Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being a reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man. No one yet has guessed multiple people, or a scholar. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
If you don't understand, it would probably help to work on the metaphor.
A tariff barrier is not a closing of a supermarket, not least because tariff barriers already exist between American allies. That is what the EU common market is- a trade barrier between the European group of allies and their other allies, including the Americans, the Brits, and so on.
Even more relevantly, a threat of tariff barriers is not a closing of a supermarket either, particularly when everyone (should) understand that the threat is conditional on [insert trade / political concession here]. The conditionality is critical because it can be used to create and either-or dilemma of which supermarket the consumer goes to, as opposed to the consumer has no choice.
The rise of deglobalization and the multipolar world order is not a close off of markets entirely, but a process of choosing / forcing choices of which markets to associate with. Globalization may have been a 'choose any supermarket you want' dynamic, but deglobalization is a mutually exclusive membership program, where association with one supermarket will lead to increasing limits with the other.
The issue for some countries, of course, is that the two supermarkets are not anywhere near to competitive in attractiveness. The European Family, for example, is not going to fine any meaningful offers from ChinaMart on in the 'expeditionary armies to fight in your defense' market, particularly when ChinaMart is close business partners with 'WeSwearWeWon'tBlackmailYou' Russian Discount Gas, which is currently in a special hostile takeover operation against the cousin down the street.
Dean
Flairless
1mo ago
We haven't discussed deportations, recently, and appellate litigator (and formula Scalia clerk, for those who care about that sort of thing) Adam Unikowsky posted a good explanation of AARP v Trump/WMM v Trump, this morning. The situation seems pretty Kafka-esque:
Who is Adam Unikowsky and why should anyone trust / care about their explanation / characterizations of a contemporary culture war topic filled with bad and bad-faith explanations / characterizations?
Dean
Flairless
3mo ago
Can you explain what the Hobbesian premise is that's being rejected/forgotten?
Sure. You not mentioning Hobbes at all, let alone Hlynka's position on Hobbes, is the Hobbesian premise that is being rejected / forgotten.
How I would characterize Hobbes doesn't matter. My position is that you can't properly characterize Hlynka's position if you don't address such a significant part of the position. Which is rather hard to do without mentioning them, which is generally a precondition to accurately characterizing. If you aren't accurately characterizing Hlynka's arguments, there's reason to doubt the validity of your argument.
The lack of mention in your rebuttal-argument is itself the hole.
Who wants to hear about who blew up the Nord Stream Pipeline in September 2022?
If you haven't heard in the news yet- the official take of the 2022 Nordstream Pipeline explosion is hitting the news, as Germany has issued an arrest warrant for a person of interest, and the Wall Street Journal is fielding one of those totally-not-Government-assisted exposes on what happened (somewhat).
Was it the dastardly Yanks? Perfidious albion? The sinister Russians?
No, it was someone that many including the Russians insisted at the time couldn't be responsible because the culprit was so blindingly obvious it didn't need to be discussed further...
Putin has publicly blamed the U.S. for the attacks. A senior Russian diplomat in Berlin echoed that claim, and said the German investigation findings were “fairy tales worthy of the Brothers Grimm.”
...which is to say, it was the Ukrainians.
To quote-
One of the most audacious acts of sabotage in modern history, the operation worsened an energy crisis in Europe—an assault on critical infrastructure that could be considered an act of war under international law. Theories swirled about who was responsible. Was it the CIA? Could Putin himself have set the plan in motion?
Now, for the first time, the outlines of the real story can be told. The Ukrainian operation cost around $300,000, according to people who participated in it. It involved a small rented yacht with a six-member crew, including trained civilian divers. One was a woman, whose presence helped create the illusion they were a group of friends on a pleasure cruise.
“I always laugh when I read media speculation about some huge operation involving secret services, submarines, drones and satellites,” one officer who was involved in the plot said. “The whole thing was born out of a night of heavy boozing and the iron determination of a handful of people who had the guts to risk their lives for their country.”
If sorry / not sorry hashtag could apply, I suspect this would be one of those moments it would.
Various points of interest from the WSJ article include-
Zelensky was initially on board with it, but (supposedly) tried to turn it off after being warned by the CIA-
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky initially approved the plan, according to one officer who participated and three people familiar with it. But later, when the CIA learned of it and asked the Ukrainian president to pull the plug, he ordered a halt, those people said. Zelensky’s commander in chief, Valeriy Zaluzhniy, who was leading the effort, nonetheless forged ahead.
The CIA, warned by the Dutch, also warned the Germans in advance, indicating all three knew of the plot in advance.
But the next month, the Dutch military intelligence agency MIVD learned of the plot and warned the CIA, according to several people familiar with the Dutch report. U.S. officials then promptly informed Germany, according to U.S. and German officials.
If true, this would both explain why the 'USA did it!' theory never held sway in the upper German government, and also why the government was keen to keep it underwraps (because it would be not only a scandal on the foreign policy side, but a government-competence issue to have been warned but still failed.)
The position of the article is that Zelnsky tried to cancel the project after being found out, but that his military Commander in chief Zaluzhniy went rogue.
The CIA warned Zelensky’s office to stop the operation, U.S. officials said. The Ukrainian president then ordered Zalyzhniy to halt it, according to Ukrainian officers and officials familiar with the conversation as well as Western intelligence officials. But the general ignored the order, and his team modified the original plan, these people said.
...a bit of a skip to when the attack occurred...
Zelensky took Zaluzhniy to task, but the general shrugged off his criticism, according to three people familiar with the exchange. Zaluzhniy told Zelensky that the sabotage team, once dispatched, went incommunicado and couldn’t be called off because any contact with them could compromise the operation.
“He was told it’s like a torpedo—once you fire it at the enemy, you can’t pull it back again, it just keeps going until it goes ‘boom,’ ” a senior officer familiar with the conversation said.
Take that for what you will, and be as skeptical of the claim as you want. Valeriy Zaluzhniy was relieved in very early 2024 as part of the start-of-year Ukrainian reorganization... but possibly as (well-premptive) damage control, and other potential motivations.
Earlier this year, Zelensky ousted Zaluzhniy from his military post, saying a shakeup was needed to reboot the war effort. Zaluzhniy, who has been viewed domestically as a potential political rival, was later appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to the U.K., a position that grants him immunity from prosecution.
So if Germany wanted to pursue this line of prosecution, it'd involve going after an ambassador in a European partner.
The resourcing of the operation was not particularly impressive.
Following the May 2022 pact between the businessmen and the military officers, it was agreed that the former would finance and help execute the project, because the army had no funds and was increasingly relying on foreign financing as it pushed back against the onslaught of its gargantuan neighbor. A sitting general with experience in special operations would oversee the mission, which one participant described as a “public-private partnership.” He would report directly to the head of Ukraine’s armed forces, the four-star Gen. Zaluzhniy.
...a skip of an initially more elaborate plan...
After dismissing that idea due to its cost and complexity, the planners settled on using a small sailing boat and a team of six—a mix of seasoned active duty soldiers and civilians with maritime expertise—to blow up the 700-mile-long pipelines that sat more than 260 feet below the sea’s surface.
Note this is actually one of the reasons the Russians had an interest in downplaying / denying a Ukrainian attribution- the Russians have invested great sums in having state capacity to target underwater infrastructure as part of their deterrence / great power model vis-a-vis NATO. A minor group of oligarchs being able to do the same not only could give ideas to others, but would undercut the Russian exclusiveness of the threat.
Obviously this has its own implications for German foreign policy...
The findings could upend relations between Kyiv and Berlin, which has provided much of the financing and military equipment to Ukraine, second only to the U.S. Some German political leaders may have been willing to overlook evidence pointing to Ukraine for fear of undermining domestic support for the war effort. But German police are politically independent and their investigation took on a life of its own as they pursued one lead after another.
“An attack of this scale is a sufficient reason to trigger the collective defense clause of NATO, but our critical infrastructure was blown up by a country that we support with massive weapons shipments and billions in cash,” said a senior German official familiar with the probe.
...but said foreign policy runs into the reality that Germany's NordStream policies were, shall we say, not supported by the neighbors whose views on its destruction differ from those who would want Germany to take a hard line.
In June, German officials issued a confidential arrest warrant for a Ukrainian citizen who the Germans believe was one of the crew members. According to people familiar with the investigation, a van driving the Ukrainian sabotage team from Poland into Germany in 2022 was snapped by a German speed camera, and the man, a diving instructor living with his family near Warsaw, was in the photo.
Authorities in Poland didn’t act on the warrant. The instructor is believed to have since returned to Ukraine. Poland’s failure to arrest him is a major blow to the German probe, because he and other suspects have now been tipped off and will avoid travelling outside Ukraine, people familiar with the investigation said. Ukraine doesn’t extradite its own citizens.
As for why the Ukrainians did it? Despite claims to the contrary years ago that only the US had an incentive, well-
In May of 2022, a handful of senior Ukrainian military officers and businessmen had gathered to toast their country’s remarkable success in halting the Russian invasion. Buoyed by alcohol and patriotic fervor, somebody suggested a radical next step: destroying Nord Stream.
After all, the twin natural-gas pipelines that carried Russian gas to Europe were providing billions to the Kremlin war machine. What better way to make Vladimir Putin pay for his aggression?
...
In a subsequent broadcast interview, he said that the sabotage had two positive effects for Ukraine: It helped loosen Russia’s grip on the European countries supporting Kyiv, and it left Moscow with only one main avenue for channeling gas to Europe, pipelines traversing Ukraine. Despite the war, Ukraine collects lucrative transit fees for Russian oil and gas estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year.
...
In the wake of the attack, which took out three of the four conduits forming the pipelines, energy prices surged. Germany and other nations scrambled to nationalize energy companies that handled Russian gas but collapsed after the pipelines were destroyed. Even today Germany is paying around $1 million a day alone to lease floating terminals for liquefied natural gas or LNG, which only partly replaced the Russian gas flows channeled by Nord Stream.
So there are three general incentives characterized, though not with emphasis, in the article.
1- To hurt Russia
2- To reduce the economic leverage Russia had over Germany and other Russian-gas-dependent countries (which was a major factor in 2022 in blocking aid, i.e. the German helmet aid package)
3- (Unstated) Economic incentives to force Russia to continue paying gas transit fees to Ukraine (as opposed to cutting off the pipeline)
Inflicting costs on Germany is framed as a consequence, not a goal in and of itself- though I do fully expect this to be the angle the anti-Ukraine partisans to appeal to going forward.
Though maybe not the Russian state-backed angle. One of the implicit reasons Russia had to push against the Ukraine-Nord Stream theory in the past was that it undercut the Russian positions on both underseas deterrence (casting it as a difficult state-only capacity that gave it deterrence leverage and could be used as evidence to blame the US when the pipeline was destroyed), and because it would reveal the fragility of the Russian energy-connection arguments that a lot of the pro-Russian arguments relied on.
This is because if a country with marginal projection capabilities like Ukraine could blow up a pipeline when their security interests were threatened, so could any other Baltic country if Russia attempted to leverage the energy blackmail like it was attempting over Ukraine. The energy leverage over German policy making can't be rebuilt once the argument of 'good relations with Russia could lead to reliable cheap energy' was blown up, because even if an angry German government wanted to retaliate and make energy alignment with Russia a priority again, it could, again, just be blown up. German-Russian energy ties transitioned from being a bilateral issue that could isolate other countries, to being hostage to the Russian ties to everyone who could sever them, which is frankly nearly anyone.
This not only undercut one of Russia's early/pre-war goals (to increase German energy dependence on Russia), but explains why the German government has been largely sitting on the issue over the last two years. Not only was the pipeline not as popular in-country or in the near-abroad as it was with the government and business circles, but the foundations for the energy relationship have been fundamentally blown up on multiple angles. The connections aren't reliable even if the Russians wanted it to be, and the Russians demonstrated they were willing to be unreliable suppliers for political purposes, and the limits of the German state to protect it were revealed even when pre-warned by NATO and European allies, and the necessary neighbor support to go after the issue after the fact was opposed by other NATO/European allies. While the German government may not like that, it's the reality of a strategic context they have to act within.
None of this was advantageous from a Russian perspective, and while the Russians may adapt to the change... well, they've been resisting the Ukrainian accusation for the last two years already, and minimizing the threat Ukraine can pose to them abroad remains in their negotiating interest for what they're trying to frame for peace talks in the future.
I suspect this issue will be used by angry partisans, particularly from those far from government, but I'll be surprised if the German nation significantly shifts. Not only has this been hinted at with increasing directness for awhile, and I've not seen evidence that the German public is particularly moved, but the government's strategic interests aren't really changed from when it was last informed about it 2 years ago.
This isn't new news, but this is a new directness of what was once the primary contemporary anti-American conspiracy theory. While it will be interesting to see who pivots with as much vigor, this has a lot of the characteristics of stories that- even when publicized- quickly fade in general disinterest.
But I found it interesting enough to elevate here. Cheers.
Dean
Flairless
5mo ago
I guess what I want to know is, Am I The Asshole?
Yes, though anyone who ironically proposes a special military operation deserves one. (This is a joke, but do be kind to your friend.)
More to the point- your friend is raising relevant points, and you are raising bad geopolitical analogies. There are contexts where it is not war to conduct strikes in a neighboring country's territory, but these are generally limited to very specific contexts- namely imminent threats of which 'routine drug smuggling' generally does not qualify. If you do so anyway, there are many, many, many ways it can go badly, particularly if the sovereign state doesn't give you permission. Given how many things in diplomacy rest of voluntary cooperation, there are many ways for an unwanting state to make their neighbor's life difficult, even without armed resistance, and in the modern era there are also easy ways for that to go very, very costly. (See- drones.) This doesn't even touch how foreign state actors could partake and interfere- such as smuggling weapons (see- drones) to cartels for use against the Americans.
There are a number of reasons an armed intervention would be a bad idea, but let's focus on why it's not a good idea: it's not 1917, Mexico is not in a civil war, the cartels are not Pancho Villa doing cross-border raids into the US, and the Pancho Villa expedition failed anyways.
Dean
Flairless
1yr ago
In reference to Trump, they argued that the events on and surrounding January 6th intending to overturn the election would constitute "insurrection or rebellion" as understood at the time of the passing of the amendment.
Why?
The 14th amendment was, after all, passed after the Civil War, a conventional war in which field armies were marshalled to fight against the uncontestedly lawfully elected government. (The Confederates did not deny that Lincoln won the election, which is why they cited other casus belli.) The contemporary acts of insurrection included federal garrisons being overrun, cities sacked, massive civil destruction the likes had never been seen in North America since maybe the fall of the Aztecs, and millions dead directly or indirectly. In the drafters' own lifetime, non-insurrectionary violence in the capital included beating Congressional representatives with canes and honor-duels.
January 6, by contrast, wasn't even in the top 5 violent acts of political violence within a year of it happening.
I can't see this not being important,
Why not?
Trying to frame January 6 as an insurrection or rebellion has been an attempted narrative line since January 6, 2021, with generally only partisan effectiveness. It has been approximately 945 days and American public polling has consistently held viewing this along partisan lines. What, besides the appeal to Federalist society credentialism, is supposed to make it more significantly more persuasive after day 950?
Dean
Flairless
2yr ago
It is far away from the argument, but it's also far more correct. Note that your framing is selectively allocating agency to the Poles and the Brits/Germans to choose in response to the German demands, just as Flynn's framing attributes agency to the American influence driving others decisions, but neither address that the Germans themselves had the agency in not only making unreasonable demands, but also the agency to not make those demands. The dictator is not an immovable fact of nature, for which there is no reasoning and agency only exists with the responder. The dictator is an agent, and has used their agency to posit the demand in the first place.
Avoiding this point- that people are resisting unreasonable German demands- is required to credibly claim that the Poles were unreasonable in not compromising to them, because there is no failure in reason or competence to resist the unreasonable. But the German Nazis were being unreasonable, and the other actors were being reasonable in resisting the unreasonable, and so re-establing the actual originating context- that the Germans were the originating actors and making unreasonable demands- is the more correct point for conveying not the argument, but the actual context the argument is trying to ignore.
The trade flow diversions across the globe, who will receive what runoffs and to what effect, will be the most interesting part of these interesting times. One of the most pressing macro-economic questions of the trade war is 'who in the world is supposed to absorb the Chinese exports no longer going to the US?'
One of the limits of a lot of the recent discussion has been that it focuses on the Trump tariffs as a bilateral or even unilateral effect, i.e. how bad this will be for the US specifically. Part of that is understandable- the way you generally try and end a trade war is to sap political willingness from the pursuer, and convince them it's worse for them than pursuing. Totally normal, and I'm not implying that's necessarily wrong on any sort of factual or ethical level, though such arguments do have an incentive to exaggerate. (You can probably find plenty of online threats of, say, the EU cutting the US service exports at the knees in retaliation- instead, the EU so far as gone after certain red state good exports, a fraction of the fraction. This is a strategy tailored for political effect, not maximizing cost, which is what discussions/threats over the service economy exports would have been. However, those are focused more in Blue states, so...)
But what those types of arguments don't address is that the mountains of trade goods and oceans of trade flows will go elsewhere, and when they do that will cause second and third order trade conflicts that don't directly involve the initial party.
Take the US goods exports to China. On page 5 it breaks down various categories by share and volume of trade. While no category measured in the billions of US dollars should be considered 'small', note what some of the larger categories are. Food products. Oil and gas. Basic chemicals. Other forms of input products.
A lot of these are relatively fungible goods, but also where global demands itself is relatively static. If China refuses to buy, say, oil and gas from the US, that doesn't mean that china does without and stops all things that previously used the US export. It means China pays for an equivalent amount of oil and gas from somewhere else, possibly outbiding other market equilibriums for the privilege. Which takes that oil and gas off the market, and leaves the customers who would want them available for... the US oil and gas not going to China.
Now apply this to other categories. If you price-out, say, medical equipment via tariffs, then either you go without or you go elsewhere. If you go elsewhere, then you're taking from that status quo. The American goods are, nominally, available to fill the void. There may be complications- quality standard disputes, language and labeling barriers, etc.- but the underlying fundamental demand (the people who had been willing to buy Good X before China came in and bought it), and the potential supply (the American goods no longer going to china) exists.
At the end of the day, economic actors don't either produce to make maximum products or not produce at all. They will continue to produce as long as even decreased margins are preferable to no income. As long as it makes economic sense for the producers to keep producing rather than shut down, the goods will continue to be produced for the market while substitute transactions are sought. This is why input-producers, such as Russia, are often able to survive disruptions with major established trade partners as long as they have the ability to get their goods to global markets. The former-importer still needs to import something like the no-longer imported [thing], and the former-exporter can now export to whomever the former-importer is buying up the [thing] from.
This substitute process is generally not economically efficient. It costs more, in absolute and opportunity costs. It often gives less profit due to higher transaction costs (though politically-influenced deals are a wild card). This is less beneficial to most people involved, though the intermediaries who can make the connections can make a killing. There will be all sorts of compliance costs to try and access the demand that opened up when China bought out [thing] from [elsewhere], whether it's relabeling to new languages or trying to regulate regulatory approval or whatever else. Not all businesses will be able to survive that transition, and will be bought up or close down when they otherwise would have carried on. The people who say this entails high economic costs are not lying.
But that economic inefficiency does not change that an absolute mountain of goods are about to be redirected and crash into national markets that are magnitudes smaller in scale, and upset the political-economic equilibrium in different ways.
It also is not an argument that is specific to the US. A point was made that the US goods to China were in some respects relatively fungible. People gonna eat and put gas in cars to go to work or fuel factories. Demand for these is relatively inelastic. If China buys food and gas from elsewhere, then elsewhere will want to buy food and gas to make up what they would have been consuming but China purchases.
But if the US isn't buying from China due to the trade war...
Above I linked a product to show the US exports to China. If you looked at it, did you notice anything that ought to have been there, but wasn't? I'll link again. Can you spot it? It breaks down exports by type, exports by US state sending to China, exports volumes...
Can you find the word 'import', and find where it is used outside of the context of what China imports from the US, i.e. US exports?
Here is another (Biden-era) product of exports and imports by category.
Three of the top US import from China categories include-
- Machine appliances ($268.5 billion)
- Textiles ($50.3 billion)
- Misc. Manufactured Items ($69.4 billion)
$388 billion dollars, or $388,000 million dollars, is a significant-but-not-overwhelming amount to the scale of the US economy, which in 2023 the world bank estimated was over $27,360,000*... million USD.
*Edit: used wrong box in first post, corrected. Same point to argument.
But if you sort that wiki-list by size and scroll down, that $388,000 million starts to match and then even exceed, by multiple magnitudes, the GDPs of the smaller countries in the world. Which- if the China-originated formerly US-bound trade flow of manufactured goods has to go elsewhere- are not going to be the only places that good surplus will redirect. After all, countries can't subsist on nothing but machine appliances, market saturation will be reached, which means going to the next markets and so on.
Except, some of those countries like having their own manufacturing economies of their own. And would want to protect their own markets from Chinese dumping. When even the EU is in internal conflict over the implications of the forecasted wave of Chinese products no longer going to the US...
Manufactured goods aren't necessarily fungible in the same way that production inputs are. Arguably if the Chinese had the same sort of tariffs overall as everyone else, they'd keep (or even slightly grow) the same general market share of American imports for these categories as long as it remained a roughly even playing field with everyone else. But the nature of the US-China trade war in particular vis-a-vis the rest is that as the US and China put higher tariffs on eachother, then every exporter-to-the-US isn't hitting the same impact. Americans will still buy goods, even if at higher prices, just not as efficiently. Which also means that those manufactured goods that previously would have gone to [place] because China had such a share of the US market are now subject to go to US as the China market share in the US is up for grabs.
Which also means that there's fewer goods in [other markets] even as China's manufactured goods are looking for a place to go.
Anti-dumping practices exist for reasons, but it's less obvious that it isn't the US most at threat of price-dumping. And while the World Trade Organization has historically tried to discipline anti-dumping practices, the WTO dispute resolution mechanism (i.e. judges to make rulings) wasn't exactly resurrected before Trump came back. Which is to say, there's no WTO authority to make a formal and binding judgement against you, the national politician, taking actions in your national (and domestic political) interest.
None of this is an argument that the US will 'win' a global trade conflageration. Whether you think that's because there is no way to win / that Trump won't cut any deals / whatever reason, this isn't an argument about what will happen for the US. The US outcome is separate from the point.
The point is that the more that China's trade-to-the-US is diverted by the US-China trade war, but still produced by the economic incentives within China to keep producing, the more that will put China into its own trade tensions / conflicts with other states, as it seeks to have them absorb the consumption of China exports that the US no longer is. It's not like China has no cards to play- the rare earths mineral supply chain has been a topic of concern for years, as China has used it to coerce and punish neighbors on various issues.
And that will have its own interesting follow-on effects, both for the success and political dynamics for pressuring countries to accept the export flood not going to the US, but also the impacts to states that resist those pressures. But also the impacts on relations between those countries who took the Chinese exports and their neighbors who might not want the same sort of deal and now face overflow from their neighbors who they previously had a tolerable equilibrium with.
That is the sort of global trade issues that I feel have been under-recognized in the last week's focus on arguing about the American-specific element of the Trump tariffs. It's not all about the United States, and the longer the trade system upheaval goes on, the less proximal the US (and Trump) will be to future, predictable, trade conflicts.
Relying on foreign talent leaves you wide open to treachery and manipulation
The general irony of the post, but this line in particular, is the Christmas present I didn't know I needed. Truly it could only have come from a self-identified Australian who regularly cites Chinese tiktok as a representative and reliable source of information, who has been an impassioned advocate of deferring to American geopolitical offensive-realists, and whom routinely uses collective self-identification terms with American and European audiences from nearly the literal opposite side of the globe.
(Another irony for non-Australians in the audience being that if you are to rely on the Ranger's opinions to shape your own, you would be opening yourself to treachery and manipulation from a foreigner, the best way to guard against being to disregard any foreigner's opinions. Self-negating advocacy at its most unintentional.)
More Trump policy: Trump is promising to try to raise the military budget from the current $892 million to about $1 trillion. Source.
Unsurprisingly, Politico doesn't mention that the administration mooting an up-to 90,000 reduction in the active-duty component of the Army, out of current US Army size of about 450,000 active-duty.. This is about 20% of the total size of the active-duty US army. It is also in the ballpark of the total number of US forces in Europe in 2025. That doesn't imply an intent to withdraw every last soldier in Europe, but it does create a Europe-force-sized-hole in the US army.
Nor does it factor in how the US navy is advancing some long-mooted concepts of buying warships from allies and leaning into foreign shipyards for naval shipyard capaacity, like the South Korean shipyard MOA signed... today. Which has implications for things like the multi-year backlog in the American naval yards mentioned in the linked article.
In other contexts, 'we are looking at cutting the Army by the size of peacetime forces in Europe and want to re-orient investments towards the neglected Navy' might be considered a notable defense policy adjustment worth acknowledging. It reflects a substantial cut in status quo capacity in some fields (current Army activities globally), with potentially relevant implications for the next conflict- say a naval conflict.
On the other hand, Trump bad, and here is a Politico article to encourage that sentiment.
The Great Le Pen Conviction Saga
Yesterday, Marine Le Pen, a French politician sometimes called a (female) French Trump and once called the Devil's daughter, was convicted in France of embezzling EU funds in the early 2000s. She is to be sentenced to house arrest for two years, and barred from politics for five.
The significance? That takes her out of the next presidential election, in 2027, where she is the current front runner.
The other problem?
When the original sentencing judge says Le Pen and other co-defendants didn't enrich themselves personally, 'embezzling' may have the wrong connotations. The judge who made the ruling preferred a 'democratic bypass that deceived parliament and voters.'
How does this lead to a leading political candidate getting imprisoned and disqualified in a leading western democracy?
Oh boy. This is a long one.
TL;DR: Banal political corruption insinuations ahead. And more. And more. Bless your innocent hearts if you have high trust in government, and don't be surprised if what follows starts to echo in your culture war interpretations in the months and years to come.
Disclaimer: What follows is a mix of plentiful citations, and some things that can only be noted with an eyebrow. Which is to say- some pretty hefty suspicion of impropriety, in ways that aren't exactly public record. However, if you want to believe that all governments are innocent unless proven guilty, by all means. Be ye warned.
What is this scandal?
It's more of a funding-code issue that results when you deliberately overlap organizational interests but establish conditionals that can be used as gotchas depending on whether the anti-fraud office wants to pursue.
EU funding for european political parties is normal. The overlap between national parties and EU political parties (Members of European Parliament, or MEP) is normal. The transition between national parties and nominally distinct EU parties is normal. Money is fungible. Even political aids are fungible- an aid who helps in one respect of a politician's work load enables the politician to work on others.
What Le Pen is charged / guilty of is that EU MEP party-member funds were used for someone who was working for Le Pen, the National Party leader, rather than Le Pen, the MEP party leader. Part of the basis of this claim is where there aid worked from- MEP assistants getting EU funds are supposed to work from / near the EU parliament, but around 20 of Le Pen's aides worked from France. As a result, they did not qualify for the funds they drew for being an aid to MEP-Le Pen, since Le Pen's MEP-aids are supposed to be geographically bounded.
Hence, embezzlement. Did the aids help with MEP work from France? Not actually relevant. Did the aids enable Le Pen to better focus on her MEP duties, as was the purpose of the money-for-aides? Also not particularly relevant.
What gives the saga more backstory, and scandal potential for those who think it's a gotcha, is that it's part of a much, much longer multi-decade saga.
Who is Le Pen?
Marine Le Pen is the daughter of Jean Le Pen, her father who founded the party. In short, he was the political outsider / far rightist / probable fascist sympathizer / possible nazi sympathizer, or at least dismisser, who was absolutely hated by the French political establishment. He's the guy who's synonymous with the National Front, unrepentant French far-right of the post-WW2 variety .
One of the key notes of Le Pen is that he ran the National Front like a family business... not successfully. Whether by purely coincidental mismanagement, personal bilateral animosity with French industry, or possibly indirect state pressures after the National Front's surprise and embarrassing showing in the 2002 presidential election, the National Front had some troubled finances.
And by troubled finances, I mean that by 2010 the French Government was progressively revoking the government's political party stipend that made up a plurality of its funding, even as Jean Le Pen was unable to get bank loans from French banks and unable to find a buyer for the 10-to-15 million Paris HQ to raise funds in 2008.
Where does the money come in?
The financial situation is where Marine Le Pen really enters in earnest. Marine Le Pen was given control of the party by her father in 2010. This was notably after she had already entered the European Parliament for over a half decade. Marine Le Pen was a MEP from 2004 to 2017, which is to say she inherited the National Front- and its financial issues- when she was already a MEP with no particular issue.
Marine's political priorities in the early 2010s was the rehabilitation of the National Front as a party. In 2013, she was still being called the Devil's Daughter by publications by the Atlantic. In 2018, this was when the National Front became the National Rally.
But the other part of Le Pen's job was to right the fiscal ship to keep the party viable. This is why across the 2010s Marine Le Pen was seeking foreign bank loans from abroad, including from US banks. This was where the Russia bank loan line of attack starts, since it was a Russian bank in 2014 that ultimately ended the credit embargo, but also saw Le Pen adopt a more pro-Russia rhetorical position. This challenge / options for loans has endured, and is why Le Pen more recently got a loan from Hungary in 2022.
So, to restate- Marine Le Pen was a reasonably-long-standing MEP in the 2000s with no major alleged issues at the time. In 2010, she took control over the national front. At this time, the NF was in financial distress.
This is the context where the misuse of European funds arose.
The Start of the Scandal
The Marine Le Pen allegations arose in Feb 2015, when European Parliament President Martin Shulz, a German MEP, raised complaints against her. Le Pen's party promptly counter-accused one of Shulz's own aids of a similar not-in-the-right-location violation. This didn't exactly get anywhere, because as noted at the time-
Machmer explained that one of Schulz’s assistants organizes study trips for a local branch of the SPD, but said this was “in his spare time, for free, because it is his hobby.”
Remember: it's embezzlement if you take EU money and work for the party. It's not embezzlement if you voluntarily do national party work for free as a hobby.
Who was Martin Schulz?
Well, in 2014, the year before he initiated the Le Pen allegations were made, Schulz was generally considered a bit... lacking in ethical enforcement. He was one of the European leaders who may / may not have turned a bit of a blind eye to notorious Malta corruption. After his time in the EU parliament, he made a brief but ambitious play in german power politics as the actual head of the German SDP in the 2017 German election. He lost to Merkel, of course, but so do they all. But he had the ambition to try, and had a history of building favors and friends.
But back to the earlier 2010s for a moment. Besides being President of the European Parliament at the time, he was a member of the Party of European Socialists in the European Parliament. He was also a (clearly important) member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in Germany, i.e. part of the key governing coalition which itself is part of the Franco-German alliance that is the heart of the EU. Schulz was in the running for being the German foreign minister following the 2017 German election,, which might have some relevance to foreign relation implications with France.
Why does Martin Schulz matter?
Why does this party orientation possibly matter?
Because in 2015, the President of France, Francoise Hollande, was a French Socialist. Unsurprisingly, French Socialists tend to caucus well with the European socialists in the European parliament, though party politics being what it is I'll just ask you believe me on that.
Did they get alone? It's hard to say. But in May 2015, just a few months after the le Pen allegations were leveraged, Hollande was among the heads of state awarding Schulz the Charlemagne prize 2015. The Charlemagne prize is bestowed to those who have advanced european unification, which means as much or as little as you think it means. Typically it's an insider's appreciation award for strengthening European Union politics, which is to say strengthening the Franco-German influence on the continent because that is, in most practical respects, what EU centralization entails.
More relevant was that Schulz's very diplomatic interest in working with French rose above partisan politics, such as his notably high-profile willingness in 2017 to work with Macron, the current (but currently troubled) French president whose political fortunes have gotten a bit better with Le Pen's disqualification.
Would a German politician-
- with a spotty ethical record
- who stood to personally benefit
- from a political favor
- to the ideologically-aligned current French president
- or the subsequent french president
- who they might closely work with in their post-EU political career
-ever leverage a politically motivated ethics complaint against a MEP with a decade of non-complaints, over an issue that they themselves might be guilty of?
Heavens no, that's absurd.
Ahem. Sorry. Back to 2017 for a minute?
2017: Enter Macron
2017 is when Macron enters the Le Pen tale, since the 2017 election is what established them as rivals.
The 2017 French elections were notable for that they benefited both Macron and Le Pen as anti-establishment candidates. The election saw the collapse of the French establish right and left, and while that left a vacuum for Macron, it also benefited Le Pen. Macron ultimately won by the French firewall when the French socialist-left voted for him and against Le Pen, but it was historically remarkably close.
What was also remarkable is that Macron's party position has gotten worse over time. His party did very poorly in the 2020 municiple elections, though this was more a collapse of his left than a rise to Le Pen on the right. Macron pulled out another win in the 2022 election, where Le Pen, again, made it to the final round after a stronger-than-most showing.
This creates a certain... shall we say complication for the 2027 election, because Macron can't run for re-election in 2027, and he's known to not like that. Macron managed to beat Le Pen twice- was arguably the only person who could have- but the 2027 election would see him leave the stage and Le Pen be... well, a clear leading candidate, if by no means a guarantee.
Unless, of course, the judicial block-out is coincidentally underway even before the 2022 election is over.
And starting in a way that is- coincidentally- convenient for Macron's re-election.
2022: The Year the Scandal Returns In A Most Convenient Way
Five years after Macron takes the presidency, and nearly 7 after the Le Pen EU funding scandal starts, it returns in ways whose implications to the surrounding context become a bit clearer if you lay out relative dates of events. (Most of these dates are in the above al jazeera link.)
11 March 2022: The European Anti-Fraud Office provides the French prosecutor's office it's report on Le Pen.
Clearly the French government was taken by total surprise, and had no hand or insight into this EU process delivering this package.
12 March - 9 April 2022: No mention of or publicity is given to this report in most media. As such, no voters are aware of the duplicitious deception of French voters by a former MEP for whom this is an old scandal, forgotten scandal from over half a decade prior.
Which might have been slightly topical, given that...
10 April 2022: The first round of the French Presidential Election occurs.
After the French government sits on the report for a month, Le Pen places strong but somewhat distant second place, out-performing some expectations and underperforming others. 28% Macron, 23% Le Pen. The third-place runner up, and thus the potential second-round candidate party is a leftist party that garnered... 22%.
Which is to say, the French Prosectors really did Le Pen a favor by keeping that potentially embarrassing and undemocratic revelation a secret! Why, if she hadn't made it to the second round, Macron would have faced a broadly united left against him rather than for him in the name of the anti-le pen firewall!
It's a good thing that this virtuous adherence to principle applied for the rest of the campa-
17 April 2022: French prosecutors announce the new (actually old) Le Pen fund appropriation report
Coincidentally, 17 April 2022 was a Sunday, meaning this would be one of the opening media report for the next week's media cycle.
24 April 2022: The second round of the French Presidential Election occurs. Macron wins, 58% to 42%.
Fortunately, Macron's presidential margins are great! Any effects from the timing of the report probably had no result on a 16% gap.
June 2022: Unfortunately, Macron's parliamentary margins in the June 2022 elections are dismal, as his party loses control of the parliament and Le Pen's party gains 81 seats to become a key power player in government (in)stability for the next year and a half.
July 2022-February 2023: No particular action or movement is made on the Le Pen case. Nominally this is when the French prosecutors are developing their case, but given the substantial prior awareness in practice the case remains where it was since between rounds 1 of the election: available as a basis of future prosecution if and when desired.
The key point of 2022 is that the Le Pen scandal resurfaced coincidentally in time to shape the 2022 Presidential Election, where it was sat on when it might have hindered Le Pen's ability to get to the second round, but publicized right at a time to maximize Macron's electoral margins. Afterwards, it was further sat on until future timeliness.
2023 - 2024: A series of Correlating Progressions
March 2023: After Macron does the eternally popular thing of cutting welfare in the name of reform, the Macron government (in the legislature) comes less than a dozen votes from falling in a no confidence vote after Le Pen's party largely votes for no confidence.
June 2023: After about a year of political paralysis and parliamentary instability, a Macron ally who totally likes him for real guys raises the prospect of amending French constitution to give Macron third term. This totally-not-a-trial-balloon proposal flops like something that has no life.
October 2023: Just kidding about before, Macron makes a personal call for constitutional amendment for a third term.
8 December 2023: The French government announces Le Pen's trial will start in March 2024.](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20231208-french-prosecutores-order-le-pen-to-stand-trial-in-eu-funding-scandal)
20 December 2023: Le Pen does the unforgivable, and gives Macron a 'kiss of death' by forcing him to compromise on immigration legislation in return for support. This actually triggers an internal party rebellion for Macron. Unrelated, establishment French media wonder how Macron will manage Le Pen's ever-rising rise.
The 20 December events aren't particularly causal in the process, but are amusing context.
The more relevant point of 2023 is that Macron's decision to prosecute Le Pen, an act which would bring favor from the French establishment, comes amidst his very unpopular bid to extend his time in office, which would require support from the French establishment. At this time, the Macron administration adopts a Tough-on-Le Pen position of 10 years- a period of time that would easily take her out of two elections- that will later be taken down to two years out of [insert choice here].
Also notable in the August 2023 initiation of prosecution of that it is both a starting block for the timer, and all future events. Whether there needed to be a 7-month gap between the announced intent to prosecute and the trial or not, had the prosecution train been started seven months earlier- during the large gap after the 2022 elections- then the future 2-year house arrest would have by consequence ended before, rather than probably after, the 2027 election. An 18-month bar, for other cases, would have been even less likely have a presidential election impact... had that been desirable.
2024: The Trial of Political Opponents with Absolutely No Political Parallels Or Impacts Elsewhere
March 2024: The Trial of Le Pen starts, about 24 months after the French government received an EU report of the 2015 report nearly 108 months prior. Truly the gears of French justice turned as fast as they could.
These are completely unrelated. Just because three major democracies of mutually-sympathetic ruling parties had parallel legal cases against leading opposition parties that threatened incumbent interests, and just because they did so on similar narrative themes/justification sof protecting democracy and rule of law themes, does not mean there was any sort of wink or nod or feeling emboldened by the example of others. Every case was independently moved forward on its own merits, with monetary judgements appropriate to the severity, and the mutual commentary by the states on the other's prosecutions was exactly what you would expect.
Also also coincidentally, this happened to be timed to roughly the same time that a UK court not only rejected a Trump lawsuit over the Steele dossier that was the root of the Russiagate hoax, but ordered Trump to pay 6-figures in legal fees, which was helpfully noted as adding to the half-billion in legal fees Trump had accrued so far that year and not at all contributing to pressures or efforts to drive Trump into bankruptcy analogous to the Le Pen experience earlier in the experience. Note that was before the historically unprecedented further half-billion fine from the New York judgement.
Now, admittedly, the Trump fiscal correlation must be a total distraction. Reputable democracies do not try to bankrupt their oppositions out of politics, and France failed to force Le Pen into fiscal insolvency years ago. The French government would only seek a 300,000 euro fine against Le Pen. And a 2 million euro fine against her party. And opened up a new case in September 2024 alleging illegal financing of the 2022 election.
This, clearly, is utterly unrelated to any other aspect of handling the Le Pen case, and not the initiation for a future basis to further fine and disqualify Le Pen from politics in the future after the current judgement runs its course.
And returning to the only relevant case itself, Le Pen trial that began in March in turn would certainly have no impact on...
June 2024: Surprise! Macron triggers snap elections in effort to overturn political gridlock and break his dependence on Le Pen. Perhaps the ongoing Le Pen trial will at last get rid of this troublesome opposition party?
July 2024: It, uh, doesn't work. Le Pen's party gets about 1/3 of all votes, and about 13% more than Macron's party.
The snap elections are generally considered a strategic mistake for Macron, doubling-down on his issues.
They also, coincidentally, totally kill any talk of Macron's constitutional reform for a third term candidacy.
A candidacy that- remembering previous elections- would have been substantially improved with a Le Pen in the field to rally a resentful Left to his side.
But now that Macron's political hopes for a third election are dead and buried...
November 2024: The French Government announces it seeks 5 years in jail, on top of the political bar, for Le Pen. However, conflicting reports say 2 years., with judgement expected in march 2025
Notably- even a 2 year sentence from vaguely April 2025 to April 2027 would release Le Pen right on / after the 2027 election, and thus totally unable to compete. And, depending on the terms of the house arrest, unable to speak or influence.
31 March 2025 (Yesterday): Le Pen is sentenced to 4-but-2-if-she-behaves years of prison, 2 of them under house arrest and 2 suspended, and a five year bar from political office. She is allowed to appeal but...
Even if she does appeal the ban on public office, only an appellate ruling could overturn it and restore her hopes of running, although time is running out for that to happen before the election as appeals in France can take several years to conclude.
Gallic shrug
I am sure the French government that took a decade to bring this conviction about will speedily process the appeal of the Le Pen who recent French polling suggested was somewhere in the 40% voting range for the first round. (Usual French first round poling disclaimers abound.)
Functionally, this ruling conveniently clears the deck for France's nominal establishment left and rights to make a return, without Le Pen in the way.
Call it Macron's farewell gift to French democracy. It's not like he disqualified his own presidential election opponent...
...though that's more because he failed to get the constitutional change he wanted that would have allowed him to run again...
...in which case, perhaps prosecutorial discretion might have leaned another way.
Summing It All Up
Le Pen (Senior) was an all-around tosser and more or less enemy of the French establishment, if not the French State per see
- Le Pen (Senior) embarrassed the French Establishment in the early 2002 election where he made the second round of the presidential election
- Le Pen (Senior) thereafter suffered years of unfortunate financial prospects that would have driven the Le Pen party out of politics
- Misfortune including perfectly neutral reductions in state stipends for political parties, a bank blockade, and an inability to sell a multi-million dollar property in Paris
- Le Pen (Senior) is politically toxic, and fiscally insolvent, before his daughter takes over the party
Le Pen (Marine) is Le Pen's daughter who inherited his mess, and his enemies
- Le Pen was an unexceptional MEP for over a decade with no notable scandals or accusations of fraud of this sort at the time
- In 2011, Le Pen inherits the party, and its finances, from her father. Money is tight.
- During this time, and probably before, Le Pen deals in the technically-illegal-but-totally-not-widely-practiced practice of paying national party members with EU funds.
- No one cares.
- Le Pen spends the next years working to rebuild fiscal solvency, including taking foreign loans to break the Parisian bank blockade
- The foreign loan most in question is Russian, marking a turn towards a more Russian-friendly narrative line, and increased institutional and international suspicion
President of European Parliament Shulz was a totally-not-corrupt German politician who totally didn't do a political hit job on the rival of an ally in furtherance of his own political ambitions
- Schulz had a notable, internationally-reported reputation for corruption, including on a similar issue
- The issue that will be the basis of the scandal is, uh, not unknown in his circles
- Schulz takes a particular stab at the political rival of a major political partner
- and potential future diplomatic partner who could help Schulz's ambitions come true
- Schulz definitely doesn't get awarded for services rendered for French-appreciated interests
- Or eagerly try to sustain the relationship with surprise arrival Macron
- But Schulz is not the villain
- Merely the tool providing the French establishment their means to prosecute Le Pen when desired
President Macron was totally not letting Le Pen stay in politics as a foil to bolster his personal electoral prospects against the French left
- It's not like Le Pen automatically invoked the support of the French left in every second round election
- Or bolstered his parliamentary prospects against the left that would, absent her, happily no-confidence him
- Or that his administration hid scandalous information that might have let her fail to be the foil when his left flank was weak
- It just takes an additional half-decade to complete investigations to find prosecutable evidence of something that was recorded and reported on more than half a decade prior
- You know, to develop the case until the time is right
Macron was totally not prolonging the case management by months or years in parallel to anticipation of extending his own political career
- Extending his jupiter-style presidency to a third term would have been more unpopular than he was
- In which case a free Le Pen sure would have been useful for those second-round elections
- But keep her and her party in a slow boil post-2022 with unclear intentions or scope
- As insurance policy, or leverage on the parliamentary politics
But Macron's efforts to garner support for a constitutional amendment failed
- And Macron's snap election gambit to regain control of government failed
- And when it failed, so did his prospects at constitutional change
- And if he's not running again, there's no electoral advantage in Le Pen to run again
Which makes it naturally the best time to announce the intent to jail and disqualify the clear frontrunner
- A merciful 'mere' 2 years house arrest just coincidentally scheduled to time to the next election cycle
- It certainly could not have occurred earlier, and thus mitigated the perception of intentional procedural manipulation
- This is justified because embezzlement of EU funds is a critical subversion of democracy the voters should know about
- Just not when it might have harmed Macron's electoral prospects
- Or by letting voters vote accordingly against Le Pen with the knowledge
In Conclusion
Is there a 'benign' explanation for all this? Sure, if you want.
Is this a sketchy-but-will-be-claimed-above-reapproach series of events? Also yes.
The Le Pen saga doesn't actually require some all-encompassing conspiracy. La Pen (Senior) can have his own political feuds with the French establishment separate from La Pen (Marine). Schulz was a means, but hardly the start or the end of the Le Pen family feud with the French establishment. Macron was (probably) never involved in the early phases of whatever French state pressures may or may not have been used to try to bankrupt the Le Pen party.
But unless you believe the French prosecutor's office is completely independent of Macron and only coincidentally schedules things to align with electoral milestones and key dates to Macron's benefit, the Macron-era Le Pen saga has plenty of its own implications of, shall we say, politically considerate handling.
And those Macron handlings were built on a history of the Marine Le Pen handlings. And the Marine Le Pen handlings were built on the Le Pen (Senior) handlings. This has been a political fight for longer than some of the posters on this forum have been alive.
None of this means that Le Pen didn't actually 'defraud' the EU of however many manhours of political aid hours she charged the EU. If that's all you care about, this can be 'just,' sure. Let justice be done though the heavens fall, and all that.
But the other part of 'just' is if this is handled the same as other cases. And to an extent this is impossible, because no one else in France gets handled like Le Pen, because no one else represents what the Le Pen family represents, or threatens, to the French establishment.
What Next?
Don't be surprised if this becomes a significant reoccurring propaganda / european culture war theme for the anti-establishment skeptics, on both sides of the Atlantic.
Establishment European media are already signaling an expectation of further political chaos in France, and trying to coax/signal Le Pen to 'help her party' over 'seek revenge.' (Politico) The National Rally remains in position to topple the government by contributing to a no-confidence vote if the other parties oppose Macron.
The New York Times, which is broadly sympathetic to the French government effort and hostile towards Le Pen with the NYT's characteristic framing devices, concedes that-
Ms. Le Pen, like it or not, may now become another element in the Vance-Musk case for European democratic failure.
This is surrounded by all the appropriate signals that this is bad thought, of course, but it is unlikely to be solely an American critique. Various right-of-center politicians across Europe were quick to condemn, and the culture war lines will write themselves.
Not all are unhappy or afraid, though.
In Paris’ Republic Plaza, where public demonstrations often unfold, Le Pen detractors punched the air in celebration.
“We were here in this square to celebrate the death of her father,” said Jean Dupont, 45, a schoolteacher. “And this is now the death of Le Pen’s presidential ambitions.”
Jean-Marie Le Pen, the founder of the National Front and a figure long associated with racism and Holocaust denial, died earlier this year at age 96.
Sophie Martin, 34, a graphic designer, was among those in a celebratory mood. “I had to check the date — I thought it was April Fool’s Day,” she said. “But it’s not. She’s finally been knocked down. We’ve lived with her poison in our politics for too long.”
I know you're more of an expert on armed forces and geopolitics than I am, would love to heart some scenarios.
You send multi-million dollars worth of equipment into Northern Mexico. Drones costing a few hundred to thousand dollars blow them up. Rinse and repeat until the American taxpayer gets tired of seeing the celebratory videos on the internet while foreigners simultaneously mock them and highlight every American-caused casualty as an atrocity.
But it feels like as far as neighborliness goes, Mexico has been hitting defect pretty insistently. It ain't no Mr. Rogers. Well actually we've always been fucking you over slowly seems like a weak argument.
Assuming you are an American- please show some self-awareness when accusing who of fucking over who, particularly when you are advocating an act of war against a neighbor.
This sort of behavior from a neighbor that's the junior partner seems intolerable. It would never be accepted by Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, or any sane country.
I repeat the earlier point: you are making poor geopolitical analogies.
Or rather- when Russia decided it wouldn't tolerate a sovereign neighbor doing sovereign policy things, it led to one of the biggest blunders of post-WW2 Russian strategic policy, costing over a million casualties and the loss of significant global power and standing. When China wouldn't tolerate Vietnam's behavior, it invaded the north and had such an embarrassing lack of success that Vietnam has sparked not just a detente, but budding partnership, with China's main strategic rival.
These were both terribly stupid policies by the 'senior' partner, neither of which actually got what they wanted as a result.
The other countries have been less incompetent, and so have generally let their disgruntlement with troublesome neighbors remain disgruntlements rather than casus belli.
I guess the real disconnect is that I think if it does escalate to combat between one or more cartels and the US, the cartels would capitulate in less than 60 days, making it a fait accompli.
That would indeed be a real disconnect, and one that strongly suggests a lack of attention to the experiences of the Iraq and Afghan wars.
The Americans have not been able to make organized criminal groups inside the US 'capitulate' in 60 years. The US lasted about 20 years in Afghanistan, and considerably less in Mogadishu against worse-equipped criminal warlords. The idea that you would be able to totally defeat inernational cartels in 60 days by occuping a fraction of a country, in a country that you do not speak the language of, over a border zone you have never been able to seal, is not serious.
And even if you can initially disrupt, what then? Say you somehow clear them from area X in 60 day, but on day 61 you go home. What do you think happens on day 62? Or day 63? Or [however many days you stay]+1? What- besides grabbing clay and building forts to compel indefinite military threats- is your compliance plan?
Yes, I know, four day operation to Kyiv and all, but we're not threatening their nationhood or trying to grab clay. If they're at all businessmen they'll realize that we can make them bleed and lose treasure very hard very fast.
And you think this achieves anything... why?
You're not thinking like a cartel. Or rather, you seem to think cartels are unitary actors who a singular 'they' can capture, as opposed to coalitions of autonomous rivals who often fight over profit share. Life is cheap, and the cartel's losses are not your own- instead, the cartel's loss is a chance for your own gang to take out rivals and maneuver yourself for a bigger cut of the American drug-purchasing money. As long as there are americans willing to pay tons of money to buy the drugs, then there is a lot of money to be made selling despite the risks. That other people in the business lose out isn't an issue, it's an opportunity- especially if you can use the American intervention as a way to knock out rivals / settle scores / make way for yourself.
If the individual cartels test each other out and have areas of control and neutral zones, does not pushing back on their expansion mean you're just rolling over?
No, it does not.
Dean
Flairless
2mo ago
In a start to the new week in Europe that is certainly a start, the Iberian peninsula has reportedly just been hit by a major power outage affecting both Spain and Portugal, including their capitals, and parts of southern France. The power outage occurred during the day, and is disrupting activities down to the public transportation level. Power is being gradually restored, though how long for full restoration is unclear.
There is no identified cause (yet), but this sort of outage on such a geographically diverse scale does not usually happen by accident. The Spanish government is probing a possible cyberattack.
While it is possible for problems in parts of the European energy grid to cause problems elsewhere, and there was a fire recently affecting a Spanish-French high-voltage cable, I am unaware of any analogous incident where a power grid failure on the Spanish-French side would affect the Portugal side of Spain as well. (For Americans, this is roughly analogous to an incident in eastern texas leading to outages in western Texas.)
Timing is a soft-indicator that supports, but do not prove, a hostile intent.
Purely mechanical system outages tend to either be random breaks or a result of load shifting. Random breaks (key thing somewhere breaks at a bad time) is more randomly distributed over time and thus more likely on weekends and nights rather than week days. Load-shift outages can occur when a power grid fails to properly balance when raising to meet daily production. This increases the impact on the mornings, when industrial centers increase energy demand for the daily work shifts, or possibly afternoons, when post-work tool-downs create a new load-balance challenge. However, this outage reportedly occurred mid-day, when the power load is relatively stable.
Weekday afternoons, and especially early in a work week, are more valuable hostile-disruption windows. Noon and afternoon attacks affect more people out in their days, and cause more social panic as parents are separated from children or trapped without working public transportation. Mondays in particular are the inverse of the 'bury bad news by publicizing it Friday' rule. An event on Mondays is more likely to dominate public discourse and media coverage for the new work week.
Correlation is not causation, and that does bear reminding here. However, that reminder does not mean correlation is irrelevant to anything else. Expect cyber-security paradigm discussions to grow, particularly if a benign fault can't be identified. Even if a benign fault is identified, awareness of the scale of vulnerability is likely to be used either in other messaging efforts, or as inspiration for copy-cat attacks.
My best wishes for anyone affected, and hope for everyone to stay safe and have a power outage plan.
Dean
Flairless
1yr ago
I've noticed that sci-fi games are far more likely to qualify as "quality writing" for me. Even my contemporary examples (such as Prey) are sci-fi as well. That's not to say I can't enjoy other types, but I'm wondering if I either have a bias; if sci-fi lends itself to deeper writing, or attracts writers who can do so; or both. Note that I can give some very bad sci-fi examples of games (I am outspoken in how much I find Mass Effect completely awful in almost every way).
Whoah. I was just about to bring up Mass Effect as an example of popular bad sci-fi. Not simply for its ending, but from structural design perspective (a terribly managed/planned trilogy structure that led to the ending), an inability to stick to character arcs (many reoccuring characters flip from their initial story arcs to fit into the narrative / character appeal niches as needed), it's heavy power fantasy dynamic verging into sycophantism, the tendency to emotionally heal traumatized women by boning them, and so on. A good enough contrarian could even write an amusing spiel on it's fascistic themes and narrative style (though admittedly most who do aren't good enough to pull it off).
Dean
Flairless
2yr ago
Indeed, "more dehumanisation please" is an ESPECIALLY dumb argument to make when it's Russia occupying Ukrainian land and not the other way around, lol. This is surely the time to ask for more clemency, not less?
This presumes the Russians are willing to provide clemency if plead to, and is countered by point that Russia invaded Ukraine with the premeditated intention to set up filtration camps and start kidnapping, killing, and otherwise abusing pro-Western Ukrainians as a matter of policy and part of a broader cultural genocide effort in a war to destroy the Ukrainian nation.
To appeal for Russian clemency is to appeal for the Russians to reverse the policy objective which was a goal of the invasion itself.
Counts for what to who?
Is 'Scalia' in this context supposed to count as a proxy for 'shares Scalia's worldview and judicial philosophy?' Or does it count more as a talismanic shield, akin to 'he worked for a conservative, therefore he must not be politically biased?' I imagine 'Scalia clerk' counts for either, but to different people.
What else is 'Scalia clerk' supposed to mean? Was Scalia known for only employing clerks who agreed with his philosophy, and thus they are proxies for his professional reputation? Are Scalia law clerks as a class any less prone to culture war shenanigans than the rest of the legal profession? Was Scalia known for characterizing deportation as being cast into Dante's inferno, or viewing deportation as oppression?
If I look up Adam Unikowsky's professional bio, should I expect to see Scalia-esque disagreement with the lawfare practices of the last administration to shape the election, or should I expect to see concurrence as many other respectable professionals felt it was right and proper?
I am informed, in fact, that this forum is overrun with Russian Propaganda, such that some no longer wish to participate. This is lamentable if true, so I thought it might help to prompt some elaboration of the pro-Ukraine case.
If the doubt over Russian Propaganda is the basis of raising questions, then you have an odd way of going about clarifying the potentially lamentable situation.
For example, your first 8 questions are-
How much aid would you provide? Weapons? Money? No-Fly Zone? Air support? Troops on the ground? Nuclear umbrella? Something else? What is the end-state your policy is aiming for?
Set aside that many of these are badly structured questions in and of themselves. More importantly, what possible answer could any of these questions provide from a pro-Ukrainian supporter that would or would not illuminate the prevalence of Russian Propaganda in this forum?
If your theory that the forumites answering are only saying [Big Amount] because of Russian Propaganda on this forum, as opposed to other sources of information or non-Russian Propaganda? Would [Smaller Amount] provide any meaningful contrast? If a pro-Ukrainian says 'no, I don't support a No-Fly Zone,' does that... mean anything regarding the forum propaganda that a pro-Ukrainian saying 'yes, I do support a No-Fly Zone?' would indicate?
If not, why are you asking the question as a means to gain elaboration about the thing that would be lamentable-if-true? Where is the light? A 'just asking questions' inverse gish-galloping- demanding a host of extensive answers from low-effort questions- is certainly a technique, but it would be a technique far better suited for generating heat, particularly given the ease of anti-supporters to selectively pick at the answers they find most vulnerable and ignoring the rest, without having to justify (or provide) their own views to the same questions.
Moreover, and this is an even more basic structure question, why aim the question at the supporters of Ukraine aid, as opposed to the opponents of Ukrainian aid?
Again, if your stated basis of concern is to believed, then the best survey audience with whom to evaluate the prevalence of Russian Propaganda on the forum is to start with the people most likely to have adopted Russian propaganda. Then you could ask questions where you know what a Russian propaganda line answer, and then compare the answers that align with the Russian propaganda line versus those that differ. This, in turn, could allow comparison and contrasts, and see how much of opposition to a thing is due to reasons aligned with propaganda versus those that are not.
This wouldn't be the end of a genuine search for truth, of course, as not all capital-P Propaganda is false. Sometimes Propaganda boosts rather than causes the narratives of the target audience. Independent convergence is a thing. But you would at least have chosen a more appropriate survey audience.
And this is without poisoning the well with a bad question like-
Is there an end-state or a potential event in the war that you think would falsify your understanding of the war, and convince you that providing aid was a bad idea? Another way of putting it is, do you think your views on the Ukraine war are falsifiable, and if so, what evidence would be sufficient for you to consider it falsified?
Yes, this is a well-poisoning question. We are both aware we are on a rationalist-adjacent forum where intellectual integrity is prioritized. Most of the audience has internalized the principle that good theories need to be falsifiable, because non-falsifiable is itself evidence that no amount of evidence or reason can reverse the premise. which is Bad in a community that prioritizes pursuing Truth and Reason. This is also a cornerstone of the scientific process, practically an axiom of rationalist discourse, and anyone reading this can recognize the follow-on insinuation. If someone says no, they are being unreasonable since reason demands being open to being disproven (falsification), and if they are being unreasonable in this they are being unreasonable in the rest as well.
What not everyone will recognize is that you are not only asking a leading question, or that you are leading with a variation of the hindsight bias (the mental error of looking back and thinking an eventual result was obvious all along), but that you are insinuating an axiom outside of its appropriate paradigm. The Ukraine War is not a laboratory hypothesis for the scientific method. It is a strategic conflict between multiple strategic actors, and this means that paradigms of strategies and game-theory apply.
And because fewer people are familiar with those paradigms than they are rationalist-adjacent forum norms or maxims regarding the scientific method, they wouldn't recognize that the premise of the question doesn't make sense. Or even that 'yes' is the irrational answer that should invite doubt. Not just because doing so would reveal susceptibility to the hindsight bias invitation- the validity/soundness of a decision is the decision made with the information at hand on the time, not information unavailable to them- but just on the matter of strategic paradigm itself.
Outcomes do not falsify strategies.
Outcomes are results, but results are not a strategy, nor are strategies predictive devices in and of themselves. Strategies entail predictions, but equating the two is a compositional fallacy, believing what is true of a part of a thing is true of the whole of the thing. Even ignoring that potential fallacy, believing that results falsify a process (strategy) that leads to them is a first-order mistake. It is a common mistake, particularly among the sort of people who believe that a strategy that fails is axiomatically a falsified strategy, but this is a bad axiom. And like bad axioms in any field, anyone whose theoretical understanding of a field rests on bad axioms is building their understanding on poor foundations, whether the user acknowledges it as an axiom or not.
This is much easier to see when politically loaded topics are substituted by less political topics, which can be done by some basic coding to produce less politically contentious analogies that rest on the same argument structure and axiom of outcome-falsifies-strategy.
For example, this-
Is there an end-state or a potential event in the war that you think would falsify your understanding of the war, and convince you that providing aid was a bad idea? Another way of putting it is, do you think your views on the Ukraine war are falsifiable, and if so, what evidence would be sufficient for you to consider it falsified?
-could be represented for an axiom test as-
Is there an end-state or a potential [outcome of a high-stakes process] that you think would falsify your understanding of [the high-stakes process], and convince you that [engaging in the high-stakes process] was a bad idea? Another way of putting it is, do you think your views on [the high-stakes process] are falsifiable, and if so, what evidence would be sufficient for you to consider it falsified?
-because the axiom has to apply to all models for it to apply as an axiom. The Ukraine War, in turn, is a [high-stakes process], and events including but not limited to how the war ends are outcomes of that process.
However, the axiom-test is just as valid if applied to-
Is there an end-state or a potential [outcome of a high-stakes process] that you think would falsify your understanding of [the high-stakes process], and convince you that [not engaging in the high-stakes process] was a bad idea? Another way of putting it is, do you think your views on [the high-stakes process] are falsifiable, and if so, what evidence would be sufficient for you to consider it falsified?
-because despite flipping the 'engage with high-stakes process' with a 'not engage in high-stakes process,' the axiom of outcome-falsifies-strategy does not depend on what the actual strategy is. That is why it is an axiom, as opposed to a special pleading rhetorical device / argument-as-soldier to advance the strategist's favored (or dis-favored) positions.
Now consider this in a less ideologically charged- or propagandized- process where a strategic paradigm applies... like gambling. Which has substantial literature overlap with issues of strategic competition, risk-management, and so on. The field of game-theory was named because of the various meta-analysis commonalities, and has been foundational to the field of international relations and conflicts, including the school of Realist theorists.
Now just as we substituted [Ukraine War] for [high-stakes process] for the purpose of the axiom, we can substitute [high-stakes process] for something like...
Is there an end-state or a potential [outcome of high-stakes [gambling with your life's savings]] that you think would falsify your understanding of [high-stakes [gambling with your life's savings]], and convince you that [not engaging in high-stakes [gambling with your life's savings]] was a bad idea? Another way of putting it is, do you think your views on [high-stakes [gambling with your life's savings]] are falsifiable, and if so, what evidence would be sufficient for you to consider it falsified?
Somehow, it is less pejorative if someone says 'no, there is no result from gambling with my life's savings that would falsify my understanding that gambling with my life's savings is a bad idea, and convince me that my strategy of not gambling with my life's savings was a bad idea.'
And that somehow is because people will reflexively drop both axioms- the axiom that outcomes falsify strategies, and also that they must be willing to falsify their theories of strategy to be logical and reasonable- on topics of strategy or risk. Not least because they are not valid axioms on topics of strategy and risk. Which is really not surprising to anyone with any notable experience in games of strategy of uncontrollable factors, or risk management.
As anyone with experience in games of cards or dice should know, even dominant strategies don't always win. Sometimes the other party has a better hand, and statistically improbably things happen all the time. Similarly, there are times where high-risk/high-reward strategies are the only plausible strategies for [victory], whether it's because you're making up a deficit or because playing safe is a guaranteed loss. There is no axiom-level 'your strategy is falsified if you lose' principle in play- there are only disputes about the sort of assumptions should go into evaluating the tradeoffs. And, as with most subjective value systems, there is no axiom that people must agree on shared valuations, or defend their own valuation system to your own, regardless of whether you find it convincing or not. The player who tries their hardest to maximize their probable draws or avoid a lose condition, and the player who throws hands to keep a weaker player in the game because [reasons], are playing fundamentally different games for what [victory] even is, even as they play by the same nominal draw rules.
Similarly, a strategy of risk management doesn't get disproven if the risk manifests regardless. Most forms of risk mitigation are about mitigating the frequency of a negative outcome, not the total impossibility, and so it could well be worse to change strategy after a bad-outcome than to stick the course. Again, examples are not hard to find. The negative consequences of false positives driving unnecessary (and sometimes deadly) medical interventions does not disprove the value of screening for deadly diseases at a point where the risk of surgery can pre-empt the risk of no intervention. If someone asked what sort of outcome from a car crash would make someone falsify their belief that safety belts are a good idea, they would be looked at with suspicion and rightly so, regardless of whether they were a bad-faith actor for [special interest group against safety belt laws] or merely incompetent. Nor are the suspicious being irrational or unreasonable for not engaging with a question about what sort of result of [car accident] would make them falsify their strategy of [maybe we should make seat belts mandatory by law], even if there are possible negative outcomes like malefactors trying to race away from the cops and running over children and wouldn't someone think of the children?
Because, again, outcomes do not falsify strategies. Even emotionally-evocative outcomes chosen to try and shift the strategic choice.
Outcomes can justify a re-evaluation of strategic assessments. Outcomes may reveal new information to update strategic assumptions. Outcomes may even drive changes in strategy as decision-maker's tastes change rather than anything underlying information in and of itself. But outcomes do not 'falsify' strategies. The fact that a strategy turns out poorly (or well!) is independent of the validity of the strategic choice, as good strategies can still fail, and bad strategies can still succeed. And this is because judging the ultimate outcome is judging by [information] that- by its nature- is not available at the time of decision about the strategy. It could only be included if one used that as an assumption.
Which- since the point of a strategy is to try and manage risks and opportunities for the future- is assuming the conclusion to justify a decision on how to approach the future.
Which also is not a good practice as a general point of strategy. But it can work well as a propagandistic frame-setting trick when paired with discrediting pejoratives that dares the target audience to self-identify themselves with the alternative.
I saw this article and was saving it to write an effort post, and now you beat me to it. A shame, but I guess I should put the outline to use anyway.
My intent would have been to use this article to highlight my concern about the AI revolution, and share my perspective on a topic I've never really gone into.
I am on record on being a skeptic / doubter on AI singularity fears (or hopes). I broadly think the 'the winner of AI is the winner of all' is overstated due to other required dynamics for such a monopoly of power/influence to occur. I think other technology dynamics matter more in different ways- for example, I think the drone revolution matters more than the AI revolution for shaping geopolitical contexts in the decades to come. I think that AI technologies under human control are more likely to do something irrevocably stupid than AI-controlled technologies deciding to paperclip everything and somehow having the unique ability to compel all other AI to align with that.
I do think it's fine to characterize AI as a significant disruptive technology, even if I think the inherent limits of LLM are more relevant to certain fields (especially anything novel/emerging without substantial successful learning material) than is commonly appreciated. Something doesn't have to be world ending to be a major disruption. I just think it's one of many, many major disruptions in the decade to come, and not even necessarily the worst. (Though disruptions do compound.)
What scares me isn't the AI singularity, but the AI-educated youth.
Specifically, I fear for- and fear from- people who might otherwise have learned critical thinking skills in how to not only search for answers, but organize and retain answers, to things they didn't know at the start. The example in the articles covered people using AI not only in lieu of finding a solution, but even knowing what the solution was. (The students who didn't know their own essay's response.) I don't think AI is bad for students because the answers AI provide are bad, necessarily. Getting an answer from AI isn't that different from getting an answer from a first-few pages search of google. (Even before they were the same thing.) It's more that if you don't even know how to do a tailored good search, or you don't know where other alternative answers are, you can't compare even that result. And if you're not retaining the solution- if you don't understand 'why' the solution is correct- the student is missing the opportunity. What's the point of passing a test if you, the student, haven't learned?
And I think the process of learning is important. In fact, I think learning the process of learning is among the most important things to learn at all. How to find an answer you don't know. How to distinguish good answers from bad answers. How to detect and distinguish bias from error from manipulation. How to generate a new solution to a complex problem when there isn't a proven solution at hand, or if the old solutions aren't accessible because [reasons]. And finally, how to both organize and communicate that in a way that other people can use. 'Knowing' a lot is not enough. 'Communicating' it can be just as important. All of these are skills that have to be practiced to be developed.
AI can compromise critical thinking and skill development. AI can compromise learning how to look for answers. AI can compromise how to retain the answers. AI can compromise the ability of people to respond to unclear situations with incomplete information or no baselines. AI can compromise the ability of people to convey their ideas to other people.
I had a great big screed on how I think AI is ruining youth... and then I looked back to that first mention of google, and asked myself 'what is so different?'
I grew up in an era where the pre-AI internet promised unparalleled information access. An era where seemingly infinite libraries of fiction (fan or otherwise) were open to anyone with an internet, with more to read than a lifetime of book purchases. Access to other people's opinions would break people out of their small-minded closed-worlds. The truth was out there, and the internet would help you reach it. In one of the earlier versions of Civilization, the Internet was considered a world wonder, and would give the civilization that developed it first (eventual) access to any technology that at least two other states knew.
But I also grew up in an era where people bemoaned that google was ruining the ability of people to find anything not on the internet. Documents that were never digitized, people who never wrote down their thoughts, the subtext that comes from investing things in person rather than from a distance. You can think you know how hilly a hike is from reading it, but a picture of it is worth a thousand words, and actually hiking it yourself in the heat and humidity and while carrying dozens of pounds of equipment is something else. It's hard to capture the sublime beauty of nature, and thus understand why people would value nature preservation for its own sake, if you don't go out to it.
(Then again, I did go into it. I also didn't like it. My sympathies were never exactly with anti-industrial environmentalism after that.)
And it's not like the pre-AI google-internet wasn't directly facilitating cheating. Who here was ever introduced to SparkNotes? The best friend of anyone who didn't want to actually do the required reading, but still needs a talking point or essay about a famous book. It advertises itself as a 'study guide' site these days. It condensed hundreds of pages into a few small pages of summary, and that was Good Enough.
Similar points could be made about cheating. I remember when facebook was not only young, but mostly a college student thing. And I remember how schools wrestled with students sharing answer sheets to quizzes, past essays, and so on. Even if I didn't partake, I know people did. Were they getting substantially more critical thinking skills than the modern AI exploiter just because their cheating methods were a bit more taxing on time or effort?
Maybe. But then, what's so different between the pre-AI/post-internet student cheating, and the pre-internet student cheating?
Were cheating circles any less of a thing in eras where colleges had notorious stories of famous historical figures basically fooling around until last-minute cramming? Were those cramming sessions really imparting the value of critical thinking not only to the Great Figures of History, but their less memorable peers?
Or information. If you're getting all your politics from AI, that was pretty dumb. But then, I remember when it was (and still is) a common expression of contempt to dismiss people who watched [bad political TV station], or read [biased partisan news paper], or listened to [objectional radio figure] rather than the other alternatives.
But were the people who were turning into [good political TV station] being any more critical thinking for listening to the 'correct' opinion shows? Or was it just 'my noble voters know I speak truth through their own critical thinking, yours are misled by propaganda that critical thinking would negate'? Were radio listeners decades prior any less mono-tuned for having even fewer alternative stations to listen to? Were regional or municipal newspapers any partisan when there was less competition outside the influence of political machines? Were their readers any more objective critical thinkers when there were fewer easy alternative options?
Has there ever been a golden age of critical thinkers, schooled to think well, untainted by the technology of its era, or the character of its students?
Or has critical thinking been consistent across history, with most students of any era doing the least possible to get through any required courses, and missing the point along the way?
And- by implication- some minority of critical thinkers existing and emerging regardless of the excuses of the era? And often out-competing their contemporaries by the advantages that come with critical thinking?
The more I think of it, the more convinced I am of the later. Most people in history wouldn't have been great critical thinkers if only they had access to more or even better information. They'd still have taken the easiest way to meet the immediate social pressure. Similarly, I doubt that the Great Critical Thinkers of History would have been ruined by AI. Not as a class, at least. They already had their alternative off-ramps, and didn't.
Critical thinking can always be encouraged, but never forced. The people who do so are the sort of people who are naturally inclined to question, to think, or to recognize the value of critical thinking in a competitive or personal sense. The people who actually do so... they were always a minority. They will probably always be a minority.
So on reflection, my fear about bad students isn't really warranted by AI. There has always been [things degrading critical thinking] that the learners of the era could defer to, or cheat with. If I'd been born generations earlier, I'd have had an equivalent instinct 'warranted' by something else. My fear is/was more about the idea of 'losing' something- an expectation of the critical thinking of others- that probably never existed.
Realizing that made me fear the effects of AI a bit less. As silly as it sounds to put my updated prior in this way, and the sillyness is the point here, there was no golden age of critical thinking and enlightened education that just so happened to be when I was maturing. Just as [current year] wasn't the first time in human history moralistic college students felt ideal social morality was obviously achievable, a downgrade of critical thinking didn't start after I left college either.
So when I read that article about the south korean kid who viewed Ivy League not as a chance to learn in an environment of unparalled access to quality minds and material, but as a change to meet his wife and co-founder of some company, I shouldn't- don't- despair. Instead, I shrug. As it was before, so it shall be again.
Two centuries ago, his mindset would have been right at home in his home country. He would probably only have cared about the material the nominally-meritocratic gwageo civil service exams assessed (including classical literature) to the degree it let out-compete other would-be competitors and join the yangban, a relatively comfortable aristocratic-social class. If he had the ability to cheat at the civil service exam and get away with it, I imagine he would have.
I doubt the social sanctity of meritocrat exams would have bothered him anymore than the espoused value of critical thinking in a progressive academic institution.
What is so different?
Dean
Flairless
4mo ago
I know that Belisarius thinks I'm a far-leftist (lol), but I think that a fair reading my post history will show that I am what I present myself as, more or less a classical liberal who hates both the left and the right.
No, not particularly?
You come off as a pretty standard Blue-Tribe American democrat with left-leaning sensibilities. You reliable tend towards the left framing paradigms, complete with regularly adopting left-fronted framings of what goes on, and this has been true of Trump in particular for who knows how long. Your dislike of the progressive-left comes more from irritation at friendly fire in your direction than a distrust of statist / establishment-dominated politics in general- it's just a who, whom, rather than anti-left.
I think you reversed the order of money allocation...?
If the money is appropriated for a purpose, that means it can't be allocated whenever- it can only be spent for the purpose the legislature appropriated it for from the start, and thus does not come with the opportunity cost of a later allocation decision. The money would not have been there for FEMA for the first place if it wasn't for the purpose it was appropriated.
This is the difference between being given $20 to do what you want and spending it irresponsibly, and only getting $20 to use towards a thing you may / may not care about. Not using the $20 for the thing you do not care about does not convert it into $20 you can use how you want.
You can argue the wisdom of an annual budget for spending on things you don't care about, but the initial appropriate can't send signals that care more about a previously planned thing over a later shortage because the initial appropriation for a fiscal year is on the assumption that it would meet forecasted needs.
Which is why the normal thing for a national government is to later appropriate more money on a more ad hoc basis later in the fiscal year.
Dean
Flairless
2yr ago
Well, (a) this isn't very charitable, given that Russia's stated aim is denazification and prevention of crimes against humanity against Russo-Ukrainians,
Russia's stated aim is irrelevant to charity. Russia's revealed aim and policies have included multiple crimes against humanity that do amount to international standards of genocide, and in line with Russian narratives justifying such on the rejection of the legitimacy of Ukrainian nationhood.
and (b) even if all Ukrainian-US propaganda is true and Russia really is capping any Ukrainian who ever looked fondly at an EU / NATO flag... there is always more brutality to be had.
The Russians will be brutal regardless, and will continue to be brutal over any Ukrainian territory they control both now and potentially in the future.
Daring Russia to sink even lower by engaging in anti-Russian dehumanisation will not, I think, have the long-term salutary effect Halla thinks it will: any Ukrainian lives saved from acceleration in victory are likely to be more than counterbalanced by Ukrainian lives lost from the incrementally more brutal Russian counterreaction.
That's an interesting claim, considering Russia retains maximalist war goals that are not limited to 'just' the 4 claimed sub-regions, let alone the occupied areas.
I agree that Ukraine was always a mistake. But you could say “we will provide XYZ (better weapons compared to what they have today)” while telling Ukraine “if we want you to take deal “ABC” and you don’t, then you get nothing.
Who do you think has the ability to ensure Ukraine gets nothing?
It's certainly no American- the Americans haven't even been the majority supplier of aid to the Ukrainians. The single biggest supplier, yes, the single most important yes, but EU institutions have given more financial aid to Ukraine than the US has given in value of all combined military / financial / humanitarian, and this is without addressing European national contributions.
Even if the US gives nothing, Ukraine still gets quite a bit. And if the cause of a cutoff is Donald Trump- and I'll just note that people have long downplayed his willingness to conditionally support Ukraine to take his opposition as a given- the Europeans are not going to meekly follow him, when both their own domestic-political interests and strategic interests remain with supporting Ukraine even, or especially in definace to, American pressure otherwise.
I could basically see it freezing the lines roughly where they are today. I guess that’s a surrender. But realism needs to hold sway here.
Why do you think Realism is any friend of freezing the fight along the current lines and surrendering?
Realism would note that the current war is at least the third continuation war Russia has pursued against Ukraine since the initial invasion of Crimea. (The first continuation war being the astroturfed Nova Russian campaign intended to spark a civil war, and the second continuation war being the direct military intervention when the Nova Russian uprising failed and was on the cusp of complete collapse.)
Realism would note that the Russia's leadership intentions and objectives that drove the current war are still unresolved, and thus the motivation basis remains for a fourth continuation war.
Realism would note that Russia's terms of cease fire and negotiations have for years hinged around limiting Ukraine's ability to resist a future incursion, and thus been conditional on the conditional basis for a fourth continuation war.
Realism would note that the center of gravity of Russia's conventional military strength at a strategic level, the Soviet inheritance of stockpiles, are being expended at unsustainable and functionally irreplaceable rates, and that once they are expended Russia's long-term capacity to conduct a fourth continuation war would be removed.
Realism would note that Russia's military edge is ebbing, that it's current rate of expenditures are unsustainable, and thus that relative negotiating position power will decrease away from Russia's favor of the coming years, and thus potentially create the conditions for negotiations that would not lead to a fourth continuation war.
Realism would note that the Western coalition, on the basis of supporting Ukraine against Russia, is actually mobilizing the political and economic capacity to scale military production, productions that must be greatly scaled to meet other major global competitors but which historically have observably not been invested in solely on the notional basis of those other competitors.
Realism would note a great many things that would work against arguments for a ceasefire in the near term.
'Realism' is no more a legitimization of 'what I want' than trying to claim to be a 'Rationalist' means your positions are any less monkey-brained than your opponents.
And yes, the sanctions removal isn’t a huge benefit for them (and was a massive mistake for the US) but it is some benefit.
It would be interesting in hearing why you think the sanctions strategy was a massive mistake for the US, given that the US/European sanction strategy has clearly delivered it's intended goals of limiting Russian economic capabilities (which is why Russia's only meaningful growth is now a result of a militarized economy rather than it's civilian economics), restrict access to global markets (which is why Russia has to pay significant mark-ups and risk-premiums on both imports and sales, and gets stuck with things like it's India Rupee savings), and done so in a way that didn't cripple the pro-Ukraine coalition's economic and political viability in the midst of major economic input rearrangements (the Europeans haven't cratered their own economies in the process of building up import-substitution infrastructure, and negated the Russian energy blackmail threats).
Is this going to hinge on arguments that the US didn't go far enough to try to enforce some sort of global embargo on Russian exports- which it wouldn't have had the political capacity to do? Or that the Europeans continued to import energy from the Russians- when building the physical infrastructure to import from other sources was going to take time? Or that Russia is expanding its economic dependence on China- a factor which has led the Europeans to be far more concerned and willing to distance themselves from China than they were before?
Dean
Flairless
1yr ago
I know you won't respond, but several of your justifications are humorous.
The dollar is a bad investment. How would you feel about holding a currency that is controlled by the government of a foreign country? You'd feel pretty bad if that country is $35 trillion in debt and will need to print trillions more every year to have any hope of even making the interest payments.
China is dumping U.S. treasuries and buying gold instead. It just makes financial sense.
U.S. treasuries are suffering their worst bear market possibly ever. Let's say you bought TLT (a long-term treasury ETF) at its peak in 2020. Today, you'd be down by more than 50% in real terms. What is supposed to be a "safe" investment becomes very unsafe in the presence of inflation.
The long-term picture isn't much better. Since the end of the gold standard in 1971, gold has outperformed U.S. treasuries. Simply buying and holding a lump of rock is better than holding the debt of the U.S. government. And the government was actually in good financial health for most of those years, unlike now.
Your long-term picture argument is what undermines the broader point. If gold has outperformed US treasures for nearly 50 years, and yet US treasuries have been a preferrable investment for nearly 50 years, that in and of itself is an indication that there are factors other than performance vis-a-vis gold (or other rocks) that are driving decisions of what makes something a good or bad investment. Some of these aren't mysteries- there are reasons that no one is trying to go back to a gold standard currency, let alone China.
Your next argument also undermines the specific supporting argument of China. China isn't dumping U.S. treasuries in favor of gold because gold is a better performer- again, your 1971 gold performance argument undermining the point- but because China is preparing itself financially for a conflict with the United States to mitigate sanctions risk, despite the demonstrated preference for the sanctions risk options instead of gold when the future sanctions risk was lower.
Ultimately, the value of an investment isn't in its own return, which your argument here focuses on, but in relation to the context and the alternatives. Even an investment that loses money can still be the preferable investment if the others would lose more. This is why the 35 trillion number of US debt is a big scary number used in isolation, but less so in relation to GDP (the nominal ability to pay), and even less so in like-to-like comparisons of total debt-to-GDP ratio comparisons with other prospective poles. It's not that it's a good metric- it's that while the US is in a league of its own in the ability to have debt, it's not in a league of it's own in managing debt, especially with peer economic poles. (The PRC debt-to-GDP ratio beyond government debt, for example- the whole property market financial crisis.)
The U.S. is not a trustworthy partner. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, Russia held about $600 billion in currency and gold reserves. About half of those reserves, $300 billion, were held in the West. After the invasion, those reserves were frozen. Now, they are now likely to be given to Ukraine.
Because of this, there is no reason for a country like China (or any other country for that matter) to store their wealth in the West, or to hold U.S. dollar-denominated assets. It's all conditional on U.S. allegiance.
The counter-points to this is that the Americans and Europeans have been sanctioning state and non-state actors for decades now, and seizing assets of parties who declare themselves in general conflict for centuries. Anyone surprised by the Ukraine War seizures was not paying attention, either to contemporary geopolitical finances in conflict or to historical contexts.
There is nothing new about it, and just as the threat of seizure in the west for reasons of crossing Western government red lines never went away, the reasons why countries would keep wealth in the west vis-a-vis somewhere else remain the same as they did a year ago- which is to say, it's a better system to store in at scale, unless you foresee yourself coming into direct conflict with the Western countries.
Big surprise, don't park your funds with people you may go to war with, or with whom you are trying to economically blackmail with energy cutoffs. The question isn't whether the US or West would do this- they have and did- it's who you think won't do this on equivalent or even less grounds.
For most countries, trade with China is more valuable than trade with the U.S. China now dominates most of the world's industries, and the trend continues to point in that direction. Third world countries often have much stronger trade ties with China than they do the U.S. They export natural resources and import Chinese goods. Increasingly, they can do without U.S. goods and services. Do what we say or otherwise you can't have our, um, Microsoft Excel licenses...
As this process strengthens, China will be able to lean on these countries to do business in Yuan, or perhaps in some resource-demoninated currency.
Both of these China proposals ignore the limits of China's abilities.
For a resource-denominated currency, the core issue here is that if you have a resource-denominated currency, you need to be able to provide it in scale at demand, which is precisely what cracked the gold standard repeatedly and broke it in favor of fiat currencies. The global financial system is too large in scale for any reasonable value-resource to be actually stockpiled and providable on demand in case of bank runs, and China in particular is a demonstration of that if you look at the recent property crisis, and then consider what would have happened if the Chinese government was legally obligated to provide X-ounces of Whateveronium.
What they'd do- or rather, what they wouldn't do- goes into the other main challenge in Chinese currency, which is the lack of liquidity due to the capital controls. China tries to lean on other countries to do business in Yuan, it makes loans more favorable on the condition that their in Yuan, but the issue with Yuan is that China runs a marcantile trade policy and makes it very hard to move capital wealth outside of the country at scale vis-a-vis using it in China to buy something for export or to reinvest. That's fine and dandy for bilateral trade, but that's antithetical to a reserve currency, which serves as a medium for countries doing trade NOT with the reserve currency country, but to move it in and out and outside of it.
Okay, so the dollar is done. What comes next? Probably nothing major. I don't think that the Yuan will become the reserve currency, or that we'll move back to the gold standard (although global reserves will be held increasingly in gold). But the U.S. dollar will no longer be the uncontested reserve currency. The world will once again be multipolar, with the U.S. just one of multiple competing forces, and not necessarily the strongest one.
A transition to a more multipolar geopolitical order is precisely what will continue to bolster the power of the American Dollar's role in the global ecosystem as the main reserve currency, while crushing the viability of a gold standard reserve currency.
Trading currencies are at the most risk if they are engaged in conflict zones, as the countries backing them have their economic environments shaped by the risk perceptions not only of the country, but what it takes for the supply chains to reach the country. The more potential conflict zones there are to intercept those links, the less stable the supply chains, and the more the capital needs somewhere relatively stable to wait.
A more multipolar world order is not a more peaceful one, and the more the Eurasian rim is broken apart by pole-on-pole conflicts, like we saw with the Suez Canal route being decimated by the broader Israeli-Iran conflict, the more the capital looks for somewhere relatively more stable. There's only one integrated continental economy with minimal external resource dependencies in the world, and that's in the north-western hemisphere.
At the same time, however, the more conflict-engaged currency blocks will run into the costs of financing and funding more conflicts, which goes to the same issue that gold-backed countries had with the much smaller economies of a century ago. WW1 costs of war and related debts snapped the gold-standard currencies, and the US dropped a gold standard because of the costs that came with having to honor that conversion while being a reserve currency.
You can be a reserve currency, or a gold-standard currency, but you can't be both unless you can actually provide the gold on demand. The US at the height of its financial supremacy over the non-Soviet block couldn't afford that for long. A financial pole of the multipolar order who tries will quickly be drained until it's no longer a meaningful pole, or it drops the option.
Can I convince you to try old children's cartoon series, like the original Digimon Adventure anime?
Digimon was a 1999 children's monster anime from Japan centered around a group of children who meet at a summer camp and find themselves in another world. There they are met by monsters both friendly and not as they try to survive and understand the new world they find themselves in, even as their goal is to find their way back home and return to their families. The story follows the children's efforts to survive, which depends on their personal growth, their relationships with each other, and their partnership with the monster-partners who met them on arrival claiming to have been waiting for them from the start. The later is part of the mystery of the plot that unfolds over 54 episodes, each less than half and hour.
This was isekai before isekai became a power fantasy cliche, more Swiss Family Robinson than Sword Art Online. While the format of the show is a literal monster-of-the-week setup, at nearly every stage of the adventure the children are the underdogs running from a far, far more powerful adversary. Rather than an escapist fantasy from Japanese life, it is fundamentally a story of lost-and-seeking-to-return to home and family.
While the production quality is terribly dated by modern standards- late-90s era animation, pre-modern adaptation practices, etc.- it also had strong character writing. 'Came for the monsters, stayed for the children' is how I fondly remember it. Now, that is on the admittedly biased recollections of a children's show from literal decades ago, but japanese anime has (had?) that trait of sometimes smuggling better writing into anime than American children's media of the time.
(There are various sequel series- some direct sequels, some in other settings. The third series, Digimon Tamers, starts as more of an urban fantasy genre, but arguably is better polished due to a smaller character caste and thus more focus on individual character arcs over time.)
What makes me think this might be appropriate to your ask is that the series (or at least the earlier iterations) is that the series is fundamentally a bildungsroman- a narrative focusing on the protagonists' formative years and spiritual education.
The series is fundamentally a collection of character development stories, in which the monsters and the adventure are the framing device for the children to grow, with that maturation being the narrative payoff as much as the ultimate outcome of the adventure. This isn't a mere 'the power of friendship means we win' spiel either- the series takes an Aristotelian approach to character traits, in which a virtue can become a flaw both by its absence and its excess. And this struggle is the basis of character arcs that track the entire series, even as this process is central to the world-building system.
So I thought of this when I read your criteria.
By line...
I am looking for story where group of characters (family or friends) form together a group that is NOT dysfunctional.
I think this qualifies. The groups that form have internal conflicts, but they are conflicts that are worked through. When there is an enduring conflict, it is character-appropriate and often plot-significant.
As a bildungsroman, the story is characters forming into better people. This does mean they start as worse people, but this is generally in terms of 'good-faith kids who are out of their depth and not yet mature' rather than malicious / incompetent / immoral. There is a generally consistent sense of progression, as the character development of the episode is generally permanent going forward rather than something forgotten in the next episodes.
Them dealing with problematic/oppressive/bureaucratic/evil world is fine, in fact I want to have some conflict. On the other hand I do not want them to win effortlessly or get some insanely OP powers that invalidate any opposition. I do not want tragic/bad ending, I also do not want obvious 100% perfect absurd success thanks to blatant plot armor.
Digimon Adventure starts as a survival story in which the world is dangerous, but with heavy distinctions between evil, morally flawed, and dangerous. Most of the series entails the children on the run or otherwise hiding from the Big Bad.
I also want story to not feature blatantly stupid setting or characters that make no sense whatsoever. Initially I phrased it as "no unrealistic stuff" but I am in fact fine with dragon-flying slave traders as antagonists, as long as suspension of disbelief is achievable.
The series is an isekai. The nature of the isekai isn't exactly a meta-mystery (digimon = digital monsters), but is one to the character cast.
If you can adopt the lie of the isekai premise, it is consistent enough in that context. It reflects a now-archaic 'the internet as a wild new frontier, both dangerous and amazing' mentality rather than any current political concept like disinformation or some such.
I strongly prefer avoidance of current politics in either direction, I have seen remarkably few cases where it was done well. I also do not want books that would be recommended only due to current politics, quality of that is even worse.
The series is a Japanese series that predates the post-2000 culture war. It also predates the Japanese moe-phase or isekai-escapist trends of the late 2000s/2010s.
Story may be small scale.
As an episodic series, there are many smaller-scale stories within the larger plot. While there is a constant the-stakes-are-survival context from the start, many individual stories are fundamentally smaller-stakes, like imposter syndrome, overcoming personal failures and guilt, or familial challenges born of love and complication. There is even a story about trying to help a friend who is being scammed and feeling like you are being dragged down with them.
The series does grow in scale and stakes as the internal mysteries are developed, but they fundamentally start at much, much lower scale in their initial premise. The first series starts with a survive-and-return-home premise, and keeps that for most of the series.
(The urban-fantasy series 3 starts as 'how do I keep my baby dinosaur a secret and out of trouble' child's-secret-pet tale, before the real adventure is about trying to find a lost friend. Again, everything else is framing for small-at-heart struggles.)
...so, have I gotten you to consider watching a 25-year-old children's cartoon with terrible-by-modern-standards production levels for your serious fiction fix?
Why do you believe this would be a reasonable- as in, reason-driven- as opposed to a pathetic- as in, pathos-driven- compromise?
Keep in mind that weaponized emotional appeals- including appeals to sympathy for social compact violators and shaming campaigns against those not showing enough pity towards preferred beneficiaries- have been a hallmark of the American culture war for decades now, and which the current political context is part of a political revolt against.
This is particularly relevant to this example, as a 'let's compromise on amnesty for immigration reform' was bargained in the past, except that the amnesty given did not lead to actual immigration enforcement afterwards.
Now your proposal is a compromise of further amnesty instead of enforcement for... what, exactly?
Half of half of half a cake?
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