Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
Dean
Flairless
2d ago
They can have multiple reasons to want it. Among which is the IRGC's reputation for being corrupt incredibly closely intertwined at all levels of the politically-managed economy, such that each potential new revenue flow is also money for people who like having money and regional patronage networks.
Dean
Flairless
2d ago
Why are those the only three explanations you could come up with?
You insert two or three conditional cluses per explanation. You could increase your explanations merely by modifying those.
Dean
Flairless
2d ago
In all honesty I'm not sure if this criticism is being aimed at me or pro-Iran posters who are confusing me.
Neither. It's just a pet peeve I've wanted to express for some time now, but rarely had a chance to express without it being unprompted or an implicit accusation of bad faith (which this was not meant to be against you).
If someone wants to be pro-Iranian, that's a completely different thing. And the Trump administration did itself no favors for not presenting its own case to the public for a 'why,' which I am on records as believing is a perfectly valid/legitimate expectation to ahve. As I said before, if the explainer does a bad job explaining their position, the problem is on the presenter, not the recipient of a bad presentation. I'll also maintain that 'understand' and 'agree' are different issues- you can understand / reasonably characterize someone's position without agreeing or conceding to it. Both confusion and opposition to the war are perfectly reasonable, even if there are unreasonable reasons smuggled in / not being challenged.
The particular rhetorical flourish you describe, which I eventually attribute to bad faith if it goes on after reasonable explanations, just brings out a waspish part of me. After a point, I'm less inclined to go along with faux incredulity which frames the bad faith individual as the one to set the standard of reasonableness, and instead counter it with faux credulity of their claim. If they want to claim inability to understand what's been given to them, ask what how they intend to overcome their self-professed limitations.
Which is not in line with the ethos of this forum, but it is the inclination, and thus the pet peeve.
What bothers me is the posters who don't seem to have any idea what the claims and circumstances are, either out of genuine ignorance or for need of rhetorical flourish. This is the first time in years I've felt mainstream media reporting is more reliable and informative than this forum and it's gross.
'I can't understand the reason for -position X-' is a bit of a peeve of mine when used as a rhetorical tool as opposed to confession of ignorance. If someone wants to understand, by all means, and if an explainer can't be clear that issue is on them. But when people who do understand and simply don't agree with underlying premise use it with the connotations of 'and if I don't understand it it's not reasonable,' it's just a form of consensus building via a implied reasonable person standard that smuggles in the person's standards in lieu of actually engaging other positions.
It's particularly recognizable when someone repeats the premise on the same topic. There's only so many times people can profess to having never heard a respectable counterargument until it's clear the lack of respect is on their end, not the interlocuters.
Dean
Flairless
3d ago
Their claimed conditions for peace before the ceasefire, for some. Reparations from the US, reparations from the Arab countries, the end of sanctions, and right to toll the strait of hormuz were all demands rather indicative of a state that sees money streams as a significant aspect of what they want.
Seems that Iran has closed the strait again, because the US blocked their ships.
'Again' implies that they had stopped closing the strait to regional traffic.
Aside from some high-visibility propoganda passages, the open commercial data of, say, Iraqi trade does not show any such unblocking.
To be honest, seems fair. A blockade is an act of war. A ceasefire where one side blocks economic activity while the other does not seems unbalanced.
Why NaN, I wasn't expecting a defense of the Trump's blockade from you of all people. Normally I'd have expected a pithy 'but Trump said the strait was open!' to deny the Iranian role in blocking the economic activity they weren't letting pass.
'Wasted' here only makes sense from a strategic perspective of 'we shouldn't be striking Iranian targets to begin with' - in other words, your reasoning is circular. The war is bad because we're wasting munitions, and the munitions are wasted because the war is bad.
It does have the echo of the totally-not-pro-Russians of yesteryear who were very adamant that the west was giving too much aid to Ukraine, and very evasive about what an 'appropriate' amount of aid was.
Dean
Flairless
5d ago
What, are you suggesting that Iran, leader of the axis of resistance that routinely hides military assets in restricted sites, might... lie for propaganda purposes?
Or exaggerate a real but smaller number of casualties? Or obfuscate if there was a valid military objective moved inside the school during the pre-war dispersals? Or benignly omit any past history or context of the infrastructure that might lead non-psychopaths to believe something nefarious?
Surely not. If you can't believe the government that months prior was killing thousands to over ten thousand citizens in the streets, who can you trust?
Dean
Flairless
12d ago
A Democratic media organ presenting a highly inflammatory allegation with salacious details without source and treating it as credible despite no one else seemingly able to verify?
Say it ain't so.
Dean
Flairless
13d ago
In my view, this is conflating regime leadership with regime type, which is what I'd consider 'regime change' to generally refer to.
This is understandable in more personalist systems, such as dictatorships built around specific individuals with minimal backbench of successors. In these cases, so much of the regime is tied to the individual that removing the individual removes a key driver of many of the distinct policies of the regime. An example here is Russia, where while whoever follows Putin is likely to be someone at least tolerable to Putin's security state, there's no institutional driver compelling them to follow Putin's desire to be a Great Man of History.
Iran has many issues, but that is not / was not one of them. Iran had a large backbench of clerics with government or military experience, just as it hard large cadres of Revolutionary old guard who could fill in if the old guard died suddenly or gradually. In turn, the system has spent a lot more time and effort trying to ensure that potential successors will be of a type. The clerical government's vetting and veto process is what has made even 'moderate' and often sidelied official opposition amount to 'I agree with your goals but think this is a bad way to pursue it,' while the IRGC is its own self-selecting force with get-along-to-get-along patronage networks.
With the IRGC's own influence now (and predictably) shaping the supreme leader succession, that is and was predictable grounds for expecting a change of leadership leading to a change of personalities, not a change in regime type.
This aligns with my thoughts in a general sense, with different caveats and less finality. Information sphere wise, easy Iranian victory. Underlying structural power factors, though... the war doesn't have to be a US 'win' to have bad effects on Iran.
My biggest caveat is that I personally don't think regime change or even a uprising was actually an early war goal of the Americans or Israelis. I think it was a sort of hoped-for outcome that served as a public justification that they wanted to encourage, and would absolutely have taken credit for if there was any sort of anti-regime movement, but I suspect it mostly was about putting people (particularly the Iranians) in a state of mind to, well, believe that regime change was actually the intention of what was basically a month-long (air) raid.
Which is a forest I think a lot (most) of the wartime discussion missed for the trees of individual leadership strikes. Almost everyone in the region had a general sense of what the US and Israelis had in theater, which was a lot of airpower and precious few maneuver formations. And yet, discussion for so long went from Kurdish invasions to Kharg island to what have you. Some people may believe the Iranians deterred and forced each invasion attempt to fail... or, possibly, there wasn't an invasion attempt at all. At which point it's not quite axiomatic to claim victory in repelling the invaders, but that's mostly because sometimes raiders won't leave on their own accord.
As far as a type of military operation go, though, raids are used to kill people or destroy things, and possibly bring something back. It doesn't seem like there was any raid of the nuclear sites to bring back uranium, but there was absolutely a lot of IRGC (and not-so-IRGC) military-industrial-economic infrastructure hit. Just how much and how severely remains to be see, but the growth curve has definitely been set back a bit, so to speak. Almost as impactfully, the most significant people killed were generally a leadership generation that had a lifetime of lived experience that waging proxy war could stay below the level of major combat operations, or at least stay largely safe themselves (at least until about a year or two prior). Their successors (probably) won't have that same mindset, even as they will have the reduced MIE-base to work with.
I think one of the more interesting potential long-term changes / harms to Iran will be what the impacts of the leadership succession will be. The previous Ayatollah had a lot of regional legitimacy with Shia because he was a cleric first, a ruler second. In so much that the IRGC took the reigns to run the country during the conflict and has become even stronger within Iran, the war has converted Iran from a theocracy with a praetorian guards to a praetorian guard with a theocracy. There are a number of longer-term implications of that, from religious legitimacy to rationalization of the security state and the increasing resilience of a state-within-the-state that is less bound to the clerics. It may take years to decades, but I suspect the revolutionary Islam cred will degrade compared to what it would have been, particularly if the IRGC-dominated Iran gets equated to with corruption and desires for wealth... which the current list of demands centering around money aren't exactly working against.
Dean
Flairless
21d ago
While I agree that there's definitely criticisms to be made of the war even from a neocon perspective, this does read like TDS. The war on Iran is easily justifiable from a Neocon perspective(we invaded Iraq over less), and there is an international coalition- it happens to be middle eastern countries rather than European ones, but it's there.
I suspect part of the issue is a paradigm difference between the sort of people who view wars as discrete, self-contained periods of violence, and those who view the current conflict as just the latest campaign of a longer war that neither started or expected to end (hence why the war is basically an extended air raid). I don't think 'neocon' implies one way or the other, but I firmly suspect Kagan is among the former and the current war leaders are among the later.
It's a paradigm difference that matters because a Kagan-style neocon might have a binary view of war based on the expected ability to decisively win, but otherwise see themselves at peace otherwise. It struggles when put into a context where decisive victory is not possible (and thus would prefer peace), but also is also denied peace (because the enemy gets to vote and can engage in sustained asymmetric warfare).
This is why military science discussions over the last few decades have shifted away from war as a binary to the conceptualization of conflict continuums of degrees of intensity/lethality that can be moved between more easily. But that evolution in the literature was after Kagan established his professional persona, and there's no indication he's tried or wanted to update his own models, especially when TDS-posting gives him steady employment and prestigious placings.
Dean
Flairless
21d ago
In the mainstream (TV etc) "discourse", that US is a reliable ally and a positive force in the world used to be near axiomatic, not anymore.
I suppose if we ignore not just Trump I, but also Bush II, Reagan, Nixon, and of course Eisenhower over the whole Suez Crisis.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but praise for the US was never axiomatic even from Europe, let alone other places.
Dean
Flairless
21d ago
Thank you. I'll not hold it against someone to not know about a particular media personality's long-established personality, but it was confusing seeing the equivalent someone pointing at the The Guardian and positing it as evidence that even Britain was lost. Kagan has ever been part of the Trump coalition. A person who for a decade has campaigned for the Democrats against the current Republican, writing for a generally Democratic media outlet, continuing to do so is about as surprising as water being wet.
Heck, it's not even good TDS-Kagan stuff, and it's filled with the sort of shallow geopolitical, historical, or strategic analysis that's either unserious or seriously phoning it in. There are a lot of reasons why various people in the US support the Israeli, but we have the Cold War records and deliberations of why the US started supporting Israel when it did, and 'a sense of moral responsibility after the Holocaust' is not a particularly competent summation of them... or why the US support started after a period, rather than consistent. Again, we have records from the leader deliberations at the time. Or the bit about 'Israelis should question the US's dedication to this fight' in the short but also longer term. This not only treats as an error the rather obvious limiting factor in the air campaign that the Israelis clearly helped and advocated for the US to do- the factor being that raids are by their nature shorter in duration and have more limited goals- but also ignores the elephant donkey in the room of the changing Democratic Party establishment's, shall we say, anti-commitment to Israeli support. Which would be providing the perspective for the Israelis in any now-or-later consideration. And going by his last paragraph, you'd think Kagan thinks the US never faced shifting basing basing or overflight permission shifts or adhoc coalition making in the past... as opposed to it being the standard practice (and difficulty) depending on the state and their interests at the time.
As far as rigor goes, it's slop. Comfortable slop, depending on one's taste, but it is very much served to satiate (or instigate) an emotional state rather than going for analytic or even historical accuracy. Which has been par for course for Kagan in the Trump era, so eh.
Dean
Flairless
22d ago
Honorable mention to GuessWho the Darwin alt who got so throughly destroyed that they didn't even make a huffy flounce post, but instead slunk away in shame.
Truly the legend of Amadan lives to this day, and shall never be forgotten.
Dean
Flairless
23d ago
For whatever it's worth, and whatever else I may observe or opine on this or any other conflict in the future, I do fundamentally agree / sympathize / consider this a valid position on how it should be.
Dean
Flairless
26d ago
I think this works well enough as a response from me, so thank you.
Only if it was presented as a reason to do the war, as opposed to a consequence of how the war turned out. Since Trump made no claim that this was The Goal or The Plan, he gets no credit (and has made no claim) for it.
In theory, the Iranians could have chosen another supreme leader aligned with or signalling support for the reformist camp. That they did not, and would not, was predicted by various people, including critics of the potential war before it started. This was generally preseted as a warning, typically in the form of 'a hardliner is bad (for the US/Israel) because they'll be more aggressive,' but that is in no way incompatible with 'a hardliner is bad (for Iran), because they'll refuse reform.' Whether the 'benefits' of Iran assuming greater opportunity costs outweighs the costs of another (quote-unquote 'more') hardline theocrat just goes back to frames of reference on what time scale, and under what sort of paradigm (i.e. negative-sum versus zero-sum versus positive-sum).
Which, as you note, I'm not making a position on. This is just noting the externalities that come with various dynamics.
(And thank you for recognizing / noting openly that you were not taking my... 'jawboning'?- as advocacy. The expectation of any such observation, or critique, being advocacy / defense is one reason I've avoided commenting much on the Iran conflict while I was enjoying a video game hiatus.)
Dean
Flairless
26d ago
It's possible that the war will end in a way that makes it easy to determine the winner, but it also seems plausible to me that the war will end with both sides claiming victory and the real measure of that victory will be measured in subsequent behavior over years or decades.
Very much this, and it's the decision-making process of the the subsequent decades in particular that will... not vindicate, but provide context for whose expectations may have been better grounded.
There are two general parts of state-level decision making in geopolitics: you need the resources to do it, and the sort of political leadership to choose those resources. I am far from convinced that the Iranian system will be better positioned for either in the future, even if the desires to toll the straights of Hormuz becomes the post-war status quo.
For state resources, many things are not just a matter of money, but time and capital. The US and Israel claim to have gone after a lot of military industry, and that is neither cheap or quick to replace, nor are the outputs. The nature of losing years to decades of naval or missile investments is that they may take years to decades of reinvestment to rebuild. Until you build another Navy, I doubt even the most hardline Ayatollah will, say, send a blue water task force to escort Iranian oil tankers to China in a US-china war and dare the US to start another war to stop it, with all the implications that has (or could have had in the middle east).
But political leadership matters to. The Iranian political-economic system was already strained enough that there was a 'moderate' faction of pragmatists who were willing to disagree with IRGC-aligned hardliners not in goals, but in the need for reforms to get there. This war seems to have let the IRGC step in and leave the reformists out, and over the longer term states that don't reform can still be aggressive and dangerous, but become less capable over time. There is also a point to be made about the difference between animosity and the belief of personal distance from risk. Ayatollah Khamenei and most of the Iranian high-level leadership had over 30 years of lived experience of well-justified belief that they could wage asymmetric and not-so-asymmetric warfare against the US and Israel and that they wouldn't be retaliated against. Khamenei 2.0 and his core advisors may hate the US and Israel even more than his father, but somehow I doubt they will hold that sort of belief.
None of this is an argument for or defense of the American attack on Iran, but it seems clear to me that this is a war to try and shape the trajectory of the region, and there's more to the future of the region and relative Iranian or US power than the straits of hormuz or if the Iranian theocracy stands.
Dean
Flairless
26d ago
I have heard from many a Chinese that the two decades after 1989 were some of the most profound political, economic, and social reforms of CCP-Chinese history. That Xi reversed many of these trends does not exactly change that shooting the protestors demanding such changes (and more) did not fix the issues of the Cold War-era communist economic-political order.
Dean
Flairless
26d ago
Now none of this is being reported clearly, and this all might be bullshit, and maybe one or both sides is engaging in distractionism.
Out of curiosity, what soft of things do you think the government of Iran would be saying if things were not going well for them and that they were prepared to make politically painful changes?
Remember that- at least according to various pro-Iranian positions of the last month- part of the travesty/evil of this war is that the US and Israel attacked during negotiations in which good-faith Iran was supposed to be on the cusp of making major concessions. I personally do not believe this claim, but for the sake of argument let's take the pro-Iranian claims at their word, and then take into consideration the Iranian words of the time. What narrative line pushed with the same vigor and effort by the state apparatus would you have looked at at the time and gone 'yeah, in the next few days they're going to make geopolitical concessions they've spent decades refusing'?
Or go back about 3 months ago, at the end of the January protest crackdown. This is hopefully not terribly controversial, but a government that shoots tens of thousands of its own citizens in the streets is facing things that could politely be called 'serious issues.' Hopefully also not terribly controversial, but shooting tens of thousands of your own citizens does not actually fix the issues, but tends to make them worse. Protests are a symptom, not the cause, of protests. But during and immediately after the regime, what high-level state or clerical rhetoric would you as the observer see and think 'they recognize and are going to address the underlying problems?'
Or go back further, to an event of your choice. The Iranian Revolution has had the better part of a half century to make mistakes and back down under pressure, despite the wishes of its ruling elite. At the time before the backdown was indisputably public, what sort of rhetoric were you seeing to indicate cracks within the system?
The point here isn't a claim about the current state of the current conflict, but about the ability to use certain types or sources of information to make meaningful conclusions about the state of the world. Different states lie in different ways, both deliberately and as the natural form of dissembling. For the Americans, the metaphor of kabuki theater exists for the sort of going-through-the-motions that has no real impact on the final result. For the Europeans, there will (almost) never be a diplomatic meeting that does not make positive 'progress' or that is not 'productive.' Examples could continue. There is quite often a public default position, regardless of what goes on behind the scenes.
If you want to take Iranian public rhetoric as presumptively true, and make the possibility that it's just public dissembling false the caveat, I'm not going to stop you. In fact, I will thank you for remembering the caveat. But before you feel disquiet and defeat, it might be worth considering whether Iran might have a default public persona of defiant triumphalism, and consider how that compares or contrasts if the Iranian opponent is an actor with the media objectivity and positivity that surrounds Donald J. Trump, and consider how that might shape your perception... and the information that would be provided to you.
Dean
Flairless
27d ago
Partly because right now is a politically opportune moment, but also because a lot of groundwork had to be laid to set up a viable path to cross the hundreds of miles.
Agreed on both of these parts. One of the frustrating elements of the early-war discussion was something barely discussed at all- the fact that both US and Israel have elections this fall. Trump was already more or less doomed to lose the Republican trifecta, but Israel was also going through a potential major shakeup. This was a political window of opportunity for both parties, even aside from other elements and potentially limited opportunities.
This is not a claim that it's an opportunity that should have been taken, or was right to have taken, or any such thing. But Israeli political calculus would be factoring the potential 6+ years before the next potentially favorable US executive, and the US executive branch that's been trying to settle issues (starting with Venezuela) would be measuring the window of opportunity in even shorter time frames.
Dean
Flairless
27d ago
There should be a strong prior for widespread support of the regime in charge.
Why?
Most authoritarian states exist without widespread support. They exist with widespread acceptance / tolerance / fear of consequences if they actively oppose. I suppose we could claim passive acceptance as widespread support, but that's not how many people use the term.
Government rallies and government funerals are extremely weak indicators of popular support. It's the classic conflation of proportional versus absolute numbers issue, further complicated by the resources of a state to pay for pageantry and attendance.
Even if they're not armed, where's the arson and window-breaking, the rocks thrown at police? Even Palestinians can manage that much.
That was about 2-3 months ago. Understandable to have forgotten. It's not like the even the Hamas-Palestinians are doing much different after their own recent, uh, bad time.
Dean
Flairless
27d ago
I'd be happy to concede for someone who wants to be concerned about both, so long as it's consistent. But as you say different forms of lethal conflict is still lethal conflict. That this is hard to determine parts of the conflict because of their deliberate and systemic use of proxies doesn't change the underlying point: there is no caveat to the right of self-defense under international law that says you can only act against proxies, any more than there is a word-cell series of claims that lets someone go 'I can hit you (indirectly), no hit backs.' There is no principle under international law that the other party must accept your denials of plausibly deniable proxy warfare: the determination of plausibility, and what to do with it, has always rested with the other party.
I generally don't contest peoples personal opinions per see, so I wouldn't spend much time or interest on anyone who wants to take the position on who 'started' the conflict. But who chose to 'start' a conflict is different from who chose to continue it in certain ways, and how, and there is plenty of agency open for the Iranians on that front as well as anyone else. There are a number of regional states that fought multiple wars against Israel who have chosen other paths, and there are an even larger number of global states who fought wars with the US for whom relations are anywhere from cool to cordial. Making hating the Americans and the joos part of your raison d'être is a thing a polity chooses to do, not something their chosen enemies chose for them.
So- with those caveats- I otherwise generally agree with the point that this conflict didn't 'start' in 2026. We are watching an air-campaign that has been a series of campaigns, from both directions, for longer than most members of this site have paid attention to global affairs. It is not the start of a long-war any more than the Iranian supplied-and-directed artillery campaign via Hezbollah that displaced tens of thousands in northern israel was the start, or the airstrike on Solemani when he was on his way to engage Iranian-allied militia groups in Iraq that off-and-on attacked Americans was the start, or the American invasion of Iraq as a neighboring security treat was the start, or the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentine was the start.
It is also not going to be the end of the long war. Personally, I doubt it was ever intended to be, but that is a post for another time.
Only if you make distinctions without a difference, which would merely be a skill issue.
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