gorsuch et al. is sharp enough. In most cases, you'd at least get (for instance) Kavanaugh endorsing Section IIIA of Gorsuch's opinion, in which case you'd read "GORSUCH delivers the opinion of the Court as to Section IIIA, joined by THOMAS, ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, and an opinion as to sections I, II, IIIB, IIIC, and IV, joined by THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT...etc." The key phrasing is "the opinion of the Court" vs. "an opinion."
It's true that all of the detail above is the product of centuries of tradition, but the core is rock solid--the Court is a body made of equal-voting members. A simple majority speaks for the whole. If the Chief cannot get four supporters, he's just another guy with an opinion, but if any member of the Court gets four others to agree, they speak for the Court itself.
(Roberts is rather famous for his Obamacare decision in which zero members of the Court joined his opinion in full. Four members joined part of it, and the other four joined the rest, so his full opinion had five votes in each part, but they weren't the same five votes.)
ApplesauceIrishCream
9mo ago
Ah! I was unaware--thanks for the link.
ApplesauceIrishCream
11mo ago
Broadly speaking, I agree (though I might characterize a few of the details differently). One thing to note, though, is that Hamiltonians are not simply "dovish internationalists." They are an American tradition of free-market, business-oriented dovish internationalists; a hypothetical French tradition of dovish internationalism might not have the same trade/economic focus.
IMO, GWB campaigned as more of a Hamiltonian--he made public comments about returning to a "humble foreign policy" in reaction to the Wilsonian bombast of the Clinton presidency. 9/11 changed rather a lot very dramatically, and the immediate Jacksonian demand by the public to do something about Osama bin Laden led to Afghanistan, and the second generation of neoconservative Wilsonians in his administration were a significant factor in getting involved with Iraq. I'd caution against painting Iraq as monocausal, though; there were several goals and motivations involved, some of them at odds with others.
Obama is an odd case; I think he's a relatively rare example of a Jeffersonian President. The problem with that combination is that foreign policy is one of the strongest points of Presidential power, and Jeffersonians are disinclined to wield foreign policy influence, so you have to refuse the temptation to pick up the hammer that is right there and go in search of nails. This is not to say that Jeffersonians are rare--they just show up more often in Congress or think tanks. Also, Obama's administration was not Jeffersonian; a major example that points out these tensions was Libya, where the combined force of Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power, and Susan Rice lobbied internally to support the French in the face of Obama's initial indifference.
I've been trying to get myself to do a writeup of Walter Russell Mead's four traditions of American foreign policy, because he was confronting exactly this question in the late 1990s--the various conflicts involving the breakup of Yugoslavia produced an anti-intervention movement on the Republican side of the Senate, which lost to the pro-intervention faction led by President Clinton. This also seemed, on first blush, to be a reversal of the left-coded anti-war movements in earlier decades.
In short, Mead proposes a two-axis framework, where each quadrant contains the interplay of the axes and also an intellectual pedigree particular to the US. One axis is the usual hawk/dove; the other is nationalist/internationalist. (Here, "internationalists" favor more widespread and ongoing engagement with other nations, while "nationalists" prefer to interact with other nations only when necessary, and reserve most of their attention to domestic affairs.)
Hamiltonians are the dovish internationalists, who have a particular interest in expansive trade and the promotion of American business interests abroad. They don't have strong opinions about how other countries run their own affairs, so long as Americans have robust access to foreign markets.
Jeffersonians are the dovish nationalists, whose central ideal is perfecting democracy at home and avoiding foreign entanglements that might distract or corrupt American national purpose. These are your classic anti-war isolationists.
Jacksonians are the hawkish nationalists, who mostly don't care to have extensive involvement with other nations, but react with vigorous force to assaults on American interests and especially American honor. Unlike the other traditions, Jacksonianism is predominantly a grassroots/populist tradition, not elite.
Finally, the Wilsonians are the hawkish internationalists, who want to promote democracy, human rights, and other American ideals abroad whenever possible. The neoconservatives of the late 70s are a central example, but so are President Clinton's interventions in the former Yugoslavia in the 90s.
At different points in history, these traditions have individually been more or less popular, and have allied with each other in varying combinations. I think the overall framework makes a fair amount of sense descriptively, and a few thoughts towards refinement/critique.
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