ControlsFreak
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User ID: 1422
ControlsFreak
1d ago
Eh, some people are so mentally disabled that I've seen academic philosophers in ethics (certainly left-leaning) seriously consider whether they are capable of even consenting to sex (IIRC, concluding that some of them likely are not). See also related questions about whether some people should not be held morally/legally accountable to certain crimes in the same way (and quite the lengthy jurisprudence at this point specifically with regard to the death penalty). This is and should be a true edge case, not "hurr durr, your IQ is 90, we should sterilize you", but these conversations are often still happening in the open in 'respectable society'. My sense is that it's typically left-leaning people pushing ideas that low IQ means different criminal justice, though I'm not sure if there's much of a partisan lean either way on the consent to sexual relations question.
ControlsFreak
1d ago
I've had difficulty even with its step-by-step proofs. It will make very subtle errors that really kill the whole point of what you're going for. For one example, I had a spot where it introduced a variable and then sneakily assumed a property for it that was never proven (and I suspect couldn't be). I spent more time trying to figure out where its various proof attempts were broken, then sometimes asking it to fix it, then having it come up either with something related that was subtly broken in a different way... or suddenly go in a completely different direction that required me to step back to square one to figure out if it was on to anything. I never could get it to give me a non-broken proof. This was recently, with a GPT5 subscription, using the thinking and deep research modes.
On the other hand, I may still find value in talking to it about problems I'm working on. Perhaps I should incorporate it in my process in a new way. Instead of seeing what it says and spending a bunch of time trying to validate the answer, I think in the future, I'll just ask it various questions, skim what it's got, poke at any clear issues, and ask it to take different approaches. I have had it introduce me to tools that I'd never encountered before, and that has been helpful. So far, I haven't actually used one of the tools that it introduced me to, but they're nice to know, and thinking about one of them did help me realize that I already had another tool in my toolbox that let me do something. So, in a very roundabout way, it did help me solve a problem, just by jogging my thought process to something new and different that ultimately led me back to something I already knew.
ControlsFreak
4d ago
no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate
He goes to pretty significant lengths to come up with a scheme that manages the facts that they each currently have two and that there is a rotating six-year cycle of elections, ultimately for the purpose of being able to say that at one single moment, every State would have their number of Senators cut from two to one at the same time. Will this suffice for preserving "equal Suffrage"? As with many things Constitutional, it might just depend on how people feel about it.
ControlsFreak
6d ago
Sorry if I wasn't entirely clear; I'm concerned about the nomination part of the contingent election, which is pre-veto and pre-Condorcet. For nomination, you only need 1/10th support. So, what I'm thinking is that one party controls >= 50% of the state Senate, so they pick >= 5 names (from their general party pool), all of which are ideologically approximately the median of their own party's position. Yes, the minority can come together and pick some of their own, too. So you'll have five or more essentially identical majority party candidates and four or fewer minority party candidates (ideologically arranged however they so please).
Then comes veto, and the minority party can't pick off any more of the majority's nominees as the majority can pick off of the minority's nominees.
Then comes the counting of the votes via Condorcet (yes, this is on the same ballot as the vetos, but I'm not sure it matters if we assume sufficient party solidarity). I think that the majority can ensure that at least one of their (slightly longer than the minority's) list of essentially identical party candidates gets through.
The vetos/Condorcet can definitely moderate if the party actually has to choose five individuals that are from a small, finite set that still possesses a significant spectrum of ideologies. If you've only got thirty folks in your party in the Senate, it may be difficult to cluster them all right at your party's median, especially if there are other reasons (ineligibility, perceived lack of being 'ready', etc.) that might prevent tight bunching.
The vetos/Condorcet can be very effective if you actually think you can get defection in any of the three stages from any of the more moderate members of the majority party. But if they can clearly tell their moderates, "You're getting someone who's not too bad, doesn't really matter who, just the median of our own party's ideology (which is kind of what we, as a public, are already getting), and if you defect, we're probably getting one of their guys (oh, and we'll probably be able to figure out that it was one of you 3-5 who defected)," then I'm not sure we're likely to get that moderate defection at any point.
I'll note that his footnote 33, going through example contingent elections treats every example as though the nominations are still coming directly from the state Senate, itself, in this version, too. This small set and assuming factions rather than party discipline results in examples like:
The majority naturally prefers #12, the center of the party, but #9 won their party primary and is officially their candidate. The minority prefers #34, which, lol, isn’t going to happen. The majority’s different factions nominate #2, #9, #12, and #19. The minority puts forward #21, #33, and #34.
I agree that it may have just been an oversight, but the reason why I think it's actually important to correct that oversight is that I think the majority essentially nominates #12, #12, #12, and #12, just with four different names coming from their more general party pool (ok, in his exact example, they pick #9 by name, then three nameless #12's). Even here, picking only within the state Senate, with strict party discipline (and sufficient eligibility, both legally and for other party sensibilities), they could manage something like #9, #11, #12, and #13, and we probably don't get nearly the same moderating effect.
Mayyyyybe you'll actually get more defections than I think, and there would be at least a different space of maneuvering involved, but this version lacks the sort of serious punishment that the first version had of, "If you go to the contingent election, #12 is sooooo far off the table, because the very punishing algo (if you can keep it) is only giving you #18-22 as options. As an aside, if anything, that algo may be too punishing to the majority party; if the minority knows that #18 is their worst option in the contingent election (and they're able to prevent a 2/3rds in the main one), then they may plausibly choose to just force a contingent election every time. It would definitely give more moderate US Senators, but there may be knock-on effects, even more incentive to figure out how to game the algo, etc.
I think it is a moral argument, through and through.
Desert is an even more complicated area of philosophy which is kind of neither here nor there, but let's go back to what I was responding to in your earlier comment real quick:
This is sort of just not true, at least given the sort of academic work I've discussed. They do, in fact, think that there exists a person who is not able to morally consent, which, given the conceptual framework, cashes out as "they should not have sexual relations", and it would be morally wrong if they did. Do not interpret this as assigning any particular blameworthiness at this stage; blameworthiness is yet another separate consideration. That said, I think folks would be getting pretty close to assigning some level of blameworthiness to another individual who helped such a mentally disabled person (who is incapable of morally consenting) have sex, even if they wanted to. There's sort of nothing about desert in here.
I don't think this is really the case. IIRC, the academic work was perfectly happy to stipulate that the hypothetical sufficiently mentally disabled person in question was mentally capable of feeling joy from sex. It was the consent part, the morally-important part (especially to those who think that consent is the be all end all of sexual morality, in which camp this philosopher definitely resided), that was subject to consideration.
Since the academic work was confined to the question of sexual relations, specifically, I don't believe it addressed questions about 'the joy of raising a family', but I think it would be at least coherent to similarly assume that such a person may, indeed, be capable of feeling joy from having children and doing whatever it is that they can do to raise them, but I think that's also kind of neither here nor there if we're in a world where they may not be capable of consenting to sexual relations in the first place. Questions may get even harder if one pokes at the content of what it means to 'raise a family' and to what extent they are able to do that. (I am taking no position on this.)
I think this is emblematic of one of the other issues I had with the entire academic project of distilling all sexual morality down to consent. How broadly does one look for possible ill effects? There were multiple different cases (youth for sure, but some of the discussion touched on other cases) where even he couldn't stop himself from turning it into some sort of empirical test. Vaguely something like whether, say, 'allowing' youth to legally/morally consent to sexual relations generally did more harm to them or not. When one goes down this route, IMO, it's no longer an actual investigation into the philosophy and conceptual nature of consent. It's about being stuck to only having one term in your toolbox to use for all things sexual morality and simply trying to slap it on to cases that one finds objectionable for other reasons (some sense of empirical 'harm' in this case). Letting this sort of thing leak through into the conceptual nature of consent and one's ability to consent opens the door to all sorts of other thorny, even hotter-button issues, where many people (especially left-leaning ones) would vehemently object.
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