Dean
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Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
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The purpose of an IED is to deceive people into thinking a bomb is an ordinary object.
No, the purpose of an IED is to have an explosive device, hence the majority of the name.
Improvision is because of a limitation of parts, not a preference. Hence why IED-utilizers prefer to use military-grade explosives when they have access to them rather than make their own explosive mixtures, and why belligerants per to use non-improved EDs when they have access to those.
The purpose of boobytraps is to conceal danger in seemingly harmless things. But boobytraps and IEDs are different things, and when given an option most boobytraps will use non-improvised explosive devices to get the booby. Boobytrapping is the method of employment, not the thing being employed, just as IED refers to the thing, not the method of employment.
If you want to condemn the Israelis for boobytrapping Hezbollah gear, sure, go ahead. But they didn't use an IED to do it.
Yeah with the phone hacking it’s plausible that they can always find another exploit, but with this kind of physical modification it doesn’t actually invalidate the pagers as a method of communication at all.
Depends what you mean by 'invalidate.' A system generally isn't validated when everything fails all the time, but when a critical mass of things fails enough that the reliability isn't high enough to keep doing. In some systems you only need one part to not work for the whole system to fail.
In this case I'd agree that pagers will probably still be used- I imagine they'd be used to prompt agents to go look at more secure means of communication- but if the psychological effect of the operation is that people don't trust the system enough to use it, you're going to the reliability issue alluded to.
I don't mind or quibble with your broader point about internal threats or other forms of state failure. There are interesting discussions to be had on what can cause state failure, and also how resilient states can be when they choose to be, but my position here is on the non-applicability of the historical metaphor.
If the Israelis fall for other internal reasons, it will still be a bad metaphor. The Crusader States did not fall to Saladin because of internal political identity/ideological shifts- the Crusader States fell because external armies marched on and overwhelmed them. Anything short of Israel being conquered by conventional armies would not be a meaningful historical reoccurence.
There is a separate point to be made that no insurgency has actually overthrown a state per see. The closest historical example of this was the Chinese communist takeover of China- a success the hinged on external armies (Japanese) devastating the Nationalists, even as the Communists formed (and were supported in forming) forces to wage a conventional war as opposed to an insurgency. Otherwise, insurgencies may drive a state to leave, or a state's leaders to concede as a political decision, but the actual ability to remove them from the field if they are willing to continue cracking down is basically nill. States may remove state armies... but States are precisely what nuclear deterrence works against, as states are- by necessity- centralized and static.
And yet the Lebanese are neither occupied nor under attack. Whether they militarize against Israel is irrelevant to that, and if they initated a round of conflict as Hezbollah did it would even further invalidate claims of the later.
The Boer who have lived there for 400 years are effectively second class citizens.
And yet still exist, and were not facing existential risk from invading armies.
They lost a part of France with a million ethnic French people that had been French for over a century.
And yet still exist, and were not facing existential risk from invading armies.
There won't be any, it will be death by a thousand cuts.
States don't face existential threat from a thousand cuts.
When overwhelming damage approaches existential threats, the polities responsible remain vulnerable to nuclear weapons.
There was no vast army of tanks that rolled into Rhodesia. Rhodesia fell because it was being hit constantly by endless insurgency.
Supported by states that would have been vulnerable to nuclear weapons.
Over two million Palestinian citizens.
The ethnic Arab citizens of Israel are neither Palestinians in the political sense of the Palestinian movement, nor are they an occupied or suppressed majority population.
Also much of Israel is within range of being engaged by Palestine. Even Houthis have hit Israel twice from 2000 km away. Thinking that Israel can just ignore a large group of people 10s of km away is naive.
Being 10s of kms outside the state is still outside the state, which continues to invalidate your attempted analogies to African majority-suppression states contexts.
West bank to the sea is 20+ km. That is minimal strategic depth.
Minimal is not a rebuttal of sufficient.
Israel isn't going to nuclearly destroy the west bank.
Why not, if the alternative is existential end? What's the punishment supposed to be- death?
Nor does that change that the Crusades were not a MAD context.
The Lebanese are neither occupied nor under attack. A non-state group has been conducting military activities from Lebanese territory, which the state is alternatively unable/unwilling to stop, but the incapacity of a state to maintain a monopoly on organized violence does not negate the sovereign right of other states to retaliate against belligerents.
South Africa's nukes didn't help much.
South Africa was not facing existential threat from invading armies.
France lost Algeria despite having been there longer than israel has existed despite France having nukes.
France was not facing existential threat from invading armies.
Turns out nukes aren't that great at subjugating a population, especially when your country is tiny and the people you subjugate are your neighbours.
Israel doesn't need (or use) nukes to subjugate a population. It can use nukes to mitigate existential threat from invading armies.
The Palestinians don't have to defeat Israel in a big war, they just have to put Israel in the same position as Rhodesians were in.
Unlike Rhodesia, the Israelis have nukes that can be used to mitigate existential threats from invading armies.
There aren't even six million non ultra orthodox Israeli jews. Populationwise Israel is roughly equal to Slovakia.
Unlike Slovakia, Israel has nukes that can be used to mitigate existential threats from invading armies.
In terms of land, they are smaller than Belize.
Unlike Belize, Israel has nukes that can be used to mitigate existential threats from invading armies.
The Palestinian population is now a quarter of the size of the population of Iraq when the US, Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands invaded. They left because it turned into a hopeless quagmire. Palestinians are more united against an enemy than the Iraqis were.
None of which mitigates them from being nuked if they pose an existential threat as an invading army.
If the refrain seems repetitive, it's because every argument you are making is a matter of the power of other states to create invading armies, or the risk to a small state from invading armies. Despite the claim, Israel is not an apartheid state in which a minority is attempting to rule over a much larger majority that dominates the demographics of the interior of the state. It has coherent borders and sufficient strategic depth that a military sufficient to overwhelm it will also give it time to use it's capabilities to prepare a nuclear retaliation.
Now, if you want to argue that doesn't matter because the Palestinians / Arabs / choose your protagonist here are willing to get nuked anyway, we can work with that... but now we are stepping decisively away from any Crusader State metaphors, which were not MAD contexts.
Nukes may always be the trump card of course, but
But what? You leave off without saying what nuclear weapons mean to the Crusader metaphor, almost like it was inconvenient and should be ignored rather than acknowledged.
Why does a change of heart in the west spell the doom of Israel, when Israel doesn't need the west to have or maintain nuclear weapons?
Why would unity among the Arabs spell its doom, when unity among the Arabs doesn't remove Israel's nuclear weapons?
Why would a united Arab state commit to a war mutually assured destruction by invading a state with nuclear weapons?
Why does a population of 7.5 million versus 149 million matter when relative population numbers actually increase the value of nuclear weapons?
Why would Israel's survival depend on a war of attrition when Israel has nuclear weapons?
Moreover, your historical analogies don't really address how history would have differed without, and let's say it together, nuclear weapons.
Why would Saladin have been able to retake Jerusalem in 10 years if the holders of Jerusalem in 1177 had nuclear weapons?
Why would anyone in 1210 have had reason to hear of the Mongols had the Mongols targets had resort to nuclear weapons?
The unexpected nature of history makes me think we should do a lot more geopolitical risk management than we do.
And that is why some states invest in nuclear weapons, and other states don't try to mass armies and overrun states with nuclear weapons.
Always!
... ] Now back to geeking out about long-dead men.
This is the sort of enthusiasm that keeps me here with a smile at times like now.
If you mean directly, the last time I recall was some media interview or townhall in 2023 I believe, or otherwise early in the campaign season, in which Trump was making one of his claims that he'd get talks and get both sides to agree to [generic good term] deal. The interviewer/moderator asked what he'd do if Putin didn't agree, and the immediate response that Ukraine would get more aid.
That was generally unremarked at the time, and has long since been buried in the sea of media articles by Trump opponents (and some supporters) that try to insinuate / claim he's threatening to cut off aid.
If you mean indirectly, as in by proxy associated with him, the latest notable version that was used in international media to claim a Trump intent to cut off because of reportedly favorable reception was in June 2024, when former Trump National Security Council advisors Kellogg and Fleitz briefed Trump on a strategy to bring about cease fire talks. This was formally rejected by the Trump campaign as unofficial/unauthorized/not to be considered authoritative, but this proposal is what most 2024 media reporting alludes to when they claim Trump is considering cutting off aid to force a cease fire.
This is the document, which is hosted on the America First Institute.
While typically characterized as the 'peace at any cost' / 'force Ukraine into a ceasefire' plan, what the report actually says is pretty mild.
Specifically, it would mean a formal U.S. policy to seek a cease-fire and negotiated settlement of the Ukraine conflict. The United States would continue to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement. Future American military aid, however, will require Ukraine to participate in peace talks with Russia.
To convince Putin to join peace talks, President Biden and other NATO leaders should offer to put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal with security guarantees. In their April 2023 Foreign Affairs article, Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan proposed that in exchange for abiding by a cease-fire, a demilitarized zone, and participating in peace talks, Russia could be offered some limited sanctions relief. Ukraine would not be asked to relinquish the goal of regaining all its territory, but it would agree to use diplomacy, not force, with the understanding that this would require a future diplomatic breakthrough which probably will not occur before Putin leaves office. Until that happens, the United States and its allies would pledge to only fully lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations after it signs a peace agreement acceptable to Ukraine. We also call for placing levies on Russian energy sales to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction.
In short- by the standards of 'the Trump Plan' (as detractors and advocates characterize it, even though Trump has never formally endorsed/agreed to it), the Trump plan is to give Ukraine more aid. Ukraine aid is conditional to participating to peace talks with Russia, no peace deal required, but concessions to russia such as NATO denial and verifiable security deal guarantees are dependent on Russia accepting a peace deal. Full Russian sanction relief is separately conditional on a deal acceptable to Ukraine, but aid to Ukraine is continuous so long as it participates in talks.
The claim that Trump's plan is to cut off aid to Ukraine until it agrees to a ceasefire is dependent on reading coverage of the plan, not the plan itself, or anything Trump has said (which in 2024 has been strategic ambiguity).
Do Russian diplomats really read this forum? News to me.
Do Russian diplomats need to read this forum for your proposals to be unworkable because of poor modeling of the interests and concerns of participants?
In any case your model of the motivations of the belligerents is not the same as mine so I don't really think we can reconcile the reasoning for any of this.
Sure we can. We can work to justify the models based on key actor behavior, contexts that the proposed models will work within, and past iterations.
For example, you made a concession that if Putin is interested in clay instead of all his declared war goals, then peace is a non-starter. I noted that it is impossible for Putin to achieve all of his declared war goals, and that in lieu of those he has significant interest in the clay in order to declare victory. You have not disputed these points on all of Putin's war goals. If Putin has many interests in the conflicts, and many/most have fallen away, then the reason to continue the conflict remains the rest- which includes the clay.
This is a synthesis, not a refutation of your model, and thus allows the conversation to reach your own conclusion. Putin cares about the clay, and thus peace is hopeless.
From this point, we can discuss what that means for reasonable peace talks (which have a purpose even when an adversary has no interest in fulfilling them), assumptions of terms they can be approached with, and so on.
I will say however that taking the current declared terms from both sides as immutable gospel as you do here is absurd. Diplomacy never works like that.
Fortunately I am not arguing on the immutable gospel of declared terms, but rather past iterations, interests, and incentives... which is how diplomacy routinely works, absurd as that may seem to you.
Moreover, you seem to be trying for a flawed reasoning of what is or is not considered subject for negotiation. Just because initial declared terms are 'never' final terms doesn't mean all parts of initial terms are subject to concession. Plenty of terms are not subject to trading way short of total capitulation- which is not the context Russia is faced with in the timeframe being alluded to. As such, the basis by which currently held Russian territory would be traded away with requires justification rather than going without saying, particular in light of past Russian policies in regards to frozen conflicts and relevant historical analogs to broad-front indefinite cease fires.
Trump has also said that if Russia did not agree to his terms he would give more assistance to Ukraine, so the presumption would not only be unfounded, but false.
And Monzer's point remains the same: Wilson wasn't a first-tier player who had the agency to overturn the preferences of the rest, and many of the factors that led to the nature of the end of WW1 (such as breakup of empires into smaller nation-states, but with ethnic mixing) were already baked in.
I hadn't heard of the "Cult of the Offensive" before.
I would strongly (and warmly) recommend reading up on it. More than a specific historical context, the Cult of the Offensive is a mindset that can be observed across periods of time, and is an example of a strategic paradigm that can simultaneously be logical (because premise can be true and valid) and illogical (because the consequences of adopting the paradigm include negative externalities that make it illogical to embrace).
Something I've often wondered about lately is how the world went from a system where winning territory by military conquest was just the way things were done, to our current system where the idea that one country would invade its neighbor for such base motives as gaining territory is viewed as scandalous. But maybe it makes sense for our morals to change in this way, as we adapt to the reality that defense is easier than offense.
Rather than scandalous, the more relevant point is 'too expensive to be profitable.'
The British and American formal empires fell because of scandal. The sense of self of what it meant to be 'civilized' precluded arbitrary and extreme uses of force, and political-ideological senses of legitimacy and democracy asserted self-limitations that, eventually, led them to no longer want to militarily enforce rule and so negotiate exits.
That negotiation- and the experience of other conquerors- was in the context that insurgencies were increasingly cheap and bloodily effective and incurring huge costs. Starting with post-WW2 military surpluses, but then expanding with the Cold War military-industrial complexes, advanced and effective and relatively portable weapons made armed resistance a real and feasible thing. The AK-47 is perhaps the hallmark of a cheap and effective peasant-usable weapon, and further advances in explosives and communications and plenty of safe support zones made supplying insurgencies very easy for anyone who either sympathized with a target, or wanted to counter an aggressor. These costs could be economically ruinous and politically disruptive.
Peace requires concessions on both sides,
So far your concessions are largely unilateral in light of how Russia has approached or poison-pilled various equivalent standards before.
and I think a European guarantee is enough of a deterrent.
A peace treaty doesn't depend on what you think is enough of a deterrent, it depends on what others think is enough of a deterrent. The typical-minding of other actors perspectives and interests to your own is why your proposals will not be credible to the actors that matter.
Both sides' declared conditions are mutually exclusive, I tried to cleave from both of them somewhat fairly.
Are you trying for fairness, or functionality?
If you are trying for functionality, your sense of fairness has neglected the functional failures that already occurred as a result of equivalent terms in the past, failures which you are expecting previous victims of to subscribe to again.
Formal borders sans Crimea restored and an end to military occupation seems like it goes without saying,
It not only requires saying, but categorial opposition to this has been the starting position for the Russian position for over two years now, with no provided reason for why they would drop the position and un-annex regions now given that a cease fire or frozen conflict- a BATNA to a treaty- would let them retain territory well beyond formal borders sans Crimea.
formal schedules for returning Ukraine to normal administration are left as exercise to the reader.
And as one of the readers is the Russians, this turns any formal schedule into a frozen conflict scenario. Which is the same scenario that led to the 2022 invasion as Russia deemed a frozen conflict with no viable path to NATO membership insufficient to meet its desires vis-a-vis another continuation war.
If Putin is interested in clay instead of all of his declared war goals, peace is a non starter, but I believe him when he says his concerns are related to security of Russia and Russians more than rote imperialism.
Putin is interested in the clay because many of his claimed war goals were false or lost already.
The Russophone regional populations were not categorically endangered until Russia created and enforced a separatist conflict with external interventions, NATO expansion was accelerated instead of countered, the Ukrainians were not a false nation seeking Russian liberation, and the Ukrainian government was never a Nazi regime.
The clay is what allows Putin to justify to himself, his partisan supporters, and his historian that he 'won' in some meaningful sense.
If you have time, can you elaborate on what Germany was doing to destabilize the continent and/or prevent its re-stabilization?
Among other things, the formation of modern Germany started with provoking a territorial conflict with established major power neighbors like France for a Prussian-centric state, instigating a major naval arms buildup despite the lack of naval relevance to its primary competitors (and thus really only being usable against Britain), alignment with the Austrian-Hungarians who were already cracking under the efforts to repression national identities (and thus getting involved in messes observable to Bismark), attempts to interfere in the overseas sphere's interests of its continental neighbors (demands for access to Africa and China, attempts to build influence in Latin America), the role of treaties as a co-belligerancy rather than defensive arrangement (thus getting Germany into wars of others choosing), and the previously mentioned adoption of the cult of the offensive.
This doesn't include such things like the flavors of ethno-supremacy of the era, the reputation for diplomatic brinksmanship, prussian militarism, monarchism, and so on in the post-victorian age.
This is, again, not to say that Germany was worse than its neighbors, but that it was not better, and the same flaws that saw its neighbors unable to provide pax Europa applied to Germany as well: greed, pride, and jingoism were all there, and such things do not work well for a peace and stability or abroad. The German empire felt it was entitled to territorial and colonial expansion at others expense, and the limits it faced were those of consequence of opposition, not self-limitation.
In the book Buchanan claims that Germany would have been largely content with a tranquil European continent but minimal colonial presence, so their only real goal was a navy large enough that England would fear getting involved in a conflict with Germany and Germany wouldn't be cut off via English control of its sea routes to the wider world.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but Pat Buchanan is writing as a moralist ideologue, not a historian.
Buchanan is an ideological paleoconservative, and part of that is an ideological alignment with American isolationism vis-a-vis Europe. He is writing with that conclusion in mind and working backwards via historical metaphors to try and convince the audience of the moral preferability of American isolationism/innocence by contrasting it to morally bad involvement in undeniably bad conflicts. However, doing so requires the metaphor fit and provide the narrative elements, such as to have a villain (the selfish/evil politician who links the alegorical Americana to Europe) drag the innocent (the US / US-analog England) into sin (needless European wars). When actual history gets in the way, it needs to be glossed over or ignored to fit the narrative.
As part of that, Buchanan needs to downplay the moral agency and responsibility of the opposing side, because if the conflict would come or occur regardless because the opponent was unreasonable it undercuts the moral argument for isolationism, since isolationism wouldn't avoid the conflict as much as delay it to a potentially worse position. Therefore, Kaiser Germany's naval buildup was 'just' a deterrence, despite torpedo boats being more than enough to keep battleships away from shores, and not a way for Germany to try and force its way into overseas territories to form a colonial empire that would lead to competition over colonies. Hitler's demands for a Polish corridor are not unreasonable demands as part of a publicized design to control Poland and treat eastern europe as living space, but a genuine attempt to build a German-Polish alliance. And back to WW1 again, Germany is a passive recipient to being forced into a war by the Russians, rather than the Russians being forced into the war by Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia, or rather than a supporter of Austria-Hungary's response. It's classic hyperagent / hypoagent morality framing.
Likewise, Buchanan needs to elevate the sins of the tempters, the politicians who bring Americana into European issues. Hence the scale of the Holocaust is a consequence of Churchill's choice not to accept a peace in 1940, as opposed to an ideological fixation of Hitler's antisemetic party that was pursued despite and even against military utility. And in the context of WW1, Prussian militarism needs to be a myth invented by irrationally afraid British leaders to bring Britain into the war.
Buchanan isn't approaching history from a perspective of truth-seeking, but allegory. It relies on the audience not knowing enough about the subject to find the conclusion plausible, and the conclusion is to agree with Buchanan's politics of appropriate US foreign affairs regarding Europe.
And yet, duty bound or not you didn't rebut the point of what had already failed.
*The accords you claim already existed were non-viable due to Russian demands even before the Bucha Massacre was recognized, and conditional on Russian demands for Ukrainian disarmament to levels below what Ukraine has already since lost in the war- i.e. an inability to defend itself- while demanding a Russian veto on external security assistance by non-Russian providers- i.e. that other actors like the EU would not be able to act in a crisis.
*The end of sanctions on Russia will not occur because the sanctions are themselves a mechanism of European transition away from Russian energy imports on grounds of national security following Russia's attempted energy blackmail.
*Russia has no credibility has a military guarantor of Ukraine's security as it is currently on the third continuation war of violating Ukraine's neutrality.
*Russia has already rejected the applicability of neutral administration of the Russophone oblasts both in the form of annexation and in its previous positions during Minsk agreements positions of previous agreed upon neutral parties.
*As there is no reason to believe there would turnover of territory, by consequence the destination of most reconstruction aid would be in the areas most heavily damaged- the areas Russia holds- amounting to a subsidy / reimbursement to Russia of the costs of Russian conquest. If there was no cross-control spending, the provision would have no role as both powers would simply spend on reconstruction of their own areas regardless.
*Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine was already conducted when Ukraine was on a much less involved level of EU association despite existing treaties.
Your terms of peace are non-credible because they rest on provisions that Russia has already broken or insisted on poison pill sub-provisions that lead to this conflict.
Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984; by Jack Snyder. Here is a summary
The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War; by Stephen Van Evera. Here's a link to a summary... and of some other military history education sources.
Here is a thesis from an American Airforce officer on the Cult of the Offense as it applies to airpower.
This assumes Germany would have established a pax Germana on the European continent. 'Everyone would be better off just accept the despot's peace' tend to miss the despot is a despot because he already forewent the social and political systems that facilitate peace, and is actively preventing their re-assertion in order to remain the despot, and as such will be replaced in time with another despot whose own interests do not align with institutional peace.
And this is without Wilhelm or the era's German self-perception as a global power deserving colonies and privileged interests abroad. Imperial Germany may have been no worse than other colonial Empires, but it was also no better while still being a colonial empire whose colonial interests were at odds with others.
Thucydides Trap historical metaphors tend to fall into the trap of ignoring relevant actors, the issues of when national advantages get conflated with national strategies, and incompetent leaders.
The Thucydides Trap paradigm is a way of modeling behavior between two potential hegemons, but by the nature of the historical allusion (where ancient Sparta and Athens were by far the regional leading leaders of coalitions with limited agency) and general proposer propensities (the Thucydides Trap is most often raised in realist schools of theory, which are currently framed in bipolar conflicts), it's really, really bad at recognizing or accounting for other relevant actors. These actors not only have their own agency (France was a major military power in its own right, and there's a reason France-British rapproachment coincided with the rise of torpedo speed boats that the Royal Navy couldn't have stopped from throttling channel trade), but their presence and potential drives decision making of the key actors (Germany's WW1 strategy prioritizing a westward rush due to expectations of Russian mobilization; modern Eastern European lobbying to expand NATO in the post Cold War).
This matters to your Russia-American metaphor because the roles in the current era really aren't analogous to either WW1 or Thucydides Trap due to the relevance of other actors. The US is not the actor who felt a need to pre-empt a specific threat (the German allusion to WW1), nor was it trying to displace a hegemon / at risk of being displaced as a hegemon by Russia in Ukraine.
The model also struggles to recognize how doctrine and strategy interact, and yet don't substitute for eachother, and how a doctrine predicated on a form of offense can lead to bad strategy and unwise conflict. In WW1, Germany was caught up in what was sometimes referred to as the cult of the offense- the idea that with elan and alacrity and modern military planning you could blitz the enemy to submission much faster and cheaply than a methodical campaign. This, in turn, would let you fight greater opposing forces, since you could knock out some (say France and thus Britain) early enough to focus on the rest (Russia). There was reason to believe this was possible- German offensives had beaten the French before, and would again nearly 30 years later- but this is a tactic that became a strategy by necessity. This was because the Kaiser German military context kept getting worse and worse, because the willingness to aggressively push personal interests at the expense of others created coalitions that wouldn't have formed had other actors felt at risk. The greater the potential coalitions became, the greater the appeal of the cult of the offense to negate that disadvantage. By WW1, German planners largely thought Russia was a massive threat that would take their full focus and thus couldn't be faced with France at the same time... hence the intent to knock out France first. But doing so required going through Belgium, which is what got Britain into the war that it otherwise would have likely sat out on. The Germans took a calculated risk, but boy were they were bad at math because not even they recognized the implications of the technologies available, and that their own strategy built on past success was putting them in a bad strategic context.
This matters to your modern example because Russia was/is in the thrall of its own version of the cult of the offense. Call it the cult of the asymmetric spook. Putin had enough success with small-scale unconventional / special operations that it not only became a Russian advantage, but the entire Russian strategy for Ukraine. The reason so many people publicly doubted the pre-invasion American warnings was because it would be monumentally stupid to go up with a force like that with what Russia had assembled. But Putin was convinced his special military operation successes in the past would work again, and lo and behold when it didn't the strategy crashed and burned.
By contrast, the American comparison to this metaphor isn't Germany in WW1, but far closer to... America in WW1, where the American center of power was never at meaningful threat, and potential threat-rivals devastated themselves while the American political debate was how much favoritism to show the generally favored side without actually entering the war.
Which goes to the final point, leader competence.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but WW1's Kaiser Wilhelm was a certain kind of an idiot- an aggressive idiot. Aggressive foreign policy got him results he otherwise wouldn't have had he been more passive, but who also created the foundations for the coalition that would encircle him, and the willingness of everyone to not only fight back but to help others keep beating his forces up well after the initial bloody nose. Wilhelm's incompetence wasn't just in choosing a bad war, but in the choices that led to Germany's isolation in Europe leading up to this, and the strategic options available to him as a result of his shaping of the local international environment to a point where allies were mercurial at best.
From this position- where the military facts were against him, and the coalitions surrounding him, and victory hinged on a trump card succeeding without issue- Wilhelm then doubled down on a weak hand.
This matters to your example because, again, the historical analog here isn't the US to Germany, or even the US to Britain, but Russia to the worst aspects of WW1 Germany.
Still, Trump says he'll solve the issue and the war will be over within 24 hours of becoming president. What do you think his plan is?
That people will take him seriously, not literally. And/or pay attention to other things that he's said in the past, such as his conditional willingness to further supply Ukraine if Russia doesn't agree to reasonable terms, various formulations of which Russia has to date rejected as unreasonable.
Which is why I thank you.
(Which was what I meant to write instead of 'think you', so embarrassment on me.)
The most frustrating part of having a even a barely decent understanding of history is having to constantly deal with people claiming that this time it's different and we must upend all norms to deal with a novel evil which is always made up to be unprecedented.
Amusingly, having watched various sides discussing the Ukraine Conflict for so long, this applies to so many perspective and positions on it that I'd have no idea what position on the conflict this is supposed to be without checking someone's past posting history.
Is the 'this time it's different' mean to refer to the people who are aghast at a war which is the third continuation war of a decade? The credulity given to claims of nuclear thresholds at odds with decades of practice and saber-rattling? The multi-year sustainment of imminent collapse narratives? Are the novel threats justifying upending norms supposed to refer to the Russian imperalists, the Ukrainian nazis, the dreaded American/Western influence? And this is without the issues that come from barely decent understandings of history often also routinely carrying about deliberate misunderstandings that make it into pop history.
It almost certainly wasn't intended to be as omnidirectional as it was, but I thank you none the less.
I'd agree with this, but also note that two of the main things that has changed since the 60s and 70s is the nature of how we know of eachother in an information sense, and for Americans in particular a collapse in shared trust in systems.
On the information front, something that's changed for everyone is the rise of social media. For all the worries of disinformation or misinformation or foreign interference, one of the other negatives of it is that it truly does allow people to see and hear what others may think of them- and that it's often both vocal and vitriolic disapproval. In the 60s and 70s, when countries had only a handful of centralized media presenters at a national level of visibility, the centralized news would tend to be... maybe not consensus based, but rarely radicalized, and radical-fringe views would be more limited to local media that simply couldn't be conveyed across a country in real time. People who might have had heated political fights in person were functionally physically separated in the information sphere. With the rise of the internet and social media, people in political segment A can absolutely know the loathing/mockery/opposition/subversion of their fellow citizens in segment B, often aided by the highly public organized acts of meanness that comes with such partisanship. The toxicity or violent might have been worse in the 60's and 70's, but the information flow and prevalence was much 'better' (in the sense of being less immediate and pervasive). In the 70s, if you didn't want to be bothered by news and views from other parts of the country, you could change the channel- now you can't open up most social media platforms without an algorithmic push of some variation of a sneer club / outrage bait of how bad-stupid-evil your outgroup citizens are... or, if you dare to be heterodox and observe another tribe, how bad-stupid-evil your ingroup is.
Combine that with a collapse of trust in shared systems- from religious to governmental to even informational- and even if the individual behaviors are 'better' than in the 60's/70's, you're working from a worse position in terms of social coping mechanisms to deal with the issues that are there.
Trump has been pretty vocal about ending the war. I’d go as far as saying it’s one of his main talking points.
If you ignore most of what he or his campaign says, I suppose. It certainly doesn't make his platform, or his campaign website, or most of his speeches, and when more distant campaign associates raise end-the-war proposals, they often come with caveats like 'and if Russia doesn't agree to what we think is reasonable, big increases in Ukraine aid.'

The term as an acronym came into modern parlance to describe the American experience in Iraq, where repurposed artillery shells and similar munitions were turned were used as makeshift mines along roads rather than to sabotaging utility items. This occured because the Americans love their acronyms and their media and cultural connotations are what set the standard for modern Americanized audiences, most of whom have no clue about IRA boobytrapping slang beyond reverse-applying the Americanized concept backwards.
I believe the technical term is 'lol.'
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