DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
Tell me about it.
User ID: 745
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
Put another way, my argument is that household consumption as % of GDP is low because a great volume of capital has been invested in making life cheap, in particular rent, healthcare, connectivity and education, via infrastructure and assorted social transfers-in-mind. The fraction of GDP that is “government spending” or “employer spending” goes towards increasing purchasing power of the average (and below-average) Chinese. Consider:
Chinese households receive benefits such as subsidised education and healthcare provided by the state. Such social transfers in kind (STIK) were about 6.2 per cent of China’s GDP in 2019 and 6.4 per cent in 2021, up from 3 per cent two decades ago.
Even so, STIK only covers the transfers and consumption provided by governments and non-profit organisations. Chinese businesses are also more likely to provide employee welfare such as subsidised lunches and staff dormitories than their foreign counterparts. These, however, count towards Chinese business expenses rather than household consumption. Thus, adding all social transfers could lift China’s consumption rate by at least 6 percentage points.
etc.
This is a separate strategy from either low-intervention market economy or “welfare socialism” with explicit gibs that boost discretionary spending. It can be criticized but it's internally coherent and it's not just “make people poor to have cheap labor to flood global markets”.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
How is it not supposed to help? Money is good, market share is good. It reduces US trade deficit, providing funds for more useful things. Just 1 million chips is $25B, it's equal to the annual worth of those soy exports Trump frets so much about, it's like 5 times more than the much-hyped LNG boom. It derisks the circular investment bubble with NVidia as the nexus that's now a large part of US economy, and extends the timeline on which China stops importing them (ie the moment where domestic computing platforms are adopted by their top labs and shutting Nvidia out is not disruptive to DeepSeek V5 or Doubao-Seed 3 or whatever).
In a more relaxed geopolitical environment, they may not even stop 100%, just like they're still buying high-end Western CNC machines, despite being able to make functionally similar ones now. Nvidia will still have better yields, lower unit prices, higher power efficiency, more polished software, likely for decades. It's not like they have a philosophical commitment to not buy at all, they are simply focused on becoming strategically invulnerable to export controls after years of American gloating about how they'll fall behind and die, starting with Huawei.
The main argument against this has nothing to do with Chinese plans to stop buying chips later, it's just that they'll develop and deploy stronger AI at larger scale and secure some advantages in the short term, in the limit literally ASI. An auxiliary argument is that they will use extra compute to speed up the necessary research. That can be debated and weighed against standard economic arguments.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
It's impressive how you can make a $4.6T business in the US just being a lucky huckster, huh. Just like you can dance into becoming the president of a superpower while being a bumbling TV personality, rather than claw your way up over decades, starting from the flea-infested cave in Shaanxi. Blessed land, Manifest Destiny, a people chosen by Providence itself. I guess any mediocrity ought to feel invested in protecting it, then. Where else do you play and win in such lotteries.
But I don't share this theory. I don't think the US allows you to play on God Mode, and I think Jensen is not just an excellent businessman, and certainly not a “treasonous worm”. He is an industrial titan like Rockefeller or Carnegie, he genuinely has a long-term vision, and he demonstrably executes on it. America was made great by such men, and if it declines, it will be over forgetting their value.
Nazis were wrong about innate racial superiority. Most people are mediocre, whether Aryan or not. This doesn't mean that Nietzsche or Confucius were wrong about the existence of specific superior individuals.
Because those are the same issue.
In the PPP-based approach adopted, China–U.S. aggregate price differences are computed using China’s category-level shares of household cash consumption expenditure as weights. Under this weighting scheme, China’s overall price level is estimated to be approximately 66 percent lower than that of the United States.
By contrast, when China’s category-level consumption is explicitly revalued under the U.S. price system and then aggregated—as shown in Table 7—China’s per capita consumption under U.S. prices reaches USD 24,507, which is close to the earlier conservative estimate of USD 26,857. This convergence reflects substantial reweighting across consumption categories once prices are converted to the U.S. price system. For example, health is extremely expensive in the United States, and China’s health prices are approximately 94.7 percent lower. As a result, after price adjustment, China’s per capita health expenditure increases sharply from USD 340 to USD 6,443, with its expenditure share rising from 7.2 percent to 26.3 percent. A similar pattern is observed in education. In contrast, categories such as transport, clothing and footwear, and food—where China–U.S. price gaps are smaller—experience declines in their relative weights in total consumption.
In effect, if Chinese services consumed by the people provide 5-20 times more value than PPP calculations suggest, this straightforwardly means that Chinese people's "consumption" share of GDP is higher, because the volume of economic activity included in these services is larger relative to exports and government spending than it appears. We can directly estimate the value of their exports. The efficiency of their services and internally consumed goods is more opaque, so it's easy to say “oh just 2000 RMB, that's $285, adjust for PPP… $428”. It actually matters if it's more like $3000.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
I don't believe that any specific accelerator will change the situation much. “ASIC” is a meme, Nvidia's Vera Rubin are probably very close to optimality, they're no longer GPUs in a meaningful way.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
The man is without vision or sense and deviates wildly from decades of American policy.
He has a vision, though we can debate the merits of that vision, I agree he's a pretty vulgar individual and his execution is often appalling. But was “decades of American policy” sustainable? The permanent deficit only makes sense if you can serve the growing debt indefinitely. Why should we assume that this can hold? As I've said multiple times, Trump is correct in his diagnosis even if ham-fisted with treatment. If America becomes materially productive, it will diminish European share of the pie, you can't sustain your consumption with just soy and LNG exports, something has to give. Or what is the idea, make AGI and sell tokens instead of IOUs, in exchange for TRUMPF machines? I guess that can be argued, but far as I can see, nobody argues for this. Do you argue for this?
It should probably be noted that this policy of autarky didn't exactly turn out well for China over the following two centuries ending in their century of humiliation. The period itself was also an aberation as China was center to a vast trade network before the Qing
It wasn't so much about trade autarky as about comprehensive intellectual isolation and stagnation, the Qing did not understand the world outside China's borders and honestly bought into the idea that they'll naturally be productive enough to not worry. Qianlong still had some clue, thanks to Heshen, who was ultimately executed for vast corruption, leaving the Qing blind for decades. Then, it was too late and they grew too dysfunctional to modernize like Japan. By First Opium War, Daoguang emperor didn't know where Britain is. It was a pathological regime preoccupied with managing a quaint and unnatural arrangement of Manchu superiority. I definitely won't say their trade policies made sense but it is just a small part of overall Manchu awfulness. Though to be fair, Manchus were following the Ming with their tryhard Confucian disdain for trade. By 1736, China had mostly lost its ironworking. Insularity is the dominant Chinese policy for many centuries. We need to go back like 1000 years to see China that's even remotely as trade-oriented as the modern one. And yes, none of this is plausible in the modern world with high-density information flow.
Anyway, what does it matter? People complaining that “China is making trade impossible” don't mean anything like Ming-style ban of maritime commerce. They mean precisely the opposite, that Chinese exports are too cheap and abundant, and call it unfair. What exactly do you want them to do? Enforce the internal demand for more expensive foreign goods, such as subsidizing private consumption of Macbooks? Get worse at manufacturing? Make their subsidies as ineffectual as European ones? Focus on welfare spending, until they get old, slow down their value-add climb, and fall behind far enough to balance trade? It's just hopeless demands to change their value system, they won't change it. Keep raising tariffs if you don't want to compete on prices. 100% on EVs, 200% or whatever on solar panels, outright ban on Huawei… seems to work, keep going. American deficit with China is already shrinking.
American hegemony has not historically been about autarky, We've historically traded security guarantees for access to international markets.
American hegemony itself is a very recent phenomenon, and may have run its course. America was a relatively prosperous and absolutely powerful nation before it became “a hegemon” and so massively involved itself in Old World affairs, for intrinsic reasons of having a large internal market, little red tape, and good geography.
Your security guarantees don't look very credible and monetizable now.
This is a place with a habit of outright banning outside competitors, not just tariffing them.
I don't oppose any of that, it's fair game so long as it works. By coercion I mean buffoonery like forcing allies to invest in American production or Lutnick's machinations around TSMC (again, “security guarantees” come into play). China simply can't do any of that, irrespective of morals. It can only offer terms of the deal and expect consent. JVs were not coercion. Expropriation of Trina Solar, meanwhile, is coercion with extra steps. But whatever, this is sliding into moralism, everyone will price in those tactics and act rationally.
This map just seems to be a measure of economy size relative to nearest neighbors, no?
Pretty much, but that doesn't change the conclusion. The US is a vast economy. China is becoming comparably vast (or is already bigger depending on how you count), and specifically on goods production it's just no contest. Such economies gravitate towards autarky, both for security and macroeconomic reasons and because of basic logistics.
Household consumption being 40% of GDP means households receive 40% of national income to spend. The rest goes to the state and corporate sectors, funding the investment-heavy model.
I repeat that Chinese household consumption is underrated due to in-kind transfers (such as all this public infrastructure), while American consumption is overrated due to Baumol disease. CF40 doesn't just argue that they're even richer than PPP suggests, and consume on par with developed economies (just not the US). It argues that they spend 20 times less on healthcare and get comparable outcomes. Americans cannot not consume some of these items, their floor for cost of living is just too high, you physically cannot survive in a modern city for $137 a month for two people over 3 years, and for the Chinese the ability to do that is subsidized by in-kind transfers. There can be a spirited defense of American consumption pattern, about allocation efficiency or whatever, but the crux is that while the Chinese are directly extracted from to build up physical capital and trade competitiveness, Americans are indirectly extracted from to make pharma/hospital/insurance company etc. stonk go up, charitably – fund R&D and reinvest into tech. The latter is accounted for as “consumer spending”, the former is not, both are effectively non-optional capital transfer from civilians to the national backbone, largely physical in their case and largely financial in yours. I think that when all is considered fairly, both nations have about 50% “real consumption” share of GDP.
My model for an ai future if ai drops marginal labor cost to the base electricity needed to complete the task(but doesn't go infinite intelligence like the yuddites expect) isn't every nation turning inwards, like civilizational wire headers. I find that a bleak image frankly but I suppose some may and China may be one that does if that comes to pass
When labor is very cheap and raw materials, even if they can be harvested much more efficiently, are the scarce thing then what is the offense/defense equilibrium?
Right. That's the big question, isn't it.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
Can you stop with this nonsense please? He founded Nvidia, he navigated it strategically through every industry transition, proactively shaping them, he made a gamer hardware shop into the most valuable company on Earth and the kingmaker in the AGI race, he clearly intends to keep it in the running through all future transitions, and he understands Chinese competition very well. He knows that they're in a tough spot and Mellanox is not an adequate counter to Huawei's networking. He's trying to save not just his company but your asses, because he's existentially invested in them.
When he says that he's playing an infinite game rather than just chasing a quick buck that'd leave his headquarters irrelevant in under 20 years, this deserves infinitely more faith than your jaded dismissals of “CEO boilerplate”. You need to acknowledge that your standards of judgement and your theory of incentives are only fit for business done by inferior men. People are not created equal, opinions of people are not of equal worth, Jensen's opinion >>>>> median American's opinion.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
No, as you can see mainly I rely on other means. But this Baumol-diseased "consumption" that Americans pride themselves on is indeed largely propaganda.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
The goal of the CEO of any American company is implicitly if not explicitly the maximization of shareholder value
You're so confident. On what time horizon? One quarter? One year? Decades? As long as the company gets to exist? Do you realize that Jensen is a founder, and founders are not equal to board-appointed CEOs?
The idea that Huang is doing it as some grand geopolitical play (and where his company's bottom line is a secondary concern) is a bit hard to take seriously.
If the only way you can think of this is myopic mercantilism, then you are indeed culturally and civilizationally inferior to the Chinese and deserve to lose, get dunked on and consigned to the dustbin of history. You're inferior people, xiaoren. The Teacher had said:
The nature of the noble man is like the wind, the nature of the inferior man is like the grass. When the wind blows over the grass, it always bends.
Get bent already.
…But I think people like Jensen and Elon — tellingly, not Americans, but those who have adopted the nobler American ideal — are different. Jensen says:
First, in order to have a race to do well in a race, you have to understand the race and you have to understand the resources that you’re working with, the assets that you have, the assets you don’t have, your advantages and your disadvantages. And some of the things to realize is that AI is fundamentally at its core level. And going back to the three levels that we’re talking about, at each level we have to make sure that we understand the game.
And this game isn’t. There’s no 60 minute clock on this thing. This is an infinite game. And so most people aren’t very good at playing infinite games. You know, Nvidia is now 33 years old. We’ve been through three computer revolutions, from the PC revolution to the Internet to mobile, and now we’re in AI. And so you have to, in order to thrive across all of these different changes in the environment, you have to understand how to play games.
And so the things that I just described, understanding the game, understanding the assets, you have really important at the first layer, at the technology layer, the most important thing to understand is that the intellectual capital, and remember, 50% of the world’s AI researchers are Chinese. First, just take a step back and recognize that that important factor has to play into how we think about the game.
The next is AI factories. In order to do well there, you need to have energy. Because fundamentally we transfer, we transform electricity into digital tokens. Just as the last industrial revolution transformed atoms through energy into, you know, steel things and physical things that we know cars and things like that, buildings and things like that. And the generation before that, we gave it water into a machine called the dynamo. And what came out was electricity. And so now we have electricity go in and tokens come out. So the next layer requires energy.
The layer above that is just happening now. And it’s really, really important that we understand that ultimately the winners of the last industrial revolution wasn’t the country that invented it, it was the country that applied it. And the United States applied. Applied steel, applied energy faster than any country. Everybody else was worried about things like labor and, you know, horses being replaced by cars and, you know, those kind of matters. But the United States just. We just took it and ran with it.
And so the infrastructural layer above that is about the application of the technology. It’s about not being afraid of it, wanting to engage it, reskilling. Reskilling our workforce so that we’re able to apply it, encouraging people to adopt it. And so when you look at the, when you look at AI through the lens that I just described to the framework I just described, each one of the layers has its own, if you will, challenges and opportunities, and the game’s a little different in each one.
I don't think Jensen wants to sell out to China to make line go up. He wants to keep playing the infinite game.
But inferior men can only interpret a superior man's vision in terms of profit.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
GLM-4.7 for instance, supposedly it has stats comparable to Opus 4.5.
I don't think GLM is really that high. In my experience it may be more comparable to, like, Xiaomi V2-Flash or Minimax M2.1. Chinese ecosystem is uneven, and GLM team has massive clout thanks to their Tsinghua ties. I believe they're a bit overhyped.
Won't the US enjoy a quantitative and qualitative superiority in AI though, based on the compute advantage, through to at least the 2030s?
It probably will have the advantage, but a) unclear what this advantage gives you practically, and b) the divergence from compounding this advantage keeps getting postponed. Roughly a year ago, Dario Amodei wrote:
R1, which is the model that was released last week and which triggered an explosion of public attention (including a ~17% decrease in Nvidia's stock price), is much less interesting from an innovation or engineering perspective than V3. It adds the second phase of training — reinforcement learning, described in #3 in the previous section — and essentially replicates what OpenAI has done with o1 (they appear to be at similar scale with similar results)8. However, because we are on the early part of the scaling curve, it’s possible for several companies to produce models of this type, as long as they’re starting from a strong pretrained model. Producing R1 given V3 was probably very cheap. We’re therefore at an interesting “crossover point”, where it is temporarily the case that several companies can produce good reasoning models. This will rapidly cease to be true as everyone moves further up the scaling curve on these models. …
Making AI that is smarter than almost all humans at almost all things will require millions of chips, tens of billions of dollars (at least), and is most likely to happen in 2026-2027. DeepSeek's releases don't change this, because they're roughly on the expected cost reduction curve that has always been factored into these calculations. […] This means that in 2026-2027 we could end up in one of two starkly different worlds. In the US, multiple companies will definitely have the required millions of chips (at the cost of tens of billions of dollars). The question is whether China will also be able to get millions of chips.
Well, American companies already have millions of chips. We're nearing 2026. Multiple models trained on those superclusters already got released, RL cost is now in high millions, probably tens if not hundreds of millions for Grok 4 and GPTs, and likely Claudes. Result: Opus is not really far smarter than V3.2, an enhanced version of a year-old model Dario writes about, with total post-training costs around $1M. On some hard math tasks, V3.2 Speciale is not just like 20x cheaper per task but straight up superior to American frontier at the time of release. The gap has, if anything, shrank. Wasn't «gold at IMO» considered a solid AGI target and a smoke alarm of incoming recursive self-improvement not so long ago? V3.2-Speciale gets that gold for pennies, but now we've moved goalposts to Django programming, playing Pokemon and managing a vending machine. Those are mode open-ended tasks but I really don't believe they are indexing general intelligence better.
Maybe we'll see the divergence finally materializing in 2026-2027. But I think we won't, because apparently the biggest bottleneck is still engineering talent, and Americans are currently unable to convert their compute advantage into a technological moat. They know the use cases and how to optimize for user needs, they don't really know how to burn $1B of GPU-hours to get a fundamentally stronger model. There's a lot of uncertainty about how to scale further. By the time they figure it out, China has millions of chips too.
There is an interesting possibility that we are exactly at this juncture, with maturation of data generation and synthetic RL environment pipelines on both sides. If so, we'll see US models get a commanding lead for the next several months, and then it would be ablated again by mid-late 2026.
V3.2 was a qualitative shift, a sign that the Chinese RL stack is now mature and probably more efficient, and nobody paid much attention to it. Miles is former Head of Policy Research and Senior Advisor for AGI Readiness at OpenAI, and he pays attention, but it flew under the radar.
But if AI/AGI/ASI is a big deal, then America enjoys a decisive advantage. Doesn't matter if China has 20 AGI at Lvl 5 if the US has 60 at Lvl 8. I think a significantly more intelligent AI is worth a lot more than cheaper and faster AI in R&D, robotics, cyberwarfare, propagandizing, planning.
Another reason I'm skeptical about compounding benefits of divergence is that it seems we're figuring out how to aggregate weak-ish (and cheap) model responses to get equal final performance. This has interesting implications for training. Consider that on SWE-rebench, V3.2 does as well as «frontier models» in pass@5 regime, and the cost here is without caching; they have caching at home so it's more like $0.1 per run and not $0.5. We see how even vastly weaker models can be harnessed for frontier results if you can provide enough inference. China prioritizes domestic inference chips for 2026. Fun fact, you don't need real HBM, you can make do with LPDDR hybrids.
But all of that is probably secondary to social fundamentals, the volume and kind of questions that are economical to ask, the nature of problems being solved.
In a compute drought, the compute-rich country is king. In an AI race, the compute-rich country is king. China would be on the back foot and need to use military force to get back in the game.
I think all of this is stages of grief about the fact that the real king is physics and we have a reasonably good command of physics. Unless AGI unlocks something like rapid nanoassembly and billion-qubit quantum computers, it may simply not change the trajectory significantly. The condition of being a smaller and, as you put it, dopey society compromises "compute advantage". Great American AI will make better robots? Well, it'll likely train better policies in simulation. But China is clearly far ahead at producing robots and can accelerate to tens of millions in little time given their EV industrial base, gather more deployment data, iterate faster, while American startups are still grifting with their bullshit targets. Similar logic applies in nearly every physical domain. Ultimately you need to actually make things. Automated propaganda is… probably not the best idea, American society is too propagandized as is. Cyberwarfare… will American AGI God really be good enough to hack Huawei clusters after their inferior Temu AGI has hunted for vulnerabilities in an airgapped regime for a few months? I think cyberwarfare is largely going dodo in this world, everyone will have an asymmetric defense advantage.
Obviously, that's still the most credible scheme to achieve American hegemony, conquer the light cone etc. etc. I posit that even it is not credible enough and has low EV, because it's an all-or-nothing logic where «all» is getting elusive.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
When the japanese and south koreans copied and then bested american cars and german optics and swiss watches, did the americans and germans and swiss subsequently sink into poverty?
I don't know what the Swiss thought of it, but Americans absolutely had a psychotic meltdown about Japanese competition. I think you don't get how intoxicating the sense of supremacy is. Switzerland is just a nation, its manufactures are just manufactures, it operates on the logic of comparative advantage. Americans have an ideological stake in being Number One.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
They spend very little on social safety nets. the end result being that Chinese household consumption is something like 40% of gdp vs 65% in the states.
I simply don't think this is even true, it's more self-serving imperial propaganda to present failures as a moral choice. Most of your consumption value is rent-seeking like high rents. Chinese consumption is not that low, read this. Even Chinese safety net is not as low as is often said, it's on par with other middle-income nations.
You're not doing anyone a favor by being corrupt.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
I think this is somewhat incoherent.
Americans are happy to let other nations lead in some industries and rely on them long term. We're happy to buy Korean appliances, Japanese cars, European fine crafted goods and Columbian cocaine. If you want to build out a niche the American empire is happy to let you have it and integrate into the global family. This is not how China acts.
Your narrative is a bit out of date. How will Europeans pay for Chinese imports if China has no need of their exports (in «fine crafted goods», services or anything)? Maybe they just won't, if China can do all that fine crafting cheaper and better. But they will face the same issue with American imports, indeed already are facing:
The Trump tariffs have already hit German exporters hard: over the first nine months of the year, their US exports plunged by 7.4 per cent.
But the prospects in China are if anything even bleaker, creating a “China shock” that is now biting into the bottom lines of globally successful German companies.
Since the start of 2025, Germany is now running a trade deficit in capital goods with China over a rolling 12-month period. That is a first since records began in 2008. Chinese machinery exports to Europe roughly doubled to around €40bn in over six years and may reach €50bn this year, according to industry association VDMA.
Trump’s haphazard trade policies are hurting German industrialists much more than the 15 per cent headline tariff accepted by the EU in July suggests.
A month after the controversial deal, the US expanded an existing 50 per cent duty on metal components to more than 400 additional product categories, including motorbikes, railway cars, cranes and pumps. The charges on steel, alloy and copper come with complex disclosure rules and threats of heavy fines for incomplete declarations.
This hit German companies of many stripes. Farming equipment maker Krone Group, for example, based in Spelle in Lower Saxony, was forced to temporarily halt its US-bound production. The extra tariffs on metal were “very shocking”, recalls Bernard Krone, chair of the family firm with €2.4bn in sales. US farmers will face hefty price increases which could damp demand, he predicts.
Yet while selling goods to the US has become more difficult for German industrialists, competing with China’s rapidly ascending industrial might presents an even greater challenge.
Goods coming out of China are no longer cheaply made, lower-quality knock-offs, if they ever were. “Most of what German Mittelstand firms do these days, Chinese companies can do just as well,” says Thilo Köppe, partner at German consultancy firm Vindelici Advisors who worked in China for more than a decade.
American Hegemony is not about building some happy global family with a division of labor. From software down to extractive industries, American Empire wants to be like Emperor Qianlong said: «our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce». Currently, the Chinese economy is pretty export-dependent, but Xi would prefer it to be otherwise – Dual Circulation is a big pillar of his policy, and in purely thermodynamic terms, if literally everything is cheaper in China, you can ignore standard macroecon, largely eschew exports, subsidize domestic demand and make Qianlong's boast a reality.
The main difference is that China got there with industrial policy and human capital, and you're trying to get there with tariffs and coercion and a Wunderwaffe. But the end result is the same for non-live players.
Back then, I asked for what the end game of AGI race is, and you said:
If it is powerful enough to actually do high level engineering work then it instantly obviates China's other major advantage in having a big workforce. If it scales all the way to AGI then forget about it, winning that race is all that matters. Winner gets to be the center of commerce and yes some latitude that comes along with having the most powerful military.
A center of commerce in what sense? The US currently has a very low fraction of international trade in GDP – around the level of Pakistan. The US wasn't a global center of commerce during its ascent either. You pat yourselves on the back for importing some junk but it's not really spreading a lot of your wealth around, it's only large in absolute terms. China is simply already doing what you want to do once you get «AGI», and by 2038, if AGI plans pan out, your narrative will be laughably quaint.
Moreover, what's wrong with that? Both nations are large, decently situated and can, in theory, produce all goods in prolific abundance within their own borders more economically than imports would be; and China is entitled to a larger and more diverse internal market on account of population size. There are some hard natural endowments – Australia has more accessible mineral wealth, Atacama desert has excellent solar resource, I don't know – but commodities are cheap. Maybe they'll become less cheap? What remains scarce after labor and R&D are commodified? Land? Copper? Wombs? We need to think of how the world would operate when major nations are capable of industrial autarky, because modulo some Butlerian Jihad we will have to deal with it anyway.
Finally, what exactly is your concern? The US imports more than it exports not out of some moral commitment to subsidizing globalism, but just because it has very credible IOUs to sell. You basically print USD and export inflation. The EU can't do that. China can't do that. Chinese industrial competence doesn't have a direct effect on that, they cannot deny you the ability to print paper and buy Columbian cocaine. Trying to rationalize the take – you deserve hegemony because what, it'll mean unquestionable military supremacy, hard guarantee of your IOUs, and therefore indefinite ability to exchange goods for paper?
Yeah, I think it's less sustainable than «China is a very large and very productive autarkic country». They've been exactly that for centuries, and the world managed fine. In the limit of this trajectory, they will only need to export enough to cover the raw commodities imports necessary for their internal economic activity. That's not a lot, in dollar terms. The more interesting question is what else we all will be trading in 2038.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
4d ago
That's a funny perspective to me. Russians have negligible industrial base, atrophied Soviet military-industrial complex, and mainly export stuff like oil, gas, grain and fertilizers. We also simply don't have many smart people remaining, and instead have a population of jingoistic TV-watching cattle that needs steady supply of copium in the face of a protracted war that's going badly. Of course we have televised fantasies about Wunderwaffes. The US is, for all its grandeur, similarly a corrupt Soy and Gas Empire that struggles with building physical things relative to its consumption and ambition, we see whining about the Rust Belt, Powerpoints with 6th gen fighter jets and «Trump class battleships», and the whole AGI project is supposed to restore the claim to primacy. And even in Ukraine, Americans heroically grappled with the costs of exporting this or that long range wundermissile or Smart Shell, and thought that their Wunderwaffes like HIMARS, or Palmer Luckey's gadgets, will make more of a difference than commodity drone parts from Aliexpress procured by both sides. They did not.
China is the factory of the world and the source of almost all new process innovation and, say, the bulk of Californian top patent holders. The Chinese are not advertising their ion implantation techniques, procurement plans, fabs, they are quietly doing business and actively avoid international publicity on these matters. No, I don't think this is a Wunderwaffe. Yes, we'll see what they can actually produce in 2026.
Alternative explanation: Jensen Huang won the game of "be the last person to talk to Trump", since he knows Trump is a waffling buffoon and Huang just wants to maximize Nvidia's stock, US security concerns be damned.
This is still denialism of the erosion of fundamentals, I think. Classic stabbed-in-the-back-by-Jews [of Asia] doctrine. Huang founded Nvidia over 30 years ago, I don't believe he's a petty merchant optimizing for quarterly reports.
Minor update on the US-PRC tech competition.
Culture war significance: it matters for the grand strategy understanding and the narrative of the US as the Main Character of History. Personally, I had stopped regularly engaging on this forum when it became clear that the US is, in fact, not such a Main Character (at least for the moment), but just a great power with massive momentum and cultural influence. Not being American, I mainly only care about American cultural affairs insofar as they have global spillover effects. Local legislation news and woke-MAGA strife are overwhelmingly noise for the world, unless they reach some critical volume like peak woke or BLM did. Some American tech, and related politics, is very much not noise. The chip war in particular is very high-signal, so I follow it closely.
It seems something happened behind the scenes after those events in October, when the US Department of Commerce went with the Affiliate Rule, China retaliated with REE+ export controls, and soon enough, by November 1, we've got the usual Trump style Deal. (There's also a subplot with Nexperia/Wingtech, that demonstrates Chinese supply chain power and European ineptitude again, with a similar outcome of the Western actor retreating). Suddenly, on Dec 8, we get the news about Trump permitting the sales of H200 to China (context and understandable rationalist perspective here). China reacts somewhat paradoxically, if your theory of their mind is just «they're desperate for our chips» – as per the FT, «Companies seeking to purchase the H200 would need to submit a request explaining why they cannot use domestically produced chips and undergo an approval process», in continuation of their earlier scrutiny, rejections and negative publicity directed at H20s.
10 days later Reuters breaks the news – which were not quite news for those in the know – about Chinese successes with their EUV effort. The article is somewhat confused, as almost all reporting on Chinese AI and IC tech is; from my private sources, the situation has already moved further on multiple components, like optics and metrology.
What I want to emphasize here is that it's not just trivial «industrial espionage» or IP theft. Their light source project is led by former ASML head of light source technology and «Light source competence owner for metrology in ASML research» Lin Nan. I think that he returned not just for money, nationalism or career opportunities, but because China offered him a more ambitious challenge – he seems interested in solid state lasers, which ASML, constrained by market incentives more than strategic considerations, gave up on. For sure, straightforward IP theft also happens - CXMT's DRAM/HBM progress is apparently propped up by Samsung IP which was, well, illicitly transfered by former employees. And there's very substantial domestic talent pipeline, though people are prone to dismiss their patent/paper counts; they lack brand power, «Changchun Institute of Optics» doesn't have the same zing to it as Zeiss, though you may see it in the news soon.
All in all, China is moving far faster than even I imagined. Now we get reports – straining my credulity, to be honest – that ByteDance doesn't expect Nvidia to sell move than a few hundred thousand cards in China, not because of any trade barriers from either side, but because adequate domestic competition will come online in mid-2026 already. Almost certainly it'll be worse and less power-efficient, at least. But clusters with Chinese hardware are eligible for electricity subsidies, and that may be enough to tip the scales? This logic is corroborated by the surprisingly low leaked price of H200s – just $200.000 for an 8-card module (not sure if that's before of after 25% Trump Tax, but in any case very low, maybe lower than in the US proper, at least pre-tax). Meanwhile that's 5 times more bang for the buck than H20s offered. On the other hand, for now Nvidia is selling old stock; new production is being discussed, but at this rate I don't expect the price to increase. One can reasonably ask if this makes any sense, given that the demand in the US outstrips supply. I think it does, both for complex strategic reasons (mainly ecosystem lock-in, which is in fact a big deal, as I explain here) and simply because the US AI market is becoming a very convoluted circular Ponzi scheme where Nvidia de facto subsidizes companies to buy Nvidia wares. That's more of a potential market meltdown recipe than a revenue source. H200 sales to China, for what it's worth, unambiguously pull in dollars, and both Jensen's fudiciary duty and Trump's deficit-slashing mandate (and to be blunt, likely Trump's corruption) create a strong incentive to greenlight them.
Anyway, what looked like Chinese bluffing and negging at the time the sale of H20s was debated looks more and more like genuine, coherent industrial policy. China is pretty sure it'll have sovereignty in the entire stack of AI development, soon enough, that it will even be capable enough to export its AI hardware products, and the US is acting as if that is likely true – as if the competition is about market share and revenue. They are obviously compute-constrained right now, so DeepSeek V3.2 only catches up to around GPT-5 level, with the usual complaints in the paper. They don't appear to mind this enough to bow and scrape for more American chips at any cost. A large component here is that what they need, they can often rent overseas openly –
a data center near Osaka, operated by Japanese marketing solutions firm Data Section, is effectively dedicated to Tencent. This data center houses 15,000 of Nvidia’s Blackwell (B200) GPUs. Tencent secured access to these GPUs for three years through a $1.2 billion (approximately 1.8 trillion Korean won) contract with Data Section via a third-party entity. Data Section plans to establish additional data centers in Sydney, Australia, with over 100,000 Nvidia GPUs, also primarily serving Tencent.
– but I think it's primarily about confidence in the domestic supply chain.
Long before all these events, in September, we had a debate with @aquota here, when the topic was selling China relatively worthless H20s. (For my previous take on H20s specifically see here).
He argued:
This lock-in effect is just nonsense and has not worked for literally a single firm that has sold out to china. China is not going to forego building their own echo-system and hasn't for any other sector they've found strategically important. […] Our one chance at dominance in this sector is remaining ahead in AI and reaping compound interest on that lead whether it's AGI or simply accelerated AI and chip development. If it's not enough then I just don't buy this fantasy that selling out now is going to give us a better seat in the future.
To which I've replied:
As I've said before, "China" is not omnipotent and cannot create an ecosystem solely through political will and subsidies, they've been trying for decades and it hasn't been working so long as Nvidia was the obvious superior choice. Even now, nobody wants to use CANN if afforded the chance. I think this is how Jensen views this: he's straightforwardly fighting as the CEO of American company Nvidia, not just for line going up in quarterly reports but for enduring global dominance of his stack.
… personally, I believe this [AI race theory] is all deluded and very much in the spirit of last days of Nazi Germany. Both sides will have adequate AI to increase productivity, both will have "AGI" at around the same time, you're not going to have some dramatic inflection point, you will not leave them in the dust as a military or economic power, you'll just slow down global economic growth somewhat, and in the long run end up poorer and have a smaller slice of the global market. That's all.
[…] I guess this is the crux. In your world, where unipolarity is the default trajectory, it makes perfect sense to cling to Pax Americana and play negative-sum games hoping to outlast the opposition. Like, what is the alternative, capitulation, suicide? In my world, China is basically guaranteed to not only exist in 30 years but have comprehensively stronger economy than the US plus closest allies, no matter what you sell or don't sell, buy or don't buy. And the US will have to figure out how to exist, and exist well, without boons of global strategic superiority, in a bipolar world, and hopefully remaining a hegemon in its own backyard. That figuring out has got to begin now.
It seems to me that my read on the situation from back then, both the big picture and its implications for compute strategy, is now shared by both the USG and the CPC. The former is trying to regain its position and revenue in the Chinese GPU market and slow down Huawei/Cambricon/Kunlun/etc. ecosystem development by flooding the zone with mature Nvidia chips that will be adopted by all frontier players (eg DeepSeek again – they have a deep bench of Nvidia-specific talent and aren't willing to switch to half-baked Ascend CANN). The latter is more worried about preventing the US from doing that than about gaining moar FLOPS in the short run.
In conclusion, I want to congratulate Americans again with having found a true peer, for the first time since the decline of the British empire. Germans, Japanese and my own people had failed to provide enough stimulation, so Americans have grown lonely and fat at the top.
Aquota said:
surely you understand the "equals across the sea" isn't an option on the table. That isn't what is in store if we give up all our advantages in this sector.
I do not, in fact, "understand" this. Like, that may be the case and we'll just have Pax Sinica. I'm okay with it but I'm not Sinophilic enough to expect it. Even reduced to "just a great power", the US is poised to remain a historical force.
For now the loss of the indisputable Main Character status is being processed traumatically, with anger, denial and exaggeration of the costs of that loss if it were to really happen. But as its reality sinks in, this trauma may become fertile grounds for some cultural Renaissance in the United States. Less capeshit, more self-awareness. I may even come to care about it for reasons aside from global consequences.
…Of course, we can still entertain the hypothesis that all of the above is some interesting ephemera and this final dash of the Chosen Nation towards AGI-powered Rapture and completion of history is the real story of the times. I won't completely discount it, we shall see.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
7d ago
I suspect that these antisemites would rather blame AI on Jews in the sense that it's a “Jewish trick” to extract money while feeding us “goyslop” under the pretenses of building AGI.
Those who take AI seriously are very terrified of the implications.
Amodei siblings are also connected with Holden Karnofsky, of OpenPhil, which can be reasonably described as some kind of New World Order project (albeit, it seems, grossly unsuccessful).
And there was no pre-WWII history of anti-Jewish pogroms, expulsions, or legal discrimination against Jews in China
This is not entirely correct. For sure, generally Jews were treated well in China (eg in Harbin they only were harassed by local Russian fascists, somewhat humorously not by the Nazi-aligned Japanese who sought to resettle them in Japan, on grounds of taking Protocols of the Elders of Zion at face value and anticipating high ROI from alignment with the Jewish people). But Kaifeng Jews were at the very least forced to assimilate, and probably abandon endogamy.
Of course, China is so vast and has seen so many different peoples that all of that is a complete nothingburger in their national consciousness. Anecdotally, I have the impression that they thought well of Jews (even of negative stereotypes), assuming that this is NGMI whining of whites who complain of Chinese shrewdness and intelligence in the same manner. Chinese themselves experience relationships somewhat similar to Medieval Jewish-Gentile ones across the broader Sinosphere, eg in Malaysia where they are the educated, clannish middleman minority with financial assets but without hard power. Politically, the PRC is consistently pro-Palestinian but it doesn't have much of an actionable component or popular purchase, and the Israel Question is folded into the broader competition with America, often with this lazy Marxist spin about Israel as the bulwark of global imperialism for those who want an ideological case against he US.
On the other hand I've been told by Mainlanders that China got really redpilled on the JQ after the reports of starvation in Gaza. They take starvation extremely seriously, and then pattern-matched the whole post-Oct 7 dynamic onto Japanese occupation. That may color perceptions going forward.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
10d ago
That's some quite superficial thinking. I think you really underestimate how far we could have gone with biological and chemical weapons, for one thing. Modern wars are in no way maximally brutal yet. Big states do avoid the logical endpoint of a race to the bottom where all personnel on both sides is writhing in agony within 72 hours.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
10d ago
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
15d ago
Your post is passive just descriptive. Do you endorse ethno nationalism or just observe it?
I will answer thusly.
My default moral intuitions aren't that different from modal American ones 50 or so years ago. Russia is a multiethnic society, clearly defined by one ethnos and culture (mine, to a first approximation), which does not possess the instinct or inclination for clannish diasporic behavior. We are more ethnocentric than modern Westerners but not by far. We assimilate easily in Western societies, find them an upgrade to our own, and generally agree with the way of the West, whereas the ways of The Rest are seen as unfair and backward, if demonstrably adaptive on the personal and sometimes collective level. Ethnocentrism specifically has been investigated in a toy model I like, by one Artem Kaznatcheev and friends, in Canada in 2013, and the conclusion was that it “…eventually overcomes its closest competitor, humanitarianism, by exploiting humanitarian cooperation across group boundaries as world population saturates”. Intellectually, then, it appears necessary to develop a system that can defend that superior humanitarian way, and the unpalatable conclusion is that in practice it amounts to something not unlike ethnocentrism – aggressive policing of defectors, attention to proxy metrics of defection, operational presumption of non-assimilation, and rejection of comforting lies about universality and natural attractiveness of preferred values. Western experiment with mass immigration and “race-blind meritocracy” is clearly a cheap hack motivated by Western cognitive biases, myopic financial considerations and such, not any concern for long-term preservation of the Way. Similar thoughts are common for sympathetic peoples on the periphery of Western civilization, which is why we see Slavs, assimilated Jews, Moldovans and so on disproportionately represented among the European right.
On a more philosophical level, I don't know. Ethnocentrism is a crude but effective means to preserve the intrinsic direction of a people, it increases the activation energy for changing course, and lets the direction be explored further. Moral intuitions aside, I'm not convinced that the Western direction is truly superior; it would be premature to say so.
I'm pretty open to the idea that diversity is good — real diversity, not this consumerist Western appreciation of cuisines, not the lukewarm respect for ethnic varieties of ideas the West already accepts. Why is diversity good? I consider great men of history to be scientists, and civilizations to be ongoing longitudinal natural experiments – about the limits of human nature, society, what kinds of minds should be incentivized to develop, what notions of goodness are viable and lead to more adaptive behavior, better instrumental outcomes and, in the limit, to greater collective and individual flourishing. Some experiments achieve negative results, invalidating the hypothesis for observers, but it's always a pity if this happens for contingent reasons like a natural disaster, or an opportunistic alliance, or luck of the draw in relative timing of access to some preexisting technology. I am distraught at being unable to know how failed civilizations could have developed to their “mature” stage, given a couple more millennia of literacy and a handful of extra IQ points, or passing a good reform, or contacting a powerful idea earlier; where would they have met their ceiling. When possible, one should run experiments in controlled conditions, after all.
The West is a beautiful experiment, plausibly the most successful that has ever been proposed. Its core thesis, stripped of the ever-changing scaffolding, is something like “human nature inherently has the spark of God's love and wisdom, therefore individual freedom is good and barriers to its realization are at worst prejudices, at best training wheels and must be systematically removed”. It's been working very well. But this near-genocidal desire to universalize the way smells less and less like sincere proselytism, and more like anxiety, fear of the hypothesis getting falsified. The truth is, the West has no clue as to what made or makes it work, beyond currently-commoditized pieces like capitalism (but whence capitalism? If “because freedom”, why does it port to societies that don't adopt the rest of the package?) Americans sometimes boast of “nation-building” Germany and Japan, developing “institutions”, and that reveals the hollowness and vulgarity of the doctrine. Germany and Japan, seriously? Japan got destroyed in the first place precisely because it got competitive, while remaining philosophically largely alien; Germany was actively advancing a divergent branch of the Western thesis. And today, both these nations are deeply troubled. Nation-building in less performant societies has a dismal track record. The West doesn't really know what to teach others so that it sticks. Really, what made the West into what it is, what was the generative function behind those generically adaptive innovations? Christendom (adopted Middle Eastern teaching, effectively dead now)? “HBD” in the sense of high IQ and conscientiousness – OK but why did it happen, just deep time migration patterns, cold winters, founder effects? What's the lesson here, pray to RNG? Galton-style Social Darwinism, Gregory Clark's Anglo class eugenics (grotesquely replaced with education-mediated assortative mating, also largely dead, and their practical implications made taboo in the resultant society)? “High trust” and non-kin cooperation by default (as covered here, a giant exploit for people who practice kin cooperation, and thus a mere bootstrap phase)? Science? Everyone above 95-ish median IQ can do science. The discovery was invaluable, but can “the West” come up with anything of that caliber ever again? Rather, can you even do what you used to do? We seem to be near the end of the session. Do you even know if you want to live? When you have full automation, will you put forward an argument for not just exercising your freedom to pass away replacing yourselves with machines, like you're currently doing with immigrants? Of what nature will that argument be?
China is another large old civilization. They've been running their own experiments. Their most enduring research program is Confucian. At the risk of butchering it, Confucianism says something like “humans aren't very good and are prone to self-interested behavior. Individual humans are not even human, they can only be elevated from monkeys via social context, and even then they default to barbarianism. But if compelled to cultivate “virtue”, starting on the mundane level of filial piety, hierarchical propriety and standardized ritual, escalating to mental discipline and scholarship, if rewarded with reproductive opportunity for utmost compliance, if the peace is maintained for many generations – they can build hierarchical societies of unbounded scale and splendor; and eventually, more of them become Superior Persons capable of and entitled to correct independent moral reasoning, and those will ennoble everyone else”.
It is debatable how seriously that has been pursued, but I'd say at least as seriously as the Christian/Western program. Both have undergone course corrections that arguably reflect growing out of their scaffolding and purify the original strategy. The West going from theism to deism to non-superstitious interest in the Universe, generalizing the validity of “love” and “freedom” beyond traditional norms. The East purging “thieves of virtue” along with ossified ritual and adopting a more common-sensical epistemology. To an extent this can be decried as trivialization and loss of function on both sides. There's been substantial convergence, but the divergent bits are what's at stake. Right now, I think the Eastern project is showing more promise, and the West is no longer in a position to lecture them on how to steer it. They're more ethnocentric? Less individualistic? They're authoritarian? Their society feels wrong? OK, I hear you. But they're solving social trust, they're solving – in their own way, less charismatic and more transactional – international relations, they're even solving creative expression, while having solved long-term large-scale coordination to a greater extent. And crucially, this isn't their first rodeo, they've had massive collapses and comebacks, they're the only major player that has a sophisticated applied discourse about civilizational recovery. Isn't it saying something that they've fallen behind, failed catastrophically, but have recovered, denied you the option of converting them, and are again pursuing their own program? Isn't it exciting that another solution can exist? Aren't you curious of where it will peak? Of course, they're doing well enough that another questions, for example “how much of the light cone will we be able to claim at this rate” are becoming salient for savvy observers. So it is necessary that they be treated as competitors, not just an interesting alternative path.
Jews, likewise, are a unique research program. They have an insular doctrine of their exceptionalism and special nature of themselves as “the people of God”, their moral obligation to biologically and culturally perpetuate themselves, a very long story of surviving and adapting, institutions built for venerating and reproductively rewarding exceptional individuals who have superior insight into God's will, they're punching so far above their weight that it's almost comical… and all of that hinges on extreme, almost naive ethnocentrism. They've mixed with Western peoples, experienced some assimilation, and now we're watching them return to a more traditional (indeed, exxageratedly traditional) form, with large Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox subpopulations having a vast fertility advantage over secular ones which, so long as they exist, provide a bridge to Western decisionmaking, invent spins like “Judeo-Christian liberal democratic values” and “our common Islamic/Communist/Han enemy”, and generally add confusion (partially their own). It doesn't take a genius to recognize that this research program, while fascinating on its own, can derail the Western one, and on top of your own dysfunction and anxious miscalculations it can create very ugly outcomes. We've seen trial runs in the Middle East, and the worst part is that you can barely articulate that it was mostly about them, not your “strategic interest” or oil or some other bullshit. So they, too, ought to be treated as competitors. It's okay, they can take it.
That's pretty much all relevant live players; smaller or less coherent players, who have a latent opportunity to expand their niche, are also more ethnocentric. The West is uniquely non-ethnocentric and has unique moral narcissism about this fact, largely owed to successes of the last several centuries. I think the jury is out on whether this system is sustainable or has the highest ceiling, and you're not entitled to try and “enlighten” others, but you're clearly valuable enough to think of how you can preserve and improve your program in a world of ethnocentrists, and that's what you should be doing now.
Spawn a great man or something, I don't know.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
15d ago
I seriously don't see how that addresses anything @SecureSignals has said. Like, yes, Bari Weiss is more than just «a Jew», she's a specific person, with individual connections, traits, skills and credentials that have differentiated her in the pool of admissible candidates. Certainly she couldn't be substituted with someone like Norman Finkelstein on the mere account of his ethnicity. The issue here isn't even Bari per se, it's the criteria defining the nature of the pool. It's the same issue as the negatively-defined criteria of DEI preferential treatment, which people are much more comfortable rejecting.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
15d ago
The problem is that this whole «human capital» philosophy that treats humans as interchangeable stuffing of different grades in the American pie is premised on some extremely degenerate assumptions about human nature at this point.
The most plausible explanation for the vast amount of cultural decline in our country over the past 15 years is NOT some secret cabal of Jews conspiring to destroy the countries that they share with us. It seems much more likely that outside actors who actually have a vested interest in watching the US and Europe collapse are to blame: the Qatari, Saudi, Emirati oil money are buying their way into influencing Western academic, political, and social capital in a way that undermines Western values and promotes Islamic ones. Likewise, the Chinese Communists are no doubt using all of the psychological warfare tools at their disposal to accelerate the collapse of the American Empire. The Chinese definitely want to see America be as multicultural as possible and promote identity politics to create more divisions within us.
Islam is at war with the West, and they have been for thousands of years. The difference is now the West is losing this war, and we are losing badly. If Western Civilization can muster the courage to actually declare war against Islam, as they have declared war on us, the Jews will be overrepresented in the political, military and cultural institutions that are fighting for western civilization. The Jews helped us beat Hitler. The Jews helped us beat the Soviet Union. The Jews can help us beat China. The Jews can help us beat Islam, too.
I notice you don't mention China except as something to beat, while extolling «Japanese», «Taiwanese» and «Asians». It's peculiar because of course Taiwanese are Chinese, most American [East] Asians are Chinese, and indeed, they're doing very well! Low crime, high SAT, sizable tax contribution, and as I've said in my last long post, when an American Jew (Zuckerberg) wants to build an American Superintelligence Lab, 20 out of 30 research scientists turn out to be Han Chinese. In fact, 18 of them even hold PRC citizenship. This is about how it looked at the absolute peak of Jewish dominance in the American cognitive elite.
And yet, and yet – the US is having a decade-long meltdown about strategic competition with China. Even these researchers are suspected as potential spies who'll leak our precious inventions (their own work, largely) to the Red Dragon. There's a lot of vitriol directed at the Chinese, smoothed over with unconvincing noises to the effect of «no no I don't hate Han people, love my Hapa children, much beautiful ancient culture, wow very friendly very nice, I hate the CCP [also nuke three gorges dam]». Well, but the CCP is made of 100 million Chinese people, it has a sky-high approval rating (no it's not fake), and it genuinely represents their collective will to be a successful race, a superpower with hegemonic potential, rather than an assembly floor and source of high-skilled labor for Americans (including Jews).
White people like (presumably) you, people who buy into this «human capital» doctrine, are simply people. Chinese and Jewish people are a people, and in their own cultural frame even the People – a distinction which is a bit better articulated than in many other cultures, but in no way an abnormal way of thinking. They are ethnocentric. Goys and barbarians are not part of the people, and the people will coordinate to achieve collective gain in zero-sum games with barbarians and goys. That's table stakes for a self-aware successful culture.
What kind of war against Islam are you envisioning? It's pretty funny because militarily, Islam is not a threat to the West at all and has no potential to become a threat. It is, of course, a moderate but real threat to Israel, which is why pro-Israeli actors will hype up the Islamic threat to try and have you fight their wars. The Saudi money works, if it does, because your ruling class is hilariously corrupt and disinterested in the long-term prosperity of the populace. The main danger scenario is illustrated by the case of the UK, with slow population replacement by a mix of different immigrant groups and the low-status people (low human capital, so much less interesting for «the UK» than Jews or Asians) converting to Islam out of desperation. To stop this, you don't really need high-IQ Jewish generals and nuclear scientists, you need to learn to think of yourselves as «a people» that have intrinsic worth not denominated in tax returns or exam scores. But that's at odds with those very «values» you hope to have the Jews protect for you.
All of this is very mush-headed. There's no need to antagonize any ethnic group or reject cooperation, but there is a necessity to acknowledge that major nations represent essentially ethnic interests that are partially shared by their diasporas, and there is not a single non-Western nation that is straight up invested in propping up the West for «values» or whatever. Including Israel. All alliances will be alliances of convenience.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
17d ago
I think that peaceful reunification is the base scenario at this point and Americans are a bit high on their own supply. It's not that there's more enthusiasm for it, but there is definitely less visceral rejection. The fundamental case against it has been not «freedoms and democracy» (Taiwanese adopted LGBT stuff largely to please their patrons) but the belief that the Mainland is a big, embarrassingly poor North Korea where you worship Mao, eat gutter oil, work like a dog at Foxconn and die.
It's still popular with the older Taiwanese, but facts change and speak for themselves. As a young graduate you can earn more in tier 1 city like Guangdong than in Taiwan, and Guangdong is plainly newer and bigger and cooler. The Mainland is increasingly seen as «awesome» by local influencers, DPP is unpopular (eg for shutting down their nuclear power on a Germany-tier green platform, which ironically makes reunification-via-blockade a lot easier, they'll run out of coal and gas in 2 weeks and their civilian society, nevermind those fabs, stops dead) and getting censorious in apparent desperation, KMT is likely to win this time, Ukraine as of 2025 serves as a warning rather than inspiration. The military buildup on China, including specialized assets like these zany barges that defeat the «few landing-worthy beaches» objection, seems very serious and increasingly impossible to deter. Basically, if you're against China, you can't rely on any shithole level deterrence like geography, they can simply engineer and build their way over it. You need to rely on hard military capability.
And that's the problem, because no matter how porcupine Taiwan gets, the real muscle has to come from the US. And they believe less and less that it will come. Lutnick-style opportunism is widely seen as dismantling their Silicon Shield, and I think they're right – the US that can make chips at home doesn't have an existential stake in Taiwan. China cares about the First Island Chain and about finishing the civil war. The US stopped caring about that back in 1979-1980, and using Taiwan as an opportunity to contain China is only worthwhile if that's the relatively cheap option. It doesn't look cheap. Only chips, then – and once chips are made in Arizona, not even that. There's broader logic about «our allies in the Indopacific» but at the end of the day that's hubris and imperial overextension, all of these arguments are downstream of the ambition to contain China and Win History, and as Trump's National Security Strategy demonstrates, ambitions can be downscaled in response to new circumstances. The US can keep Guam and Okinawa in a world where Taiwan has fallen, and will try to.
So I think that by default, China takes Taiwan within 5-20 years, either by a face-saving «1 Country 2 Systems» arrangement, or with a brief blockade followed by polite demonstration of overwhelming power. I believe China (Xi) has a similar theory and so won't rush into a hot conflict, which serves everyone for the moment just fine, even if me and Xi are in fact wrong.
P.S. People who argue about blockading China are not very familiar with the facts. They aren't dependent on imported food, these soybeans are for pigs. They don't actually biologically need to eat that many pork bellies. They have vast stockpiles too. They're electrifying very rapidly, from cars to trucks to ships now, and in a few short years their core logistics and power generation will be able to maintain wartime economy without any maritime fossil fuel supplies. Commodities like iron ore are harder but that's not even a blockade issue, the US can compel Australia/Brazil/Chile to stop exports. Even then, it's not going to be decisive. The Chinese can just do things, it's actually mesmerizing to see.
As promised, I'm responding in more detail. Much of the below I could nitpick at myself, but I'll leave you the pleasure. My confidence in being directionally right is underpinned by having been optimistic about Chinese trajectory for years of seeing «Xi bad» and «China collapse» narrative. I was even right in expecting their failures – such as no EUV breakthrough or quick solutions to fertility and real estate problems. I was, however, wrong in predicting a stronger American showing in response to their success.
Disclaimer: the load-bearing phrase in your spiel is «cold bug person». Your perception of China is downstream of finding Han Chinese people, politely, uncharismatic, and bluntly – not hot, in terms of a vibe rather than mere looks. You are inclined to believe that «not hot» people are categorically lesser than hot ones, incapable of True Creativity/Courage/Honesty/Ambition/Valor/Decisiveness etc., and unconsciously reason backwards from that about object-level evidence. This is compounded by the historical and contemporary distortion that the Chinese themselves have done to their image, like painting a 1.9m tall cannibal commander from that famous "decisive Tang strategic victory" meme as a pompous literati with long nails, and today taking advantage of leftist grievance narratives. A PLA soldier can point a Dongfeng DF-17 missile in your face, and you'll laugh about how it's filled with water and compensating for something, Bugs Bunny style. It's similar to the blindspot the Kzinti had for human females. More controversially, this is a common bias that I think is genetically hardwired in peoples of Northwestern European extraction/WEIRD cluster, due to greater historical female mate choice and thus disproportionate returns to thinking about mate value and general charisma signaling on evolutionary timescales. This being basically a misgeneralized instinct, arguing about it is a waste of time. I will argue about downstream confusions, though.
As a Russian, I don't really mind – actually, I'll welcome it – if China becomes the preeminent power of this century (which seems more likely by the day) and you guys get knocked down a peg with your flabbergasting ill-earned provincial chutzpah. Given their traditional isolationism, I estimate the damage to be mostly confined to morale. I am not cruel, however, so these cowboy jeers are worrying me, because their popularity, coupled with populist incentives and low cultural level of American officials, implies you may wade into a serious war in the South China Sea and get mauled, with massive economic devastation and losses for you, them, and everyone else. You'll directly drag other nations into it, too, it has already happened on trade, and the escalation potential is pretty much uncapped. So we can't be too cautious and I will present my attempt at dismantling this theory of Chinese doom and American exceptionalism.
What I want to accomplish, however, is not just dunking on this particular laundry list of assertions. Ideally, I want you is see how your very frame of thinking, embedded in (the quite recently established version of) your civilization, is just one of possible frames. Your notions of how to evaluate success, what is hard and what is easy, what makes nations strong or weak – those are just opinions of a 21st century American (or mental American). China doesn't think in this way, it has a compelling claim to the priority of the very different Chinese stack, and it's not some vague Orientalist wisdom but a comprehensible, pragmatic product of millennia of social evolution.
One aspect of it is the theory of Mandate of Heaven, which amounts to a claim that the source of legitimacy is neither birthright nor opinion of some constituency, but undeniable object level performance, and that the people ought to obey performant rulers but topple those who had clearly lost their touch. It has its shortcomings, of course, but I am not sure if the justifications for representative democracy with universal suffrage are stronger than the case for Mandate. Another is focus on cultivating everything under the state's control, starting with human capital, which is the only truly irreplaceable resource. Mencius, 4th century BC: «The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain come next; the sovereign counts for the least.» The clearest example of this is how they played the Rare Earths card. In 1992, during his Inner Mongolia tour, Deng Xiaoping had proclaimed «The Middle East has oil. China has rare earths». This wasn't because he had stumbled on the biggest pile of REEs known to man, like Americans in Bumfuck Indiana often boast of; it was because dominating REEs required long-term grit and investment that he could expect other nations to prove deficient in. In 1995, Deng's sons-in-law bought out Magnequench from General Motors. Over the next 30 years, China has indeed invested in relevant education, capex and R&D, evolved from mucking around in toxic sludge to 6N HREE refinement, consistently forced ≈everyone else out of business, and now can make Trump play ball with a single export controls announcement, even as it's building actuators for legions of robots of all kinds (flying, wheeled, legged, seaborne, industrial…) using a late evolution of this very Magnequench technology and others. All of that has been done more or less in plain sight, documented in official 5 Year Plans of the Communist Party of China and programs like MiC 2025, inciting decades of WTO-mediated outrage, «maybe we can substitute it» procrastination and «wake-up call» rhetoric on the West, and yet nothing has been done successfully to counteract it. That's one measure of each system.
On demographics, the problem is overstated. To return to the meta level, people often assume that if the Face-Saving Paper Dragon China admits a problem that's because the situation is too catastrophic to deny. No, they simply communicate clearly to coordinate their own policies. Yes births are plummeting, population contracting, median age and dependency ratio climbing, there are miserable men etc etc. It's rough. The same and far worse is happening in Korea, which despite some efforts hadn't had a comparably strict One-Child Policy (ironically enough, TFR had never reached 1.0 during 1CP, and only reached it once Xi abolished all limits and turned pro-natalist) and has no plausible policy response either, same as everyone else sans Israel. China is de facto running a massive research program, in parallel across provinces, counties and towns, with some promising results, so if anyone figures it out, I reckon it'll likely be them. But any success will take 20+ years to manifest so it's probably irrelevant in the grand scheme of things. And in the grand scheme of things they're retiring peasants and construction workers who've seen Cultural Revolution, and graduating more STEM cadres than the rest of the world combined, so even with the unfortunate pyramid shape the total productivity is expected to grow. The Party itself is becoming a hive of Tsinghua STEM Ph.Ds who (just a guess) might become even better technocrats than the current set of boomers in control, nevermind boomer lawyers or the US.
More to the point, the median age of a White American is ≈44 years vs 40 for a Han Chinese in the PRC, White American TFR too is well below replacement, and the population contraction has been offset via immigration, largely of people who aren't doing that well on MSAT and often don't speak English well. Around the time when average ages are projected to converge (2040s, age 49-51), non-Hispanic Whites will have become a minority at home, and equal to roughly 1/7th of the PRC's population. This community knows well what Trump thinks about such a strategy, and many agree. (Btw, contra racist stereotypes, South American fertility is in free fall and I expect Mexico to join soon, so this gig isn't going to work forever anyway). Given such factors as a) poverty level pensions for rural citizens of the PRC (citizens who were largely excluded from the 1CP, had TFR ≈2.5 in the 80s, and so actually have > 1 children today, unlike urbanites and party members – there's a fascinating aspect of an accidental inter-class contract), b) retirement age only ≈60 in the PRC, and c) 17% youth unemployment at 5% economic growth… I'd say they have plenty of gas left in the tank, are more demographically robust than the West and even the US specifically, and Zeihan-level doomposting is simply innumerate.
One last note on this. India also tried to implement population control, psyoped by the same Limits To Growth style western concern trolling, but India doesn't have Chinese state capacity, so after an atrocious sterilization campaign they gave up and now they're the most populous nation. They're also probably the only nation in modernity that has seen height decline without ethnic mix change, because they're unable to feed themselves and now their children are fucking stunted, exactly as had been predicted by the big bad Ehrlich; and now young Han Chinese men are like 10 cm taller than young Indian men, which no doubt adds to the cross-border seethe. On the economic growth side, both nations having started from subsistence agrarianism and Subsaharan poverty level in the 70s (with sizable Indian per capita lead), enough has been said. I am still ideologically quite disgusted by the 1CP, but like most things Chinese, it deserves deeper consideration.
Bullet point 2 is pure assertion. High tech surveillance is not very expensive when you make all the tech for it and are surveilling unarmed 40+ year old East Asians. By all accounts the primary goal is genuinely to improve public conduct and it had already been largely achieved, the people are more polite, they drive lawfully, there's less scam, corruption and squalor, and on the ground level China is looking more «Japanese» than ever since the Southern Song Dynasty probably. It's a pity that this is now mostly seen by Russians because Western tourists don't want to come after Covid. «Social credit score» as commonly imagined is a mythologization of ad hoc regional programs to do stuff like penalize public transport misbehavior (which you sorely need) and, well, actual credit scores you already have. And they do have a social safety net which is evidenced eg by virtual absence of homelessness, it's just implemented via in-kind transfers (6-7% GDP) such as community canteens, rather than direct cash redistribution, which makes sense given that they're a materially productive socialist society. It could be more robust but, again, the issue is blown out of proportion: «Social expenditures in China have more than doubled as a share of GDP since 2010 and are on par with Mexico and Turkey.»
On technology, I have pretty strong opinions. The catch-up growth with IP «theft» (overwhelmingly, not theft but joint ventures, M&A and other above-board mechanics that foreign entities myopically signed on to) is tale as old as time, from Britain-Germany to USA-Japan, only made special by their sheer scale. At this point they have everything, invention AND innovation AND tinkering. They fucking license anti-cancer drugs to you, Intel is testing their wet etch equipment, they run circles around you in hypersonic warfare and EMALS and radars and power electronics… but certainly they are doing better in the «lots of compounding, happy accidents shared across a large population» department. That's the whole story of Shenzhen – a giant singularity of small shops with narrow expertise, doing swarm process innovation. That's what they build dozens of technoparks and industrial zones for. That's why they rapidly churn through zany concepts like here– semi-autonomous truck caravans, the exact sort of product-oriented tinkering innovation Americans were doing before they had assembled their own centers of basic research (mostly from European human capital fleeing Apocalypse). Their ever-growing trade surplus, driven by expansion of exports and contraction of non-commodity imports, is not about «weak RMB» or «subsidies» (you also do subsidies, you're just bad at subsidizing structural growth factors) – it's about trivial, brutal and unceasing productivity increases. Per unit of labor, a Chinese worker produces 2-3 times as much equal quality physical output as an American one:
Electric vehicles provide a clear comparison, as Tesla’s Shanghai and California Gigafactories produce identical Model 3 and Model Y vehicles. In 2024, Shanghai produced one million vehicles with 20,000 workers, while California produced 464,000 with 22,000 workers. Even in nominal value-added terms, Tesla’s Shanghai workers were twice as productive as their US counterparts. This despite the fact that Model 3 prices are 24-32% lower in China due to competition from numerous other EV makers, whereas Chinese EVs are practically barred from the US market.
That's not because they're superhumans who work 996, that's decades of learning and coming up with ideas, on a level that Americans have forgotten how to think about, and now cannot even conceptualize as a dimension of innovation. You have like one guy who's thinking about this and screams DESIGN IS OVERRATED MANUFACTURING IS UNDERRATED, and half your country wants to cancel him for being an asshole. Well, Elon Musk is venerated in China, because he's the apex of what every Chinese industrialist wants to be, and there are thousands of these guys. Accordingly every Chinese EV company is now an AI company and a humanoid robotics company, and other companies try to catch up and differentiate, and XPeng IRON 2 is in my humble opinion a more impressive piece of hardware than Optimus 3 (to the extent that people were suspicious it's amputee in a suit), and UBTech will be the first company to ship thousands of factory-grade units with Walker S2 while FigureAI CEO Brett Adcock is hyping on social media and trying to deboonk their video as CGI, and so on and so forth, in every single industry. What MENA now.
On domestic market side and weak demand, this is again a problem acknowledged as a big one by the CPC (Xi's entire «dual circulation» agenda) and thus overrated as a catastrophe. They are still heavily dependent on exports but that isn't an existential problem, seeing as they've cultivated an enormous and growing market in the Global South/ASEAN, for high-margin capital goods (that these industrializing nations can't afford to tariff heavily) rather than Walmart trinkets, while the US and EU have stagnant demand for material exports, tariffs or not. They're eating up German capital goods market share even in Germany, anyway. Historically, raw superiority in productivity wins against contingent trickery, it's what defeated China the last time, shattering their self-conception as the most productive civilization (indeed the only real civilization, because for them the civilization is largely about productivity), and they have a very clear «never again» position here. As with other points, I don't seek to deny real problems, but the doom narrative gets somewhat embarrassing when put in proper context. This is what is supposed to collapse them? They're «merely» consuming about the same volume of goods as the US, while producing more electricity than the next three biggest entities combined? They're a much bigger economic power than the Soviet Union ever was, and you had a decades-long meltdown about the genuinely poor and dysfunctional Soviets, but China is a nothingburger? Sure I'll grant that us Ruskies are more charismatic. And more handsome. Gagarin, Korolev, Zhukov, Kasparov, Baryshnikov… But please, guys, that's getting weird. Be real.
On «cultural aptitude for tinkering, exploring, developing in a truly creative sense», maybe you need to install RedNote and see what they're actually doing, because they absolutely tinker like mad, as they have been tinkering for centuries, it's the same energy as young Palmer Luckey but on an incomparable scale. They are natural shape rotators and tinkerers, what they lacked was precisely systematic scientific inquiry (and risk-tolerant patient capital). Do you realize that this is the people who've developed treadmill-driven paddleships in the 5th century and mechanical landmines in 15th? That «four great inventions» is just a PR term and they had invented vastly more stuff along the way? When Meta is desperately trying to build a Superintelligence Lab at any cost, paying $100M sign-on bonuses to highest-alpha talent, this is what the list ends up looking like, 20 out of 30 «research scientists» are Han Chinese (18 of them holding PRC citizenship). VAUK is a furry weirdo who tinkered with wolf-head exosuits and now works with the PLA to build actual exoskeletons for «wolf warriors». Here's a more Reddit-coded example of their tinkering (considered lame in the Mainland because it's «not hardcore»). But more to the point, I'll just repeat what I've already quoted:
Impression 1: In our sophomore year, while we were obediently attending classes, doing homework, and preparing for exams, Liang Wenfeng was already self-studying digital circuits and analog circuits and had begun his own engineering practice. What left a deep impression was that he personally handled everything from circuit design, PCB layout, microcontroller programming, to UI design, creating something like a miniplayer software (doing Software UI in 2004 was a high-skill endeavor). He modified an ordinary guitar into an electric guitar, where the guitar's string sounds could be controlled via a UI on the computer. This project seemed incredibly impressive at the time; we all looked at it in awe. He humbly said the guitar's tuning wasn't great and it would be better if it could tune itself automatically. This can be considered a testament to the seed of his ideas about AI intelligence back then.
Liang Wenfeng proceeded to tinker his way to National First Prize in the Electronic Design Competition, then to tinker full stack marine navigation systems, then he tinkered away 3 years in isolation as he developed quantitative trading strategies, then he tinkered into building one of the 4 biggest quant funds in China, then he tinkered and somehow now we have DeepSeek in the open source, from their in-house file system to weights and methods published in Nature (he's on top 10 this year). All that said, Liang agrees with you that the default Chinese mindset is suboptimal:
"DarkWaves": Do you think curiosity-driven madness can last forever?
Liang Wenfeng: Not everyone can be mad for the rest of their lives, but most people, in their youth, can devote fully into something, with no utilitarian concerns at all.
"DarkWaves": Why is it so easy for Chinese companies -- including big companies that don't lack money -- to prioritize rapid commercialization?
Liang Wenfeng: Over the past 30 years, we have emphasized making money and neglected innovation. Innovation is not entirely business-driven, but also requires curiosity and creativity. We're just bound by the inertia of the past, but it's just a phase. […] "DarkWaves": But it's hard to form an absolute advantage in a large model, simply by being ahead in technology, so what's the bigger thing you're betting on?
Liang Wenfeng: What we see is that Chinese AI can't stay a follower forever. We often say that there is a gap of one or two years between Chinese AI and the US, but the real gap is the difference between originality and imitation. If this doesn't change, China will always be a follower, so there's no escaping of doing exploration. […]
“DarkWaves": Back to the topic about original style innovation. Now that the economy is trending down, and capital is entering the cold phase of the cycle, will it put more of a damper on original innovation?
Liang Wenfeng: I don't think so. The restructuring of China's industry will rely more on hard-core technology innovation. When many people realize that the fast money they made in the past probably came from the luck of the draw, they will be more willing to bend over backwards to do real innovation. "DarkWaves": So you're optimistic about this too?
Liang Wenfeng: I grew up in a fifth-tier city in Guangdong in the 1980s. My father was an elementary school teacher, and in the 90s, there were a lot of opportunities to make money in Guangdong, and many parents came to my house at that time, basically because they thought education was useless. But when I go back to look at it now, the ideas have all changed. Because money is not easy to make anymore, even the chance to drive a cab may be gone. It has changed in one generation.
There will be more and more hardcore innovation in the future. It may not be yet easily understood now, because the whole society still needs to be educated by the facts. After this society lets the hardcore innovators make a name for themselves, the groupthink will change. All we still need are some facts and a process.
Their slogan is «Unravel the mystery of AGI with curiosity. Answer the essential question with long-termism» and they're the highest-prestige lab in China, with 5 IOI Gold winners on a team of ≈200 and a crapload of comparable talent. Liang is a hereditary teacher and I think he'll succeed in teaching China that his way is the right way, as I've previously argued. He's already impressed Xi and Li Qiang a year ago, he's just matched GPT-5 on a shoestring budget after a year of pundits saying that 100x compute advantage will erode his competitiveness, I think that's a big part of the reason Trump has abandoned Biden era containment and greenlit H200 exports. That's a very compelling set of facts, much more compelling than Jack Ma's (btw Jack Ma was at the same meeting with Xi and he's back in control, only now Alibaba is building AGI rather than shady fintech; that said, Ant Group also has an AGI division doing DeepSeek-style MoEs) and… it's pretty clear which way the process is going.
Can the US change its process after seeing new facts? Or do you lack the self-awareness to notice its defects?
On self-awareness. I think one of the greatest Chinese strengths – in addition to their sheer intelligence, endurance, their concept of the performance-based Mandate and the legitimacy (in fact, moral imperative) of rising against a degraded power, their notion of cultivation of the realm on all scales – is simply that they're an old, continuous, cultured civilization. They're jaded. They have seen it all, usually centuries before us; before you. Military overextension, proto-capitalism, proto-fascism, proto-Nietzscheanism, currency debasement, religious zealotry, multiethnic assimilation politics, infrastructure boondoogles, whatever. They can draw on an immense wealth of examples, positive and negative, and unlike modern Americans it's not restricted to the 95th percentile of cultural elites. Along the way they have developed a language to talk practically of how societies on the scale of modern Western powers fail and collapse, what moves people, how to make them act better, what is the «superior person» and how he differs from a «thief of virtue»… They have all these terms like «mianzi» and «guanxi», and Westerners look at it with condescension, Orientalist excitement or cold zoological curiosity, not realizing that these are human univerals, that Westerners themselves are driven by fairly similar if not cruder mechanisms. From what I can tell, the US today is a lot like late Qing, and its people are trying to save face before a more productive and well-ran civilization that they have grown used to regard as a barbarian shithole (and also, as I've said – «not hot»). And there's a whole lot of Guanxi going on in this Administration, too. Trump is trying to do a Self-Strenghtening Movement. Godspeed, I guess.
P.S. On cope. One of the most popular copes about China is «we've already heard all that about Japan». To me, that alone exposes Americans as an intellectually washed people. You heard that about Japan because Japan was seriously challenging you in trade, like it had previously challenged you in the war. In both cases, Japan was doomed. It's simply too small, too resource-poor, has too few people, and after the war it was under occupation and dependent on your security umbrella. Still it became enough of a problem to prompt that unhinged prophesying of the sexy scary neon-illiminated Japan Inc. turning the US into one big Detroit, and force Congressmen to smash a Toshiba radio on the Capitol lawn, like a bunch of rabid chimps. No other nation, save the USSR, had merited the distinction of such fear. So you won again. So what? The correct takeaway is not this self-congratulatory «America fuck yeah baby, our values!» attitude, but understanding that a structurally disadvantaged nation of 120 million East Asians can push you to the ropes; that in some very relevant ways they are more productive than you. Then, you ought to have noticed that China is 12 times larger in population, 25 times larger in territory and resources, is fully sovereign, and (contrary to the very strange stereotype divorced from what we see in everyday individual performance) Chinese people are not racially inferior to the Japanese. It's more or less Japan times 12, with unsurprising extra benefits of scale, clustering and on top of that a more competent industrial policy (MIIT>METI, as evidenced by the rigid embarrassment of Basic Hydrogen Strategy vs the civilization-scale triumph of the «New Three»).
To predict that they'll somehow fizzle out before eclipsing your global power (ie, more than 25% of your «per capita power») is to assert that either you have some near-supernatural tricks up your sleeve or that they're, bluntly, subhumans. Bugmen. An euphemism like «barbarians», «commies» or something also works. You're free to say that, but I think it's a bit too bold of a strategy to bet your nation's future on.
I have the exact opposite view on this. Market share is the long term play – maybe 30 years. Your “long term” AGI supremacy play is a no-term Hail Mary premised on some dubious assumptions and, frankly, low IQ racism about Chinese capacity for independent R&D.
It's a philosophical commitment to independence. They enact protectionist measures for fledgling industries, and scale them down after achieving competitiveness, like they cut subsidies for EVs or batteries.
As I've repeatedly said, current Chinese AI software has low adoption, especially by talented collectives, and thus low development velocity; so long as it doesn't get adoption it doesn't matter if they can physically make good chips, they'll remain vulnerable to export controls and will have to do another multi-year moonshot after the next Democrat opportunistically cuts them off. H20 and RTX Pro 6000D are just not providing enough value to justify further software stagnation (not to mention reduced revenues to domestic manufacturers). H200, because it is both a powerful GPU and scales to large training clusters, seems to be marginally valuable enough so we see more nuanced regulation. After domestic chips become better than H200 (or rather, domestic systems + power subsidy become competitive with Nvidia clusters) and there's wide adoption of Huawei CANN and Cambricon NeuWare, I predict that they will relax controls on imported chips, maybe replacing it with a simple tariff. Your model suggests that they will tighten controls. It's an empirical matter, we will see in a matter of 2 years, most likely.
As explained above, it does not follow and you're refusing to understand what they're doing.
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