Dean
2hr ago
No problem.
For elaboration- most weapon shipments go by sea due to the bulk shipping costs, and Syria was a preferable point unloading to Lebanon for a variety of reasons. In addition to the increased difficulty of smuggling through Lebanese ports where non-Hezbollah factions (such as Israel) would increase the risk of exposure compared to the more supportive Assad, the 2020 Beirut port explosion (where a warehouse of amonium nitrate created a city-shaking explosion) made arms shipments through such ports politically risky as well. One of the theories of the amonium nitrate explosion is that it was part of a Hezbollah stockpile, and while Hezbollah has denied that, being caught with major weapon shipments through ports would have been a significant risk.
As a result, post-2020, Iran relied more on the Syrian route.
It's "blinker thinking" to think that a country has responsibility to limit damage it causes abroad?
It is when you project damage it didn't cause onto the tab out of American ethnocentricism and a dismissal of the agency and ability of other actors.
It may be self-validating in a way to believe American power is central to the cause and outcomes in other conflicts, but the Americans were never the biggest player in the Syrian civil war, or the most decisive, or the most responsible. Americans are not the hyperagent of the Syrian Civil War. Americans were never the hyperagent of the Syrian Civil War.
'You broke it, you bought it' depends on 'you' actually being the agent to break it. 'You' did not.
Dean
3hr ago
The more relevant migrant flows wouldn't be from Europe to Syria, but Turkey to Syria, in turn enabling Europe to Turkey (which already occurs in substantial amounts).
Turkey not only has the far greater number of Syrian refugees, but those who did just go to the first safe country. These are a electoral burden, and facilitating their return was a policy goal of Turkish-Syrian relations for a good part of the last year, and Assad's refusal to engage on that was part of the Turkish support for the coalition that just took most of the major cities in Syria.
If/when Turkey pressures its recent partners to accept back Turkish-based refugees in exchange for continued reconstruction / reconsolidation / resist-other-rivals aid, that will create two opportunities for the Europeans. One is leverage the opening for their own aid-for-reacceptance bargains (as countries being willing to accept deportees is one of the big obstacles Europe has to deportation), and another is to make renewed deals with the Turks to accept the European-reached migrants, a deal more possible when Turkey has reduced its own refugee burden.
Dean
4hr ago
Yes.
Conditional on there being relative stability in any of the major cities (Aleppo down through Damascus), there is a non-trivial chance that an aid-for-acceptance swap will occur, in which external backers (Turkey / the EU) offer much needed financial / civil governance assistance in exchange for whoever is holding the area to accept returnees. The benefit to the local authorities is not only the assistance in rebuilding what they'd want to rebuild anyway (including housing to absorb more than just the returnees), but the 'import' of a tax and recruit base.
This will be less viable in the areas where there is significant fighting, but with the collapse of the Assad government it's uncertain how much Iran can, or will try, to force a fight. Beyond that, the actual ability of internecine militant conflict is unclear.
The factors that enabled internecine fighting between militant groups in the civil war phase were the presence of a unifying opponent to justify mobilization in general and tactical alliances in particular (Assad as the unifying enemy), the inflow of resources to fight and compete over (foreign aid to groups opposing Assad), and the lack of clear leading groups (mutual relative weakness supporting existential struggles). The later in particular was a goal / function of Russian airpower, which prioritized consolidating / less radical power groups in order to keep the rest fragmented and present Assad as the only alternative to ISIS.
With Assad's fall, those factors have substantially changed. There isn't a single unifying interest to drive mass mobilization, the interest external states have for flooding the anti-Assad movement with weapons has changed now that there is no Assad, there are indeed dominant groups whose clear strength facilitates detente rather than existential struggle, and there isn't likely to be a Russian (or American) air campaign deliberately trying to crack coalitions.
Dean
12hr ago
Alternatively, that's an even worse feudal metaphor because that wasn't how feudalism worked, nor does or did the US rule over a world-system.
There are substantial differences between 'a complicated mess of formal hierarchical relationships' and 'not in a formal hierarchical relationship at all.'
Your question had the premise that jews don't exist,
No it didn't, lol. You were making a categorical error of a premise you either didn't know was impossible, or did know but choose to dishonestly advance.
And I'm no good at history, I don't know of many of the instances in which jews were "kicked out", but you can't kick out what isn't there, and if a country has built resentment towards a certain group of people, then it would be weird if said group hadn't been involved in something controversial in the country at the time. It would be even weirder if this had happened over 100 times, in many countries, across more than 1000 years of history.
Why do you think a banal practice in history is weird, other than your lack of historical understanding not knowing it's not exceptional?
I don't need to know people personally to know their religion.
Of course you do, otherwise you wouldn't know if they are Jewish as a religion, Jewish as a culture, Jewish as an ethnic identity, or Jewish as a label that others impose onto them but which they have no particular feelings about.
I don't know if regular jews, outside of elite institutions and rich families, fit known stereotypes. I don't know if they support the plans of powerful people who make life worse for me. I don't even know if they tend left-wing. Lets ask Google: "The AJC survey found that 61 percent of American Jews said they would vote for Joe Biden, while 23 percent said they would vote for Donald Trump". Seems that they do. I also don't know what ratio of these people support feminism and its nonsense.
You believe 61% of a demographic voted for Joe Biden because they support making your life miserable, as opposed to having different perceptions of what is good or that voting for Trump might result in bad things? And that this proves that 2% of the population is responsible for about 50% of the terrible things you hear about?
You may not be making a compelling point, but I am glad you are making it publicly.
I don't even know if I've ever met any jews in person. I don't ask people about their religion or race.
This would be a very good indication that you don't know enough to characterize Jews beyond stereotypes you have no ability to recognize the validity or flaws of.
I meant books like 1984. It warned against something that we could see happening in real time.
1984 is not only considerably less than 100 years old, but it was also not a warning about Jews.
It did, however, make significant points on the use of manufactured hate against outgroups as a form of social control of the manipulated masses to direct their hatred at acceptable targets rather than actual issues.
It was published 40 years ago. The idea that American media is left-learning, that it's owned by a few elites, and that modern "liberty" is different from classic liberty (that is, becoming pretty much it's opposite) is not exactly new, but to call it obvious as long as 40 years ago is impressive to me.
Why does something so small impress you, when insights of the political influence of publishers has been a phenomenon for centuries prior? Forget yellow journalism or American founding father gripes on media bias, one of the bloodiest periods in European history kicked off because of the power of the press, the aftereffects shaped fundamental American political traditions.
Conflating all American media as owned by a singular dynamic as opposed to there being a diversity dynamic is also a classic conspiracy theory, but still a conspiracy theory.
I don't think it would be right to dismiss these warnings as conspiracy theories since the consequences they warned about have manifested themselves almost as predicted, and since the idea that these predictions are "mere conspiracy theories" is much newer idea (it seems like the attempt to discredit ideas retroactively and to establish the current consensus as correct in a timeless sense)
There is an amusing parallel to be made to the greek philosophers on timeless issues, but you wouldn't get it.
And we were warned about this, too, in 1883: "‘Formerly the whole world was insane’ – the finest ones say, blinking." This describes how anti-traditionalists speak about the past. They essentially go "Everyone was evil, the past is immoral and wrong, but now we're enlightened by science and know what's good and proper!" and then they try to rewrite history exactly how "1984" said they would.
Your lack of historical understanding would be why you don't understand why 1984 did not say that.
1984 was a critique of ideological totalitarianism, especially the sort associated with the fascist and communist ideologies. It was not a general characterization of anti-traditionalism, nor was it any sort of accurate characterization of state capabilities of 1883 or other pre-industrial eras. It was certainly not advocating for racial stereotyping and grievances of political opponents.
It was, however, extremely critical of historical ignorance.
I don't dislike Jews because of Nietzsche, and while he has written many things about them (including my claims here, that they subverted values and made them more feminine), his overall description of jews seems positive to me. I'm aware that this reply doesn't respond to what you meant by your statement, but I feel like I'd explain my views better.
Your views come off less coherent and reasoned, frankly.
Nietzshe is a particularly bad philosopher to crib from without historical understanding, not least because he was a terrible historian who tried to use history for his narratives, and also because his was a mess made worse by many of his followers who simply cribbed what they liked in isolation for whatever project they wanted.
Finally - is there no group that you think badly about, that you haven't met in person?
Why should I hate entire groups of people I have never been exposed to and have no understanding of?
There's only so much energy to be had, and plenty of more familiar grievances to be upset over and individuals specifically responsible for them. Hating entire groups is a good indicator of a need to get offline, go outside and touch grass, and then learn more about members of the group other than the hated individuals.
And isn't your life influenced by a lot of powerful people who your voice is hopeless to ever reach?
Why should I make judgements of entire groups of ideologically diverse people on the basis that some minute number of them may be powerful elites who influence me?
Am I supposed to be insecure? A seething victim? Jealous?
Dean
13hr ago
Deeper.
Part of it is Sunni vs Shia split. The Syrian civil war was mostly a Sunni uprising, because the Assad dynasty survived by brutal suppression of the Sunni majority. This dynamic was made worse by the Iranian intervention, and efforts of the Iranians to proselytize and establish Shia communities in/as regime strongholds.
Part of it is Erdogan's Arab Spring-era desire to be a middle eastern leader of religious-democracy. Erdogan was a rare supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt when it was a thing, and had ambitions of a sort-of raising Turkey as a middle eastern leader through blending Islamic democracy. This didn't really last, but it was active nearer the start.
Part of it is Turkey's Kurdish concerns. Syria's north and east is highly Kurdish, with groups there supporting Kurdish sectarian terrorists who attack into Turkey proper. The lack of Syrian prevention was always something of a sore / a leverage point of Assad against Turkey, but the de facto autonomous states the Kurds secured during the civil war has been a significant Turkish concern.
Part of it is refugee resettlement politics. Many of the refugees who fled Syria stayed in Turkey, where they became substantial burdens far in excess of what the Europeans politically buckled under. The Turkish desire is to return Syrian refugees back to Syria, and this may have been an objective / hope of the Aleppo offensive. Turkey had desired Assad to take them back after the 2020 ceasefire, but Assad basically refused because he wanted them to be Turkey's problem rather than his own.
Part of it is regional power politics. The Turks are one of the regional major powers, but their presence and influence in the middle east has long been limited by Syria. Not because Syria is itself a major power, but because Assad invites in the Iranians (who are a regional power rival) and Russia (who is a different sort of regional power rival) in part to counter Turkey.
Part of it is Russian strategic competition. While Russia helps Assad, Turkey supporting the anti-Assad forces is a way it can indirectly poke the Russians and remind them that their interests need to be taken seriously, and not just the Syrian interests either. Regulating support for the militants is thus a form of leverage vis-a-vis Russia.
There are more, but this should be demonstrative.
Dean
13hr ago
That would be incorrect.
Iran has been running supplies to Hezbollah in Lebanon through Syria, with Syrian locations serving as the operational stockpiles and planning centers. This was the key supply route for the Hezbollah rocket campaign that led to the recent Hesbollah-Israel conflict.
Not directly, but indirectly. If you see some powerful people do some terrible things, and these people just happen by sheer coincidence, to be jewish about half the time (despite only 2% of the population being jewish), who could blame you for associating the two?
Anyone with the statistical literacy, which is why I asked the question you have tried to avoid.
Again-
How can non-existent people self-reflect about why they are hated in places they don't go to?
You're correct that I have never met any of the powerful people who are actively making life worse for me. They're just jewish at surprisingly high ratios.
If you have never met any of the people who are actively making worse for you, why do you believe you know who they are well enough to determine their relative ethnic distribution?
Moreover, if you have never met any powerful jews who actively made life worse for you, then how could the number of jews you have met who were not powerful jews actively making life worse for you provide a personal experience to believe that the jews as a collective are actively making life worse for you?
By your own statistics, you'd have a 0 encounter rate of powerful jews who actively make life worse for you, versus a X number of Jews who are not powerful and making life worse for you, where X is the number of Jews you have met in your lifetime. Unless you have personally known 0 jews, 100% of all jews you would personally know would be lived experience evidence against powerful jews being responsible for your misfortunes.
And it makes sense to distrust the elite, and even to hate them, for they know the consequences of their actions. Countless books (some dating back over 100 years) warn against what's currently happening in society.
Prejudice and scapegoating on the basis of historical ignorance are among the things the venerable classics warn against. On the other hand, there are countless old books filled with nonsense, including conspiracy theories and prejudicial scapegoating that other books warn against.
Dean
17hr ago
Hey hey, Yanukovych got a last gasp of almost-relevance when he was staged to swoop into Kyiv in the initial Russian invasion as a new government.
Assad is considerably less likely to be relevant like that, though. His minority power base is even smaller, and he doesn't have the narrative impetus of reversing an American effort.
Dean
17hr ago
The offensive is Turkish driven in the sense that Turkey facilitated the initial setup and possibly the timing. What seems to have surprised everyone was the shock and military collapse on the Syrians.
The best I can figure, the shock-effect of significant UAV use in Aleppo sparked a disorganized retreat to Hama that led to significant vehicle losses (something like 150 vehicles, including tanks, running out of gas), which weakened the Syrian forces enough to more or less keep retreating and not contest Hama. This and some other optics led to a doom loop of non-resistance, which led the Aleppo offensive to gain momentum rather than use up its resources and culminate.
The current questionmark is Homs, which controls access to Damascus and could functionally bisect the Assad regime.
Dean
19hr ago
If you're disliked everywhere you go, by the way, I'd say that would call for self-reflection.
How can non-existent people self-reflect about why they are hated in places they don't go to?
Many of the places with the most Jew-hatred have basically no proximal Jews to hate. The Arab states basically ethnically cleansed themselves of Jews last century, and yet Jewish spy animals is practically a genre of comedic international media. These do not happen because the locals have some well informed awareness of Jews, or any sort of significant exposure to Jews from which to make an informed opinion.
Many have never actually met or had a real interpersonal relationship with a Jew at all, positive or negative, to have an opinion about. They have never had a Jew apply feminine power against them, because they have never met a Jewish man or woman.
And by extension, this means that no Jew has met them.
The issue with this metaphor is that the nature of international law is that it quite often isn't.
As a project, international law theorists spent a good part of the 90s/early 2000s trying to build / impose an expectation of abiding by certain premise that others hadn't agreed to, and then using the non-compliance as a lever against those who had never consented, even though on a legal level international law rests on the consent of the states who choose to take part in elements of it. Sometimes states are agreeing to things they don't consider an objection at the time- see UN charter law- and sometimes violation of laws they have agreed to is a worthy tool- see nuclear non-proliferation violations- but in other cases international laws are used by select in-group members as a diplomatic cudgel against those who never consented to them in the first place.
The Rules-Based-Order rhetoric regularly invokes the later category, which tends to be more obvious whenever international law institutions like the International Criminal Court are invoked against non-members. It's not that the law was made but its makers refuse to follow it- it's that laws are made by and for some groups who then go on to demand that others must obey, or that customs that aren't common laws are insisted as universally applying as a matter of law.
So in this metaphor, this is more akin to the nobility of one Kingdom, let's call it Aporue, writing laws to govern the conduct the kings of Acirfa and Acirema. Some of these laws even give them the right to try and imprison the kings and nobles of these distant lands. If those other Kingdoms agree to adopt such laws... great! Fine and dandy, assuming all other things are fair. But if they don't, and Aporue tries to impose them regardless, this is less a political debate about the King following their own laws and more an attempt at a political imposition against the laws of the other Kingdoms.
Dean
1d ago
and "rules-based world order" has always been politics speak for "obey the American globalist hegemony".
...?
The phrase 'rules-based international order' grew in prominence in international affairs literature as a consequence of the American invasion of Iraq, where it was a form of criticism of the US (for not relying on UN Security Council approval). It was later adopted by the Obama administration during the American-European post-Bush reconciliation to distinguish itself from its predecessors, and later was repurposed against Obama's successor as a condemnation of Trump's willingness to break with various institutions, including the WTO, the Paris Climate Accords, and the JPCOA.
In so much that 'rules-based order' is used in regards to Americans, it has consistently been an anti-hegemonist critique of the Americans, not a hegemonist call to obedience to the Americans.
I wasn’t intending to make a personal comment, I hope it didn’t come off that way. I do think people who should know better are subscribing to this belief.
I appreciate the clarification (and would have not assumed worse than a hasty generalization), and can concur with your thought.
I think there is an opposite end of the spectrum, people who dismiss real threats because they don't take them seriously enough, but that's a separate thing and also not intended to characterize you or your view.
In all sincerity, I appreciate the sentiment.
You are welcome, then, and I hope you have a good day.
My model of the EU’s behaviour is that it’s increasingly open authoritarianism has less to do with fear of Russia, which I don’t think is a genuine concern outside Eastern Europe, and more to do with the escalating failure of EU institutional soft power.
I don't categorically disagree with your model in and of itself, but would point out that EU institutional soft power has been a target of Russia for well over a decade.
People forget it now due to the time-distance and the propaganda at the time, but even Ukraine wasn't about the Americans and NATO as much as the EU. Euromaidan initiated over the EU association agreement, not NATO, and the pre-Ukraine invasion demands weren't simply at the expense of NATO, but at the expense of EU institutions (including revaunchist claims that would target non-NATO EU members). I made a post a few years ago noting how the early Russia-Ukraine conflict was in some respects a Russia-German conflict, as Germany was a major driver in eastern European expansion of the EU and Germany pursued an international-media-influence strategy that set the groundwork for a lot of the pro-EU movements in eastern europe like Euromaidan. Russia's influence efforts follow a generally consistent divide model, and while the highest priority is the most obvious (Americans from Europeans), the EU itself is a not-at-all rare secondary (nations from the EU).
So if you wanted to say that the EU is more to blame for its failures than Russia, I'd be inclined to agree, but Russia is trying to make it fail, and for reasons that make otherwise acceptable things more problematic. It's fine, for example, if you can't find what you lost in your own house because you are disorganized, but it's another if you know there's a would-be-thief who is trying to steal.
If there's one part of your model I'd raise as questionable, it's Germany. Specifically where I suspect your model would run into issues on the categorical divide of what is / is not considered 'Eastern Europe.'
Merkel's dominance of German politics for a decade and a half created an impression of a German consensus that wasn't really so, particularly since it was sold on assumptions of Russian behavior (Russia is a reliable economic partner, Russia would never try to blackmail us) that were publicly demonstrated in the lead-up to the Ukraine War, where Russia deliberately caused gas shortages in Germany, publicly boasted about the expectations of freezing Germans, and generally attempted economic blackmail that, while resisted, has led to the major macroeconomic consequences to the Germans both as a matter of adapting (the considerable cost of gas-import infrastructure) but the second-order effects of rebalancing (significant sectors of the German economy no longer being cost-competitive without Russian gas that was kept as cheap as it was to build such dependencies).
While there is a lot of viewpoint diversity in a country of nearly 85 million people, the Ukraine War brought a significant and justified fear of Russian intent and interests to the German viewpoint. It wasn't just that the Eastern Europeans got to say 'I told you so,' it was that the Russians deliberately took a swing at the national economic foundation of the German society, demonstrated Germany's inability to functionally defend itself or others, and did so with an invasion that is figuratively next door. (It is only about a 16 hour drive from Berlin to Kyiv.) This is not just a strategic shock, but even a culture-shock.
Not only does this matter in the sense of Germany itself as the divider between East and West Europe, but Germany's institutional influence on the EU means that whatever Germany cares about, the EU will be more concerned about. Especially if France is also concerned... but here we get to the point that while France was not the leader of pro-Ukrainian support by any means, pro-French states in Africa were where Russia was able to make its most demonstrative retaliatory gains, meaning that the German-French motor of the EU was even more in alignment of Russia, creating its own feedback loops.
Dean
1d ago
The idea that Russia is about to sweep Europe is ridiculous.
Fortunately I did not making an argument premised on that idea, having mocked the premise myself in the past, nor do my characterizations depend on people subscribing to that idea.
But in my personal circle (UK) anti-Putin sentiment is driven far more by disgust than fear.
Your personal circle is, notably, located on an island that chose to not self-identify so much with the European identity, and whose strategic perspective is arguably even more influenced by the Americans.
In fact, Brexit helped contribute to the current norms of Russia thinking in Europe by taking out a counter-point against it. Rather than Continental Atlanticism, where the purpose of US-European ties is the security climate in Europe, the UK-American strategic culture has always been more globalistic view that prioritized further off areas of interest (Asia, the Middle East) far more than many continentals, and as such also discounted various concerns on Russia. With Brexit, a significant globalist perspective that would have countered Russian-centric thinking left the European elite community, and took with its the values and norms its leaders might have contributed (such as a stronger British political tradition of adherence to democratic practices at governing-party expense).
They most certainly do not.
They most certainly do, because they did.
They disliked them, they tried to restrain them in various ways, they will be happy to see Orban go, but even the EU was able to acknowledge free elections it disliked.
What has changed is not that values has changed, or even the key actors in many cases, but the geopolitial contexts within which those values and actors operate.
If you think I am making any sort of moral defense on the ethical quality of the Europeans, don't. Most people are values-first deontologist until they are in a context where consequences encourage otherwise, and that is not a compliment.
In a bit of public reflection on a past prediction of the Syrian war, Dean admits to getting a Quality Contribution post wrong...
Last week I made a post noting the surprise offensive in Syria that had seized Aleppo, Syria's second-largest city and the main northernmost city in Syria's northwest near the Turkish border region. For some strange reason [it even got nominated to the Quality Contribution thread[(https://www.themotte.org/post/1276/quality-contributions-report-for-november-2024). In that post, I made a concluding assessment where I hazarded a guess that-
Does this mean a re-opening of the Syrian civil war, if local actors see Assad is newly vulnerable without the support of the Ukraine-stretched Russia and the disruption of the Israel-distracted Iranian axis of resistance? Probably not. An offensive started without expectations of huge gains isn't likely to have prepared the resources for such a follow-through, and by the time they are martialed that will also be time for the Syrians and Russians and Iranians to prioritize this problem and reach a new stalemate.
But it is considerably more likely than it was a week ago.
Well, thank heavens for face-saving caveats and elaborating on reasoning, or that would have aged even worse.
A week has passed, and the offensive has continued, and the rebels have kept advancing (see map link). With all the usual caveats that tracking contemporary developments via open source media is prone to mistakes of the moment and other issues, what is clear is that Anti-Assad forces have captured Hama, the fourth largest city in Syria.. Hama was a government stronghold in the earlier civil war, and had one of the countries largest military airports, i.e. where Syrian/Russian airpower had established infrastructure to support strategic lift and airstrikes. It has symbolic value as well as a center of an uprising against Asad's father, and is and of itself an even worse major setback for the Syrian government. Government forces not only failed to resist in Hama as expected, and there are reports of abandoned vehicles between Aleppo and Hama that suggests that the retreat was so sudden that supply plans couldn't fuel the forces, leading to vehicle abandonments.
...and yet this isn't the worst news of the week, as the rebels are still advancing on the even more significant city of Homs, the third largest city, which would allow them to choose to advance on either Damascus, the capital, or at least cut the government into a coastal and landlocked interior zone. This is very much not a guarantee, but at the same time Hama wasn't a guarantee until the defenders didn't fight for it either. (Or, possibly, didn't reach it in time.)
Things are, in a word, bad, and many of Assad's highest partners are reportedly preparing for the worst. That includes high profile pullouts including Assad's immediate family to Russia](https://www.wionews.com/world/bashar-al-assads-family-flees-syria-presidents-whereabouts-unclear-reports-782206), the Russian naval base of Tartarus who was the nominal strategic prize of supporting Assad, and possibly even Iranian forces.
This isn't the same thing as a total collapse, however. Iran is also reportedly sending in other support, which may mean that the previous evacuations are more of change of support. Iran has reportedly mobilized it's Iraqi militias, at least a few hundred of which crossed into eastern Syria overland to try and drive to the front via southern border routes. However, the Iraqi militia option is complicated by some notable internal political actor opposition to Iraqi involvement, and of course the difficulty of driving all the way from Iraq to Damascus in scale and with speed to be decisive in time.
Further, and mixed, is the ongoing redeployment of forces from eastern Syria. For example, the Syrian army negotiated a withdrawal / turnover of Deir Ezzor to the American-backed groups. This is bad news for the regime in that it is the functional loss of territory to the US-backed forces, and corresponded to American airstrikes, but it does allow the reallocation of the retreating forces from unimportant / undefendable areas to the more important area.
All in all, it's a great big dynamic mess, with several unclear questions that will only be apparent with some more time. Will Iranian militia support arrive in time and mass to make a difference? Are the Syrian forces in a total collapse, or will they be able to reconsolidate defenses and resist an extended rebel-force? Can the Turkish rebels credibly advance much further, given the unexpectedly swift expansion to incorporating three of the largest four cities in Syria in their zone of control?
And also... why did this result? And why was my initial estimate so far off?
Well, these may have the same answer- it appears that the people who could have prioritized fighting for Syria, haven't.
Looking back to my initial assessment, I made two main justifications.
An offensive started without expectations of huge gains isn't likely to have prepared the resources for such a follow-through, and by the time they are martialed that will also be time for the Syrians and Russians and Iranians to prioritize this problem and reach a new stalemate.
Both of these seem to have contributed to each other. The people who might have prioritized fighting the rebels, didn't, and as a result the Syrian forces didn't need as many resources to keep advancing which in turn denied time for the Iranians and Russians to respond.
The crux of the Aleppo fall seems at this point to have been surprise. Not only at the timing of the offensive, but in the use of drones which was a capability not really present in the 2015 war, but which Ukrainian and Turkish black market sources have reportedly enabled. The modern militarized drone can defeat the sort of tanks or armored vehicles which served as critical strong points for letting the 2015-Syrian army resist the more man-portable-dependent rebels of the time. This created a drone disadvantage against the Assad forces, likely worsened since Russia has been buying all the drones and hirable capabilities it could from global partners for the Ukraine War, and so the Aleppo front received an expectedly large and capable shock that the forces weren't prepared to absorb.
This seems to have triggered the initial retreat from Aleppo, which- because it was so sudden and unprepared for- led to fuel shortages and abandonments already mentioned. This not only further weakened Syrian army forces, but since a number could have been captured more or less intact if all that was needed was a refuel that (so far) has not been the limiting factor, it increased the rebel capabilities.
This is where the advance on Hama led to the collapse of the willingness / ability to fight.
Having lost significant forces both in the surprise offensive but also in the retreat, it appears that the Syrian forces more or less kept retreating. Given how thin-stretched the Syrian military is due to the long war (and Russian prioritization of Ukraine), there was no second fallback army / defense force standing in Hama. As the Syrian army didn't have the defending forces or surplus stocks to reconsolidate, it seems they largely kept retreating ahead of the advancing rebels.
With the fall of Hama, however, came the fall of the military airbase, and thus the ability to simply fly in more forces and supplies closer to the front through established infrastructure. It also further enabled the rebels to capture what they could at minimal cost, rather than have to expend more forces / supplies fighting through it.
But from the public perception, the defeat / abandonment of Hama by the Syrian army seemed more an Afghan-style collapse, particularly with the immediate Syrian leadership response of Assad taking his family to Russia, rather than a Ukrainian-Zelensky commitment to defense. Leadership matters, and Assad being in Russia as Aleppo was falling, which likely an attempt to appeal for aid in person rather than actually fleeing, became perceived with the family-evacuation as the regime jumping ship, facilitating the perception of collapse.
With the fall of the Hama airbase, the Russians began a (limited) bug-out. Since the Russian presence in Syria was/has been primarily special forces (overwhelmed in the scale of the offensive), air power (disrupted by the loss of the Hama airbase), and the naval port, with the first two more or less severely disrupted, and Russians began to minimize potential losses. They are continuing to provide air power, but the Tartarus and Damascus evacuations contributed to the cyclic perception of defeat. Similarly- and now with time to recognize and capitalize on it- the US-backed Kurdish handover in the east was sort of an abandonment rather than fighting over the terrain, even though the forces likely are being reprioritized rationally.
At the same time, the Iranian efforts to support are complicated by logistical trail time (and international dynamics they don't control, like al-Sadr in Iraq). So while some elements of withdrawal were possibly true, the potential reinforcements would be much later, meaning a period of appearing to abandon rather than support Assad, contributing to the doom loop.
That was specifically made worse by the role, or non-role, of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran's closest proxy ally in the region. Hezbollah had been absent from the Syrian conflict of late due to prioritizing the conflict with Israel, which it took a considerable beating in. This led to initial international reporting/perception that Hezzbollah would not come to Assad's aid. This has at least symbolically changed- a 'supervisory force' of Hezbollah advisors have reportedly gone to Homs to help bolster the defense- but compared to the significant participation in the 2015 war, the lack of Hezbollah-at-scale, again, contributed to the doom loop.
We seem to be at a point now where Iran is trying to move what proxy forces it can to Homs, but the big strategic question is if it will be enough to matter, or if the Syrian army itself is in a collapse-loop where failure/defeat/abandonment leads to more failure/defeat/abandonment.
Edit: Amusingly enough, within hours of posting this there is non-western media reporting (including Al Jazeera) that Homs has fallen, and that rebels are in Damascus. Dynamic situations are fun.
So where does this come to my failed assessment?
The second justification for believing a more limited impact on the war was-
by the time [resources necessary for further advances] are martialed that will also be time for the Syrians and Russians and Iranians to prioritize this problem and reach a new stalemate.
The error was that the people who could have prioritized fighting, didn't, and so the rebels didn't spend as much time or resources fighting through Hama as expected.
Between the publicly troubled retreat (abandoned vehicles), the non-defense of Hama itself, and the associated perceptions of collapse, the Syrian army took what could have been a bad but survivable retreat to a secondary defense line and entered a state collapse doom loop, where the perception of disaster and elite abandonment led to further disaster. This not only reduced resistance, but in some respects gave new momentum to the advancing rebels to continue the advance, leading to real and propagandized advances emphasizing the dynamism.
This may be changing- the Russians are still applying airpower they can, the Iranians are moving militias to try and stop the rebel advance and force that sort of over-extension- but the lack of resistance when it mattered led to disproportionate impacts turned a 'nothing ever happens, they'll advance to the limits of advance' towards a new paradigm of 'things have changed so much, everyone will be reconsidering their options.'
I've said in the past that I have a dim view of any strategy that relies on an assumption of 'and then the enemy will lose the will to fight.' I stand by that, and the historical examples are plentiful. But collapse scenarios do occasionally happen, and when they do normally reliable assumptions (such as 'defending armies will fight better when defending in urban terrain') are no longer valid (the defending army chose to retreat rather than stop and fight in a defense). When incredibly unlikely but possible things do occur, exploiting the opportunity (or mitigating the risk) is part of good strategy, even if good strategy shouldn't rely on it.
Is this my worst off-the-cuff assessment ever? Hardly. And depending on what happens as a result, it may actually still hold true, which is the weird thing.
The original prediction, after all, was on the prospects of a 're-opening of the civil war.' if Assad totally collapses then there would indeed not be a re-opening of the civil war. In fact, one of the stated goals of Turkey, who was the key backer of the rebels who started this Aleppo offensive, was to get Assad to agree to a civil war ending roadmap. Assad had rebuffed that process with the support of Russia and Iran, and it had seemed unnecessary. If this offensive culminates with a strained sort of peace talks rather than full scale win, or even just that more powers don't jump back into the civil war proxy game, that could be considered a qualified success.
Except it would be being right for the wrong reasons, and the reasons I gave were... not even unreasonable in and of themselves, I feel, but certainly didn't imply what ended up happening.
So, instead, let's say it outright. I was wrong.
As it has been before, so it will be again, c'est la vie.
Dean
1d ago
One might have imagined that the Russian-advocated attempted self-coup the preceeded the culmination of Maidan (and, of course, the reversal of the EU association agreement that preceded the Maidan political crisis) might have had something more to do with kicking off the current Ukraine situation, but I am glad to see a non-American attribution for once.
...from various European diplomatic and government reporting, many of which have been posted in The Motte over the years, as well as personal engagements?
I call it a war-context rather than simply war because while there are no direct European Union/NATO-member involvement in combat operations, it's not exactly hard to find acknowledgements of the contextual perceptions on views of the Ukraine War (explicitly noted as a reopening a war in Europe to change territorial borders) with demands for reshaping the European security order (with pre-war terms that would only be achieved by war), reasonings for why supporting Ukraine is important for more than moral reasons,, the Russian gas cutoff that accompanied (the fulfillment of long warned/disbelieved geopolitical hostage taking and an understood consequence of a war), Russian-associated sabotage efforts (of which there was just a naval vessel standoff in the Baltic), the perceived role and purpose of Russian information activities (to influence election results) and political-ally cultivation in European politics (including support for Russia-amiable leaders like Orban who then go on to develop their own more authoritarian shifts), beliefs that Russia has attempted direct coups of European community members (especially Moldova), the reasons why Trump's NATO non-support threats are so concerning (because the perceived need for NATO has overwritten nearly two decades of increasing NATO skepticism), and various others.
If you do not believe many Europeans view themselves in a major geopolitical conflict with Russia which includes stakes of state and governmental survival, we will have to disagree. If you think that this conflict is unfair to be described as a war-context despite much of it happening in the context of the Ukraine War, I am open to other terms. I would support some varient of 'Cold War,' but the cold war was a war context in many ways, so that would confudle the distinction.
I would still maintain the point that many Europeans do not share an American-centric perspective of Russia as a not-really-significant threat, and view the Ukraine conflict's greater context (as in, the context that led to the Ukraine conflict rather than Ukraine itself specifically) with far greater concern. This greater concern, in turn, drives decision making and value-compromising that would not occur in less concerning geopolitical contexts.
In any case canceling elections due to a "war context" without a formal declaration of war seems like shameless authoritarianism.
And I am not trying to dissuade you from that perception. Instead, I am trying to make a point that the lack of shame is driven due to the perception of necessity in geopolitical conflict.
'We are afraid of Russia' is not a mere figleaf excuse insincerely held to justify self-interest by people who are not afraid of Russia.
Geopolitical fears, in turn, drive the substitution of value/rule-prioritizing deontological ethics in decision makers with more utilitarian/consequentialist models, particularly due to increasing the dependence on institutions biased towards more consequentialist professional ethics (i.e. military and intelligence services) and partly because the raising of stakes can lead to belief that failure will see the losses of action occur regardless. (i.e. the cold war fear that letting a Communist foothold solidify would lead to a different authoritarian of worse geopolitical effects than your own supported strongman).
What we are seeing by and from the Europeans is sad, but very much consistent with shifts from when stakes are perceived to be low (and thus deontological consistency has lower costs) to a higher-stakes competition perception. We know that the EU leadership elite has a capacity to accept the elections of governments that they strongly dislike- see the Poland PIS and Orban- and we are now seeing differences in behavior that correspond in differences to attribution.
This is a perception difference that creates a gap with many Americans, who do not view the stakes of the Russia conflict as particularly high-stakes outside of nuclear escalation risk, which itself is a reason to de-prioritize the other elements of the conflict. Which, in turn, feeds into European leadership perception on the need to act for themselves, contributing to the cycle.
The consequence of fear-driven actions, however, is that much as it's hard to make someone understand that their paycheck depends on them not understanding, it's hard to find shame in people who believe what they are doing is necessary to avoid worse outcomes. Shame for these sort of things comes later, when the sense of urgency has faded (and often retroactive information consideration makes past dilemmas seem obvious), or from outside, by people who didn't share the context-perception in the first place.
Dean
1d ago
Pretty much, and this is the reminder to the American audience that many Europeans feel they are in a war context due to the nature (and the justifications) of the Russian war in Ukraine. One can disagree with it, but the European geopolitics is reflecting the sort of balances and compromises that come with significant geopolitical insecurity.
In a way, this is what the birth of a more strategically autonomous, multipolar Europe looks like. The Europeans are following in the footsteps of the American policy transition of the early cold war, when covert actions and interference rose as way to address concerning developments near home and further abroad.
You already fumbled the structural dynamics for the mathing, and without that there's not really much to comment on.
Dean
2d ago
Why would no US support for a primarily European supported pro-European movement mean no European support for a pro-European movement?
The escape from that fate is to get bailed out by a friendly country, which in this case would have to be Germany, but Germany too is broke right now.
It's even less that Germany is broke and more that it is constitutionally forbidden from assuming debt that it could afford to take on. This is/was the reason for the breakdown of the German coalition, as Scholz was trying to change the debt break in order to take on more debt.
The issue for France is that it is too big for Germany to simply bail out... without substantial, major, concessions that make it extremely clear (to the German public) that it is a purchase, not a loan to never be paid back.
Lol. 'We conquered to our technological limits to afford and maintain a coherent empire that, bounded by the jungles and the himelayas and the steppe and ocean, was still one of the largest in the world' is not what most historical contexts would consider 'highly restrained' imperial conquest. The Chinese conquered what they could hold, extorted what they couldn't, and weren't aware of what else they could profitably do.
The past Chinese certainly lost out on the expansionism of overseas colonization, but this was a result of oversight and court politics, not knowing alternative opportunities and choosing restraint. The modern Chinese state generally consider this a mistake not to be repeated.
This is a fair enough point. Erdogan himself hardly inherited, but there was substantial government composition evolution (including his own viewpoints, informed by the previous eras) that I agree he probably wouldn't make the same policy decisions as awhile ago.
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