Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
Obviously so, yes, but by posing a question anyways I was able to get some adults to nerd out about a children's book series. ;-)
But here in America, we're rarely exposed to the British working class.
Out of curiosity, what did Harry Potter qualify as?
Is there a continental-scale societal category that historically does not have high rates of mass violence?
Just to look briefly at Europe- football hooliganism, muslim riots, public-targetted terrorism, Russian border wars, Paris lighting itself on fire every presidency or so...
Those could literally all be true without caveat, and it wouldn't matter in the budgeting sense since those may seem like big numbers in absolute terms but are proportionally very small compared to entitlement spending. It doesn't matter of bridges 100x or even 1000x more than they 'should' if the budget is spending thousands times more on entitlement spending than on bridges.
To wit- according to the Biden administration earlier this year, the US has $40 billion allocated to spend over 5 years on bridges. By contrast, the combined Medicare, Medicaid, and Obamacare spending in 2024 is $1.67 trillion, and expected to rise to 3.1 trillion by 2033.
Put another way- 5 years of all bridge spending is less than 3% of one year's medical spending, and shrinking. You could make that $40 billion 10x, 100x, or even 1000x more efficient, but no matter how efficient you spend 40 billion it's a drop in the entitlement spending. Sure, you could argue that there are savings to be made there... but then you're not going into the discretionary budget administration, you're going to the automatic entitlement spending, which goes to the laws rather than the executive administration thereof.
Part of that's just baked into demographic politics.
When the Americans legislated Social Security in 1935, FDR signed a law that authorized payments for those 65 or older when the average American lifespan in 1935 was... 61 for men and 65 for women, according to a quick google search.
Today, social security can begin between ages 62 and 70 depending on your preference of payout amount... when the average American lifespan is about 75 for men, and 80 for women.
It fundamentally doesn't matter in a budgeting sense how efficient you are at executing the discretionary programs if the entitlements previous created on the assumption that less than half of people would live long enough to see them are instead expecting to pay for more than a decade. When you start adding in medical spending, which costs increasing with age, you're adding more. This is an issue of law and what the legislators deem is the appropriate entitlement, not administration of that amount. No matter how much you save on the executive side- and it can be very good to have more efficiency there!- it's not the central or determinative issue.
The best example is the cult of the "martyr" (i.e. suicide terrorist) among Salafi Jihadis in most places, but not in Saudi Arabia or Taliban-ruled Afghanistan where Salafism is not an oppositional culture.
Eh. The Taliban made plentiful use of suicide bombers, and the Saudi extremist wahhabism had plenty of 'die for the cause and call them martyr' extremists over the last two decades. You saw more suicide bombers in conflict zones because conflict zones are where you get more desperate / angry / 'I don't care if I die / what do I have to live for' types.
What changed the cultural value of suicide bombers was when suicide bombers started getting associated with targeting muslims as opposed to Jews / Christians / outsiders. I think it was around 2009 round abouts, but even before the rise of ISIS or the Arab Spring there were surveys noting that regional support for suicide bombers as a valid form of resistance was dropping. When suicide bombings transitioned from more associated with the anti-israeli intifada and more associated with civil wars and targetting other muslims, it became less heroic and more problematic.
But maybe it takes a chainsaw-wielding maniac to get the job done. How is Milei doing, by the way?
Reasonably well, but for reasons that are generally non-transferable to Trump. Milei's success / continued political survival was in large part because the economic issue of government bloat / inflation were central to his election. He was able to win election and maintain support despite warning upfront that things would get worse before they get better because he was very clear there would be pain, and the voting public accepted the legitimacy of that in order to address a broadly recognized problem that had decades of buildup.
The Trump context is considerably different. Trump beat Biden, and the electoral college makes it more decisive than the vote difference otherwise would, but Trump ran on a generalized vibe rather than an explicit and widely accepted problem. Particularly since US problems aren't the same sort of 'within the Executive sphere' as Milei faced. Milei had to deal with executive patronage networks / make jobs / inflationary policies, but the US challenge on the budgeting sense is the automatic entitlement spending, not the bureaucracy administering it. The sort of cuts to be needed would need to be legislative, and the sort of sphere that Trump has tended not to challenge.
This will be interesting, in the sense of interesting times, but the chainsaw will probably go after the wrong institutions to meet it's stated goals (but which probably will meet less-stated goals).
If the image that Trump supporters (and opponents) have constructed in their heads of Trump that presents some sort of a major different to the general thrust of postwar American foreign policy differs from reality... well, that can't be helped. In general, foreign policy tends to the be one thing where political changes don't usually lead to large differences in course.
This, mostly. Don't forget that John Bolton was Trump's National Security Advisor for a time, which is a position of significant influence (but, critically, not determinative).
Trump isn't an isolationist, nor is he a neocon. He's more than willing to have hardliners on the staff, but he will ignore them as much as he ignores that anti-hardliners, which is to say he'll pick whoever's proposal he likes most in the context. Trump isn't ideological enough to be consistent, and while he's willing to go with things that are thought of as 'hardline' (such as the Soleimani killing), he's also been willing to go along with things considered 'weak' (such as the meeting with North Korea's Kim).
Part of Trump's style / implicit offer to his cabinet and significant appointments last time is that he's willing to appoint people whose ambitions / desires are outside the Overton window of the department they oversee, as long as they stand by him / don't start to try and spat with him / his priorities. Trump's appointments, however, are not themselves an endorsement / indication of top-level support for their preferences (i.e. Trump isn't going to fight their bureaucratic battles for them).
What that means is that Rubio and Trump probably have some identified overlapping interests that Rubio wants to do but the current state department momentum isn't. Rubio being a hawk doesn't disqualify him to Trump, because Trump isn't going to defer to Rubio as much as let Rubio do his own thing until Rubio gets involved in a fight with Trump.
And I approve! It was meant to be a joke, but I realize now it might have seemed a bit mean-spirited, which I apologize for.
It's actually as short as it is because I cut off a bit of a nerd spiel. One of my favored commentators for analyzing video games (specifically Elden Ring) was- for some unfathomable reason- only posting on Tumblr. It was just that level of 'niche access' and 'you have to really be dedicated to this topic' that I now associated with Tumblr, for its highs and its lows.
If those people are able to buy houses in Eugene, they are within the system. It's still just demand.
Now, it may be a demand curve that needs to be adjusted by different legislation- such as restricting property purchases by non-residents or some such- but that's different from a claim that the demand is stimulated.
Imagine the sort of Tumblr's who would stay on Tumblr without porn.
I believe the counter to the steelman is that 'stimulated demand' is just known elsewhere as 'demand,' which is to say the exact thing you'd expect to see from a supply and demand curve interaction when you increase supply.
A Twitter exchange is in fact a form of contract -- so whether the guy sent Nate a piece of paper saying "I will pay Nate Silver 100K if Florida goes less than R +8, otherwise he will pay me", I think the terms of the bet were pretty clear.
...?
If the Twitter exchange is in fact a form of contract, then so is the stipulation of said Twitter exchange for the requisite next step- which includes Nate's condition that the other person send a formal contract via lawyer. If the guy sends a piece of paper saying what you say, it would be failing to meet the conditions of the terms of the Twitter-contract.
But no one accused him of dishonesty.
...er, yes, there has been. That is one of the implications of the phrase 'weasel out of a bet,' which has been invoked in this Nate Silver context*. In forum and elsewhere, the Nate Silver's bet post is being used to charge Nate Silver of dishonest for not following through with his offer for a bet.
*Though not by Ranger specifically.
Nate never said "I didn't get any contract", that's my entire point!
Nor, to my knowledge, has Nate ever said he did get any contract. Hence you do not have a point- you have an absence of information.
Hence why I am asking for some support that he received the contract, as opposed to working from a position of assuming he did.
It's his opponent that exposed himself to an accusation of dishonesty if and only if he didn't send the contract.
Incorrect. Nate's opponent would only expose himself to an accusation of dishonest if and only if he claimed to send the contract but didn't.
However, if Nate's opponent has not made a claim, he would not be dishonest regardless of whether he sent a claim or not.
Unless I misread something earlier, at this point and in this thread, no evidence has been provided that Nate's opponent has claimed to have sent a contract. IF Nate's opponent has made a claim, THEN that claim could be looked at for evidence of credibility- for example, if the claim was made before the election (when results were still uncertain) that would be more credible than the same words made after the election (when the results are now hindsight)- but no consideration can be made absent of existence, and without existence of a claim from Nate's opponent then Nate's opponent cannot be dishonest about said claim.
This, and the fact that you thought it's his reputation as a better that's at stake, makes me think you're not really getting the logic behind my reasoning, but I don't know how to explain it any better.
No, I get your logic behind your reasoning, I just think it's a very poor counter to a request for information, and does not warrant accepting an assumption that is required for various arguments to be valid.
In other international news that totally-isn't-a-consequence of the US election shaping state decisions, Qatar has agreed to remove Hamas from its territory after Hamas refused to conduct genuine hostage, ceasefire negotiations (as characterized by an anonymous US official).
This is a significant development if true, as it represents a significant drop in Arab political support for Hamas inclusion into a post-Gaza-War unified Palestine government, a point of post-war tension with Israel, and likely signals the further political decline of the Palestinians as a key factor in Arab politics as the loss of one of their key sponsors / sympathizers will likely see Hamas turn more towards Iran, and thus burn further bridges with the Arab states concerned about Iran and its axis of resistance.
For those unaware, Qatar has been the host to the political wing of Hamas for some times. Qatar-Hamas relations more or less started in earnest after Hamas's take over of Gaza in the mid-2000s, and in 2012 Hamas set up a political office in Qatar. Due to Qatar's role as a 'negotiates with everyone' regional diplomatic power, Qatar is a country the Israelis do not generally conduct assassinations / targetted killings, and so Hamas was able to operate with... not impunity, but relative safety and patronage. While this was supported by the Obama-era US and Israel to facilitate negotiations between Israel and Hamas, Qatar has provided its own support, including lots of money (well over $1 billion USD over the years, 'for the Palestinians' but via Hamas), safe shop, but also a very supportive media relationship with Qatari-owned Al Jazeera news. Setting aside cases of Jazeera journalists outright supporting Hamas, the Qatari line via Al Jazeera is one of the most public and influential Arab media / information influence shapers for the pro-Hamas / anti-Israeli side of the current conflict.
While the Hamas military and political wings are not synonymous, and the political wing in Qatar likely were not directly aware of Oct 7 (because why wouldn't they be spied on intently), the Hamas political wing being stationed in Qatar represents something of a last-stand of Palestinian resistance politics in the Arab world. The various Palestinian violent resistance movements across history have progressively gotten less support / more opposition from regional Arab states after various misteps, including Black September, support for Saddam during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and others. The Qataris were, to a real degree, the last major Gulf Arab state both willing to host Hamas and able to sponsor them... and whose hosting provided protection from Israeli retaliation.
With Qatar ejecting the Hamas political leadership during the Oct 7 war, that protection is ending. Hamas leaders will almost certainly seek alternative patronage support in other countries... but the list of those (a) willing to host, (b) who Israel isn't willing to attack into anyway, and (c) willing to protect Hamas if Israel tries is very small, and mostly non-Arab.
Especially since there is a not-very-subtle US pressure in play.
"After rejecting repeated proposals to release hostages, its leaders should no longer be welcome in the capitals of any American partner. We made that clear to Qatar following Hamas's rejection weeks ago of another hostage release proposal," the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.
This doesn't mean a country like, say, Turkey couldn't do so anyway, but in all likelihood the confluence of 'willing to sponsor Hamas in the Oct 7 war' and 'doesn't care about US pressure' is probably Iran... and honestly, either Iran or Turkey (though less Turkey) demonstrate the same point: the Palestinian resistance issue is transitioning from an Arab-led issue, to an issue led by Arab-rivals.
This doesn't mean a sharp or sudden change in political cultures or such is imminent- al Jazeera will still be running pro-Palestinian / anti-Israeli issues for years to come- but as states change their priorities, and their patronage networks, so do their information efforts and priorities. It's been said before the Palestinians never lose an opportunity to lose an opportunity, and in this case the opportunity lost was Qatari sponsorship.
As for why now? Well, as hinted above, probably US election political politics. The US message quoted above was 'weeks ago' for an issue apparent months ago, but the President coming in was only determined days ago. How Trump might have approached the issue likely had a non-trivial influence on the Qatari decision.
It is not his reputation as a confident bettor at stake, it is his reputation as an honest man which reflects on both the value of his words as a bettor and his words as a political scientist.
Hinging an argument on an accusation of dishonesty is precisely why I feel it is reasonable to request evidence of dishonesty, lest that accusation of dishonesty also be dishonest.
Ranger does not appear to have meant to make an argument about Silver's reputation as a bettor in the sense of upholding a bet, but if you wish to on the basis of Nate Silver being 'a weasel with no integrity,' I would make the same question of you: please provide the evidence that Nate Silver weaseled out of the bet.
and that should absolutely inform your opinion of his political commentary as a good Bayesian
I don't believe I have ever claimed to be a Bayesian, or ever particularly cared about others being Bayesian, particularly when the claims of being a good one or not revolve around character rather than statistical grounds.
In fact, for transparency I have a general skepticism of arguments about when other people are a 'good' [Insert Applause Category], since in my experience these often attempts to use assumed category requirements as a cudgel in either a No True Scotsman fallacy sense (if you wish to qualify as [Good Group], you must meet my critiera) or in ad hominem effect (this person is not [Good People]).
This is tangential to my main point.
If that is so, I accept this correction in good faith, and I do believe this elaboration of the main argument is substantially stronger. I am not attempting to change your opinion on Nate Silver's accuracy.
I am still curious of if there was ever evidence that Silver's bet was accepted, both for it's own sake in addressing the question and to updating priors, but an argument of 'he would have lost money if he made the bet' is a substantially different argument than 'he refused to respect his own challenge,' and if you did not mean the later interpretation I am grateful for the clarification.
I supposed we will have to agree to disagree that it is unfair to request evidence to substantiate an accusation, particularly when that accusation is a form of argument.
'The accused did not defend themselves' is so flawed a standard for determining truth that Americans prohibit it as a legal standard at a Constitutional level as an element of self-incrimination protections (you cannot be forced to testify, but also your refusal to testify is not itself self-incrimination), and while we are not a court of law it does lead to why it's a poor argument on grounds of reputational damage. Even Nate defending himself in this twitter at this point can inflict reputation damage to Nate- after all, it could be presented / accused as Nate lying / trying to deflect from the poling-result mismatch / doing a condemnable thing in and of itself. General decorum is to not air legal conflicts on your pseudo-business reputational Twitter account, particularly when they are about a prediction that you got wrong- just re-raising the topic is causing reputational harm.
And this is without other possible reasons of reputational harm for not going into detail of why an offer might not have been carried through. Like, say, the fact that Nate Silver is a married men, and married women are often quite willing to have strong words with their husbands when said husbands start offering 5-figure bets. Or maybe his finances are not so liquid and stable as to set a 5-figure risk. Or that he was drunk and not in a good state of mind when he made the offer. Nate is already suffering reputational harm for coming off as a bet-welcher, but he could suffer more reputational harm if he provided more context... and this is regardless of whether there was an actual acceptance-offer made.
It's also a defense that doesn't really acknowledge the shifts in which reputations are being challenged how.
Note here that Nate's reputation isn't regarding whether he would fail to pay a bet. It's not even about if he made a bet. The reputation in question is if Nate's reputation as a political data analyst, i.e. whether his analysis of election, is sound enough to warrant respect.
Whether Nate is willing to actually to make a bet or not isn't actually a failure of his analytic capacity (i.e. whether he should be considered valuable input), it's a failure of an additional standard introduced as a basis of dismissal (if Nate Silver is not willing to go through with a bet, his work can be dismissed). Nate Silver's [Reputation as a political scientist] and [Reputation as a confident better] are two different reputations, which are being conflated to use the one that is easier to condemn [reputation as a betting man] to dismiss the other [reputation as a political scientist].
Since the [reputation as a betting man] is being used as a proxy argument for [Nate Silver's arguments can be dismissed without addressing], the role of evidence is in turn strengthening or weakening the proxy argument. This seems like a reasonable request, but I will admit that is my own opinion.
Or that it's debates between large numbers of different people with different positions, even the people within the same coalition.
Just as governments aren't hive minds, neither are 'pro' or 'anti' camps. It's not a motte and bailey if person A takes position A and person B takes position B, even if B is better at some arguments than A (and often vice versa).
That's less of a steelman and more of an indictment of competence that would be entirely Marn'i's fault.
Setting aside that the 'FEMA is at risk' reporting was for an entirely different state over a fear that didn't happen and in which FEMA activities were re-implemented, and thus not a credible fear in Florida, the broader issue is that the mitigation measure doesn't pass muster. If there is a safety fear in a neighborhood/area, then the safety mitigation is to prevent any personnel from going into the area until you have security, not avoiding specific houses. You are still in gunshot range of a danger house if you knock at the house next door.
Marni's is a person with agency, not a brainwashed thrall, and unfortunately their competence was quite low.
That would not be fair. In the absence of Nate confirming that he refused to sign a contract, a claim of having sent the contract is just a claim absent further evidence.
My curiosity / eyebrow is raised because Ranger is raising this bet as a character failure on the part of Nate Silver, but the proffered evidence is of the conditional offer of a bet, not that the bet was accepted as offered but that Silver refused to sign it.
This leads to a couple of issues for which more information than has been provided is needed.
-Did the other person actually accept the bet, or are they just claiming so with post-election hindsight? (i.e. is he talking the talk after the election is decided?)
-Did the person try to modify the terms of the bet offered that would render the offer void? (i.e. did he refuse to walk the walk when it mattered?)
-Did the person fail to meet the conditions of the offer of bet? (i.e. did they not have their lawyer do it, but tried to make their own contract- thus invoking the payment risk issue raised?)
I've no particular strong feeling on Nate Silver one way or another, but if someone wants to make a character failure accusation with linked evidence I'd generally prefer the links to be evidence of a character failure.
Did the other guy provide proof that he sent the contract?
Many do, one of the reasons being that a lot of bottled water is literally just tap water.
I'm not joking- there was a study in the US earlier this year that upwards of 60% of bottled water is sourced from municiple tap water.
We can make the argument that a filter 'changes' it, but a lot of tap water is itself going through filters installed in homes / point of exit.
I posted this in the main week thread, but feel I probably should have posted it here instead.
/
In non-American election news of note, the German governing coalition has collapsed with German Chancellor Scholz (SDP party) sacked his Finance Minister (FDP), setting the stage for a snap election in the next few months, possibly as early as January.
The collapse occurred for typically German reasons, which is to say over money and budgets and deficit spending. Specifically, how to cover a 60-billion euro hole in the budget after a German court in November 2023 annulled a plan to repurpose COVID emergency funds, when more money is needed to conduct domestic stimulus / address EU issues / further support Ukraine. Scholz and other members of the coalition wanted to suspend the German balanced budget amendment, i.e. the 2009 debt break amendment to the constitution. The FDP, a more neoliberal minority member of the coalition but who had the finance minister portfolio, refused. Scholz had an exceptionally emotive press conference yesterday, and now the issue is turning over to the timing of the vote of no confidence to bring forth a new election.
Yes, Germany- the country which helped replace multiple governments in southern Europe in the name of enforcing austerity and balanced budgets- just saw its own government collapse over deficit spending. There are jokes to be made here.
While this issue was German internal politics in nature, however, the timing was almost certainly a consequence of the US election, which is to say we could blame Donald Trump. The issues are not new and have been building for a year, while German election results in recent elections have shown a rise of the right that worries the German establishment whose coalition is as much to keep them out as it is to keep itself in. The confluence or risks was acceptable while Biden was in the white house, and might have continued had Harris won.
The victory of Donald Trump in the American election, however, provided new future risks. If the previous German expected election cycle occurred in OCT 25, that would be the better part of a year in which budget-locked Germany couldn't maneuver diplomatically on any major financial issue, even as Trump is almost certainly going to make that a major issue. Further, Scholz would have been in a lame duck position as the months ticked by, unable to do much and no one necessarily expecting his continuation into 2026.
By quickening the election to as early as January, right as Trump transitions into office, Scholz will (possibly) mitigate those risks, while also (probably) benefit from substantial anti-Trump sentiment in Germany that will probably support the SDP more than it's further-right rivals. While Scholz himself may / may not be the leader of the next government, the election may break free the FDP log jam on deficit spending.
Which, to put it lightly, will have major political (and social) implications for not just Germany, but Europe as a whole.
German political power in Europe- overt and soft- has for a decade and a half been limited as much by German budgetary restrictions as by German reputational inclination towards fiscal restraint. But if Germany is willing to spend big, this will be a tidal wave of money no one else in Europe would be able to match, which no existing systems were expecting to absorb and utilize, and so a lot of money which many in the European Union will seek to channel. This is both in terms of other countries trying to get what benefits they can out of spending to benefit their own needs, whether that's debt cancelation or military investments or so on, but also at the EU level, where Germany will have a lot more purse for a lot more power of the purse. There have long been dreams of German-financed financial consolidation in the EU that were economically impossible so long as Germany barred itself from funding them- but if the debt break barier is removed, then it's 'merely' a very difficult lobbying effort.
It will also create an interesting context for other countries seeking to shape the incoming government. In 2021, for example, remember that the Belarus migration crisis was itself timed to the German government formation, and which led to a partial rapproachment between PIS-Poland and Germany due to Polish tactics to force back migrants aiming to go to Germany (and thus the enabler-governments behind those migrants willingness to poke Germany in the eye at a senstivie time). Expect non-trivial cross-europe lobbying and advocating within Germany as well, as countries try to enable foreign voting from their territory (if they think ti might benefit) / mobilize expatriats / good old fashioned election propaganda and social media and newfangled AI-propaganda influence efforts.
None of this is a guarantee, mind you. The German election could be more divided and create a weaker government rather than a stronger one. There's no guarantee that the FDP fiscal log jam will be expelled. The government might be 'worse' by whatever standard of good you choose.
But this could be significant that will impact the next years of European politics.
In non-American election news of note, the German governing coalition has collapsed with German Chancellor Scholz (SDP party) sacked his Finance Minister (FDP), setting the stage for a snap election in the next few months, possibly as early as January.
The collapse occurred for typically German reasons, which is to say over money and budgets and deficit spending. Specifically, how to cover a 60-billion euro hole in the budget after a German court in November 2023 annulled a plan to repurpose COVID emergency funds, when more money is needed to conduct domestic stimulus / address EU issues / further support Ukraine. Scholz and other members of the coalition wanted to suspend the German balanced budget amendment, i.e. the 2009 debt break amendment to the constitution. The FDP, a more neoliberal minority member of the coalition but who had the finance minister portfolio, refused. Scholz had an exceptionally emotive press conference yesterday, and now the issue is turning over to the timing of the vote of no confidence to bring forth a new election.
Yes, Germany- the country which helped replace multiple governments in southern Europe in the name of enforcing austerity and balanced budgets- just saw its own government collapse over deficit spending. There are jokes to be made here.
While this issue was German internal politics in nature, however, the timing was almost certainly a consequence of the US election, which is to say we could blame Donald Trump. The issues are not new and have been building for a year, while German election results in recent elections have shown a rise of the right that worries the German establishment whose coalition is as much to keep them out as it is to keep itself in. The confluence or risks was acceptable while Biden was in the white house, and might have continued had Harris won.
The victory of Donald Trump in the American election, however, provided new future risks. If the previous German expected election cycle occurred in OCT 25, that would be the better part of a year in which budget-locked Germany couldn't maneuver diplomatically on any major financial issue, even as Trump is almost certainly going to make that a major issue. Further, Scholz would have been in a lame duck position as the months ticked by, unable to do much and no one necessarily expecting his continuation into 2026.
By quickening the election to as early as January, right as Trump transitions into office, Scholz will (possibly) mitigate those risks, while also (probably) benefit from substantial anti-Trump sentiment in Germany that will probably support the SDP more than it's further-right rivals. While Scholz himself may / may not be the leader of the next government, the election may break free the FDP log jam on deficit spending.
Which, to put it lightly, will have major political (and social) implications for not just Germany, but Europe as a whole.
German political power in Europe- overt and soft- has for a decade and a half been limited as much by German budgetary restrictions as by German reputational inclination towards fiscal restraint. But if Germany is willing to spend big, this will be a tidal wave of money no one else in Europe would be able to match, which no existing systems were expecting to absorb and utilize, and so a lot of money which many in the European Union will seek to channel. This is both in terms of other countries trying to get what benefits they can out of spending to benefit their own needs, whether that's debt cancelation or military investments or so on, but also at the EU level, where Germany will have a lot more purse for a lot more power of the purse. There have long been dreams of German-financed financial consolidation in the EU that were economically impossible so long as Germany barred itself from funding them- but if the debt break barier is removed, then it's 'merely' a very difficult lobbying effort.
It will also create an interesting context for other countries seeking to shape the incoming government. In 2021, for example, remember that the Belarus migration crisis was itself timed to the German government formation, and which led to a partial rapproachment between PIS-Poland and Germany due to Polish tactics to force back migrants aiming to go to Germany (and thus the enabler-governments behind those migrants willingness to poke Germany in the eye at a senstivie time). Expect non-trivial cross-europe lobbying and advocating within Germany as well, as countries try to enable foreign voting from their territory (if they think ti might benefit) / mobilize expatriats / good old fashioned election propaganda and social media and newfangled AI-propaganda influence efforts.
None of this is a guarantee, mind you. The German election could be more divided and create a weaker government rather than a stronger one. There's no guarantee that the FDP fiscal log jam will be expelled. The government might be 'worse' by whatever standard of good you choose.
But this could be significant that will impact the next years of European politics.

The Tumblr person for EldenRing is @yournextflame.
I don't remember if they had anything about the Ring Cycle in their pieces- that was me just being more familiar with the director and the material- but they have some great cross-cultural insight into the Japanese language/connotation/cultural context that doesn't always translate to the English fandom.
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