ControlsFreak
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User ID: 1422
ControlsFreak
20hr ago
There's a pretty long history of dirty theists making arguments along the lines of, "Let's compute how inconceivably improbable it is for intelligent life to spontaneously develop out of simple dead matter." I don't really subscribe to such arguments, but that is neither here nor there. It may be the case that you are unaware of the typical battle lines that have been drawn when they do so. Not being aware of such would be a reasonable explanation for your confusion.
ControlsFreak
1d ago
I must admit, I did not have "intra-atheist squabble over aliens results in arguments that intelligent life may be extremely improbable" on my bingo card. Handwavy BigNum arguments are a typical part of the arsenal. Isn't the entire point of the unfalsifiable multiverse idea to construct a handwavy BigNum argument?
ControlsFreak
6d ago
Kavanaugh wrote:
The only apparent principle unifying the four disparate exceptions listed by the Court in Wong Kim Ark—especially in light of the exception for tribal American Indians—is that the parents in all of those varied circumstances were not U. S. citizens and were citizens of other nations, whether tribal or foreign. An exception for those born in the United States to foreign parents unlawfully or temporarily in the country is consistent with that principle and therefore with the Fourteenth Amendment.
and
And most starkly, plaintiffs cannot convincingly explain their view that the children of tribal American Indians are not constitutionally entitled to birthright citizenship, while the children of foreign citizens unlawfully or temporarily in the country are constitutionally entitled to birthright citizenship.
Among other things, Thomas wrote:
Like temporary visitors, tribal Indians were not completely subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The United States did not have the right to impose personal taxes on them—hence, “Indians not taxed.” Their personal affairs remained subject to the jurisdiction of their tribal nation. “The right of self-government” was “secured to each tribe, with jurisdiction over all persons and property within its limits, subject to certain exceptions, founded on principles somewhat analogous to the international laws among civilized nations.” The United States did not interfere “with the disposition, or descent, or tenure of their property, as between themselves,” or “prove their wills,” or subject them to the “laws of marriage and divorce,” or subject them to the “laws of the United States, against high treason.” Tribal Indians did not owe the United States primary allegiance and did not receive from it complete protection.
and
But, the Court cannot explain why tribal Indians were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States if they happened to be born outside Indian lands while foreign temporary visitors were. It is true that tribal Indians belonged to “alien and sovereign” nations and that the United States’ relations with them implicated “intersovereign concerns.” Ante, at 12. But, temporarily visiting foreigners also belong to “alien and sovereign” nations, and the United States’ relations with them also implicate “intersovereign concerns.” It is difficult to understand why China, for example, would be less alien or less sovereign than the Cherokee Nations. It is also difficult to understand why tribal Indians would be less entitled to American citizenship if born on non-Indian land within the United States than children of birth tourists who immediately returned to China.
Alito wrote:
the Court cannot explain why the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer citizenship on children born in the United States to tribal Indians. As explained, federal law governed those children and their parents to the extent the Federal Government wished. If the Court were right that the Citizenship Clause applies to anyone who is born here and is subject to our laws, then the Fourteenth Amendment would have conferred citizenship on all tribal Indians. But the exception for tribal Indians was well-established at the time and remained until Congress eliminated it by statute.
This is quite the claim about a concept that is known to be rather messy. Multiple entire books have been written by philosophers of ethics trying to explore the nature of consent, because it is, indeed, rather messy. One may desire to collapse all the messiness down to a binary state, but that is a significant enough of a claim that it likely requires yet another one of those books written by a philosopher of ethics to argue for. Probably not something that's going to be settled in a MottePost.
To be clear, I think that for some situations (many situations), there is a clean enough mapping from the complex mental state that was present in that situation to a binary consent state. But that mapping is not always clean. One can hold as an axiom that, in theory, such a mapping must always exist, but that would either be an axiom or a claim. If it's a claim, I think it's hard to look at the existing academic work and believe that it has been conclusively shown.
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