Don't know why you're trying make a mess of history on the matter. Even the regime change wing of the State Department admits of their activities in Russia's backyard and the very thing I'm calling it out for.
I'm not sure why you believe Global Research .ca, an anti-globalization conspiracy website, represents the regime change wing of the State Department, but this would be both an incorrect citation and not a rebuttal to the post on hyper and hypo agency.
And as such, Russia's response is reasonable in turn to US' operations in their sphere of influence.
Similarly, you seem to have missed that point that he was making fun of the argument structure, and not actually making a position that your argeement with would advance your position.
Dean
30d ago
And he tried exercising it to find more amicable solutions to the problem. That's what the Minsk Accords were.
The Minsk Accords were many things- including the functional erosion of national sovereignty by legislating an external power's veto by proxy- but an amicable solution they were not.
Why was the west encouraging Ukraine behind the scenes to give Russia a run around, while the west poured arms into the country to bolster its strength so the government could betray the terms of their agreement?
Why wouldn't the west encourage Ukraine not to submit to unreasonable Russian demands that the Russians knew were unreasonable and would not be accepted, while bolstering the ability to resist the military coercion that pushed the demands in the first place?
The demands were unreasonable, and were made at the end of a military intervention. Europeans, as with many other cultures, tend not to support those things against their neighbors lest it be applied to them.
Dean
6mo ago
Well, that's certainly a novel theory, and given the longevity of the Crusader Kingdoms and rarity of total state collapse without external intervention, a generally non-falsifiable one that would outlast either of our time on the mortal coil.
I generally am not moved by conditionals that already failed to occur (Egypt was already ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood- it did not take the deal in a heartbeat), presumption of uninterupted trend lines that justify inevitable disaster without shaping (the othrodox population claim), or hypotheticals that run contrary to historical experience or macro trends (lol, said pan-Arabism, RIP), so as such I'll just leave that I find your failure to see how nukes would be useful in saving a country unconvincing as evidence that they don't have more relevance that historical metaphors with fundamentally different assumptions.
Dean
6mo ago
Not sure we disagree.
Not intended to be a disagreement! It was intended as more an elaboration/expansion, with a point of a personal pet peave (historical anachronisms).
There was a period when the fear being the point is true, but the anachronism is when that was- which was not mid-century Jim Crow as known or protested against in the mid-Century US. Fear of lynchings ceased to be a point when lynchings stopped being any sort of coordinated or even common point, which it hadn't been for the better part of a generation by the time the modern conception of Jim Crow south was cemented in popular memory. No one alive today has any living memory of lynching as an organized suppression policy in the American South (or anywhere else).
To draw back a few posts higher, the people deriving eliminationist intent in the current era are even further removed from a period when lynching was a point, and lynching as a means of social control wasn't even living memory for most of the US during the period most contemporary progressives are thinking off as the Jim Crowe South that the Civil Rights were against. Appealing to modern fears of Jim Crowe returning and/or lynchings as a means to subjugate blacks and/or eliminationist fears is as historically illiterate as trying to frame, oh, muslim immigration into Europe as related to the Crusades. The later may have been more generations ago, but it was generations ago, and is neither living memory or lived experience to justify current concerns.
Dean
7mo ago
The Ukraine experience should teach us to treat this kind of inflammatory unverified story as having more or less zero credibility -- I'm quite sure Israel is not lacking in the information warfare department.
This seems odd, as the Ukrainian experience was that there was indeed quite a bit of well documented mass crimes, some visible from orbit. While there were certainly exaggerations, the number and degree of validated incidents would lead to far more than zero credibility.
Now, if you said the Russian experience in Ukraine, that might have the meaning you seem to mean, since the Russian atrocity propaganda before and early on were far more contrived in many high-profile cases, but that doesn't seem to be what you meant.
The apparent true facts are bad enough -- the smell of propaganda is concerning as gestures in the direction of whipping up support for a very brutal response.
Well, of course. That was the Hamas objective. You don't have a Daesh-style atrocity self-publicity campaign without wanting to escalate.
Dean
7mo ago
This is nonsense. During the Cold War, neither the US nor the USSR gave weapons in proxy wars that resulted in incursions into the other sides’s territory let alone amped up the exchange.
Neither had the opportunity, as neither directly invaded an adjacent neighbor and started a sustained urban bombardment campaign.
In terms of preparation, the Russian position on NATO as a threat is that this is precisely what NATO has been from the start: a US proxy threatening incursions or worse into peaceful Russian territory. The Russian narrative, propaganda it may be, is as relevant to precedent for Russian nuclear deterrence posturing as anything else, or even more so, because one can take Russia's own words and actions for what both represents a threat but demonstratably does not represent a nuclear-retaliation trigger.
Mentioning Korea is besides the obvious point
You seem to have missed the original point as much as the previous replier, so that's not a surprise.
The Cold War did not have anything close to the current situation.
The Cold War had numerous examples of both sides engaging in massive conventional arms shipments that resulted in tens or even hundreds of thousands of casualties to the other in the other's wars of choice where losing would not threaten to trigger state collapse and existential risk thresholds that drive nuclear weapon use.
As the relevant comparison being invoked was nuclear risk, that is incredibly relevant, especially as the Cold War had multiple contexts were nuclear war was far closer than the current Ukraine war.
Finally the causal mechanism is clear — weapons are provided that help Ukraine make serious inroads into say Crimea and Russia uses tactical nukes. NATO responds and the world ends.
That is not a causal mechanism, as the threshold criteria has already been falsified in this very conflict.
If 'serious inroads into Russia' were the standard that would invoke nuke use, nuclear weapons would have been used last year, because the Ukrainians have already made 'serious inroads' into de jure Ukrainian territory that Russia annexed. This is just one of the reasons why Putin's annexation gambit of the eastern parts of Ukraine last year was panned as a strategic mistake- in his attempt to box himself and any would-be successor into continuing the conflict to victory, he demonstrated that Ukrainian military successes in internationally-recognized but Russian-annexed Ukrainian territory were NOT something Russia was going to go nuclear over, a dynamic that was furthered with the Kherson defeat and which is ongoing in the southern front in late 2023. The obvious rheotrical off-ramp- that these aren't 'serious' inroads- just undermines the central premise, because the Russians can always claim that a major defeat is not 'serious', which moves the nuclear retaliation from objective criteria to subjective criteria, which goes to rational or irrational actors, which drives back to what observable indicators there are of nuclear thresholds and if they've already been passed X number of times, why they should be believed to be nuclear on X+1 time.
A similar lack of credibility occurred with claims that any attack on Crimea might meet a nuclear response- there have been many, many, many attacks on Crimea since the war started. They have not made the war go nuclear. Attacking ships in port did not make the war go nuclear. Conducting operations from within Russian-claimed territory, and even internationally-recognized Russian territory, did not make the war go nuclear. There was never any particular reason to believe they would besides people claiming clear causal mechanisms, but like many, many other Russian red lines, these have not been nuclear. That the Russians claim Crimea is a part of Russia as any other is itself undercut by the other areas they claim is part of Russia, ie. the territories they claimed not only when they didn't already hold them, but also lost significant major portions of. The precedent is already set, because Crimea is only as indisputably Russian for nuclear deterrence purposes due to being annexed as the also-annexed Ukrainian east, which has not been basis for nuclear retaliation.
A third extension of this theme of undermining nuclear-threshold criteria is, of course, Russia's own attacks into the other's territory: Russia set precedent in the world that strikes into urban centers were an acceptable form of non-unacceptable activity, and when the Ukrainians reciprocated, the Russians demonstrated it was not, in fact, a nuclear threshold. These were, notably, established with Urkainian strikes not dependent on Western advanced munitions, but from Ukraine's own stocks of Soviet-derived (and in some cases Soviet-produced) munitions. The actions doable from non-American sources demonstrated the lack of threshold criteria in claimed thresholds, and so western-provided munitions have to have something more than a magical western aura to be nuclear-escalation risk. Maybe if Urkraine began some sort of population-targetting WMD campaign... but the Ukrainian bio-weapon labs have not exactly materialized.
Between strategic mismanagement and precedence, the Russians have demonstrated that Ukraine taking Russian-claimed cities, reciprocating strikes, and other forms of military engagement remain below the level of nuclear threshold criteria, which is typically only associated with the survival of the state or WMD retaliation. Throughout the war, the Ukrainians have not significantly impacted the Russian state's ability to maintain internal control of the population, or even the military, which might cause a threat to the continuity of government, which is also credible nuclear thresholds. The most relevant threat to the state's capacity to control in the last two years have been overwhelmingly self-inflicted internal politics, which would not- and did not- lead to a credible nuclear threat.
If the argument is that aid packages will eventually allow Ukraine to march on Moscow, which would threaten state survival, that's not an argument against current aid packages. That's an argument against hypothetical future packages well, well after the point of Ukraine taking its internationally recognized borders.
And this is aside from the assumption of the Western response, for which leading to MAD results from the typical muddling of whether actors are rational or irrational. Even setting aside the nature of assuming the NATO response would be nuclear, if the Russians are rational nuclear actions, and NATO nuking is a given, then the Russians would not conduct the nuking that leads to MAD, because they are rational and the use of the nuclear weapon would not be worth it. As the Russians have not used nuclear weapons to reverse battlefield setbacks even without the threat of NATO nuking, the non-Russian observer is going to have to justify why a particular Russian battlefield loss will precipitate nuclear use when it hasn't been rational to do so to date, but also why- if the argument twists to that the Russians are irrational- why the irrational Russians haven't done so to date.
Which goes down to the typical muddling of actors being simultaneously rational and irrational which tends to retreat for the motte when challenged.
That Wagner is unlikely to succeed in a coup is not the same thing as not producing any consequences (doing anything). The threat of Prigozhin's rebellion isn't in the likely doomed attempt- it's in the second and third order effects of the purges to follow not just against Wagner, but Wagner's allies, and the apathetic sorts of bystanders who didn't oppose them with fervency.
Prigozhin and Wagner aren't politically significant in the sense that 'Prigozhin thought he was a real boss.' Prigozhin is well aware, hence why he went on his antics for publicity, and targetting his feud of the MOD bosses, and the instigation event being Shugoi's alleged attempts to both administratively dismantle Wagner's independence (Soldier contract demands) and potential bombing. Prigozhin likely isn't under delusions that he's 'a real boss'- he's likely under very clear understanding that he was targetted and doomed, and is deciding to go down fighting.
Prigozhin and Wagner are politically significant in that they are representative/rallying points for a key contingent of what you might call 'the non-state nationalism.' Wagner is... I hate to use vague terms live 'Avatar' or 'totem,' but symbollic of the idea of a Russian strength that's not simply the state. Signalling support for Wagner was a way to show your support for Russia as a good nationalist even if you opposed/detested/thought Shugoi and the MOD were incompetent/wrong/ruinous. Being pro-Wagner was a form of acceptable criticism of the regime by people who were fellow travelers. It was a nexus through which anti-Shugoi factions could persist and loosely coordinate.
When Shugoi wins- and I agree that he's likely to win this- he is not going to stop at just Wagner leaders. He's going to go after their allies, which includes not only other disaffected oligarchs (it's own risk to the system if/when a class of greedy opportunists opportunistically move against eachother to take eachother's stuff), but their support networks as well, which includes their media/social presence spheres. And in that, what was previously swarths of officially tolerated opinions- and criticisms- will no longer be tolerated, but officially suppressible.
What this will mean is up for debate, but the reason Wagner was a totem of alternative nationalists was that they didn't want to support the existing national symbol of strength- the MOD-military- in the first place. Removing the alternative doesn't mean people will transfer their favor to the persons/institutions that did so... and is likely to be suppressing them either actively or with open suspicion. Dismantling parts of the oligarchy doesn't mean that only the traitorous parts are subject to being targetted- or that only the traitors will resist and fly back.
This is an event that, even in failure, will change how the war-supporting base view the government fighting the war, and how the oligarchs move against eachother. Either would be significant on their own, and this is before Putin's typical insecurities drive further responses against either group.
Dean
11mo ago
I keep seeing this take in a lot of social media and I really don't think that it has any relation to reality. It isn't a "fairly moderate chunk of the US military budget" but a massive economic imposition and cost upon the rest of the west. Aside from the direct costs of sending money and arms to one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, the indirect costs from rising energy prices, economic disruption, inflation, sanctions, refugees and the like have made this entire affair incredibly expensive.
This conflates a few different topics of wildly different scopes, so I'll focus on the point of energy prices. The energy price rising isn't the consequence of the war, it's the consequence of the Europeans- namely the Germans- refusing energy blackmail. The war was the context of the blackmail, but the capacity for the blackmail was baked into the status quo ante as a result of deliberate central and western European policy choices over the objections / concerns / warnings of US and Eastern European countries. The Russians were always very blatant that they were prioritizing political goals over economic profit with their use of gazprom, and that the German industrial base getting functionally subsidized energy was a means to an end.
The energy costs Europe is experience are the cost of a much delayed structural shift away from a nigh monopoly supplier to more resilient import network infrastructure. This is the epitome of a good cost, and will drastically increase European economic safety over the long term.
For any sort of advocate of European strategic autonomy, this is perhaps the best cost of the entire conflict, and exceptionally well timed as it occurred when there was the US-alliance network to fall back on for sourcing for LNG imports.
If the de-dollarisation that the sanctions regime has spurred continues it could ultimately prove to be one of the most expensive mistakes in US history.
Laconic 'If' applies. De-dollarization has been a thing for literal decades, and continues to be a thing, and will continue to be a thing. The reason it always seems to never happen is epitomized by the Russia-India experience in the rupee trade debacle- the other person has to want your currency, and to want your currency at scale it needs to be a a stable and fungible store of value. It's not enough to offer your own money as loans to buy stuff back from you, as is common with the Chinese yuan projects- the currency has to have value with others.
I am happy to concede that China may yet get some value out of the Yuan as a way to facilitate corruption outside of dollar monitoring systems (which is how, say, Lulu got caught for corruption in Brazil)- but this is independent of the war.
Even then, the cost in materiel matters as well. Western supply chains and reserves have been tapped out to funnel that equipment to Ukraine, and those stocks have been considerably depleted (at least among EU member state militaries).
They are depleted because they were incredibly thin beforehand, due to decades of neglect and under-resourcing and frankly falling behind the tech curve. Again, this is a good cost to pay if you are any sort of advocate for a strategically resilient and autonomous Europe, as the cost was going to come regardless.
With unavoidable costs, timing is key to relative preference, and the Ukraine crisis is about as ideal a time to restock / modernize, as political support is high, support from the current American establishment is high to subsidize modernization costs, and the political costs of emptying out the outdated cold war stock to free up budget / admin capacity for modernization is practically negative.
While that's bad by itself, it becomes even worse when you remember who Russia's biggest ally is - China. The Chinese government is, presumably, sitting back and rubbing their hands together with glee as they watch the west burn vast amounts of military equipment on a pyre. Every bit of kit that gets blown up in the Ukraine or sold onto the black market by some unscrupulous oligarch is a piece of kit that is not going to be used in any prospective defence of Taiwan
...but it was never going to be used in any prospective defense of Taiwan regardless, because water is a thing other than the color blue on a map.
This has been a thing since last year, but it bears repeating: Taiwan is an island. It's not in need of tank columns to drive across the strait. No one is building trench lines in the water. Many of the weapon systems that are very useful in the Ukraine conflict are practically irrelevant in a Taiwan conflict, because even if they were on the island they wouldnt' reach far enough off the island to matter in what really matters in a Taiwan conflict- the ability of the Chinese to maintain a blockade of the island against the US Navy.
In a Taiwan conflict, there will be no Ukraine-style aid packages to fight a major ground war. Only the equipment already on the ground has any relevance, and even then only in so much that it extends the time the Chinese need to maintain a blockade. As long as there is any blockade, no aid package would get through. If there is no blockade, it's because the Americans have beaten back the Chinese navy, and if the Chinese navy isn't there, it's not landing forces.
The Taiwan conflict isn't about ground-force kit, it's about naval assets. Which, notably, have not been sent to Ukraine.
if the US is getting a pretty great deal, you're gonna run out of superlatives when you try to describe the one China is getting.
A white elephant.
The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that several of the assumptions that might have supported a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan in the near term were extremely suspect. This included the power of offense versus defense, assumptions of acceptance by the targeted population, the unwillingness of the Europeans to assume costs to diplomatically resist pressure, and inability of the US to do things, and of course the ability of the Russians as allies.
Dean
1mo ago
The Jack romance certainly ends with a lovers relationship, and her romance is the only one where she makes meaningful emotional healing and interpersonal progression in ME2. Miranda is uniquely characterized as smiling in a way she never did before and is also only able to have a healthy emotional relationship solely if Shepard is the one to provide it (with their dick). Kelly Chambers, in so much as that one qualifies, resolves it's emotional catharsis by having her do stripper dances in your room after she was kidnapped, locked into a pod, and nearly turned into bio-goop. Tali is much less emotionally traumatized, but certainly emotionally questionable given that she risks death itself for the sake of the Shepard bone out of a mix of captain-crushing hero crush (and the fact that you covered up her father's cultural war crimes).
Ashley... is a more mature frank attraction in ME1, but Ashely's character arc also jumps to the point that the tomboy not-a-model gets a major model glow up come ME3, so who knows there.
Dean
2mo ago
Don't let the party label fool you. In Asia, democratic parties are much less of 'political parties' in the American or especially European sense, roughly fixed coalitions with a breadth of ideological representation, and far more personality-based coalitions of factions. You don't support the Party, as is the European norm, or even necessarily the Person of a specific geographic area as is the American practice, you support the political faction, which can be substantially more dynamic than in Europe as factions even within the same party maneuver.
In Japan in particular, the Liberal Democratic Party factions are basically parties-within-a-party, such that 'the Liberal Democratic Party' is just the current coalition government of internal LDP factions, whose breadth and diversity can marginalize, co-opt, or subsume parties outside of The Party. If you want a more pro-China Japanese government, you don't need (or want) to start a pro-China party for people to vote for- you're better off just pumping up the current more-pro-China factions so that their factional strength influences the party's internal coalitions and maneuverings. Voting directly affects these, as LDP candidates can run against eachother as much as opposition parties- meaning that instead of a 'here is your only possible candidate from the one-party', you can have as many LDP candidates as opposition candidates running in a slate. Nominally they may be from the same party, but in effect they are each from distinct factions or faction-alliances, meaning that the victory of 'the party' is not synonymous with the status quo.
Japan's Liberal Democratic Party is 'one-party' in the same sense that the American 'bipartisan consensus' is 'one party'. There have been many people who feel there's no point in voting because there's no prospect of change and that all the candidates are the same, but they'd be just as wrong in either country.
Dean
3mo ago
The size of the Supreme Court shall be permanently fixed at 9 members. All Presidents are guaranteed one appointment per term. If there is no vacancy during the term, then the President may vacate any single judge to create a vacancy at the conclusion of the Presidential term. If there is more than one vacancy, the President may appoint additional interim justices who will automatically be vacated at the start of the next Presidential term. [EDIT] The Senate may veto permanent appointments by a two-thirds majority. Interim appointments may not be vetoed.
This would be a huge centralization of judicial power in the Executive, and would be an immediate red-flag legal reform for a court-packing scheme in democratic backsliding countries. Any sort of coherent party or dynasty state would easily be able to exploit this to establish executive control over the judiciary.
Just on the veto side, the legislative break is a joke of a check or balance. Any president to win the American system has such a broad geographic coalition that they'd have more than a 1/3rd presence in the Senate, and thus basic party discipline would bar all but the most outrageous picks. This leaves nearly all the power in the President's hands.
Just on the presidential appointment side, just two concurrent Presidents of the same party/dynasty would be able to create almost overwhelming shifts in court composition. An incredibly hostile 7-2 court would easily become a 5-4 near-even split in just two elections, and would completely flip if, say, the President 'resigned' right before the 'transition,' thus elevating their vice-president to president, and letting said president get their own appointment for a 3-judge shift in 2 elections. Because there's no obligation to wait until the end of a term to replace a judge, any Presidential office worth it's salt would immediately reshape the court as their first act in office, while exploiting any absences for more.
The interim appointment without veto is also incredibly prone to abuse, as it directly encourages the ruling party to run intimidation- or elimination- campaigns against the judiciary. Just from the start, since any judge can be replaced, and because the natural incentive for the President is to replace the most hostile/opposing party judges, the incentive for any judge to not lose their seat for -insert personal reason here- is to comply with Presidential pressure and not stick out. If they do stick out and are removed- on pretext, for actual reason, resign 'under pressure', whatever- the President can immediately appoint a party loyalty. It wouldn't matter that the next president can appoint their own judge from the 'vacated' judges- that just means they can re-appoint loyalists, who can easily be counted on to make letter-if-not-spirit of the rule considerations. (Like, say, not counting an interim-replacement against the once-a-term appointment, letting pro-forma Vice President ascents appoint further judges, letting the same President make an additional replacement per time they assume the presidency, and so on.)
This would easily enable a system of court packing political loyalists and removing independent judiciary elements from the top court.
Sorry, by contemporary I meant to the time, not to today, if that wasn't clear.
It was clear, and I am still awaiting a standard that distinguishes January 6 as a rebellion but which does not also catch many more non-contested politicians to the point that it's not an arbitrary special pleading.
I can't go into details because I can't get the pdf to open, but I believe they referenced assorted earlier cases that were smaller than the civil war (the one I remember was the Whiskey rebellion, but they referenced a bunch more). I don't know the details, but I wouldn't be surprised to learn that even those were larger than the Trump events.
Then the comparisons are not validating the necessary claims that the events of January 6 are a rebellion from an Originalist perspective. If January 6 is not a rebellion from an Originalist perspective, then banning Trump from running would not be an argument based on Originalism, but something else trying to claim the mantle of originalism to disguise smuggled assumptions. It's still assuming the conclusion that Trump conducted rebellion, and then arguing that the assumption warrants ignorring the sort of due process that is set out for actually establishing the conclusion.
Sure, it's novel and not authoritative, but it being more mainstream could make an impact, since all that it needs to do so is convince a few officials.
But there's nothing here indicating it's any sort of mainstream. Again, no claim has been made this reflects a common or shared viewpoint of the Originalist legal establishment, let alone the non-Federalist legal schools of thought, let alone the opposition party that has been deriding the Federalists for years.
For something to be mainstream, it needs to be, well, not novel and actually be authoritative.
If no one else, I could see state officials in democratic states not listing Trump, and that could make a big difference in the primaries if it doesn't get to the supreme court before then.
What, besides political cover of preferred justifications, makes you think Democratic states would de-list Trump based on this, and but would not de-list Trump on grounds that Trump has been indited and impeached multiple times?
Dean
10mo ago
Your contention relies on the Germans requests being unreasonable when you could just as easily say that they weren't.
It would be very easy to say many false things, but they would remain false, hence why not even you claim that the German grivance narrative driving the demands was justified.
Not the least considering Poland could have been much better for it, along with all of Europe, if they had aligned themselves with Germany against communism and what National Socialists recognized as capitalism in the hands of the international jew.
Their reward would have been to be colonized, treated as subhuman, and progressively enslaved and exterminated, as per the policy statements and intentions of the German rieche.
My argument isn't selective about anything.
It is very selective about many things.
I think you should step back and recognize just what narrative is being revised. Hitler could have done things differently, but the obvious case here is that so could everyone else.
This is irrelevant to the reasonableness of other people, as Hitler did NOT do things differently, and people were making decisions based on what he DID do, which was unreasonable by standards both contemporary to now and contemporary to then.
In the context of general WW2 narratives that shovel all blame on Hitler in particular, and to a lesser extent the Treaty of Versailles,
These narratives are false, not least because Stalin had his fair share in allying with Hitler, and the Treaty of Versailles was a red herring that was not a justified grievance for German actions.
there exists an obvious angle of blame that is never talked about lest it draw attention away from the great myths we have created out of Hitler and the holocaust.
There are no great myths of Hitler or the holocaust. There is banality of incompetence and evil, and those who wish to dismiss it away in their mediocrity.
Dean
9d ago
I mean, a lack of meaningful reliable information doesn't help theory making in a society where it's literally against the law to impugn the good reputation of certain institutions.
What, specifically is Putin's popularity absent the cultural context where various public criticisms can lead one to defenestrate themselves?
Dean
30d ago
Rebuilding doesn't take that long.
Militarily? It certainly can. An officer corps of 20-years experience takes 20 years to build, and much of Russia's institutional experience was razed and the current crop have been resorting to much lower-level operational designs than previously done- the current generation of new direct leaders is going to have to unlearn trench infantry tactics to relearn actual Russian manevuer warfare doctrine. Similarly, building up a cold war's worth of artillery ammunition stockpiles took the Soviets literal decades, and the Russians don't have the Soviet industrial base to do so with.
Military hardware wise, also yes, in various categories. The Russian production rates of aircraft are, well, bad, and while the drone economy is a booming, it doesn't exactly enable the sort of deep-strike operations that Russia started the war off with. The naval losses will take a similarly long time to build. And while Russia can absolutely bring out raw numbers of reactivated obsolescent tanks to pad the numbers, this is the reminder that they weren't even able to get a meaningful production run of the Armata before it went back behind the lines to hide out the war. Any production run of modern tanks will be from a much deeper pit than they hadn't gotten out of before they started digging themselves into the war.
The bigger issue for the Russian military-industrial complex is the Russian arms export industry. It's been struggling for awhile, and appears to be cratering to a bare select few clients since, especially as the Russians have had clear trouble both honoring various contracts in favor of supplying their own forces. Given both the role that Russian arms exports plays in its foreign policy, and the long trail times for being displaced, one of the key Russian funding models for managing the costs of the industry is going out the window, with the longer it's out the worse it will be. Russia's ability to rebuild its arms market share is... probably dead, as people with needs will have gone elsewhere, and people with resources will have more promising partners to work with. Rather than the post-cold-war T-72 sales and such, expect Russia to be one of many drone providers, a much less lucrative and much more crowded market.
Doesn't make for strange bedfellows when you understand the Minsk Accords mandated a similar relationship to Ukraine that the US imposed on Japan in the postwar period,
Which was not an amicable solution to negotiations, but a compulsory surrender punctuated by more than one nuclear weapon after years of unrestricted submarine warfare against an island that needed to import resources and firebombing of cities made of wood and paper... after the receiving country had launched a series of unprovoked invasions and a litany of warcrimes across the region.
The Minsk Accords were, again, many things, but the Pacific Campaign of WW2 they were not.
which remains today.
Alas, the Japanese-American alliance today does not remain an unconditional military occupation with overt censorship by the occupying authority.
Also, the Russians aren't interested in dismantling a warmongering oligarchy as much as installing one.
Dean
1mo ago
This is just believers in government policy believing there should be a floor in government's ability to mismanage, rather than accepting that technocrats can easily make things worse for short-term political advantages. This is dispiriting to visions of top-down technocratic control, but is completely in keeping with far more banal expectations that politicians who run the economy for political benefit will not actually prioritize economic health.
That Argentina has some relatively unique political interest entrenchments in the way- such as regional ability to incur debt not found in most centralized economic systems- simply provides more obvious purchases for the later view. That Peronism was adopted functionally entrenched for so long is another.
And how do you think running Venezuela into the ground by sanctioning them will impact migrant flows?
Why should anyone believe that US sanctions are 'running Venezuela into the ground' relative to the effect of the Venezuelan governance?
The Venezuelan government even 20 years ago was led by a clique who struggled with basic concepts like 'if you dictate that private businesses sell items at or below cost of procurement, private businesses will stop stocking items' or 'if you send people with guns to take over specialized businesses, the business people with specialized knowledge will leave.' It instituted a deliberate system of personality cult, attacks (literal and legal) on opposition actors and political opponents, and cultivating gangs as a national security strategy who then went on create a domestic security climate on par with Iraq. It routinely picked diplomatic and economic fights with its biggest trading partners while willfully and eagerly trying to align with countries less known for their quality of governance and far more known for their police states and party-empowering corruption. These were all chosen through the agency of Venezuela's own governmental leaders, for two arguably three political generations now. The same general clique of incompetents is still in power, and has been for long enough for an entire demographic cohort to have grown up under their management.
By contrast, you believe the relative impact of the US sanctions is...?
(This is a direct question, by the way.)
For all that you regularly like to cite US malfeasance as the cause of whatever cause of whatever blowback of the hour, I don't believe I've ever seen you actually provide a position of relative blame of US actions vis-a-vis other actors. Without any sense of relative allocation of input to output, this is just the cliche hyperagency/hypoagency paradigm that leaves agency with the US while everyone else is a passive recipient of their will, where even their own policy decisions are forced upon them by the US rather than, well, chosen both in response to and to shape US policy themselves.
While this is certainly flattering to US prowess in the same way that anti-semetic propaganda is empowering for the mythical Jew, it's not particularly well informed, and rather patronizing to the many invested and career anti-american politicians around the world who work hard to make their own policy disasters with hefty externalities but do so without American direction or demands. Give them their credit!
Dean
5mo ago
But Kissinger just straightforwardly bombed and wrecked Cambodia.
There was considerably more to it than that, so this would be a reductionist rather than accurate summation of the reasons involved.
If your thesis is that anti-communist containment was a global good that should be pursued despite a few megadeaths,
That is not the thesis, no.
then doing what he did in South East Asia was actually really bad since it hurt the anti-communist agenda, tarred it with the sting of defeat, led to the Ford/Carter years of pullback and consolidation.
Pullback and consolidation is a considerable part of what Nixon-Kisenger were trying to do, seeking to create the conditions for, and saw as a key point in the anti-communist containment vis-a-vis a position of unsustainable overreach.
This is not the counter-argument you think it is.
Dean
6mo ago
The bar for blowing hospital and it not being a war crime is quite high.
The bar is extremely low, as low as 'is it being used as a military position.'
War crime law is not that legitimate military targets (military positions, command posts, munition stores) are made ineligible by the presence of protected classes (i.e. hospitals), but rather than protected classes are made eligible by the presence of legitimate military targets. There are no protected classes of military sites where someone can fire at you, but you can't fire back.
The proportionality principle, which is what limits collateral damage that could kill civilians, is proportionality relative to what is needed to destroy the legitimate military target compared to other means that would achieve the same military effect, not the proportion of military-to-civilian casualties. There are no convention requirements to take military casualties in the process of storming military objectives in order to minimize civilian casualties.
It’s certainly worth pointing out that the terror campaigns had long passed their zenith by the time of the Civil Rights movement. But this might be an overstatement of how completely they, and the fear they inspired, had been extinguished by the 1950s.
There wasn't a statement that the fear was extinguished by the 1950s. There is a statement that lynchings were not happening as a social control measure in the 1950s, and hadn't been for decades, and wasn't living memory for much of the relevant generational cohort (including, sadly, Emitt Till).
When she sent her son to visit relatives in Mississippi, Mamie Till warned him to be extra deferential to white people down there. The fear was still alive, and obviously not unjustified.
That depends on what the fear was, precisely. If the fear was simply dangers from racism, sure, not unjustified. If the fear was specifically lynching, that would have been unjustified, even as that's what ended up happening, because the data did not (and does not, even with advantages of hindsight) support that specific fear at the time, and even less so since.
That Emitt Till was killed by lynching does not change that he was one of only 3 african americans lynched in a 5-year period (52-56), all three of them in the year of his own murder. It was shocking precisely because it was so abnormal, even for area and not just the era, not because it was even a quietly-tolerated norm. Emitt Till form of murderer was not some deliberate community act of social control- Emitt Till's murder was an asocial act even within the society that it occurred within, even one as unsympathetic and bigoted and fuck-the-outsiders as that town.
In the 1960s, the number of children kidnapped from parks or front yards was tiny compared to the number of carefree happy childhoods spent out in the sunshine. But the visceral horror this struck into the hearts of parents caused us to totally remake childhood into the supervised, indoor activity it is for too many Zoomers today. And that wasn’t even an intentional terror campaign! You really don’t have to torture-murder very many people before others drastically change their behavior in response.
Sure. And the proper course of action since the abduction panics has still been to have children go outside and touch grass, and for people consumed by visceral horror at the extremely unlikely to be disabused of the disproportionate focus and weight they assign to it. Likewise, the appropriate response to any other unsupported fear is to... not support it.
This is true regardless of whether it's fear of COVID, or fear of muslim extremists, or fear of germs. People absolutely have died from all of these- tens of thousands more than were ever lynched in the United States- but no matter how visceral the fear, it's not valid just because it's closely held and driving changes in behavior and perception. It's precisely because it drives changes in behavior and perception that it's so harmful to the people who hold such views, because despite what post-modernists theories imply, perceptions are not reality.
Dean
6mo ago
I have a strong suspicion that the Americans and Europeans would happily help foot the bill in exchange for closing off various Israeli revenge options.
The real question is how the to deal with the tunnels themselves once detected. If you're going the landmine route, I've heard unironic advocacy for digging a moat around gaza from the Mediterranean. Not particularly well thought advocacy, probably, but unironic, with the premise of 'if tunnel detected, flood it.'
Dean
6mo ago
Ah, I see we're in the 'words are tantemount to literal weaponized physical threats' territory for speach-restraint advocacy now.
Dean
7mo ago
I'm thinking not so much of the atrocity-porn (although much of that is not exactly certain either); more of the sorts of things reported breathlessly in Western media with minimal (or fabricated) evidence -- like those guys on the island, various twitter 'ghost of kiev'-y stuff, others that I can't think of at the moment. Those had a definite info-ops feel to me -- hard to say whether amateur or pro ofc. Some of the things I am hearing now have a similar feel, is all.
Sure. And the proper response to that feeling is not to dismiss everything as having zero credibility.
That propaganda exists, and will exist in short or even immediate order in any context, doesn't mean that the counter-propaganda measure is to dismiss all things as zero-crediblity propaganda. That is the point of many propaganda strategies. Trying to get the audience to disengage, refuse to consider real facts, and be apathetic is not a failure state, it is the desired state for propaganda aimed at undermining resistance to emotionally objectionable things. Spreading around claims of other things with enough falses to trigger non-tailored doubt is a very easy way to do that.
That was the Hamas objective. You don't have a Daesh-style atrocity self-publicity campaign without wanting to escalate.
Assuming the Israeli war-hawk objective is to turn Gaza into a parking lot, they share this objective with Hamas. (and I think have more professional propagandists on staff)
If you tried to formulate this into an actual claim, it would implicitly require that the Israeli government was not, in fact, humiliated and caught off guard by one of the largest disasters in their history, but in fact knew about it well enough to have prepared entire sophisticated tailored IO campaigns in advance with the ability to launch within hours of attack... but not actually stopped the attack. The enemy was not successful while the government failed- the government was actually in control, but it's just evil!
While this will no doubt be a theory for some time, it's little more than 9-11 Trutherism with a tinge of zionism.
Ah, I see we are going to play the pretend we don't know game, such as--
-that US support for Yanukovych stepping down followed Yanukovych starting to process of shooting protestors in the streets with government snipers.
Oh, hey, called it-
Come now, we can go over the transcripts if you'd like. We can even go over Yanukovych's invitation for the opposition to join the government, which was the basis of Nuland's discussions of who would actually work well within Yanukovych's government which- again- was invited and being discussed in the context of Yanukovych running it.
While this certainly nails your flag high, it doesn't really establish your awareness with Euromaiden-
-or that, as far as challening American imperialism unipolarity, Ukraine was such an own-goal by Russia.
Yawn. Like I said, I'd rather you build a competent historical metaphor, not your naval gazing. If your media is telling us Putin is Next Hitler, or running out of gas, or out of ammunition, pick better media, not other trash.
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