Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being an insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
Every time I'm reminded of that quote, I'm reminded of a person who insisted with a straight face that they were mature enough to sleep with a subordinate without it compromising their leadership of their team.
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
Depends on how you define it, but it's also a red herring: there are more to sanctions than SWIFT.
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
Which is a separate question from 'wanted to imprison this citizen for reasons other than US say-so.'
'US say-so' implies the US wants the man imprisoned. It is agnostic on the reason why.
'This man is a gang member' is a motive that can apply regardless of US desired results. It is agnostic as to the source of the information.
The gang affiliation is also a matter of US record that predates the current Trump administration's deportation push. There's no allegation I am aware of that it was invited in the last three months since Trump's inauguration.
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
...are we ignoring El Salvadorian President Bukele's extremely well documented inclination to imprison known and even suspected gang members, which occurred despite US say-so?
Or Bukele's comments last week?
The administration was ordered to “facilitate” his return. That’s different.
For anyone else just reading this topic for the first time- the lack of definition of what 'facilitate' entails was the crux of last week's discussion thread on this topic.
If 'facilitate' is used in the sense of 'make easier,' then no change in the person's actual location status is required. 'Facilitate' does not mean 'achieve.'
If 'facilitate' is used to demand a result, this becomes a foreign policy requirement, and especially an international sovereignty conflict, which creates a constitutional issue against the court demanding such a result.
As Prima notes, the Supreme Court did not order a result. The courts that have denied 'make easier' efforts as sufficient facilitation are lower courts. Tthe Supreme Court has not specifically weighed in on their ability to demand a result versus an effort.
And to think, just last weekend I posted some of my thoughts and predictions on last-Friday's foreshadowing. I wouldn't have been surprised if this came even weeks later, but nothing here changes my position in general.
I'd agree with you that this is a good deal for Russia, but I'd disagree that Puti is no nationalist. I think nationalist reasonings would be the reason Putin does not accept this- either by outright refusal or waiting long enough that the Trump administration walks away or most likely by trying to blame the Ukrainians. The 'we're winning and we'll keep winning and if Trump walks away that's good for us to keep going until total victory' is a political force, and Putin is a strategic procrastinator unless faced with clearly bad decisions of setback or worse setback.
This is not that. This is 'good' versus 'could be better later.' If US is willing to recognize Crimea now, there's no inherent reason why Trump wouldn't be willing to recognize Crimea later, or Russia might not demand other (European) countries do as well. Things like preventing Ukraine from having unfettered access to the Dnieper is a point in and of itself for permanent long-term maleffects to Ukraine. Similar with threatening Ukraine power system prospects.
We'll see if the war ends with this. I have my doubts*, but it is within the scope of possibilities. On the other hand, so is kabuki for several more weeks. (The offer mentions sanctions since 2014. This does not specify, but likely includes, European sanctions. However, Trump notably has not exactly included the Europeans, who could veto such a relaxation, in his Putin negotiations.) So would a temporary cease fire that returns to fighting.
*I'll actually go further: I hope it stops, but that hope on my part has a tendency is itself subject to interpreting incoming information with confirmation bias.
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
It’s the same problem that’s occurred since time immemorial and is the reason why (as I understand it) Republican politicians were discouraged from spending too much time in Washington.
That was part of the 1994 Republican Revolution under Newt Gingrich. It wasn't just 'discouragement' either- it was a organizational-restructuring, as the rules of Congress were changed to facilitate frequent travel out of DC. Most notably, Congressional business workflows were centered on the mid-week, so that key votes were Tuesday-Thursday, to make Monday/Friday travel days more viable.
It was part of 'proving independence from Washington' and 'staying in touch with your constituents.' It is the oft-forgotten root of regular complaints that Congress spends too little time in Washington compared to the past, and the associated complaints that Congress gets less done (because they are present less) and don't know eachother as well. On the other hand, it arguably contributes to the dynamic of voters loving their congressperson but hating congress.
It was also, critically, a period where Republicans were also incentivized to not bring their families to D.C., which in turns means the wives and children who stay behind aren't culturally socialized into the blue-tribe-dominated national capital region. But it also means, by extension, that Democratic representative families under the same dynamics aren't socializing with more red-leaning counterparts, and are free to be even bluer influences on their Congressional-spouses.
This is an oft-forgotten / underappreciated rules-level dynamic of national-level political centralization and elite-consensus.
Keeping key elites spending time together and away from their own power-bases that could foster a sense of disconnect from the central authority has been a national cohesion strategy since before Louis XIV and Versailles. This helped political centralization by giving the monarch an easier time keeping an eye on everyone if they were in one part. But it also allowed for political homogenization/consensus-building/shared-identity cultivation of a common French identity amongst elites, as the French nobility were forced by proximity (and tactical political interests) to get along and socialize. Court politics is infamous in fiction for political infighting and drama, but it does create paradigms for collective understandings, interests, and identities, hence the divide of the french estates leading to the French revolution. Nobles infight against eachother, but unite in common cause against challenges to their collective interests and privileges.
Congressional committee placement politics isn't an exact analog to the French Monarchy making appointments dependent on remaining at court, but there are more than a few parallels. If you're not missing key votes because you're spending time with constituents- because Congressional workflows are focused on Tuesday-Wednesday-Thursday execution- then you're not losing your chance at valuable appointments to powerful Congressional committees. The lower the opportunity cost of not-being in the capital, the greater the opportunity-gains of being elsewhere for fundraising / political events / etc. And, again, you're away from your family less if you're free to return to them more often.
These are changes that the Congressional Democrats have kept even when they recaptured Congress. They get many of the same benefits as well. And as the D.C. area is something like 90% Democratic for a variety of reasons, it's hard to see them convincing (or, frankly, forcing) the Republicans to revert to the pre-Gingrich status quo in the name of homogenizing them in an expected blue direction.
Interestingly, it's also a dynamic being actively pursued in the reverse by the movement of property, and not just people.
You can arguably see an implicit effort-to-reverse Federal consensus-centralization ongoing right now, as Trump attempts to push the federal bureaucracy away from the capital region.
One of the less-commented efforts the Trump administration is pursuing is moving federal agencies outside of the DC area and to other states. This has been overshadowed by the media coverage of the personnel management, but the property management is (almost) as important.
Among the earliest executive orders was a direction for agencies to propose relocations away from DC and to other states. This purportedly on cost-reasons. DC property is expensive to maintain, employee allowances are higher to make up for the regional cost of living, etc. The actual cost of moving has to be balanced against savings are likely to provide, but states have an incentive to take some of that cost for their own long-term gain in getting the relocated agencies.
Almost as importantly, Congress persons have an incentive to approve federal agency relocations to the benefit of their own state. Even Democratic politicians who might personally hate Trump. Which is to say, Federal government divestment from DC offers bargaining chips / horses to trade in the upcoming year(s) of budget negotiations.
That this is also is likely to have an employee-composition impact, as the hyper-blue DC environment those agencies recruit and socialize and network within get replaced with more purple environments that are geographically dispersed, is probably not going to be a publicized or recognized until it's as locked-in as the Gingrich Congressional travel changes.
As has been seen with some shutdowns like the USAID shutdown, DC-based federal employees have often indicated they want to stay in the DC area. This is natural. Even if they were offered an opportunity to keep their jobs if agencies were relocated instead of shutdown, some percent would refuse and seek other employment in DC. This is just a matter of statistics. It is also an area of precedent. In the Trump 1 administration, nearly 90% of DC-based Bureau of Land Management employees retired or quit rather than relocated to Grand Junction, Colorado.
That's bad if you think an equivalent dynamic to, say, the DC Headquarters of the Justice Department would lose vital experience and expertise and informal coordination with other agencies. On the other hand, if you don't think the headquarters of the US Justice Department should be rooted in the swamp that is 90% blue, and less than a mile from where a 'Black Live Matter' mural used to be maintained on the street...
And once departments are separated, the sort of informal coordination that can occur if you and a friend/ally you know in another part of the government can meet in the same town also goes away. Inter-government lobbying is a lot harder if you are cities apart. Inter-department coordination is also, and almost as importantly, a lot harder to do without a document trail.
And this is where one could infer a non-stated motive for the resistance-shy Trump. One of the only reasons the US electorate learned that the Biden administration white house was coordinating with the Georgia anti-Trump case despite denials was because one of the Georgia prosecutor assistances invoiced the White House for the travel expenses for in-person engagements. In-person meetings, in turn, are one of the ways to avoid Freedom of Information Act requests or Congressional subpoenas for communications over government systems.
This is where the Versailles metaphor comes back, but as an inverse of sorts. It was easier for Louis the XIVth to keep an eye on and manage the nobility when they were in one place. They were scheming, sure, but he could keep watch of them in a single physical location where he controlled the coordination contexts. Trump / the Republicans do not control the coordination context of DC. They can, however, increase political control over the bureaucracy by physically separating it across multiple physical locations, where they have easier means to monitor inter-node coordination.
It is also an effort that will be exceptionally hard for the Democrats to reverse, if they try to. It is a lot easier to divest and reorganize government institutions when you have a trifecta than when you don't. It is also much easier to give up federal property in DC to the benefit of states than it is to get state Congressional representatives to vote to strip their states of jobs and inflows for the sake of DC.
Which means that federal agencies that depart DC will probably not return in the near future. And the longer they stay away, the longer that local employment hiring filters into organizational cultures at the lowest levels. The more that Federal employees have their spouses and children shaped by the less-blue-than-DC environments, and thus shape them in turn. The less engaged, and involved, they can be in the beltway culture.
The Trump administration DC divestment are arguably going to have long-term effects on affected parts of the federal bureaucracy on par with Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution affects on Congress in the 90's. Affected agencies will be less compositionally composed of, less socially exposed to, and less culturally aligned to Blue-dominated DC in ways that will only become apparent decades from now.
That is perhaps a valid distinction, but I don’t see any indications that Russia’s military economic advantages have actually decreased over the course of the war.
What does it matter that you don't see indicators when you regularly dismiss indicators you don't want to see?
In the last three posts alone, you have dismissed half of a category to fixate on a non-central non-counter, dismissed literal photographic evidence that you don't acknowledge could be processed to deal with your objection, and added a conditional to dismiss an indicator literally visible from orbit. Various elements of each of these can be supported by commercial satellite imagery from any country you choose.
I’m sorry I’m so salty about this, but I spent a solid two years getting downvoted and /k/ope brigaded for the mere suggestion that it didn’t seem like Ukraine was winning a decisive victory.
Have I ever claimed that Ukraine was winning a decisive victory? Brigaded you on any /#/ board? Called on you to be downvoted?
Shortening the lines of communication shorted how far the logistics had to travel. Sustained aerial bombardment of industrial centers, naval blockades from receiving foreign materials including oil, and eventual capture of resource-input regions and industrial centers created far worse logistical capacity.
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
The key words in that being and equipment, as well as stockpiles, and the other economic factors implied within military-economic.
A rebuttal that focuses merely on the mobilized manpower at the start of the conflict is not a rebuttal of military-economic disparities. Particularly when the non-mobilization of reserves was a policy choice rather than a lack of availability.
Russia may have squandered many of its military-economic advantages at the start of the conflict, but that does not mean it did not have them.
Did you misunderstand the phrase 'military-economic' to mean 'manpower', per chance?
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
The WW2 example also had different acceleration dynamics that favored the Soviets.
In WW2, the allied powers got more capable of conducting offenses over time due to the increasing relative manpower and applied logistical throughput (i.e. actually giving manpower the equipment for mechanized warfare) compared to the Axis. This dynamic accelerated due to the relative tool up of the Allied war-economies vis-a-vis the earlier tool-up of the Axis economies that progressively lost access to resources as the war continued. Put in other terms, as the war continued, the Soviet logistical situation got better, and the German logistical situation got worse.
In the Ukraine War, the difference in warfighting capabilities has decreased, not increased, over time. Russia was at its maximum military-economic advantage in the earlier phases of the war, when it had not only the larger standing army but the larger standing stockpiles to match to it. Russia also began its war economy tool-up faster than the Ukraine coalition. However, as the stockpiles degraded and the military-mobilization phase reaches diminishing returns, Russia has gotten less capable of mechanized warfare advances over time. Similarly, the military-economic mechanics have played out Ukraine has gotten more capable of providing sustained resistance over time now that it's no longer limited by things such as a Soviet ammo standard and such.
There are some dynamics that could yet work in the Russian favor- que 'the Ukrainians will collapse any time now'- but there's a reason that last year's 'significant increases' in rate of territory change were still measured in positional rather than maneuver warfare terms.
The system works on the principles of sovereignty and jurisdiction that you (continue) to avoid addressing the implications of. Your repeated attempts to avoid those relevant facts do not make them not-facts or not-relevant to the merits of your citations.
Nothing needs to fundamentally change to respect those fundamental limitations to the judiciary's ability to demand policies of the executive branch. The government not merely submitting to an improper attempt to invoke judicial authority over foreign policy regarding a foreign citizen in a foreign country is the system working appropriately. As is dismissing appeals that are blind to history or standing precedents, particularly when repeated by people who know the legal differences in play.
Judges are not the source of law, or even legitimacy. Their word is not Law.
But I'm sure your next attempt at a last word will be all the stronger if you ignore the implications of sovereignty or jurisdiction to focus on anything else.
In Which Dean Points to New and Upcoming News as Reason to Expect the Ukraine War to Continue For Some Time
TL;DR - We are entering a few weeks in which Trump/Republican/American support for Ukraine is likely to transition to a more stable sustain-aid-to-Ukraine footing. The post-inflexion point where the future trajectory is clear will probably be apparent in May with the state of ceasefire negotiations. The longer-term balance of aid politics will probably be apparent by late August, with the 2026 US national budget proposals for FY26.
/
Start
In the spirit of 'possible foreshadowing for the next week of this crazy ride we call life'- the Trump administration signals it is ready to 'move on' from Ukraine peace talks if no progress in the coming days.
/
What Has Happened / About to Happen?
The very abbreviated summary of what's new is that Trump has been raising frustration with the (lack) of progress on the 30-day general ceasefire proposal in public and private, which is reaching media through official and unofficial channels. While the Trump administration has raised concessions such as raising recognition of Crimea as Russia as part of a framework and some forms of sanction relief, this has been undercut by elements like Russia announcing that the 30-day energy truce is over and that a broader Ukraine ceasefire is "unrealistic." As Ukraine signaled support for the broader ceasefire proposal back in early march as part of the post-Trump-Zelensky White House blow up that included the temporary intelligence / aid freeze, and has been publicly supportive/aligned since despite clear misgivings, I doubt Trump will be blaming / punishing Ukraine if that 'insufficient' progress decision is made.
Not least because, and totally coincidentally, the Trump administration signaled an expectation of signing the Ukraine mineral deal late next week as well. The deal is not without its critics within or outside of Ukraine. However, after a US concession / clarification / [choose weaker term of choice] that the deal would respect / not hinder Ukraine's EU obligations as part of EU process. This would still leave the formal ratification through the Ukrainian parliament, as if it were a treaty, but this does not appear to be an obligation on the US side... but will be doubtlessly be raised by Trump as a diplomatic / economic triumph for his domestic audience.
So we have a Trumpian warning / demand for immediate progress on a broader ceasefire or a drop of peace process.
What does this mean?
No necessarily much, but enough for a 7-point effort post.
/
Point one, it's not necessarily as time sensitive as it is being presented, as opposed to being part of a possible multi-week push for a truce.
This can be your typical negotiating tactic of trying to create a sense of urgency for Russia to close a deal. People on all sides can recognize it. What does (or does not) happen next week will not 'prove' anything on its own.
However, that doesn't mean there isn't a limited window of opportunity. There are other geopolitical priorities competing for Trump's attention. There is Latin America migrant repatriations. There are (indirect) negotiations with Iran. There are (many) trade negotiations over tariffs. There are (broader) China issues. There is everything else, including the upcoming federal budget negotiations. Some of these (the 90-day tariff pause, US budget negotiations) are more predictable than others.
Ukraine peace is a policy priority of choice, not necessity. Trump can, and eventually will, move on to some other issues. The only dispute is whether this is a matter of weeks, months, or years. Trump is signaling / claiming days-weeks. You don't need to believe that to recognize that even a window of weeks (or even months) is still a window.
This creates a risk that even if all parties wanted to end the war, they could miss the opportunity if some (Russia) attempt to draw out negotiations in the name of trying to get more.
/
Point two is option two- the (unlikely) prospect that Russia reigns in its demands to accept a cease-fire deal is likely sooner than later.
This is not presented as the 'expected' option. Arguments have been made in the Motte and elsewhere that Russia has no reason to stop if they feel they are winning and expect to keep winning. There are separate lines of argument that Putin has political and social reasons to maintain the war, and some of these reasons apply regardless of whether Russia is actually able to win or not.
I've made no secret in the past that I view Putin as a strategic procrastinator, and these tendencies can compound to drawing out negotiations on the belief that delay will improve your result. Especially when a 30-day military ceasefire would give Ukraine a full uninterrupted month to patch up eastern fortifications and thus increase Russian costs in resuming an offensive afterwards.
However- just because it is an unlikely option doesn't mean it's impossible. And if it does happen, that would be more likely in the coming works than right after Trump publicly moves on. And if that happens, expect a surge of international attention and maneuvering as Trump attempts to close a deal on a longer peace, and everything that means. The month after a ceasefire could see everything from a surge in Russian recrutiments (as people attempt to leverage enlistment bonuses on the expectation of a lot of money without having to fight) to European efforts to make their ability to veto Russian demands of them (i.e. sanctions relief) a veto/leverage point.
But the more unlikely it is, the more likely any window-of-opportunity with the Trump administration is to close. And re-opening a window can be much, much harder the second time than the first.
/
Point three is what Trump 'passing' on the peace process means for Ukraine if it does occur.
My position is that a collapse of US-Russia negotiations means sustained, not diminished, US aid for Ukraine.
The crux of the Trump ukraine peace plan that was raised as far back as last election was that aid to Ukraine would be a lever against both parties to bring them to the negotiation table. The point most reported- typically by those who were opposed to Trump, or wanted to believe that Trump would end Ukraine support entirely- was the point that Ukraine would not receive weapons if it did not participate in peace talks with Russia. However, the plan also stipulated that if Ukraine did do so, then the US would continue to arm Ukraine so that Russia would not attack again after a cease fire concluded.
Obviously, negotiation results with Russia could change that. However, absent those results, the question becomes why Trump would cut off all aid to Ukraine regardless.
An argument made is the monetary / cost issue will motivate Trump. The past arguments of affordability, replacement costs, and so on.
The relevance of the mineral deal is that it is a profit motive / political cover for military aid. We know this is a paradigm Trump has considered because the Trump administration raised the prospect of framing past aid as a loan the mineral deal could pay off. While Zelensky pushed back against past military aid as a loan to not be compensated for, and the US softened its position on past aid during the negotiations this is what we would generally consider a 'suspiciously specific denial.' 'Old' aid, after all, is rather distinct from 'new' aid.
In other words (from sources more sympathetic to Ukraine to the US), the mineral deal cann be seen as a proposed reparations mechanism to pay back American aid. And if this isn't going to be applied to old aid...
This may go a non-trivial way for weakening/neutralizing the 'the US cannot afford to give away aid to Ukraine' line of arguments in the US government for cutting off Ukraine aid entirely. Aid that is 'purchased' can be replaced at cost, or better- with all the beneficial implications for scaling up an arms industry for another conflict (China) on basis of orders (paid to fight Russia).
Future military aid may no longer be 'aid' in the sense of coming at no cost to the recipient, but it is more likely to come even from relative skeptics if it is 'purchased.'
And that, in turn, changes some of the Russia-Ukraine war dynamics going forward in ways that do not support a mid-term end if the near-term window of opportunity closes.
/
Point four- parallel negotiations as a means of leverage on each other.
This final point is a framing to help understand why certain unpopular/criticized things of the last months have occurred, but also why they can support a longer Russia-Ukraine war. In short, the Russia-US ceasefire negotiations and the Ukraine-US mineral deal negotiations increased US leverage in both.
The Russian diplomatic/economic strategy for years has been to try and keep Ukraine separated from western military aid, so that relative Russian economic size could be an advantage, as opposed to relative western economic size. In this context, the pending US-Ukraine mineral deal is a theoretical leverage, by promising / threatening sustained western aid. This may not be enough leverage, but it is a basis for pushing Russia to make a cost-saving concession sooner. However, if the mineral deal is executed, this potential leverage goes away- the US political-economics involved make backing out of a one-sided deal (in the US favor) exceptionally difficult.
On the other hand, the continuation of the war is itself leverage for the US over Ukraine in the mineral deal. The more the Ukrainians expect to need continued aid, the more the US can make military aid conditional on future reimbursement. The more the Ukrainians need to reimburse, the more value the mineral deal has over time as a means to cover the collateral. If the Russia-US negotiations culminated before the mineral deal, however, those negotiations could more easily have terms that prevent the long-term interest in forming in Ukraine. Which, in turn, means less ability to secure American aid.
So the 'I expect Russia to come to the table soon' is not just a matter of the Russia-US negotiations. It also serves as a second-order pressure on Ukraine to seal the mineral deal. Which includes things like getting it through the Ukrainian Rada (legislature), including the Zelensky administration spending political capital to overcome criticisms to do so in a timely manner. Either a Russian conciliation for more serious negotiations or a Russian intent to keep fighting indefinitely both providing incentive to sign the deal and keep the weapons flowing.
(This weapon flow in turn is why this may be a one-sided but not solely to American benefit / Ukraine expense. Note that securing American aid against Russia not only provides the means to resist Russia / increase Russia costs if it chooses to pursue conquests. It also weakens the Russian negotiation position vis-a-vis Ukraine, if Russia can no longer expect to completely separate Ukraine from US aid in the future. This increases Ukrainian bargaining posture for any peace deal, as while it may take longer in the near-term for the Russians to internalize that, it will decrease the Russian ability to demand long-term concessions that would leave Ukraine more vulnerable to another war.
This is not an argument of 5D-chess / 'everything is going according to plan.' But it is a model for understanding how seemingly separate lines of negotiations, and unsightly diplomatic conflict, play into each other.
Take the Trump-Vance-Zelensky blowup in late February. Most people can understand, if not like, how the following military aid/intelligence cut off improved leverage via making Trump aid cutoff threats credible. The willingness to do so can also be generally understood as a credibility booster for the US entering into the Russia-US negotiations, that the Trump administration was willing to break with the prior Biden administration and consider concessions the Ukrainians/old-guard would not want. That credibility might not be enough, it might be the basis of Russia pressing for more, but it is a form of credibility of good-faith* effort. *For a certain perspective of good-faith.
But not everyone will recognize that the more promising (or unfortunate for Ukraine) the Russia-US negotiations appear, the more leverage that applies on the mineral-deal negotiations in turn. Or how that has a feedback loop where progress on mineral negotiations can influence Russian negotiations, such as the Russian offer of mineral incentives to the US, including from Russia-occupied Ukrainian territory. Which is its own feedback loop back to the Ukraine deal, and so on.
(This isn't limited to ceasefire-mineral relations either. It can apply to other aspects as well. The US-Ukraine mineral deal shapes Ukraine-EU relations. That means it is also an aspect of US-EU trade relations, currently under negotiation. What is also subject to negotiation is the EU's publicly-mooted 'lots of money for rearmament, but not from Americans because we don't trust them' funds. Which are, however, open for negotiation by other non-EU members. Quid-quid-quid exists.)
Feedback loops are not infinite. They are not all-powerful. As noted above, if the Ukraine-US mineral deal goes through, that undercuts the US leverage against the Russia position. And if the leverage against Russia fails, then the war goes on.
But that's not for a lack of a 'good-faith' effort. And what's also often not recognized is the importance of good-faith effort at the cease fire to legitimize the lock-in of American support to Ukraine.
/
Point five - the importance of having tried and failed, over having never tried at all, and covering the costs with a skeptical-but-not-hostile electoral base.
The not-quite-final point I think the two news stories brings up, of ceasefire windows and mineral-deals-for-weapons, is what this means for the Trump coalition and its willingness to continue supporting ukraine if Russia is blamed by Trump for a lack of ceasefire.
The general American republican-versus-democrat divide on Ukraine support centers on whether the US provides too much support to Ukraine or not. Last month, a Gallop poll from 3-11 march of Americans, broken by party, characterized the Republicans as relatively divided. 56% said the US was providing too much. 56% is indeed a plurality, and some may take it to mean that the US republicans collectively oppose any aid to Ukraine.
But it is a plurality with nuance. 12% of Republicans were in the 'not enough' camp, and 31% were in the 'right amount' camp. That alone is a 43% share of 'right amount or not-enough.' A 5.6 to 4.3 response is an advantage, but it's not an overwhelming advantage.
It's also subject to future change, just as it was subject to recent change. Back in December 2024, the 'too much' category was 67% percent, and the 'not enough' was still... 12%. And the 'right amount' was 20%. But remember- 'not enough' was 12% in both december 2024, before Trump entered office, and in the march 2025 polling. This means the only real change was between the Republican 'too much' versus the Republican 'not enough' factions.
That means nearly the entire shift in Republican support for Ukraine aid corresponded to Trump's handling of the Zelensky white house issue of the previous week, including both the aid-freeze but also the indications of its return.
The poll was 3-11 March. 3 March was when the post-blowup military aid freeze was announced. On 5 March the administration was indicating the aid would come back if negotiations were pursued.
Put another way- when Trump was actively freezing, Republican opinion shifted about 11% away from 'the US is providing too much aid' (even as the US was freezing aid), and Republicans 'not enough or about right' went from nearly 30% to over 40% of the Republican base.
Now, there are two general ways to read this. One reading is that the opinion numbers reflect absolute value of aid. The other reading is that this change is about how aid is handled.
The anti-Ukraine case could use the chang to argue that the cutoff of aid leads to the 'right amount' polling because 'freeze aid' is 'right amount.' However, this ruling on absolute volume of aid runs into the question of what those who think no aid = too much aid are thinking. Does aid need to be actively negative to not be too-much? Polling challenges occur.
The other reading is that the Republican shift is less about the actual volume amount of money- of which Americans are notoriously unfamiliar with the specifics of- and more about how the aid is handled. This is a conditionality approach- the right amount depends on tying aid to the right conditions on the ground. Cutting aid is appropriate after a high-level fight. Promises to condition aid are appealing if aid is conditioned on peace talks. The amount is less important than the political context.
I'm not here to argue which you should believe is right. My point is that both of these readings suggest that the potential news of the coming weeks- the Ukraine mineral deal and Russia peace deal- may shift the Republican coalition towards a greater 'right amount or more' coalition balance for further Ukraine aid.
/
Point six - how the deals (and Trump walkway from a ceasefire) may shape Trump's base into a more pro-Ukraine-aid direction.
For the 'too much' coalition, this is because 'too much' can itself be broken down into 'too much because [cost]' and 'too much because [anti-Ukraine]' subgroups.
For the later [anti-Ukraine] group, any aid is too much regardless of cost because of who it benefits, not the money itself. This is just locked in. It doesn't matter why you oppose Ukraine aid, whether further sub-groups of [pro-Russia] or [anything-but-Biden] or [Ukraine-specific] motives. It can be none of those, even a [US isolationist] position. Any foreign aid/involvement is too much. This is the baseline of the forever-'too-much' faction.
However, the [cost] faction is less locked-in because [cost] is relative to [gains]. These gains may be monetary expectations (mineral revenues to pay back non-old 'aid'), or in-kind (mineral resources instead of cash), or other. The kind of gain is less important than the perception of gain. This is the distinction between [cost] as a motive, and [cost] as argument-as-soldiers. [Anti-Ukraine] factions may use [cost] when it is convincing, but it's not their motive. It is the motive for those who view [cost] as a primary issue.
This is where the Ukraine mineral deal can start prying apart the 'too-much' coalition, because expected future gains can offset costs. And the more Democratic / international media criticizes the deal as 'extortionate,' the more credible it can be to an otherwise unfamiliar base that, hey, aiding Ukraine is not just [cost].
The 'how it is handled' faction in turn will respond to success of the mineral deal / failure of the peace talks.
This is because the 'handling' faction is, again, less motivated by the actual amount of aid as much as the perception that the decisions are being made appropriately. This may be because they felt Biden was blindly giving away stuff without giving peace a chance. It may be pure partisanship that condemned aid as too much because it was from Democrats rather than Republicans. It may be because they feel aid should be responsive to political power dynamics, approving of a withdrawal because of 'disrespect' but open to 'earned' or 'deserved' aid. Again, the actual value of the aid is not the determining point.
The mineral deal can be a partial salve in this group because a quid-pro-quo is a reasonable 'handling' that can alleviate concerns on the relationship aspect. The more advantageous to the US the better, in so much that it affirms their view of the 'proper' power relationship. It's a bit like 'millions for defense, not one cent in tribute,' where 'give Ukraine aid because you're supposed to' is an imposition of obligation where the premise (obligatory tribute) is more important than the money (millions in defense being more expensive than unacceptable tribute).
However, a ceasefire talks collapse is even more relevant.
Trump-Putin ceasefire efforts may be a partisan reframing of US-Russia pre-war negotiations, but that partisanship is what makes the Trump experience more relevant for 'was peace tried' objections. Trump, by virtue of not being in office, is not held responsible. Trump's position that the war should be ended by negotiation is the basis by which people believe he would [rightly/wrongly] compromise Ukrainian interests in nways Biden would not. Arguably no one but Ukraine has more interest in a near-term ceasefire than Trump.
And if that fails- and as importantly if failure is not credibly assigned to Ukraine, which I think is doubtful- then Trump and the Trump base is more likely to blame Russia than Trump himself. This is a question of good faith versus efforts to oppose the talks.
The Trump cutoff of aid to Ukraine and willingness to enter negotiations with Russia was a proof of 'good faith' on Trump's part. The Ukrainian public capitulation / alignment to the ceasefire proposal construct, and the mineral deal, will make it hard to convincingly blame Ukraine as the cause of failure. (That doesn't mean that partisans won't try, but a 'benefit' of the US immigration brohas has been public attention is far more on US domestic politics than the Russia-Ukraine attempts to blame eachother for ceasefire violations.)
And that leaves Russia more likely to catch blame with lower-information republicans. Partly because of clear motives (the more they are perceived as 'winning' in the present), partly because of higher-profile signals of rejection (like calling Trump's efforts unrealistic), and partly because of who Trump is liable to blame if he doesn't blame Ukraine.
This may be a result that many people see coming. This may be a result the democrats wouldn't have needed for their coalition to support Ukraine aid. But it's also a point that some people/groups of people need to try and fail for themselves rather than defer to the judgement of their partisan foes. Only someone 'on your own side' can sell some ideas. Only Nixon can go to China, and all that.
And that leads to Trump.
/
Final Point - The Trump Effect: If Trump Supports Aid It Can't Be Wrong
This is point that assumes a part of the conclusion (talks collapse, Trump doesn't blame Ukraine), but as a baseline for making a narrower point about party politics. IF Trump drops the ceasefire project, but continues to support Ukraine aid, the political space for the anti-Ukraine advocates to try and message / persuade in the Republican party decreases.
This is because anti-Ukraine advocates need Trump to be politically relevant, not the other way around. Trump is the one who has created the political space for them to advocate. Trump's tolerance / endorsement is what bestows them not only a platform, but the audience (MAGA-cult, if you prefer) that will think positively of whatever Trump thinks positively up. Trump is not influential because he is [anti-Ukraine], [anti-Ukraine] are influential because Trump indulges them.
But the quickest, surest way to fall out of favor not only with Trump, but by extension his MAGA-following, is to turn against Trump if he stops advancing your pet cause, or letting your advance yours. This is the difference between Musk, who's kept a cordial relationship despite various breaks from Trump, and those like Steve Bannon and John Bolton, who are locked out. Such people have their own pre-existing power/popularity bases, but their influence in the Trump party falls if they fall out with Trump.
This means that once (if) Trump takes a position that negotiations are no longer something he's going to pay political capital for, but that mineral deal/etc. make continued Ukrainian aid acceptable, then the political influence of the [any aid is too much] factions is going to wither. They will still exist, but they will not have the platform or the following if they try to critique Trump-support for Ukraine like Trump signal-boosted their condemnations of Biden-support for Ukraine.
This effect will get stronger the worse you think of Trump and MAGA in general. The more you think that Trump is sensitive to criticism or defiance, the more you think MAGA is a cult, the more any Trump walk-away from the Russia ceasefire talks will shape the Republican aid picture towards the aid-sustaining 'about right or not enough' crowd that will let Ukraine aid keep flowing.
And once the MAGA-support is behind supporting Ukraine, then the question transitions from an internal-party 'should we keep supporting Ukraine' to an external-party 'what can we get for supporting Ukraine' debate. Ukraine support shifts from a 'yes/no' to 'if yes, for what?'
This is where a Ukraine-supporting Republican party that is established this year can leverage this consensus for future negotiations.
Those negotiations can be internal the US, such as the fiscal year budget negotiations. FY 2026 negotiations could, technically, be done without any Democrat support as part of the Republican trifecta. However, if Republicans lose the mid-terms- and that's a safe bet- then the Democrats get a say in the budget either. Something the Democrats poll as caring far more about than the Republicans- like Ukraine aid- is a good piece of leverage.
Those negotiations can also be external to the US. Replace 'Democrats' with 'Europeans,' and the mineral deal paradigm of 'paying back for aid, going forward' has another potential buyer (or seller). The Europeans ran a notable campaign a few weeks back about how much money they were willing to spend on re-armament / aid for Ukraine. Yes, it was framed in 'we can't trust the US' terms. No, that does not mean that negotiations might not offer some quids and quos.
The specific negotiations here don't matter as much as what negotiations mean. Negotiations that allow Trump to 'win' are things Trump likes. In so much that Trump drives MAGA preferences, they are also things MAGA likes. If/as Ukraine aid-for-compensation becomes a negotiation tool, MAGA will support maintaining the tool that offers wins.
And that creates the issue that when/if Russia finally decides it has had enough of the war and would like real cease-fire/peace negotiations, it is increasingly likely to be doing so in a context where Trump will have to take even higher political costs to re-open the topic and give up existing advantages. The longer this delay occurs, the more entrenched and potentially useful the status quo will be for Trump, and thus the higher costs- personal and opportunity- for Trump to offer the same sort of terms he's offering in the present.
/
Summary / Conclusion - What Does This Mean?
For starters, that if I'm totally wrong I'll have an interesting top-level mea-culpa analysis due. Let's say if Trump walks away from talks but also blames Ukraine to the degree of cutting off all aid to the point of not even letting Ukraine/the Europeans buy US weapons. That will certainly drive some reflections.
Outside of that (probably) small chance- and small chances due happen regularly-
In the next few weeks we may seeing the start of a political transition to a more stable US/Republican support for Ukraine aid for the next year(s).
This won't be immediately apparent, but will be observable over the months to follow, particularly by the fall when the 2026 US budget negotiations culminate. How Ukraine aid factors into that will indicate a lot about the new state of the Republican party and Ukrainian aid politics.
This change is based on how Trump has spent a non-trivial amount of political capital prioritizing the Ukraine War. He's also increasingly impatient about it. Impatience does not mean he's obligated to accept any deal, no matter the cost. It also does not mean he's obliged to carry on negotiations as long as Russia feels like drawing them out. Trump absolutely can re-orient his foreign affairs focus to other things, such as the trade war negotiations.
The threat to walk away from ceasefire negotiations is credible. It will especially be so if/when the mineral deal is signed. The more that the mineral deal is 'clearly good' for the US- even/especially if unethically so- the more that a non-trivial part of the Republican base that opposes Ukraine aid is liable to swap over to supporting Ukraine aid going forward. This can be because the mineral-deal covers [cost] objections, that the quid-pro-quo by a president trusted not to simply obligate it out of hand satisfies [handling] concerns, or just because Trump did it for [MAGA fealty].
If/when this transition to a post-ceasefire but supply-Ukraine occurs, the power/influence of the Ukraine-aid opponents in the Republican coalition will be reigned in due to the prospect of fighting Trump. Those who are dumb enough to turn against Trump openly because any aid is too much will get cast out. Those who toe the President's line will remain, but their potential influence restrained by their self-restraint.
The more MAGA-Republicans grow comfortable with supplying Ukrainian aid for compensation- a paradigm that will (probably) be codified in the mineral deal and if cease-fire talks fail and aren't blamed on Ukraine- the more Ukraine aid will become an instrumental asset for negotiations outside of the Republican party. It may play a role in Democratic party negotiations for the FY2026 federal budget. It may play a role in US-European negotiations. If/as it does, the aid will be valued more as a tool worth sustaining.
The more this happens, the more stable the Ukrainian-aid political situation will become on the US end. A Trump-endorsed political consensus on US aid to Ukraine for compensation in return- whatever the form of the concession with whomever- will have significant impacts on decision-calculuses for future ceasefire attempts or peace negotiations.
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
But the question then is - how do we get out of this mutual defection spiral?
In so much that there are no coherent parties, then the people want to escape the defection spiral clearly and credibly signal their separation from those still interested, including the breaking of political alliances, even if it leads to their own political disempowerment as a faction.
In so much that there are coherent parties involved, the party that started the defection spiral signals credible intent via no longer pursuing a defection strategy, upto and including accepting rollback of previous gains at personal cost.
Many of those things have already been answered by the courts or are in the process of being answered.
No, they haven't. Hence your forced resort to repeated appeals to non-equivalent cases that don't apply to the relevant issues of foreign citizens in foreign countries, while dodging the lack of criteria that were already raised. Hence also why, when repeatedly challenged to this, you conduct an appeal to authority whose limitations are the subject of question. And whose argument already failed by past actions of previous administrations.
Unsurprising, but I'm sure the demands of bad faith partisans will improve if you ignore it for another attempt at a last word.
The question was about the problem of returning them:
And the answer remains the same: it can start being considered a relevant concern when there is evidence that it is a relevant concern.
You can't ask a surgeon about possible complications, after the anesthesia's kicked in.
This would be an excellent reason to establish that there is condition justifying surgery before demanding that someone be placed under anesthesia on a table before a surgeon.
Demanding the surgery be carried out, just because an eager surgeon has already started applying anesthesia in anticipation despite the lack of present condition, is mere malpractice.
When evidence exists of efforts to try and send them.
Until such time that Trump attempts to deport American citizens without due process, claims or insinuations that he's about to if everyone doesn't oppose him over [news cycle of the week] can be appropriately dismissed as cries of wolf.
Genuinely: do you have a recommendation of who to read in order to gain a non-partisan narrative-level understanding of what has happened with the US government over the last few months? I'd like to get away from some of my regular sources of information and into ones that provide a higher signal-to-noise ratio.
There are no non-partisan sources. There are ways to get a balance of partisan readings over time. News aggregators that make a point of aligning different sources on the same general topics- such as the RealClear portal or Ground News
Should I just read Project 2025
Yes.
and take it as gospel,
No.
despite the counter-hysteria during the campaign season?
The hysteria over Project 2025 is precisely why you should read Project 2025, to understand what it says, what its detractors claim it says, and recognize the difference.
But you should also read it so that you can correlate what it says to what specific members of the Trump administration say, so that you can recognize differences between what the Project 2025 organizers want and what key policy makers in the administration want so that you can make an informed judgement as to how influential it actually is, as opposed to how influential it is accused of being.
What is the bar for competence-of-evaluation for an average citizen to judge the worthiness of their executive branch?
There is no bar. However, the credence given to their judgement generally scales with their ability to demonstrate a general level of awareness of political history beyond their partisan media bubble, particularly on events in living memory of their audience.
Should no one protest the actions of their government because they're not qualified to evaluate the competence of those who took those actions?
You can protest the actions of government no matter how competent you are at characterizing them. The saving grace of democracy is that it protects the roles of the incompetents to contribute to policy debates, by forbidding would-be elitists from disqualifying the uncredentialed lacking elite recognition or support.
This is a good thing. There are many good reasons for considering the views of unwise masses. It would have been a perfectly fine defense to make that a challenge to your own competence was irrelevant.
However, doing so would have undermined your condemnations of other peoples' incompetence, unless you could defend your own.
Yes, but to an outside observer I'm just a shitposter[2] on a political forum, and they're the supposed leaders of the free world. Different standards, no?
Heavens no. If they posted their arguments on the motte inviting pushback, they would receive the same gentle handling.
Can't answer the sovereignty and jurisdiction issues, eh?
I'm sure your position will get stronger if you try to avoid it for another last word.
My main issue with your interpretation of my post is that you're reducing my use of the word "wargaming" to a very literal activity that happens behind closed doors with a couple military brass at most. I could have chosen a better term that would not have evoked such a specific image in your mind, so mea culpa. What I mean by "wargaming" is broadly any strategic, adversarial simulations with starting conditions based on scenarios that are executed in order to relatively evaluate the outcomes of different actions.
No, that's what I understood you to mean. And that is why I find your analysis lacking as even a starting premise. Your claim that the people who do this were purged in favor of loyalists is more characteristic of a partisan narrative-level understanding than familiarity with what's happened in the US government over the last few months.
This is an initial-evaluation level issue. Call it a 'vibes-based analysis' if you will. It is consistent with your vibes-based understanding of history, both contemporary-american and broader leader issues. It is not consistent with accurate model-building of people or efforts outside your vibe, which so far you have not demonstrated.
The nature of being a vibes-based analyst is that contempt / condemnation of other people for being vibes-based decision-makers rings more than a little hollow. This is particularly true if you cannot model what other people outside your vibe are trying to achieve, or why they believe certain actions will advance that goal, without building in a back-handed basis of dismissal.
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
The number of illegal immigrants in the US has stayed pretty constant over the past couple decades,
...?
Which numbers, specifically, are you thinking of?
Generally when I hear this argument, it refers to articles like this one, which presents arguments like the prominant graphic one that the 'undocumented' migrant population has remained relatively constant in the US since 2008 (~12 million.)
However, they tend to bury the categorization schemes like this-
Arrivals of undocumented immigrants are offset by many hundreds of thousands of departures from the undocumented population each year, including those that emigrate voluntarily, are removed by DHS, adjust to legal status, or die. Reliable statistics are not available to measure these four ways of leaving the undocumented population.
However, one of these categories is notably not like the others. 'Adjust to legal status' is a legal category shift, not a departure (or death) of the person.
If you provide a temporary legal status to a million illegal immigrants, your country's population has still increased by a million people, even if you offset that number by a million legal-category grants. This is a false equivalence of categories that avoids dealing with the implications and insinuations of absorbing a million peoples who arrived illegally, mostly by handwaving the numbers away as no longer counting.
Further, even the 'removed by DHS' category is subject to statistical chicanery. Or as a former president once admitted, "a little deceptive."
During the Obama administration, for example, the Obama administration's deportation statistics conflated different actions that made the number of deportations appear high even as the expulsion of people who settled and worked in the US decreased. That sort of mismatched occurred because at- or immediately-within border returns were publicly equated to deportations. Moreover, the Obama administration counted removals that previous administrations wouldn't have. This was a recategorization that let Obama claim a hard-on-illegal-immigration reputation even as the expulsion of people who settled and worked in the US- i.e. deportation of people who got past the border crossing phase- dropped by 40%. This practice resumed with the Biden administration
So when the (often pro-migration) studies make claims that the migrant population is generally steady, it's always important to see how they address the issue of re-categorization of migrants (redefining illegal arrivals as legal residents no longer tracked) and the conflation of deportation types.
I think this whole thing stems from a common misunderstanding of the court system and how it works. There's this often understood idea of law being entirely about saying the correct magic words in the correct way to get technicalities and while it's certainly true that's a large portion of it, judges have always had the freedom to look into things a bit past that as well in determining if orders are being carried out in good faith.
Judges do not have the freedom to invent jurisdiction.
Nor do judges have the freedom to define good faith with their preferred results of foreign affairs.
You can be held in contempt (and it happens pretty often) when people are caught "officially" following the rules, but admitting they aren't elsewhere.
The Trump administration is not admitting they have jurisdiction over Garcia elsewhere.
There are motivated partisans who are claiming that payments to El Salvador amount to administrative control and thus jurisdiction over Garcia, but alas the fungibility of money does not actually demonstrate either jurisdiction or even administrative control.
The court system is not intended to be blindly idiotic. It's the reason why Eisenhower, despite his disagreement with the rulings actually executed on it, instead of playing games pretending to.
Did the Eisenhower case entail individuals over which the United States government executive branch no longer had jurisdiction?
If not, the continued attempts to appeal to the Eisenhower case are indicative of bad faith that intends to ignore the non-applicability of dissimilar cases to the legal issue at hand. And that legal issue is the jurisdiction issue.
You can still do that mind you, they tend to give lots of leeway but the court system would have to be blind to not see how the Trump admin is purposely sabotaging efforts.
Why is a natural consequence of a loss of jurisdiction being treated as proof of sabotage?
The nature of deportation is that it removes an individual not only from a country's territory, but it's governance. The court's order to 'facilitate the return' of Garcia is a demand for an result of governance if it does not acknowledge that 'facilitation' can acceptably not delivere a preferred result. However, the nature of sovereignty under international law is that government of a separate government does not have jurisdiction over the affairs of another country absent criteria that would allow a claim of jurisdiction. These criteria generally hinge around citizenship, which does not apply.
And again, the court system is not intended to be blind. That's part of why we have multiple judges (for example this ninth circuit ruling had three judges) and so many appeals processes to begin with, because there is room for interpretive and judicial idealogical differences.
What does the number of judges and appeals processes matter if those judges and appeals do not have jurisdiction over a foreign citizen in a foreign country?
Because nukes.
Any geopolitical discussion on what Russia needs to survive as a state that does not acknowledge or address the role of second-strike nuclear deterrence is not a serious discussion.
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