DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
Tell me about it.
User ID: 745
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
EVs are a good example - how many Chinese people buy American EVs? I'd assume the number is approximately zero since American EVs are about 5x the price for a comparable product
Well, this reveals the problem with first principles thinking popular among rationalists. Tesla model Y is consistently one of the hottest EVs in China. They totally love Teslas. It genuinely has advantages over domestic cars, they constantly make videos where its FSD dunks on Xiaomi and other competition. Upper class Chinese buy Teslas.
(Of course, it's Tesla made in Shanghai. It so happens that Shanghai Gigafactory is about 2.3x more productive per worker.)
Similar logic can apply to Nvidia.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
trump bad
OK, but how does this make the previous system sustainable? You consume more than you produce, and you cover the delta with IOUs. It's a time bomb, people just got accustomed to the explosion being repeatedly postponed, developed a mindset that American “reserve currency” grift is so strong that this is no biggie. I think they're wrong.
it's your model that we should be trying to sustain our consumption with just Soy and LNG exports
Unfair. As you can see I'm arguing in favor of selling high-end GPUs, where you actually dominate. Soy and LNG obsession was Trump (before recent course adjustment).
I think we should continue to try and dominate in aerospace, tech, entertainment and other industries. We should happily let ASML dominate in fab design, TSMC dominate in fab execution(although China hungrily eyeing their island for conquest does justify some industrial policy to move that particular industry into safer territory), Samsung dominate in RAM
You currently can't “not let” them dominate there, they are simply dominant, like you are in aerospace, so it's not exactly a choice. And in your own logic, all of that “let” becomes effectively charity soon after you have AGI (unfortunately, a necessary evil to fight Red Chyna!). It's just a question of maximizing comparative advantage by tolerating division of labor, while you complete the Total Labor Eraser Machine 9000; in fact a continuation of the earlier mustache-twirling “let the broke ass yellow bugmen assemble our gadgets for pennies, while we deepen our design and basic research dominance” strategy, justified by the Smiling Curve logic. Sorry, one doesn't have to be Xi to see how it works.
And of course, your personal distaste for Trump won't change the reality of him forcing allies to rebuild their core industries in the US. This is American policy for the foreseeable future and I don't think it'll be rejected by the next admin, like Biden didn't reject and only reinforced core pillars of Trump's China policy.
I have to point out that China is led by an aging dictator who has progressively isolated himself from the type of people who would bring him bad news.
Xi was born in 1953. He's 72. Trump was born in 1946, like George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. I get the “leaders are like underpants” logic but humans are not really underpants, which quickly get dirty but do not appreciably age in storage; and I wonder if a well-functioning autocrat really is worse than a structural inability to elect people born after 1946 AD (Biden dates back to 1942, of course). Xi's father lived to 89, after 16 years of persecution. A very interesting man. Xi's mother is apparently still alive at 99 years of age. I think Xi is pretty damn lucid and will remain so for another decade, and the “progressively isolated from bearers of bad news” bit sounds like a lazy trope. Maybe Zero COVID applies but that was more about excessive paranoia than desire for good news. He's quite obsessed with calamity consciousness and “preparing for danger in times of peace”. Xi's China has systematically derisked its position, to the extent that when Trump ranted “the U.S. has Monopoly positions also, much stronger and more far reaching than China's. I have just not chosen to use them, there was never a reason for me to do so — UNTIL NOW! … For every Element that they have been able to monopolize, we have two.” – it was hot air.
Apparently you think that the reason China could only take export controls on the chin 6-2 years ago, and can clap back and force US concessions now, is just that Trump is a venal corrupt moron and in fact he did have those two elements. The fact of the matter is that he used to have them but does not anymore, because Xi is not like Trump, nor like Putin. In 2018, when Trump cut ZTE off from US kit, Chinese state newspaper “Science and Technology Daily” published a series of 35 articles “What Are Our Chokepoints? Core Technologies We Urgently Await Breakthroughs In”, obviously building on Xi's rhetoric. I recommend reading it in detail. Xi kept scolding everyone for not doing enough – in 2020, in 2024. As of now, at least 30 out of 35 items are deemed solved. We know very much about their efforts to break all such chokepoints, they are in fact increasingly well organized, the graft of Big Fund I was eliminated. This is not the behavior of a delusional autocrat in an echo chamber. Your whole society looks more like an echo chamber, given how shell-shocked DC China Watchers were after Oct 9, how they kept saying that Xi miscalculated, overplayed his hand or whatever. He clearly did not.
But I don't expect to convince you. “Arrogant power-hungry strongman kills goons who report bad news” is a staple of your scholarship, a justification of your system, and a powerful trope of your media culture. After all, Free American Men do not need to stoop so low as to seriously scrutinize the policies or behavioral profile of some bugman chief (who wasn't even born in 1946 AD). It's not like there can be any consequences of being wrong.
The whole autarkic emperor blinded to their weaknesses and his subjects being afraid to tell him he's wrong seems to me at least as good of an explanation for denial of NVDIA imports
I think they're much more afraid of lying than of any demotion for underperformance, because being implicated in some graft gets you expelled from the party, jailed or executed, and the CPC is designed with good incentives for mutual surveillance. Of course there's the American trope/cope that corruption investigations are just selectively applied for “purging rivals”, everyone is corrupt and corruption adds no risk. We'll see. For now, you can be thankful to Xi for doing USG's proper job of not letting advanced chips into China.
You seem to oscillate between claiming NVDIA is going to establish some kind of vendor lock in while also celebrating an impending Chinese internal semiconductor champion that will make refusing to export toothless anyways. Either lock in is real or it isn't. If it's real then surely China's efforts won't mean much if they can't even get their national champion to use their home grown chips.
I don't oscillate, those processes are just in tension. Liang Wenfeng said: “NVIDIA’s dominance isn’t just its effort—it’s the result of Western tech ecosystems collaborating on roadmaps for next-gen tech. China needs similar ecosystems. Many domestic chips fail because they lack supportive tech communities and rely on secondhand insights. Someone must step onto the frontier.” And yet even DeepSeek has not yet trained anything on Ascends. You need usable chips and frontier AI talent, working together. Frontier talent has options – go to the US, work with domestic chips under duress, work with Nvidia chips in the PRC (but those were becoming scarce), work with domestic chips because they literally are the only thing they can get, and so on. Nvidia can create a vendor lock, not unbreakable in principle, but sufficient to slow down their ecosystem and prolong the vulnerability to export controls. Domestic chips will have both low utility and slower hardware progress if domestic software has no adoption at the frontier. China ultimately wants good AI and less talent flight (that is a thing, you realize) and so won't meddle egregiously in frontier roadmaps.
Their plan seems to be letting Tier A labs do what they want with their own money, subsidizing power for domestic compute, forcing Tier B to match procurement of Nvidia/AMD with domestic compute, and building public datacenters with domestic compute. In time, this will result in an okay-ish domestic ecosystem and wider adoption of those chips, after which they may require, incentivize or naturally get some frontier training runs. But the end goal is to downgrade Nvidia from a chokepoint to basically another commodity, not ban it. They can ban commodities in retaliation, as with soy, but it's not about a commitment to never buy American produce. So long as they have security and optionality and it makes basic economic sense, they don't mind importing soy, or LNG, or chips, or airplanes, or anything.
I want to see more of the returns from China's growth go to improving the quality of life of Chinese people rather than Xi's vanity in needing to dominate every market that exists What I want China to do if AI is a pivotal technology is to lose to America in a race to develop it, I would understand if Xi declined
indeed. Except, “every market that exists” is the same issue as a singular pivotal technology. The simple fact is that either you move up the value chain relentlessly, or you get some sort of “lost decades” or “middle income trap” and then you're American chewing toy. When you actually have the potential to be a great power and not just some cute intermediate supplier with no security like the Netherlands, Americans will chew on you until you have no potential. China is not special, it's just the only remaining contender after Europe and Japan were done with. Clearly an American can have Chinese family and remain committed to the hegemonic project. All you can offer to the weak is to be in your orbit, sell cocaine or cheeses or whatnot; all you can offer to the strong is defeat. That's normal realpolitik. I just want you to acknowledge that the noise about “quality of life of Chinese people” is disingenous.
China's high-speed rail program was built on technology transferred from Siemens, Kawasaki, Bombardier, and Alstom.
Bought and paid for, minor (yes, minor) extralegal fraction aside. Unlike Japan, these nations were not forced to transfer technology under duress, as China does not control their security.
There's a big difference between aggressively pursuing autarky and just the natural internal trade
There's also a big difference between being on the giving or receiving side of export controls and Wassenaar Arrangement. This isn't about Xi bad, Americans have been working to keep China non-competitive in the semiconductor segment for at least over three decades: “We found that the executive branch practice was aimed at keeping China two generations behind the U.S. semiconductor manufacturing industry. On March 1, 2001, the under secretary for export administration (a policy-level official), described this practice and reconfirmed it in a follow-up January 2002 meeting with GAO after he left office”. That's “Jiang Zemin good” era, growth, engagement, all that soapy bullshit. Meanwhile, your semiconductor industry is heavily dependent on Chinese brains. I won't moralize on the hypocrisy and laughable entitlement, obviously you feel entitled to allocating progress conditional on how much you like a given regime. After all, “if we weren't worthy, they wouldn't have come”. The point is that even modulo their autarkic preferences, proactive derisking – for every industry with a chokehold – makes perfect sense.
Not every local area should try to answer "how do we design cell phones?" for themselves. If they have a competitive advantage in cell phone design, or some step of the process, then sure go ahead
Speaking of local cell phones. I loved Nokia. Very cute story of plucky little Finland doing well in tech, connecting people, all those 3310 memes. The era before total Chimerica dominance. Was pretty sad when it got killed. I recall @Stefferi even speculated that it led to the decline in birth rates. I suspect Elop did that intentionally, though he just wanted to deliver fresh game to Microsoft and fumbled the company altogether. Now it's either iPhone or Chinese phones, and you tried to kill Huawei too.
But the excess industrial buildout? That's going into exports. It's the Americans and Europeans enjoying discounted goods that is enjoying the surplus here.
This is partially fair. There are two components to this. One is subsidizing the base undifferentiated layer of economy - energy and raw materials, agriculture, infrastructure, “wasteful SOEs”. This makes it possible to not just produce anything effectively but discover new physical products faster, without the pathologies of American financialization. Another is provincial competition with duplicate companies and “involution”, spurred on by national plans like MIC 2025. Not even Xi likes involution, but they seem to be unwilling to tackle it, because it also produces very fit companies. Overall, I think that in the long run this strategy works fine as it makes goods cheaper very quickly at the cost of slower growth in nominal consumption.
At least the American excess spending is circulating among American Doctors and Pharma companies, which yes are actually making miraculous drugs.
Well, it's fueling Chinese pharma companies too, and now they're licensing miraculous drugs to you, and you buy the end product at 30-fold markups. “In China, a single-dose vial costs US$280 but in the US it will have a wholesale price of US$8,892”. Though the US distributor, Coherus, classified as a manufacturer, captures 80% of this markup, on merit of its role in dealing with the FDA. Who knows where we'd be if the Chinese could rip you off directly. Maybe all cancer would've been solved already, and your healthcare would've been cheaper too.
Baumol's applies to all sectors, household, state and industrial at least equally, probably more to state
Maybe but that's a quantitative question, I think rent+health+education are uniquely Baumoled in the US relative to China (which subsidizes them), constitute non-optional spending, and cover a large fraction of the gap. The accounting of US consumption is pretty different from Chinese approach too, as @FrankishKnight explains here. Anyway, as I've said, low Chinese household consumption is not more anomalous than high American one. Nations have all kinds of ratios, and the US ratio is not characteristic of a prosperous state.
How is China getting the 70+% of its oil imports in this future? The iron ore? The soy beans?
Those are worth peanuts in comparison to their current trade volume and surplus. They'll be fine, at least it won't be their biggest problem. If the world stops buying their ships, they also won't need quite so much iron.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
Yes, there is a big gap. But why does the gap to the US matter at all? You both have abnormal societies.. China is an outlier in its GDP bracket, you are an outlier in yours. Chinese household consumption is similar to its East Asian neighbors. We can quibble about specific datasets, but South Korea is under 50% pretty much no matter how one looks at it. Why is Indian or American ratio inherently better than Chinese or Swiss ratio? This is all a pretty facile discussion, different nations have different systems, your main problem with their system is that it's too internationally competitive, not that Chinese people are poor (and they aren't even that poor).
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
Money and market share are the short term returns, the question is about the long term.
I have the exact opposite view on this. Market share is the long term play – maybe 30 years. Your “long term” AGI supremacy play is a no-term Hail Mary premised on some dubious assumptions and, frankly, low IQ racism about Chinese capacity for independent R&D.
including by banning imports of certain chips in the first place, which sounds like a philosophical commitment to not buying at all to me.
It's a philosophical commitment to independence. They enact protectionist measures for fledgling industries, and scale them down after achieving competitiveness, like they cut subsidies for EVs or batteries.
As I've repeatedly said, current Chinese AI software has low adoption, especially by talented collectives, and thus low development velocity; so long as it doesn't get adoption it doesn't matter if they can physically make good chips, they'll remain vulnerable to export controls and will have to do another multi-year moonshot after the next Democrat opportunistically cuts them off. H20 and RTX Pro 6000D are just not providing enough value to justify further software stagnation (not to mention reduced revenues to domestic manufacturers). H200, because it is both a powerful GPU and scales to large training clusters, seems to be marginally valuable enough so we see more nuanced regulation. After domestic chips become better than H200 (or rather, domestic systems + power subsidy become competitive with Nvidia clusters) and there's wide adoption of Huawei CANN and Cambricon NeuWare, I predict that they will relax controls on imported chips, maybe replacing it with a simple tariff. Your model suggests that they will tighten controls. It's an empirical matter, we will see in a matter of 2 years, most likely.
it follows that China's strategy would be to avoid the lock-in in the first place, which means that there is no long term market for Nvidia chips in China
As explained above, it does not follow and you're refusing to understand what they're doing.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
Put another way, my argument is that household consumption as % of GDP is low because a great volume of capital has been invested in making life cheap, in particular rent, healthcare, connectivity and education, via infrastructure and assorted social transfers-in-mind. The fraction of GDP that is “government spending” or “employer spending” goes towards increasing purchasing power of the average (and below-average) Chinese. Consider:
Chinese households receive benefits such as subsidised education and healthcare provided by the state. Such social transfers in kind (STIK) were about 6.2 per cent of China’s GDP in 2019 and 6.4 per cent in 2021, up from 3 per cent two decades ago.
Even so, STIK only covers the transfers and consumption provided by governments and non-profit organisations. Chinese businesses are also more likely to provide employee welfare such as subsidised lunches and staff dormitories than their foreign counterparts. These, however, count towards Chinese business expenses rather than household consumption. Thus, adding all social transfers could lift China’s consumption rate by at least 6 percentage points.
etc.
This is a separate strategy from either low-intervention market economy or “welfare socialism” with explicit gibs that boost discretionary spending. It can be criticized but it's internally coherent and it's not just “make people poor to have cheap labor to flood global markets”.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
How is it not supposed to help? Money is good, market share is good. It reduces US trade deficit, providing funds for more useful things. Just 1 million chips is $25B, it's equal to the annual worth of those soy exports Trump frets so much about, it's like 5 times more than the much-hyped LNG boom. It derisks the circular investment bubble with NVidia as the nexus that's now a large part of US economy, and extends the timeline on which China stops importing them (ie the moment where domestic computing platforms are adopted by their top labs and shutting Nvidia out is not disruptive to DeepSeek V5 or Doubao-Seed 3 or whatever).
In a more relaxed geopolitical environment, they may not even stop 100%, just like they're still buying high-end Western CNC machines, despite being able to make functionally similar ones now. Nvidia will still have better yields, lower unit prices, higher power efficiency, more polished software, likely for decades. It's not like they have a philosophical commitment to not buy at all, they are simply focused on becoming strategically invulnerable to export controls after years of American gloating about how they'll fall behind and die, starting with Huawei.
The main argument against this has nothing to do with Chinese plans to stop buying chips later, it's just that they'll develop and deploy stronger AI at larger scale and secure some advantages in the short term, in the limit literally ASI. An auxiliary argument is that they will use extra compute to speed up the necessary research. That can be debated and weighed against standard economic arguments.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
It's impressive how you can make a $4.6T business in the US just being a lucky huckster, huh. Just like you can dance into becoming the president of a superpower while being a bumbling TV personality, rather than claw your way up over decades, starting from the flea-infested cave in Shaanxi. Blessed land, Manifest Destiny, a people chosen by Providence itself. I guess any mediocrity ought to feel invested in protecting it, then. Where else do you play and win in such lotteries.
But I don't share this theory. I don't think the US allows you to play on God Mode, and I think Jensen is not just an excellent businessman, and certainly not a “treasonous worm”. He is an industrial titan like Rockefeller or Carnegie, he genuinely has a long-term vision, and he demonstrably executes on it. America was made great by such men, and if it declines, it will be over forgetting their value.
Nazis were wrong about innate racial superiority. Most people are mediocre, whether Aryan or not. This doesn't mean that Nietzsche or Confucius were wrong about the existence of specific superior individuals.
Because those are the same issue.
In the PPP-based approach adopted, China–U.S. aggregate price differences are computed using China’s category-level shares of household cash consumption expenditure as weights. Under this weighting scheme, China’s overall price level is estimated to be approximately 66 percent lower than that of the United States.
By contrast, when China’s category-level consumption is explicitly revalued under the U.S. price system and then aggregated—as shown in Table 7—China’s per capita consumption under U.S. prices reaches USD 24,507, which is close to the earlier conservative estimate of USD 26,857. This convergence reflects substantial reweighting across consumption categories once prices are converted to the U.S. price system. For example, health is extremely expensive in the United States, and China’s health prices are approximately 94.7 percent lower. As a result, after price adjustment, China’s per capita health expenditure increases sharply from USD 340 to USD 6,443, with its expenditure share rising from 7.2 percent to 26.3 percent. A similar pattern is observed in education. In contrast, categories such as transport, clothing and footwear, and food—where China–U.S. price gaps are smaller—experience declines in their relative weights in total consumption.
In effect, if Chinese services consumed by the people provide 5-20 times more value than PPP calculations suggest, this straightforwardly means that Chinese people's "consumption" share of GDP is higher, because the volume of economic activity included in these services is larger relative to exports and government spending than it appears. We can directly estimate the value of their exports. The efficiency of their services and internally consumed goods is more opaque, so it's easy to say “oh just 2000 RMB, that's $285, adjust for PPP… $428”. It actually matters if it's more like $3000.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
I don't believe that any specific accelerator will change the situation much. “ASIC” is a meme, Nvidia's Vera Rubin are probably very close to optimality, they're no longer GPUs in a meaningful way.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
The man is without vision or sense and deviates wildly from decades of American policy.
He has a vision, though we can debate the merits of that vision, I agree he's a pretty vulgar individual and his execution is often appalling. But was “decades of American policy” sustainable? The permanent deficit only makes sense if you can serve the growing debt indefinitely. Why should we assume that this can hold? As I've said multiple times, Trump is correct in his diagnosis even if ham-fisted with treatment. If America becomes materially productive, it will diminish European share of the pie, you can't sustain your consumption with just soy and LNG exports, something has to give. Or what is the idea, make AGI and sell tokens instead of IOUs, in exchange for TRUMPF machines? I guess that can be argued, but far as I can see, nobody argues for this. Do you argue for this?
It should probably be noted that this policy of autarky didn't exactly turn out well for China over the following two centuries ending in their century of humiliation. The period itself was also an aberation as China was center to a vast trade network before the Qing
It wasn't so much about trade autarky as about comprehensive intellectual isolation and stagnation, the Qing did not understand the world outside China's borders and honestly bought into the idea that they'll naturally be productive enough to not worry. Qianlong still had some clue, thanks to Heshen, who was ultimately executed for vast corruption, leaving the Qing blind for decades. Then, it was too late and they grew too dysfunctional to modernize like Japan. By First Opium War, Daoguang emperor didn't know where Britain is. It was a pathological regime preoccupied with managing a quaint and unnatural arrangement of Manchu superiority. I definitely won't say their trade policies made sense but it is just a small part of overall Manchu awfulness. Though to be fair, Manchus were following the Ming with their tryhard Confucian disdain for trade. By 1736, China had mostly lost its ironworking. Insularity is the dominant Chinese policy for many centuries. We need to go back like 1000 years to see China that's even remotely as trade-oriented as the modern one. And yes, none of this is plausible in the modern world with high-density information flow.
Anyway, what does it matter? People complaining that “China is making trade impossible” don't mean anything like Ming-style ban of maritime commerce. They mean precisely the opposite, that Chinese exports are too cheap and abundant, and call it unfair. What exactly do you want them to do? Enforce the internal demand for more expensive foreign goods, such as subsidizing private consumption of Macbooks? Get worse at manufacturing? Make their subsidies as ineffectual as European ones? Focus on welfare spending, until they get old, slow down their value-add climb, and fall behind far enough to balance trade? It's just hopeless demands to change their value system, they won't change it. Keep raising tariffs if you don't want to compete on prices. 100% on EVs, 200% or whatever on solar panels, outright ban on Huawei… seems to work, keep going. American deficit with China is already shrinking.
American hegemony has not historically been about autarky, We've historically traded security guarantees for access to international markets.
American hegemony itself is a very recent phenomenon, and may have run its course. America was a relatively prosperous and absolutely powerful nation before it became “a hegemon” and so massively involved itself in Old World affairs, for intrinsic reasons of having a large internal market, little red tape, and good geography.
Your security guarantees don't look very credible and monetizable now.
This is a place with a habit of outright banning outside competitors, not just tariffing them.
I don't oppose any of that, it's fair game so long as it works. By coercion I mean buffoonery like forcing allies to invest in American production or Lutnick's machinations around TSMC (again, “security guarantees” come into play). China simply can't do any of that, irrespective of morals. It can only offer terms of the deal and expect consent. JVs were not coercion. Expropriation of Trina Solar, meanwhile, is coercion with extra steps. But whatever, this is sliding into moralism, everyone will price in those tactics and act rationally.
This map just seems to be a measure of economy size relative to nearest neighbors, no?
Pretty much, but that doesn't change the conclusion. The US is a vast economy. China is becoming comparably vast (or is already bigger depending on how you count), and specifically on goods production it's just no contest. Such economies gravitate towards autarky, both for security and macroeconomic reasons and because of basic logistics.
Household consumption being 40% of GDP means households receive 40% of national income to spend. The rest goes to the state and corporate sectors, funding the investment-heavy model.
I repeat that Chinese household consumption is underrated due to in-kind transfers (such as all this public infrastructure), while American consumption is overrated due to Baumol disease. CF40 doesn't just argue that they're even richer than PPP suggests, and consume on par with developed economies (just not the US). It argues that they spend 20 times less on healthcare and get comparable outcomes. Americans cannot not consume some of these items, their floor for cost of living is just too high, you physically cannot survive in a modern city for $137 a month for two people over 3 years, and for the Chinese the ability to do that is subsidized by in-kind transfers. There can be a spirited defense of American consumption pattern, about allocation efficiency or whatever, but the crux is that while the Chinese are directly extracted from to build up physical capital and trade competitiveness, Americans are indirectly extracted from to make pharma/hospital/insurance company etc. stonk go up, charitably – fund R&D and reinvest into tech. The latter is accounted for as “consumer spending”, the former is not, both are effectively non-optional capital transfer from civilians to the national backbone, largely physical in their case and largely financial in yours. I think that when all is considered fairly, both nations have about 50% “real consumption” share of GDP.
My model for an ai future if ai drops marginal labor cost to the base electricity needed to complete the task(but doesn't go infinite intelligence like the yuddites expect) isn't every nation turning inwards, like civilizational wire headers. I find that a bleak image frankly but I suppose some may and China may be one that does if that comes to pass
When labor is very cheap and raw materials, even if they can be harvested much more efficiently, are the scarce thing then what is the offense/defense equilibrium?
Right. That's the big question, isn't it.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
Can you stop with this nonsense please? He founded Nvidia, he navigated it strategically through every industry transition, proactively shaping them, he made a gamer hardware shop into the most valuable company on Earth and the kingmaker in the AGI race, he clearly intends to keep it in the running through all future transitions, and he understands Chinese competition very well. He knows that they're in a tough spot and Mellanox is not an adequate counter to Huawei's networking. He's trying to save not just his company but your asses, because he's existentially invested in them.
When he says that he's playing an infinite game rather than just chasing a quick buck that'd leave his headquarters irrelevant in under 20 years, this deserves infinitely more faith than your jaded dismissals of “CEO boilerplate”. You need to acknowledge that your standards of judgement and your theory of incentives are only fit for business done by inferior men. People are not created equal, opinions of people are not of equal worth, Jensen's opinion >>>>> median American's opinion.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
No, as you can see mainly I rely on other means. But this Baumol-diseased "consumption" that Americans pride themselves on is indeed largely propaganda.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
The goal of the CEO of any American company is implicitly if not explicitly the maximization of shareholder value
You're so confident. On what time horizon? One quarter? One year? Decades? As long as the company gets to exist? Do you realize that Jensen is a founder, and founders are not equal to board-appointed CEOs?
The idea that Huang is doing it as some grand geopolitical play (and where his company's bottom line is a secondary concern) is a bit hard to take seriously.
If the only way you can think of this is myopic mercantilism, then you are indeed culturally and civilizationally inferior to the Chinese and deserve to lose, get dunked on and consigned to the dustbin of history. You're inferior people, xiaoren. The Teacher had said:
The nature of the noble man is like the wind, the nature of the inferior man is like the grass. When the wind blows over the grass, it always bends.
Get bent already.
…But I think people like Jensen and Elon — tellingly, not Americans, but those who have adopted the nobler American ideal — are different. Jensen says:
First, in order to have a race to do well in a race, you have to understand the race and you have to understand the resources that you’re working with, the assets that you have, the assets you don’t have, your advantages and your disadvantages. And some of the things to realize is that AI is fundamentally at its core level. And going back to the three levels that we’re talking about, at each level we have to make sure that we understand the game.
And this game isn’t. There’s no 60 minute clock on this thing. This is an infinite game. And so most people aren’t very good at playing infinite games. You know, Nvidia is now 33 years old. We’ve been through three computer revolutions, from the PC revolution to the Internet to mobile, and now we’re in AI. And so you have to, in order to thrive across all of these different changes in the environment, you have to understand how to play games.
And so the things that I just described, understanding the game, understanding the assets, you have really important at the first layer, at the technology layer, the most important thing to understand is that the intellectual capital, and remember, 50% of the world’s AI researchers are Chinese. First, just take a step back and recognize that that important factor has to play into how we think about the game.
The next is AI factories. In order to do well there, you need to have energy. Because fundamentally we transfer, we transform electricity into digital tokens. Just as the last industrial revolution transformed atoms through energy into, you know, steel things and physical things that we know cars and things like that, buildings and things like that. And the generation before that, we gave it water into a machine called the dynamo. And what came out was electricity. And so now we have electricity go in and tokens come out. So the next layer requires energy.
The layer above that is just happening now. And it’s really, really important that we understand that ultimately the winners of the last industrial revolution wasn’t the country that invented it, it was the country that applied it. And the United States applied. Applied steel, applied energy faster than any country. Everybody else was worried about things like labor and, you know, horses being replaced by cars and, you know, those kind of matters. But the United States just. We just took it and ran with it.
And so the infrastructural layer above that is about the application of the technology. It’s about not being afraid of it, wanting to engage it, reskilling. Reskilling our workforce so that we’re able to apply it, encouraging people to adopt it. And so when you look at the, when you look at AI through the lens that I just described to the framework I just described, each one of the layers has its own, if you will, challenges and opportunities, and the game’s a little different in each one.
I don't think Jensen wants to sell out to China to make line go up. He wants to keep playing the infinite game.
But inferior men can only interpret a superior man's vision in terms of profit.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
GLM-4.7 for instance, supposedly it has stats comparable to Opus 4.5.
I don't think GLM is really that high. In my experience it may be more comparable to, like, Xiaomi V2-Flash or Minimax M2.1. Chinese ecosystem is uneven, and GLM team has massive clout thanks to their Tsinghua ties. I believe they're a bit overhyped.
Won't the US enjoy a quantitative and qualitative superiority in AI though, based on the compute advantage, through to at least the 2030s?
It probably will have the advantage, but a) unclear what this advantage gives you practically, and b) the divergence from compounding this advantage keeps getting postponed. Roughly a year ago, Dario Amodei wrote:
R1, which is the model that was released last week and which triggered an explosion of public attention (including a ~17% decrease in Nvidia's stock price), is much less interesting from an innovation or engineering perspective than V3. It adds the second phase of training — reinforcement learning, described in #3 in the previous section — and essentially replicates what OpenAI has done with o1 (they appear to be at similar scale with similar results)8. However, because we are on the early part of the scaling curve, it’s possible for several companies to produce models of this type, as long as they’re starting from a strong pretrained model. Producing R1 given V3 was probably very cheap. We’re therefore at an interesting “crossover point”, where it is temporarily the case that several companies can produce good reasoning models. This will rapidly cease to be true as everyone moves further up the scaling curve on these models. …
Making AI that is smarter than almost all humans at almost all things will require millions of chips, tens of billions of dollars (at least), and is most likely to happen in 2026-2027. DeepSeek's releases don't change this, because they're roughly on the expected cost reduction curve that has always been factored into these calculations. […] This means that in 2026-2027 we could end up in one of two starkly different worlds. In the US, multiple companies will definitely have the required millions of chips (at the cost of tens of billions of dollars). The question is whether China will also be able to get millions of chips.
Well, American companies already have millions of chips. We're nearing 2026. Multiple models trained on those superclusters already got released, RL cost is now in high millions, probably tens if not hundreds of millions for Grok 4 and GPTs, and likely Claudes. Result: Opus is not really far smarter than V3.2, an enhanced version of a year-old model Dario writes about, with total post-training costs around $1M. On some hard math tasks, V3.2 Speciale is not just like 20x cheaper per task but straight up superior to American frontier at the time of release. The gap has, if anything, shrank. Wasn't «gold at IMO» considered a solid AGI target and a smoke alarm of incoming recursive self-improvement not so long ago? V3.2-Speciale gets that gold for pennies, but now we've moved goalposts to Django programming, playing Pokemon and managing a vending machine. Those are mode open-ended tasks but I really don't believe they are indexing general intelligence better.
Maybe we'll see the divergence finally materializing in 2026-2027. But I think we won't, because apparently the biggest bottleneck is still engineering talent, and Americans are currently unable to convert their compute advantage into a technological moat. They know the use cases and how to optimize for user needs, they don't really know how to burn $1B of GPU-hours to get a fundamentally stronger model. There's a lot of uncertainty about how to scale further. By the time they figure it out, China has millions of chips too.
There is an interesting possibility that we are exactly at this juncture, with maturation of data generation and synthetic RL environment pipelines on both sides. If so, we'll see US models get a commanding lead for the next several months, and then it would be ablated again by mid-late 2026.
V3.2 was a qualitative shift, a sign that the Chinese RL stack is now mature and probably more efficient, and nobody paid much attention to it. Miles is former Head of Policy Research and Senior Advisor for AGI Readiness at OpenAI, and he pays attention, but it flew under the radar.
But if AI/AGI/ASI is a big deal, then America enjoys a decisive advantage. Doesn't matter if China has 20 AGI at Lvl 5 if the US has 60 at Lvl 8. I think a significantly more intelligent AI is worth a lot more than cheaper and faster AI in R&D, robotics, cyberwarfare, propagandizing, planning.
Another reason I'm skeptical about compounding benefits of divergence is that it seems we're figuring out how to aggregate weak-ish (and cheap) model responses to get equal final performance. This has interesting implications for training. Consider that on SWE-rebench, V3.2 does as well as «frontier models» in pass@5 regime, and the cost here is without caching; they have caching at home so it's more like $0.1 per run and not $0.5. We see how even vastly weaker models can be harnessed for frontier results if you can provide enough inference. China prioritizes domestic inference chips for 2026. Fun fact, you don't need real HBM, you can make do with LPDDR hybrids.
But all of that is probably secondary to social fundamentals, the volume and kind of questions that are economical to ask, the nature of problems being solved.
In a compute drought, the compute-rich country is king. In an AI race, the compute-rich country is king. China would be on the back foot and need to use military force to get back in the game.
I think all of this is stages of grief about the fact that the real king is physics and we have a reasonably good command of physics. Unless AGI unlocks something like rapid nanoassembly and billion-qubit quantum computers, it may simply not change the trajectory significantly. The condition of being a smaller and, as you put it, dopey society compromises "compute advantage". Great American AI will make better robots? Well, it'll likely train better policies in simulation. But China is clearly far ahead at producing robots and can accelerate to tens of millions in little time given their EV industrial base, gather more deployment data, iterate faster, while American startups are still grifting with their bullshit targets. Similar logic applies in nearly every physical domain. Ultimately you need to actually make things. Automated propaganda is… probably not the best idea, American society is too propagandized as is. Cyberwarfare… will American AGI God really be good enough to hack Huawei clusters after their inferior Temu AGI has hunted for vulnerabilities in an airgapped regime for a few months? I think cyberwarfare is largely going dodo in this world, everyone will have an asymmetric defense advantage.
Obviously, that's still the most credible scheme to achieve American hegemony, conquer the light cone etc. etc. I posit that even it is not credible enough and has low EV, because it's an all-or-nothing logic where «all» is getting elusive.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
When the japanese and south koreans copied and then bested american cars and german optics and swiss watches, did the americans and germans and swiss subsequently sink into poverty?
I don't know what the Swiss thought of it, but Americans absolutely had a psychotic meltdown about Japanese competition. I think you don't get how intoxicating the sense of supremacy is. Switzerland is just a nation, its manufactures are just manufactures, it operates on the logic of comparative advantage. Americans have an ideological stake in being Number One.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
They spend very little on social safety nets. the end result being that Chinese household consumption is something like 40% of gdp vs 65% in the states.
I simply don't think this is even true, it's more self-serving imperial propaganda to present failures as a moral choice. Most of your consumption value is rent-seeking like high rents. Chinese consumption is not that low, read this. Even Chinese safety net is not as low as is often said, it's on par with other middle-income nations.
You're not doing anyone a favor by being corrupt.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
I think this is somewhat incoherent.
Americans are happy to let other nations lead in some industries and rely on them long term. We're happy to buy Korean appliances, Japanese cars, European fine crafted goods and Columbian cocaine. If you want to build out a niche the American empire is happy to let you have it and integrate into the global family. This is not how China acts.
Your narrative is a bit out of date. How will Europeans pay for Chinese imports if China has no need of their exports (in «fine crafted goods», services or anything)? Maybe they just won't, if China can do all that fine crafting cheaper and better. But they will face the same issue with American imports, indeed already are facing:
The Trump tariffs have already hit German exporters hard: over the first nine months of the year, their US exports plunged by 7.4 per cent.
But the prospects in China are if anything even bleaker, creating a “China shock” that is now biting into the bottom lines of globally successful German companies.
Since the start of 2025, Germany is now running a trade deficit in capital goods with China over a rolling 12-month period. That is a first since records began in 2008. Chinese machinery exports to Europe roughly doubled to around €40bn in over six years and may reach €50bn this year, according to industry association VDMA.
Trump’s haphazard trade policies are hurting German industrialists much more than the 15 per cent headline tariff accepted by the EU in July suggests.
A month after the controversial deal, the US expanded an existing 50 per cent duty on metal components to more than 400 additional product categories, including motorbikes, railway cars, cranes and pumps. The charges on steel, alloy and copper come with complex disclosure rules and threats of heavy fines for incomplete declarations.
This hit German companies of many stripes. Farming equipment maker Krone Group, for example, based in Spelle in Lower Saxony, was forced to temporarily halt its US-bound production. The extra tariffs on metal were “very shocking”, recalls Bernard Krone, chair of the family firm with €2.4bn in sales. US farmers will face hefty price increases which could damp demand, he predicts.
Yet while selling goods to the US has become more difficult for German industrialists, competing with China’s rapidly ascending industrial might presents an even greater challenge.
Goods coming out of China are no longer cheaply made, lower-quality knock-offs, if they ever were. “Most of what German Mittelstand firms do these days, Chinese companies can do just as well,” says Thilo Köppe, partner at German consultancy firm Vindelici Advisors who worked in China for more than a decade.
American Hegemony is not about building some happy global family with a division of labor. From software down to extractive industries, American Empire wants to be like Emperor Qianlong said: «our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce». Currently, the Chinese economy is pretty export-dependent, but Xi would prefer it to be otherwise – Dual Circulation is a big pillar of his policy, and in purely thermodynamic terms, if literally everything is cheaper in China, you can ignore standard macroecon, largely eschew exports, subsidize domestic demand and make Qianlong's boast a reality.
The main difference is that China got there with industrial policy and human capital, and you're trying to get there with tariffs and coercion and a Wunderwaffe. But the end result is the same for non-live players.
Back then, I asked for what the end game of AGI race is, and you said:
If it is powerful enough to actually do high level engineering work then it instantly obviates China's other major advantage in having a big workforce. If it scales all the way to AGI then forget about it, winning that race is all that matters. Winner gets to be the center of commerce and yes some latitude that comes along with having the most powerful military.
A center of commerce in what sense? The US currently has a very low fraction of international trade in GDP – around the level of Pakistan. The US wasn't a global center of commerce during its ascent either. You pat yourselves on the back for importing some junk but it's not really spreading a lot of your wealth around, it's only large in absolute terms. China is simply already doing what you want to do once you get «AGI», and by 2038, if AGI plans pan out, your narrative will be laughably quaint.
Moreover, what's wrong with that? Both nations are large, decently situated and can, in theory, produce all goods in prolific abundance within their own borders more economically than imports would be; and China is entitled to a larger and more diverse internal market on account of population size. There are some hard natural endowments – Australia has more accessible mineral wealth, Atacama desert has excellent solar resource, I don't know – but commodities are cheap. Maybe they'll become less cheap? What remains scarce after labor and R&D are commodified? Land? Copper? Wombs? We need to think of how the world would operate when major nations are capable of industrial autarky, because modulo some Butlerian Jihad we will have to deal with it anyway.
Finally, what exactly is your concern? The US imports more than it exports not out of some moral commitment to subsidizing globalism, but just because it has very credible IOUs to sell. You basically print USD and export inflation. The EU can't do that. China can't do that. Chinese industrial competence doesn't have a direct effect on that, they cannot deny you the ability to print paper and buy Columbian cocaine. Trying to rationalize the take – you deserve hegemony because what, it'll mean unquestionable military supremacy, hard guarantee of your IOUs, and therefore indefinite ability to exchange goods for paper?
Yeah, I think it's less sustainable than «China is a very large and very productive autarkic country». They've been exactly that for centuries, and the world managed fine. In the limit of this trajectory, they will only need to export enough to cover the raw commodities imports necessary for their internal economic activity. That's not a lot, in dollar terms. The more interesting question is what else we all will be trading in 2038.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
That's a funny perspective to me. Russians have negligible industrial base, atrophied Soviet military-industrial complex, and mainly export stuff like oil, gas, grain and fertilizers. We also simply don't have many smart people remaining, and instead have a population of jingoistic TV-watching cattle that needs steady supply of copium in the face of a protracted war that's going badly. Of course we have televised fantasies about Wunderwaffes. The US is, for all its grandeur, similarly a corrupt Soy and Gas Empire that struggles with building physical things relative to its consumption and ambition, we see whining about the Rust Belt, Powerpoints with 6th gen fighter jets and «Trump class battleships», and the whole AGI project is supposed to restore the claim to primacy. And even in Ukraine, Americans heroically grappled with the costs of exporting this or that long range wundermissile or Smart Shell, and thought that their Wunderwaffes like HIMARS, or Palmer Luckey's gadgets, will make more of a difference than commodity drone parts from Aliexpress procured by both sides. They did not.
China is the factory of the world and the source of almost all new process innovation and, say, the bulk of Californian top patent holders. The Chinese are not advertising their ion implantation techniques, procurement plans, fabs, they are quietly doing business and actively avoid international publicity on these matters. No, I don't think this is a Wunderwaffe. Yes, we'll see what they can actually produce in 2026.
Alternative explanation: Jensen Huang won the game of "be the last person to talk to Trump", since he knows Trump is a waffling buffoon and Huang just wants to maximize Nvidia's stock, US security concerns be damned.
This is still denialism of the erosion of fundamentals, I think. Classic stabbed-in-the-back-by-Jews [of Asia] doctrine. Huang founded Nvidia over 30 years ago, I don't believe he's a petty merchant optimizing for quarterly reports.
Minor update on the US-PRC tech competition.
Culture war significance: it matters for the grand strategy understanding and the narrative of the US as the Main Character of History. Personally, I had stopped regularly engaging on this forum when it became clear that the US is, in fact, not such a Main Character (at least for the moment), but just a great power with massive momentum and cultural influence. Not being American, I mainly only care about American cultural affairs insofar as they have global spillover effects. Local legislation news and woke-MAGA strife are overwhelmingly noise for the world, unless they reach some critical volume like peak woke or BLM did. Some American tech, and related politics, is very much not noise. The chip war in particular is very high-signal, so I follow it closely.
It seems something happened behind the scenes after those events in October, when the US Department of Commerce went with the Affiliate Rule, China retaliated with REE+ export controls, and soon enough, by November 1, we've got the usual Trump style Deal. (There's also a subplot with Nexperia/Wingtech, that demonstrates Chinese supply chain power and European ineptitude again, with a similar outcome of the Western actor retreating). Suddenly, on Dec 8, we get the news about Trump permitting the sales of H200 to China (context and understandable rationalist perspective here). China reacts somewhat paradoxically, if your theory of their mind is just «they're desperate for our chips» – as per the FT, «Companies seeking to purchase the H200 would need to submit a request explaining why they cannot use domestically produced chips and undergo an approval process», in continuation of their earlier scrutiny, rejections and negative publicity directed at H20s.
10 days later Reuters breaks the news – which were not quite news for those in the know – about Chinese successes with their EUV effort. The article is somewhat confused, as almost all reporting on Chinese AI and IC tech is; from my private sources, the situation has already moved further on multiple components, like optics and metrology.
What I want to emphasize here is that it's not just trivial «industrial espionage» or IP theft. Their light source project is led by former ASML head of light source technology and «Light source competence owner for metrology in ASML research» Lin Nan. I think that he returned not just for money, nationalism or career opportunities, but because China offered him a more ambitious challenge – he seems interested in solid state lasers, which ASML, constrained by market incentives more than strategic considerations, gave up on. For sure, straightforward IP theft also happens - CXMT's DRAM/HBM progress is apparently propped up by Samsung IP which was, well, illicitly transfered by former employees. And there's very substantial domestic talent pipeline, though people are prone to dismiss their patent/paper counts; they lack brand power, «Changchun Institute of Optics» doesn't have the same zing to it as Zeiss, though you may see it in the news soon.
All in all, China is moving far faster than even I imagined. Now we get reports – straining my credulity, to be honest – that ByteDance doesn't expect Nvidia to sell move than a few hundred thousand cards in China, not because of any trade barriers from either side, but because adequate domestic competition will come online in mid-2026 already. Almost certainly it'll be worse and less power-efficient, at least. But clusters with Chinese hardware are eligible for electricity subsidies, and that may be enough to tip the scales? This logic is corroborated by the surprisingly low leaked price of H200s – just $200.000 for an 8-card module (not sure if that's before of after 25% Trump Tax, but in any case very low, maybe lower than in the US proper, at least pre-tax). Meanwhile that's 5 times more bang for the buck than H20s offered. On the other hand, for now Nvidia is selling old stock; new production is being discussed, but at this rate I don't expect the price to increase. One can reasonably ask if this makes any sense, given that the demand in the US outstrips supply. I think it does, both for complex strategic reasons (mainly ecosystem lock-in, which is in fact a big deal, as I explain here) and simply because the US AI market is becoming a very convoluted circular Ponzi scheme where Nvidia de facto subsidizes companies to buy Nvidia wares. That's more of a potential market meltdown recipe than a revenue source. H200 sales to China, for what it's worth, unambiguously pull in dollars, and both Jensen's fudiciary duty and Trump's deficit-slashing mandate (and to be blunt, likely Trump's corruption) create a strong incentive to greenlight them.
Anyway, what looked like Chinese bluffing and negging at the time the sale of H20s was debated looks more and more like genuine, coherent industrial policy. China is pretty sure it'll have sovereignty in the entire stack of AI development, soon enough, that it will even be capable enough to export its AI hardware products, and the US is acting as if that is likely true – as if the competition is about market share and revenue. They are obviously compute-constrained right now, so DeepSeek V3.2 only catches up to around GPT-5 level, with the usual complaints in the paper. They don't appear to mind this enough to bow and scrape for more American chips at any cost. A large component here is that what they need, they can often rent overseas openly –
a data center near Osaka, operated by Japanese marketing solutions firm Data Section, is effectively dedicated to Tencent. This data center houses 15,000 of Nvidia’s Blackwell (B200) GPUs. Tencent secured access to these GPUs for three years through a $1.2 billion (approximately 1.8 trillion Korean won) contract with Data Section via a third-party entity. Data Section plans to establish additional data centers in Sydney, Australia, with over 100,000 Nvidia GPUs, also primarily serving Tencent.
– but I think it's primarily about confidence in the domestic supply chain.
Long before all these events, in September, we had a debate with @aquota here, when the topic was selling China relatively worthless H20s. (For my previous take on H20s specifically see here).
He argued:
This lock-in effect is just nonsense and has not worked for literally a single firm that has sold out to china. China is not going to forego building their own echo-system and hasn't for any other sector they've found strategically important. […] Our one chance at dominance in this sector is remaining ahead in AI and reaping compound interest on that lead whether it's AGI or simply accelerated AI and chip development. If it's not enough then I just don't buy this fantasy that selling out now is going to give us a better seat in the future.
To which I've replied:
As I've said before, "China" is not omnipotent and cannot create an ecosystem solely through political will and subsidies, they've been trying for decades and it hasn't been working so long as Nvidia was the obvious superior choice. Even now, nobody wants to use CANN if afforded the chance. I think this is how Jensen views this: he's straightforwardly fighting as the CEO of American company Nvidia, not just for line going up in quarterly reports but for enduring global dominance of his stack.
… personally, I believe this [AI race theory] is all deluded and very much in the spirit of last days of Nazi Germany. Both sides will have adequate AI to increase productivity, both will have "AGI" at around the same time, you're not going to have some dramatic inflection point, you will not leave them in the dust as a military or economic power, you'll just slow down global economic growth somewhat, and in the long run end up poorer and have a smaller slice of the global market. That's all.
[…] I guess this is the crux. In your world, where unipolarity is the default trajectory, it makes perfect sense to cling to Pax Americana and play negative-sum games hoping to outlast the opposition. Like, what is the alternative, capitulation, suicide? In my world, China is basically guaranteed to not only exist in 30 years but have comprehensively stronger economy than the US plus closest allies, no matter what you sell or don't sell, buy or don't buy. And the US will have to figure out how to exist, and exist well, without boons of global strategic superiority, in a bipolar world, and hopefully remaining a hegemon in its own backyard. That figuring out has got to begin now.
It seems to me that my read on the situation from back then, both the big picture and its implications for compute strategy, is now shared by both the USG and the CPC. The former is trying to regain its position and revenue in the Chinese GPU market and slow down Huawei/Cambricon/Kunlun/etc. ecosystem development by flooding the zone with mature Nvidia chips that will be adopted by all frontier players (eg DeepSeek again – they have a deep bench of Nvidia-specific talent and aren't willing to switch to half-baked Ascend CANN). The latter is more worried about preventing the US from doing that than about gaining moar FLOPS in the short run.
In conclusion, I want to congratulate Americans again with having found a true peer, for the first time since the decline of the British empire. Germans, Japanese and my own people had failed to provide enough stimulation, so Americans have grown lonely and fat at the top.
Aquota said:
surely you understand the "equals across the sea" isn't an option on the table. That isn't what is in store if we give up all our advantages in this sector.
I do not, in fact, "understand" this. Like, that may be the case and we'll just have Pax Sinica. I'm okay with it but I'm not Sinophilic enough to expect it. Even reduced to "just a great power", the US is poised to remain a historical force.
For now the loss of the indisputable Main Character status is being processed traumatically, with anger, denial and exaggeration of the costs of that loss if it were to really happen. But as its reality sinks in, this trauma may become fertile grounds for some cultural Renaissance in the United States. Less capeshit, more self-awareness. I may even come to care about it for reasons aside from global consequences.
…Of course, we can still entertain the hypothesis that all of the above is some interesting ephemera and this final dash of the Chosen Nation towards AGI-powered Rapture and completion of history is the real story of the times. I won't completely discount it, we shall see.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
2mo ago
I suspect that these antisemites would rather blame AI on Jews in the sense that it's a “Jewish trick” to extract money while feeding us “goyslop” under the pretenses of building AGI.
Those who take AI seriously are very terrified of the implications.
Amodei siblings are also connected with Holden Karnofsky, of OpenPhil, which can be reasonably described as some kind of New World Order project (albeit, it seems, grossly unsuccessful).
And there was no pre-WWII history of anti-Jewish pogroms, expulsions, or legal discrimination against Jews in China
This is not entirely correct. For sure, generally Jews were treated well in China (eg in Harbin they only were harassed by local Russian fascists, somewhat humorously not by the Nazi-aligned Japanese who sought to resettle them in Japan, on grounds of taking Protocols of the Elders of Zion at face value and anticipating high ROI from alignment with the Jewish people). But Kaifeng Jews were at the very least forced to assimilate, and probably abandon endogamy.
Of course, China is so vast and has seen so many different peoples that all of that is a complete nothingburger in their national consciousness. Anecdotally, I have the impression that they thought well of Jews (even of negative stereotypes), assuming that this is NGMI whining of whites who complain of Chinese shrewdness and intelligence in the same manner. Chinese themselves experience relationships somewhat similar to Medieval Jewish-Gentile ones across the broader Sinosphere, eg in Malaysia where they are the educated, clannish middleman minority with financial assets but without hard power. Politically, the PRC is consistently pro-Palestinian but it doesn't have much of an actionable component or popular purchase, and the Israel Question is folded into the broader competition with America, often with this lazy Marxist spin about Israel as the bulwark of global imperialism for those who want an ideological case against he US.
On the other hand I've been told by Mainlanders that China got really redpilled on the JQ after the reports of starvation in Gaza. They take starvation extremely seriously, and then pattern-matched the whole post-Oct 7 dynamic onto Japanese occupation. That may color perceptions going forward.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
3mo ago
That's some quite superficial thinking. I think you really underestimate how far we could have gone with biological and chemical weapons, for one thing. Modern wars are in no way maximally brutal yet. Big states do avoid the logical endpoint of a race to the bottom where all personnel on both sides is writhing in agony within 72 hours.
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
3mo ago
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
3mo ago
Your post is passive just descriptive. Do you endorse ethno nationalism or just observe it?
I will answer thusly.
My default moral intuitions aren't that different from modal American ones 50 or so years ago. Russia is a multiethnic society, clearly defined by one ethnos and culture (mine, to a first approximation), which does not possess the instinct or inclination for clannish diasporic behavior. We are more ethnocentric than modern Westerners but not by far. We assimilate easily in Western societies, find them an upgrade to our own, and generally agree with the way of the West, whereas the ways of The Rest are seen as unfair and backward, if demonstrably adaptive on the personal and sometimes collective level. Ethnocentrism specifically has been investigated in a toy model I like, by one Artem Kaznatcheev and friends, in Canada in 2013, and the conclusion was that it “…eventually overcomes its closest competitor, humanitarianism, by exploiting humanitarian cooperation across group boundaries as world population saturates”. Intellectually, then, it appears necessary to develop a system that can defend that superior humanitarian way, and the unpalatable conclusion is that in practice it amounts to something not unlike ethnocentrism – aggressive policing of defectors, attention to proxy metrics of defection, operational presumption of non-assimilation, and rejection of comforting lies about universality and natural attractiveness of preferred values. Western experiment with mass immigration and “race-blind meritocracy” is clearly a cheap hack motivated by Western cognitive biases, myopic financial considerations and such, not any concern for long-term preservation of the Way. Similar thoughts are common for sympathetic peoples on the periphery of Western civilization, which is why we see Slavs, assimilated Jews, Moldovans and so on disproportionately represented among the European right.
On a more philosophical level, I don't know. Ethnocentrism is a crude but effective means to preserve the intrinsic direction of a people, it increases the activation energy for changing course, and lets the direction be explored further. Moral intuitions aside, I'm not convinced that the Western direction is truly superior; it would be premature to say so.
I'm pretty open to the idea that diversity is good — real diversity, not this consumerist Western appreciation of cuisines, not the lukewarm respect for ethnic varieties of ideas the West already accepts. Why is diversity good? I consider great men of history to be scientists, and civilizations to be ongoing longitudinal natural experiments – about the limits of human nature, society, what kinds of minds should be incentivized to develop, what notions of goodness are viable and lead to more adaptive behavior, better instrumental outcomes and, in the limit, to greater collective and individual flourishing. Some experiments achieve negative results, invalidating the hypothesis for observers, but it's always a pity if this happens for contingent reasons like a natural disaster, or an opportunistic alliance, or luck of the draw in relative timing of access to some preexisting technology. I am distraught at being unable to know how failed civilizations could have developed to their “mature” stage, given a couple more millennia of literacy and a handful of extra IQ points, or passing a good reform, or contacting a powerful idea earlier; where would they have met their ceiling. When possible, one should run experiments in controlled conditions, after all.
The West is a beautiful experiment, plausibly the most successful that has ever been proposed. Its core thesis, stripped of the ever-changing scaffolding, is something like “human nature inherently has the spark of God's love and wisdom, therefore individual freedom is good and barriers to its realization are at worst prejudices, at best training wheels and must be systematically removed”. It's been working very well. But this near-genocidal desire to universalize the way smells less and less like sincere proselytism, and more like anxiety, fear of the hypothesis getting falsified. The truth is, the West has no clue as to what made or makes it work, beyond currently-commoditized pieces like capitalism (but whence capitalism? If “because freedom”, why does it port to societies that don't adopt the rest of the package?) Americans sometimes boast of “nation-building” Germany and Japan, developing “institutions”, and that reveals the hollowness and vulgarity of the doctrine. Germany and Japan, seriously? Japan got destroyed in the first place precisely because it got competitive, while remaining philosophically largely alien; Germany was actively advancing a divergent branch of the Western thesis. And today, both these nations are deeply troubled. Nation-building in less performant societies has a dismal track record. The West doesn't really know what to teach others so that it sticks. Really, what made the West into what it is, what was the generative function behind those generically adaptive innovations? Christendom (adopted Middle Eastern teaching, effectively dead now)? “HBD” in the sense of high IQ and conscientiousness – OK but why did it happen, just deep time migration patterns, cold winters, founder effects? What's the lesson here, pray to RNG? Galton-style Social Darwinism, Gregory Clark's Anglo class eugenics (grotesquely replaced with education-mediated assortative mating, also largely dead, and their practical implications made taboo in the resultant society)? “High trust” and non-kin cooperation by default (as covered here, a giant exploit for people who practice kin cooperation, and thus a mere bootstrap phase)? Science? Everyone above 95-ish median IQ can do science. The discovery was invaluable, but can “the West” come up with anything of that caliber ever again? Rather, can you even do what you used to do? We seem to be near the end of the session. Do you even know if you want to live? When you have full automation, will you put forward an argument for not just exercising your freedom to pass away replacing yourselves with machines, like you're currently doing with immigrants? Of what nature will that argument be?
China is another large old civilization. They've been running their own experiments. Their most enduring research program is Confucian. At the risk of butchering it, Confucianism says something like “humans aren't very good and are prone to self-interested behavior. Individual humans are not even human, they can only be elevated from monkeys via social context, and even then they default to barbarianism. But if compelled to cultivate “virtue”, starting on the mundane level of filial piety, hierarchical propriety and standardized ritual, escalating to mental discipline and scholarship, if rewarded with reproductive opportunity for utmost compliance, if the peace is maintained for many generations – they can build hierarchical societies of unbounded scale and splendor; and eventually, more of them become Superior Persons capable of and entitled to correct independent moral reasoning, and those will ennoble everyone else”.
It is debatable how seriously that has been pursued, but I'd say at least as seriously as the Christian/Western program. Both have undergone course corrections that arguably reflect growing out of their scaffolding and purify the original strategy. The West going from theism to deism to non-superstitious interest in the Universe, generalizing the validity of “love” and “freedom” beyond traditional norms. The East purging “thieves of virtue” along with ossified ritual and adopting a more common-sensical epistemology. To an extent this can be decried as trivialization and loss of function on both sides. There's been substantial convergence, but the divergent bits are what's at stake. Right now, I think the Eastern project is showing more promise, and the West is no longer in a position to lecture them on how to steer it. They're more ethnocentric? Less individualistic? They're authoritarian? Their society feels wrong? OK, I hear you. But they're solving social trust, they're solving – in their own way, less charismatic and more transactional – international relations, they're even solving creative expression, while having solved long-term large-scale coordination to a greater extent. And crucially, this isn't their first rodeo, they've had massive collapses and comebacks, they're the only major player that has a sophisticated applied discourse about civilizational recovery. Isn't it saying something that they've fallen behind, failed catastrophically, but have recovered, denied you the option of converting them, and are again pursuing their own program? Isn't it exciting that another solution can exist? Aren't you curious of where it will peak? Of course, they're doing well enough that another questions, for example “how much of the light cone will we be able to claim at this rate” are becoming salient for savvy observers. So it is necessary that they be treated as competitors, not just an interesting alternative path.
Jews, likewise, are a unique research program. They have an insular doctrine of their exceptionalism and special nature of themselves as “the people of God”, their moral obligation to biologically and culturally perpetuate themselves, a very long story of surviving and adapting, institutions built for venerating and reproductively rewarding exceptional individuals who have superior insight into God's will, they're punching so far above their weight that it's almost comical… and all of that hinges on extreme, almost naive ethnocentrism. They've mixed with Western peoples, experienced some assimilation, and now we're watching them return to a more traditional (indeed, exxageratedly traditional) form, with large Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox subpopulations having a vast fertility advantage over secular ones which, so long as they exist, provide a bridge to Western decisionmaking, invent spins like “Judeo-Christian liberal democratic values” and “our common Islamic/Communist/Han enemy”, and generally add confusion (partially their own). It doesn't take a genius to recognize that this research program, while fascinating on its own, can derail the Western one, and on top of your own dysfunction and anxious miscalculations it can create very ugly outcomes. We've seen trial runs in the Middle East, and the worst part is that you can barely articulate that it was mostly about them, not your “strategic interest” or oil or some other bullshit. So they, too, ought to be treated as competitors. It's okay, they can take it.
That's pretty much all relevant live players; smaller or less coherent players, who have a latent opportunity to expand their niche, are also more ethnocentric. The West is uniquely non-ethnocentric and has unique moral narcissism about this fact, largely owed to successes of the last several centuries. I think the jury is out on whether this system is sustainable or has the highest ceiling, and you're not entitled to try and “enlighten” others, but you're clearly valuable enough to think of how you can preserve and improve your program in a world of ethnocentrists, and that's what you should be doing now.
Spawn a great man or something, I don't know.
It doesn't come out of nowhere, it's called education, competition and meritocracy, and they clearly have strong leaders and thinkers already. You're just in a bubble.
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