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Dean

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joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


				

User ID: 430

Dean

Flairless

15 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

					

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


					

User ID: 430

I don't have any opinions on cultural superiority, and as best as I can tell, the original comment didn't express any, either. Just that Eastern devs seem to be appealing to Western audiences better than Western devs. Again, I believe examples of Eastern devs using Western culture in their games even better than Western devs do only supports this notion more strongly, similarly to how an away team defeating the home team in a sport that has home field advantage is a stronger signal that the away team is better than if played on a neutral field.

And if the foreign team defeats the home team by adopting home team signature tactics, strategies, compositions, and paradigms, that indicates that the foreign team may be doing home-team tactics better, but it does not indicate that away-team tactics are a disproof of home-team tactics or premise, or that their approach is fundamentally different. The Japanese baseball team may out-play the American team, but the sheer fact that the teams are playing baseball and not shogi is indicting whose cultural paradigm is exerting itself.

This is especially ironic in the context of east-asian countries like Japan or Korea, in which Westernization was a deliberate national policy for generations and distancing themselves from their own cultural tethers to embrace western cultural aspects was a deliberate process, even as the comparison culture (the US in particular) is commonly understood melting pot assimilation of different cultural inputs. China has solidly established culture of mimicricy of outside forms as well. These are not divergent cultures, but in many real respects cultures that consciously try to get closer.

Now, as you point out, there are plenty of Western made games that do Western culture well. I just think it's correct that Eastern devs have done it better, especially when considering within-genre - there's no Western-made game similar to Elden Ring or Devil May Cry that come anywhere close to those games in quality or stature.

Sure there are. What constitutes quality is subjective (most players don't, in fact, enjoy fromsoft difficulty curves), but stature is not, and there are plenty of series that absolutely crush the likes of Elden Ring, let alone DMC. There's a reason that the Elden Ring peak concurrent steam players was a bit over 950,000, and Minecraft was over ten times that- the qualities may not be what you value, but stature doesn't care about what you value, it cares about what other people care about.

And this is just peak players- in terms of players over time for the last year, Elden Ring for most of the year before the DLC was around 50-60k. PUBG was often at or above 500k. Devil May Cry 5 was closer to 5k. That puts it on the same level as Warhammer 40K: Darktide. Change the metric, and we can probably find comparisons. Metacritic scores? Profitability? Impact / appearances in other cultural products?

This is the issue with semantic gerrymandering. 'Soulsborne' isn't a genre, it's a subgenre specifically defined around a single company. There's no shortage of successful fantasy, or dark fantasy, or adventure. Winnowing the basis of comparison to exclude all others isn't making a point about a much wider category (Eastern-devs), it's just structural cherry picking, just as selecting the highest-performing eastern success rather than the slop is selection bias in action.

That sounds pretty dominant to me.

Then your concept of dominance is based on a peculiar non-general understanding of dominance, as is your characterization of culture. There's not much else to deal with, any more than anyone else who selectively defines words to make selection-bias arguments.

Even the “save the world” trope of action movies seems a bit played out because it’s all that’s out there and eventually you no longer care about the world.

Hasn't that been a trope-complaint for, well, decades at this point?

Seems practically cyclic to me. New franchises come, and are often at their most intense / highest fan momentum when the stakes are relatively small. To go back just a few decades- Pokemon when Ash was a rookie trainer trying to advance to the first championship, Bleach's Soul Society arc when it was just rescuing a friend from an unjust execution, Naruto when it was orphan wants to be ninja president and has a team rival, My Hero Academia when super-power-less kid gets into super-school and has to keep up, etc.

A lot of series crest around the time that the stakes start to raise the stakes so high that it's narratively impossible for them to lose.

This was hilarious, in part because I recognize parts of it and partly remember that Chinese clampdown, but also because didn't you once go a great effort post on K-Drama culture? I remember my brief exposure to K-Dramas, and some of the, ahem, interesting male-on-male focus while female protagonist orbited in the plot background.

What dominance? They are producing entertainment products in line with the paradigm of another culture- which is to say, they are emulating others, rather than the other way around. If there's any cultural dominance to be had, it would be of the influence of the customer's culture over their own, rather than the expression of their own.

If you argue a Culture X game's success is proves the superiority of Culture Y because someone from Culture Y made it in clear interest of Culture X, I'm not sure we have enough of an agreement on what culture is to have an interesting discussion. Are we talking cultural ideas, motifs, and themes, the sort of things that fiction invokes to convey common understandings and shared sets of expectations that is what culture even is, or are we deferring to ownership structure as our shortcut to what culture a game is?

If it's the later, I'm not convinced, any more than I am by many of your examples. Bloodborne is a gothic horror and cosmic horror game that is quintessentially European in cultural influence. Devil May Cry is so American-culturally influenced that it's unapologetically cringe about it, ranging from the gun culture flourishing to the main character archetype to the Christian normalism.

These Japanese companies aren't unable to do Asian-culture focus games if they want to, and when they do it's very, very obvious. When Fromsoft wants to do a Soulsborne-style Asian game, they make Sekiro. The Yakuza series is a thing. The entire Dynasty Warriors franchise and umpteen spinoff varients are distinct.

Nor is there a lack of successful culturally western games. Just last year Helldivers took the gaming world by storm, and it was a reboot of a European game parody of Iraq-War Americana. Red Dead Redemption is the same era as Dragon's Dogma, and it was (and still is) a classic American cowboy story. One of the top-selling strategy games of all time, XCOM, is basically American sci-fi with NATO-militaristic liberalism. Baldur's Gate 3, the Witcher, God of War reboot.

Appealing to Western-style games as proof of the superiority of non-western-culture is less proving the point and more like fish not having the word for water.

Adaptation should be understood to be very loose and oversimplified rather than direct, and mixing in some of those other influences, but sure.

The story is the struggle of gods, heroes, and several mythical creatures over the eponymous magic ring that was made from stolen gold, that grants domination over the entire world. The drama and intrigue continue through three generations of narrative protagonists, until the final cataclysm of the twilight of the gods, which ends with the death of all the gods but also the birth of a new world without them and free of their influence.

The majority of the narrative- but not the final act in which reflects generational change- is a result of the actions of the head of the pantheon of the doomed gods in three main parts. In the first part, the head of the pantheon steals the golden ring by force, and with it is able to establish a mighty fortress, but with the seeds of future ruin hinted at from the start. In the second phase, the pantheon head has spawned a dynasty of godlings, and is known as a manipulator of them and is involved in the death of the golden child, who both does and does not die, even as they set forth a plan for a maiden daughter that will have world-ending ramifications for the era of the gods.

In the third phase, the head of the pantheon has gone from an active figure driving the plot to a manipulator from behind the scenes while the rest of the cast fights and kills eachother over the ring. By the end of their plot, the pantheon head goes from fearing the end of the gods to willing it to be so, advancing the destruction of what they have built, utilizing a plot set in motion an age before. The home of the gods and the world tree surrounding will be burned in the fires of death at the direction of the pantheon-head's maiden daughter, who willingly dies in the same flames, which are themselves of the domain/act of a fire god bound to the head-god's will long ago.

The head of the pantheon in both cases is based on Odin, head of a dynastic pantheon of doomed gods, and who is a shapeshifting trickster god with a penchant for cross dreassing and yet also a war-god who was obsessed with death and the future. Odin sacrificed an eye and was speared to the world tree in a sort of ritualistic suicide in pursuit of the knowledge of runes, in an effort to influence the future. Odin's god-magic allowed them to cure the sick, calm storms, turn weapons against the attackers, make women fall in love, and render dangerous troll women harmless. It even allowed them to take the form of another person, which is just a wee-bit important to the plot of Elden Ring.

Re-emphasizing that this is a very loose reusage of tropes and themes, including adapting Odin beyond the play's presentation of Wotan, Elden Ring borrows from Der Ring Des Nibelungen in terms of-

-The titular magical gold ring, which has world-dominating powers

-The role of the magical gold ring, which is for everyone to fight over

-The nature of the Wotan's taking of the ring by force as a sort of 'original sin'

-The role of Wotan as a dynasty-founding manipulator

-The death of the golden-child of Wotan dynasty, who both does and does not die

-The role of Wotan's children in leading the next world

-The transition of Wotan from advancing the world order to working against it

-The role of Wotan in helping sett claimants against each other even after stepping out of the direct story

-The role of Wotan's daughter in invoking the god-killing/world-tree burning flames of a bound fire-god

-The role of Wotan's daughter in choosing to die through this act

Marika, the god-queen of elden ring, is in turn a derivative of Odin in terms of being-

-A ambitious war god who established a dynasty dominant in their realm by right of conquest, rather than as a creator-god

-A trickster god with transformation powers (the item to transform into other things, Mimic Veil, is also known in-setting as Marika's mischief)

-A manipulator god known to lie / deceive / sacrifice others for their own interest, including their own family

-Magical power sets, including identity projection, gender shenanigans, and the ability to make women fall in love (Marika's rival-queen-turned-wife-by-cross-gender-proxy)

-An obsession with death and the future (Marika's actions to seal away destined death to create an artificial immortality, but also preparing the mechanisms to destroy said system via the fire giant plot)

-An interest in learning more on runes as a means to other things (Odin's goal in sacrificing the eye; Marika's only late-reign motivations is to plumb the depths of the golden order, and the metaphysical research of the late golden-order scholars into the metaphysics which run on runes)

-The imagery and execution of an elaborate ritual suicide scheme that involves losing an eye and being pierced in the side with a spear while being pinned to the world-tree (Marika's end-position in the end-game, which is a result of her scheming and duality-nature not only between herself and Radagon, but themselves and the Elden Ring)

-The role of the suicide-ritual as a means to an end of larger ambitions (Odin's sacrifice was to gain the power of runes and knowledge of other worlds; Marika's purpose is part of an extensive scheme to wound and kill the Elden Beast, which is the Elden Ring, which is also her/Radagon (the alchemic theming playing heavier here), and which ends with Marika functionally replacing the Elden Beast on the deific hierarchy in 'her' endings)

-Said larger ambitions being an effort to defy fate / overcome the inevitable end of the world (Odin fails / arguably only succeeds via progeny who survive ragnerok; Marika's plan in 'her' endings involves her functionally displacing the Elden Beast in the divine hierarchy, by becoming synonymous with the elden ring as the mending rune is applied to her and remaining part of the new world even after her dynasty passes)

Are there differences to this? Sure. It's not a direct adaptation, and not trying to be, and oversimplification and all that.

But compared to the fandom's propensity before the recent DLC to try and shove Elden Ring into a pseudo-christian mythos (because clearly the only parallel to an organized religious institition is the Catholic Church), Elden Ring is positively dripping with north germanic vibes and tropes both in and out of the Ring Cycle.

It sits next to Elden Ring, a Japanese-made video game.

Elden Ring is basically a video game adaptation of Der Ring des Nibelungen, a German opera that takes 3 days to conduct and is centered around Norse mythology. Its primary themes are largely centered around European medieval alchemical concepts, it's fantasy aesthetic is western-style dragons, and its dominant architecture and clothing styles are so European that just about the only asian-aesthetic character in the setting is an obviously evil and subversive outsider.

It's like the least-Weeaboo game to point at as an example of Asian cultural dominance. Miyazaki is a Europhile if anything.

Allies of convenience are still allies, and expecting others to pretend otherwise based on one's own unique definitions of what an alliance is / is not is certainly a position one can take, but it's also one that will be continually doomed to disappointment. Particularly if the criticism comes from a position dripping with historical irony- there are reasons Perfidious Albion is and has been an international relations meme for centuries. (Centuries longer than the last British-Japanese war even, which makes that appeal an interesting example of alliance-compatible behavior.)

If common understanding of alliances breaks with your convictions of what an alliance fundamentally should be... swell! Such a standard also means there is no moral injury deserving sympathy over the violation of a standard that never applied. If long-term mutual support on the time frame of centuries is required for there to be an alliance, then countries that have not existed as independent polities in their current form for even 50 years will never be able to be bad allies. Being a bad ally is conditional on being an ally, after all.

But it does undercut the earlier criticism of Ukraine's actions as being those of a bad ally, as the new standards of alliance and allies puts even less onus on the Ukrainians of having committed any sort of immoral action for you to be aghast over. After all, what was targeted was not 'our' infrastructure, but the infrastructure of non-allies by not-allies that was being leveraged against the interests of other not-allies, both in the immediate context and for years/decades prior.

That depends on who you think 'we' are, and who 'our' economy refers to, and what an alliance entails in terms of from others to you, but from you to others.

In the case of Nordstream, for example, it was not European infrastructure in a political sense- it was German-Russian infrastructure project series, built over the objection of European partners, only stalled due to organized Anglo-European lobbying against German interest groups and German government positions which prioritized German economic self-interest over the economic and security concerns of a number of their eastern neighbors. It was an extension of an economic dependence to a power who would- just as predicted by the warning of Germany's allies which were repeatedly disregarded- attempt to blackmail the German economy to the European detriment. And it was one which the Germans- even when aided by the warnings of allies- was unable to defend, but relied on other parties to ignore even if doing so came at the expense of their own interests and to german benefit, even though the Germans were not allies (and were shaping their policy on the basis of the Russian blackmail to Russian benefit vis-a-vis Ukraine).

If one wants to apply a bad-ally model, this would beg the question of who the bad ally up for consideration is: the Ukrainians being a bad ally to the Germans and Europeans, or the Germans being a bad ally to the Europeans and Ukrainians. It's not as if the Germans were ignorant of the history of Russian gas-coercion against European Union members when they were investing in Nord Stream, which would have had the effect of negating German costs, and thus inherent alignment with their European allies if the Russians did so again in the future (as they ended up doing).

That the German economic model at the heart of Europe was dependent on what was functionally a subsidized Russian export scheme to cultivate influence was never a secret, and neither were the consequences if that link of subsidized gas broke.

Ultimately, international relations is anarchy, and anarchy sucks. It's not masochism to endure it, it's that it doesn't suck less if you break off connections with people who don't prioritize you over their own interests even as you do the same to them.

Simultaneously? Probably not, and possibly not at all depending what level of tit-for-tat one wants in the conflict. Not all big wars start with the intent of being big wars, and not all forms of disruption are tried, and while it's not hard to do it's not impossible to mitigate either.

But cables are notoriously vulnerable, and I can remember reading about fears of terrorists targetting undersea cable landing stations to break inter-continental network connections back in the 2000s.

If the story is true, why is U.S. intelligence leaking the details now?

Probably because the Germans earlier this week released a warrant for one of the Ukrainians allegedly involved, and with it opening up the story to be a potential international media event.

The US govt. rational for the WSJ article would be to shape the public discussion following the German warrant announcement, both to head off information drift / theorizing and to cast their version of events in a way to mitigate fallout. I'd fully encourage you to take the story's allocation of personal responsibility with a shaker of salt, but some elements claimed (such as pre-warning the Germans / assisting them afterwards) are the sort of specific claims that are either are decisively rejected if false, or undermine the capacity of someone to reject the broader position. (In other words, the German political establishment cannot simultaneously admit to prior knowledge, and then be super-shocked / react heavily to publicly learn it was the Ukrainians. From a policy shaping perspective, this helps mitigate the risk of a German political backlash / cut-off of aid to Ukraine, as it emphasizes that the German government has known and yet gone through every major aid-escalation all along.)

Now, there is a separate question from this short-answer, which is why the Germans released the warrant now?

Part of this may be that prosuction angle of this is beyond the German government's ability / willingness to stop (as a government cover up of the Nord Stream pipeline would be too politically costly to engage), but not beyond their ability to shape the timing of... and it was released this week, because this was a very convenient Ukrainian good-news week to drop it.

Not to put a fine point on it, but supporting the Ukraine War is generally popular in Germany, and more popular with the Ukrainians are visibly succeeding. If the arrest warrant was going to have to come out eventually anyways, dropping it in the midst of a surge of Ukrainian support minimizes the public/political cost of it, as by the time the contextual pro-Ukraine surge fades, so will most of the interest of the media cycle, and thus the political pressure to act / react.

Which, to go back to your question-

The US intelligence is leading the details now (possibly) because the Germans released the warrant this week (possibly) because support to Ukraine is in a popularity surge earlier this week because Ukraine launched a surprisingly-effective offensive against Russia last week.

Who wants to hear about who blew up the Nord Stream Pipeline in September 2022?

If you haven't heard in the news yet- the official take of the 2022 Nordstream Pipeline explosion is hitting the news, as Germany has issued an arrest warrant for a person of interest, and the Wall Street Journal is fielding one of those totally-not-Government-assisted exposes on what happened (somewhat).

Was it the dastardly Yanks? Perfidious albion? The sinister Russians?

No, it was someone that many including the Russians insisted at the time couldn't be responsible because the culprit was so blindingly obvious it didn't need to be discussed further...

Putin has publicly blamed the U.S. for the attacks. A senior Russian diplomat in Berlin echoed that claim, and said the German investigation findings were “fairy tales worthy of the Brothers Grimm.”

...which is to say, it was the Ukrainians.

To quote-

One of the most audacious acts of sabotage in modern history, the operation worsened an energy crisis in Europe—an assault on critical infrastructure that could be considered an act of war under international law. Theories swirled about who was responsible. Was it the CIA? Could Putin himself have set the plan in motion?

Now, for the first time, the outlines of the real story can be told. The Ukrainian operation cost around $300,000, according to people who participated in it. It involved a small rented yacht with a six-member crew, including trained civilian divers. One was a woman, whose presence helped create the illusion they were a group of friends on a pleasure cruise.

“I always laugh when I read media speculation about some huge operation involving secret services, submarines, drones and satellites,” one officer who was involved in the plot said. “The whole thing was born out of a night of heavy boozing and the iron determination of a handful of people who had the guts to risk their lives for their country.”

If sorry / not sorry hashtag could apply, I suspect this would be one of those moments it would.

Various points of interest from the WSJ article include-

Zelensky was initially on board with it, but (supposedly) tried to turn it off after being warned by the CIA-

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky initially approved the plan, according to one officer who participated and three people familiar with it. But later, when the CIA learned of it and asked the Ukrainian president to pull the plug, he ordered a halt, those people said. Zelensky’s commander in chief, Valeriy Zaluzhniy, who was leading the effort, nonetheless forged ahead.

The CIA, warned by the Dutch, also warned the Germans in advance, indicating all three knew of the plot in advance.

But the next month, the Dutch military intelligence agency MIVD learned of the plot and warned the CIA, according to several people familiar with the Dutch report. U.S. officials then promptly informed Germany, according to U.S. and German officials.

If true, this would both explain why the 'USA did it!' theory never held sway in the upper German government, and also why the government was keen to keep it underwraps (because it would be not only a scandal on the foreign policy side, but a government-competence issue to have been warned but still failed.)

The position of the article is that Zelnsky tried to cancel the project after being found out, but that his military Commander in chief Zaluzhniy went rogue.

The CIA warned Zelensky’s office to stop the operation, U.S. officials said. The Ukrainian president then ordered Zalyzhniy to halt it, according to Ukrainian officers and officials familiar with the conversation as well as Western intelligence officials. But the general ignored the order, and his team modified the original plan, these people said.

...a bit of a skip to when the attack occurred...

Zelensky took Zaluzhniy to task, but the general shrugged off his criticism, according to three people familiar with the exchange. Zaluzhniy told Zelensky that the sabotage team, once dispatched, went incommunicado and couldn’t be called off because any contact with them could compromise the operation.

“He was told it’s like a torpedo—once you fire it at the enemy, you can’t pull it back again, it just keeps going until it goes ‘boom,’ ” a senior officer familiar with the conversation said.

Take that for what you will, and be as skeptical of the claim as you want. Valeriy Zaluzhniy was relieved in very early 2024 as part of the start-of-year Ukrainian reorganization... but possibly as (well-premptive) damage control, and other potential motivations.

Earlier this year, Zelensky ousted Zaluzhniy from his military post, saying a shakeup was needed to reboot the war effort. Zaluzhniy, who has been viewed domestically as a potential political rival, was later appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to the U.K., a position that grants him immunity from prosecution.

So if Germany wanted to pursue this line of prosecution, it'd involve going after an ambassador in a European partner.

The resourcing of the operation was not particularly impressive.

Following the May 2022 pact between the businessmen and the military officers, it was agreed that the former would finance and help execute the project, because the army had no funds and was increasingly relying on foreign financing as it pushed back against the onslaught of its gargantuan neighbor. A sitting general with experience in special operations would oversee the mission, which one participant described as a “public-private partnership.” He would report directly to the head of Ukraine’s armed forces, the four-star Gen. Zaluzhniy.

...a skip of an initially more elaborate plan...

After dismissing that idea due to its cost and complexity, the planners settled on using a small sailing boat and a team of six—a mix of seasoned active duty soldiers and civilians with maritime expertise—to blow up the 700-mile-long pipelines that sat more than 260 feet below the sea’s surface.

Note this is actually one of the reasons the Russians had an interest in downplaying / denying a Ukrainian attribution- the Russians have invested great sums in having state capacity to target underwater infrastructure as part of their deterrence / great power model vis-a-vis NATO. A minor group of oligarchs being able to do the same not only could give ideas to others, but would undercut the Russian exclusiveness of the threat.

Obviously this has its own implications for German foreign policy...

The findings could upend relations between Kyiv and Berlin, which has provided much of the financing and military equipment to Ukraine, second only to the U.S. Some German political leaders may have been willing to overlook evidence pointing to Ukraine for fear of undermining domestic support for the war effort. But German police are politically independent and their investigation took on a life of its own as they pursued one lead after another.

“An attack of this scale is a sufficient reason to trigger the collective defense clause of NATO, but our critical infrastructure was blown up by a country that we support with massive weapons shipments and billions in cash,” said a senior German official familiar with the probe.

...but said foreign policy runs into the reality that Germany's NordStream policies were, shall we say, not supported by the neighbors whose views on its destruction differ from those who would want Germany to take a hard line.

In June, German officials issued a confidential arrest warrant for a Ukrainian citizen who the Germans believe was one of the crew members. According to people familiar with the investigation, a van driving the Ukrainian sabotage team from Poland into Germany in 2022 was snapped by a German speed camera, and the man, a diving instructor living with his family near Warsaw, was in the photo.

Authorities in Poland didn’t act on the warrant. The instructor is believed to have since returned to Ukraine. Poland’s failure to arrest him is a major blow to the German probe, because he and other suspects have now been tipped off and will avoid travelling outside Ukraine, people familiar with the investigation said. Ukraine doesn’t extradite its own citizens.

As for why the Ukrainians did it? Despite claims to the contrary years ago that only the US had an incentive, well-

In May of 2022, a handful of senior Ukrainian military officers and businessmen had gathered to toast their country’s remarkable success in halting the Russian invasion. Buoyed by alcohol and patriotic fervor, somebody suggested a radical next step: destroying Nord Stream.

After all, the twin natural-gas pipelines that carried Russian gas to Europe were providing billions to the Kremlin war machine. What better way to make Vladimir Putin pay for his aggression?

...

In a subsequent broadcast interview, he said that the sabotage had two positive effects for Ukraine: It helped loosen Russia’s grip on the European countries supporting Kyiv, and it left Moscow with only one main avenue for channeling gas to Europe, pipelines traversing Ukraine. Despite the war, Ukraine collects lucrative transit fees for Russian oil and gas estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

...

In the wake of the attack, which took out three of the four conduits forming the pipelines, energy prices surged. Germany and other nations scrambled to nationalize energy companies that handled Russian gas but collapsed after the pipelines were destroyed. Even today Germany is paying around $1 million a day alone to lease floating terminals for liquefied natural gas or LNG, which only partly replaced the Russian gas flows channeled by Nord Stream.

So there are three general incentives characterized, though not with emphasis, in the article.

1- To hurt Russia

2- To reduce the economic leverage Russia had over Germany and other Russian-gas-dependent countries (which was a major factor in 2022 in blocking aid, i.e. the German helmet aid package)

3- (Unstated) Economic incentives to force Russia to continue paying gas transit fees to Ukraine (as opposed to cutting off the pipeline)

Inflicting costs on Germany is framed as a consequence, not a goal in and of itself- though I do fully expect this to be the angle the anti-Ukraine partisans to appeal to going forward.

Though maybe not the Russian state-backed angle. One of the implicit reasons Russia had to push against the Ukraine-Nord Stream theory in the past was that it undercut the Russian positions on both underseas deterrence (casting it as a difficult state-only capacity that gave it deterrence leverage and could be used as evidence to blame the US when the pipeline was destroyed), and because it would reveal the fragility of the Russian energy-connection arguments that a lot of the pro-Russian arguments relied on.

This is because if a country with marginal projection capabilities like Ukraine could blow up a pipeline when their security interests were threatened, so could any other Baltic country if Russia attempted to leverage the energy blackmail like it was attempting over Ukraine. The energy leverage over German policy making can't be rebuilt once the argument of 'good relations with Russia could lead to reliable cheap energy' was blown up, because even if an angry German government wanted to retaliate and make energy alignment with Russia a priority again, it could, again, just be blown up. German-Russian energy ties transitioned from being a bilateral issue that could isolate other countries, to being hostage to the Russian ties to everyone who could sever them, which is frankly nearly anyone.

This not only undercut one of Russia's early/pre-war goals (to increase German energy dependence on Russia), but explains why the German government has been largely sitting on the issue over the last two years. Not only was the pipeline not as popular in-country or in the near-abroad as it was with the government and business circles, but the foundations for the energy relationship have been fundamentally blown up on multiple angles. The connections aren't reliable even if the Russians wanted it to be, and the Russians demonstrated they were willing to be unreliable suppliers for political purposes, and the limits of the German state to protect it were revealed even when pre-warned by NATO and European allies, and the necessary neighbor support to go after the issue after the fact was opposed by other NATO/European allies. While the German government may not like that, it's the reality of a strategic context they have to act within.

None of this was advantageous from a Russian perspective, and while the Russians may adapt to the change... well, they've been resisting the Ukrainian accusation for the last two years already, and minimizing the threat Ukraine can pose to them abroad remains in their negotiating interest for what they're trying to frame for peace talks in the future.

I suspect this issue will be used by angry partisans, particularly from those far from government, but I'll be surprised if the German nation significantly shifts. Not only has this been hinted at with increasing directness for awhile, and I've not seen evidence that the German public is particularly moved, but the government's strategic interests aren't really changed from when it was last informed about it 2 years ago.

This isn't new news, but this is a new directness of what was once the primary contemporary anti-American conspiracy theory. While it will be interesting to see who pivots with as much vigor, this has a lot of the characteristics of stories that- even when publicized- quickly fade in general disinterest.

But I found it interesting enough to elevate here. Cheers.

If not, what is different?

The nature of the relationship with the proxies, the nature of the threat the proxies pose to the opponent, the nature of the ways to provide both off-ramps to the target to stop the proxy war, and the relative difference in escalation risk of attacking proxies in the backer's countries as a contrast to the status quo.

(Or- in other words- Russia is not already in a conventional military conflict with NATO, and both does not face existential risk from the proxy and can end the proxy war by a return to conduct that respects Russia's existence. Iran's coalition instigated the framing conflict, is already in the attempted Intifada, is already executing a sustained bombardment campaign, is already disrupting maritime shipping- Iran can't really leverage threats it is already executing as deterence against an Israeli escalation.)

In case you were reading a moral judgement, don't. This was a utility-viewpoint assessment.

If you wanted to say that it's all different because Ukraine is a real country blessed by the US while Hezbollah is a terrorist militia and therefore doesn't get agency, then it seems like you would just be taking roundabout steps to Russell-conjugate "proxy war" so that the bad-sounding word does not apply when your side does it.

If you missed the argument, I suppose, but even that wouldn't mean that the distinction between being a country and not being a country isn't rightfully a dominant distinction, or even the only distinction that needs to be defended.

The international system revolves around the premise of state sovereignty. States are owed / entitled / accorded certain privileges and presumptions that non-state actors, hence why Russia spent it's pre-war justification narrative trying to discredit that there was a Ukrainian nation to have an independent state. While Iran and its axis of resistance have also rejected the right of an Israeli state to defend itself, Israel is indeed a state, and states do have a right to defend themselves against other states who perpetrate attacks against them.

Iran's mistake in disregarding the plausible deniability / gap between proxy and state backer is that this gap is what is required to try and exploit an advantage of unilateral aggression between states, even as Iran set up a weak paradigm that decreased it's deterrence against being called out. Israel pre-attack was already in the midst of an Iranian-backed attempted Intifada, major artillery campaign, maritime disruption campaign, and global anti-jewish terrorism efforts... and these all were instigated / arranged while competition with Iran was at a much, much lower level. Iran doesn't get deterrence value out of threats it is already executing- it's the threat of retaliation that drives deterence, and pre-emptively executing it just leads to targets accepting it as a sunk cost and retaliating.

The Russian collapse would be an argument against an expectation of any attack from that axis. If there were a force buildup, the Ukrainians wouldn't have been running amuck virtually unopposed. Additionally, there was never any commercial imagery indication of a russian buildup in Kursk, even though such mobilizations were noted at the Kharkiv buildup a relatively short ways away.

Honestly it's becoming a sort of Iranian strategic devolution at this point.

Most of the point of a proxy war is that the proxy is distant enough from the state so as to minimize the costs of engaging in a conflict. 'Plausible deniability' works as a mutual fiction, as it lets the person being attacked focus on fighting the proxy instead of you, but it also lets you not get exposed if the proxy starts to lose. Just like offensive-alliances are a strategically untenable idea since it drags parties into other people's wars they don't want to contribute to, a proxy relationship is not a defense treaty.

Treating an attack on a proxy as the same as an attack on one's self is losing the plot, and actively bringing the proxy into your political center is blurring the identification lines that make the proxy, well, a proxy. If the Iranian government wanted to launch a multi-day attack on Israel by Iranian forces, it could do so without the proxy. If Iran feels obliged to because Israel attacked the proxy, then it's no longer a proxy, but a vassal-ally to whom state-deterrence applies. But if you're applying state-deterrence theory in protection of a proxy, that in turn applies state-deterrence on what the proxy does... which is the whole historical mess of empires getting dragged into conflicts their vassal-allies drag them into.

This is an understandable mess given how the Iranian theocracy has cultivated the IRGC into a deep-state, and the IRGC has very personal relationships with the axis of resistance members, but it's still a mess of bad strategy. Iran has wanted and gotten used to the benefits of plausible-deniable proxy warfare over the last decades, but stopped putting in the work- or the mental discipline- to keep the distance between itself and its proxies enough for the distinction to be relevant.

There are ways to manage a proxy relationship so that they are active but the backer remains safe. You could look at how the Ukraine coalition has managed to support Ukraine, but you could also look at how Pakistan approached the Pashtun-Taliban against the US, or the Chinese in the Korean war, and so on. There are ways... but Iran's breaking some basic principles, and we're seeing the results.

[Last week JKF asked in the Transnational Thursday thread if the salient was defensible. That's not the quite the same question, but response I wrote had enough overlap to be relevant.

Per JKF-

I like a good blitzkreig as much as the next guy, but is this, like... actually a defensible salient? It doesn't really look like it, and throwing a bunch of guys into a new meatgrinder to attract some media attention seems not only morally reprehensible, but also (since I'm sure we're long past the point where that matters) pretty bad strategy for a country currently engaged in a war of attrition against an opponent with many more resources to attrit?

To which my response was-

Kinda / sorta / it doesn't need to be to serve the purpose of overall defense. The issue isn't the specific-holdability of this specific terrain, but rather what the Russians would need to re-secure it, particularly since while they have 'more resources', they don't necessarily have more of the right kind of resources to counter a mobile defense without compromising the offense in other sectors.

In military doctrines, there are generally two main types of defense: positional defense, and mobile defense.

A positional defense is what you generally think of in the Ukraine War over the last 2.5 years- trench lines, artillery duels, relatively static air defense needs and placements. This has its advantages for the defender in increasing cost-ratio, but disadvantages in that the opponent gets to choose when and where exactly to the attack. Similarly, it has its disadvantages for the attacker, but it also has it's advantages in some respects. Because it's mutual trenchworks, counter-attacks face the same general disadvantage, even as the general attack can establish overlapping mitigation measures for things like counter-drone / anti-air / artillery / etc, which can let the participant move forces in 'relatively' safe conditions. Positional defenses are costly, but generally more one way in favor of the larger party.

This is what Russia has reorganized its military to fight over the last two years. Tanks are used to support attacks on specific positions, mass concentrations of artillery forces and depots to support suppressive fires on static positions, etc.

A mobile defense, on the other hand, is a far more aggressive form of counter-force defense which terrain is given up for time / opportunities to maneuver and strike where most advantageous, with the goal of targetting enemy forces so that they are unable to advance / must retreat and reconsolidate, preserving the defender's control of key territory further behind and having out-sized effects on forces. It is harder to pull off in both terms of contexts and skill level, but it also has the potential to be even more efficient in terms of cost-to-the-defender, as the defender can be fighting over ground that the other side doesn't already have prepared with the sort of over-lapping systems of artillery / AA / counter-drone EW that could mitigate the force effectiveness, as only the stuff that you can carry with you can move with you. The defender can thus be more proactive in choosing when and where to counter-attack, avoid fights over specific terrain that is unfavorable, and because the attacker has to press the advance- and thus leave the advantages of positional defenses- to pursue.

The issue with mobile defenses is that you need to give up terrain for time and space for when to counter-attack the enemy force. This could lead to retreating until the war is lost, or you have to go into positional defenses you can't abandon. It also requires the political capital for a leader to be willing to tell his nation 'no, we're not going to fight over all the terrain.'

But if- hypothetically- you could get a lot of the enemy's terrain to maneuver through, which you wouldn't pay a significant political cost to give up...

This is where we start hitting the defensive context of this offensive. It's not that the surprisingly rapid advance of Ukrainian forces means a new static front line to be defended in Russia. It's that the fact that Ukrainian forces were able to maneuver so quickly forward, also means they will be able to maneuver backwards, and laterally, and thus have the capacity for a mobile defense. And because this is so far from the Russian-Ukrainian front lines, the Russians have to leave their static position setups and try to maneuver- and in doing so, open themselves up for attacks that wouldn't be possible against forces under the defensive-position envelopes.

We've already seen some of this happen. There was reportedly a HIMARs attack in Kursk that destroyed a column of Russian forces in transit. This would simply not have been possible in a normal static defense, because (a) the units wouldn't have been consolidated, (b) would have likely been in defensive positions, and (c) the area would have been under various AA/missile-defense envelopes. Similarly, there were reports of Russian platoons surrendering after being flanked and enveloped. The point isn't that the Russians are in a catastrophic defeat- the point is that the same sort of expenditure of Ukrainian resources wouldn't have achieved these sort of results if just pushed into the positional defenses.

What this means for the Russians is that they need to bring in maneuver forces of sufficient capacity / protective capabilities to push back the Ukrainians, and that this requirement increases with time. The more the Ukrainians are able to advance, the more terrain they have with which to maneuver and trade away- and the more they have, the more Russian resources are required to contain the pocket.

The issue for the Russians is that they don't have the extra army to spare. If it did, we wouldn't be discussing the Ukrainians advancing over a relatively under-defended Russian border, but the Russians advancing the other way across the relatively under-defended Ukrainian border. Unlike the Ukrainians, who built up the resources for this offensive rather than put it into the front lines, the Russians have been prioritizing beefing up the front lines over additional fronts- as seen with the recent Kharkiv offensive, which could be the analog here, but which was apparently under-resourced as a light-infantry push without significant technical/mechanized support.

Which will likely mean that Russia will need to take forces from the front lines. This likely means the reserves, not literal front line troops, but front line offensives won't be conducted with the same level if there's no reserve force to sustain the losses / exploit a success.

And in the process, those reserves are being exposed to much greater risk. This is why that HIMARs-convoy destruction is notable- the Russian maneuver warfare capability has sharply degraded over the last few years as the Russians have reverted from a post-Soviet era to a Soviet-era army, and maneuver warfare is one of the contexts where technological differentials matters more and more. The Russians are able to mitigate some of the risks of modern western capabilities when they have nested EW/AA capabilities, but when you take Russian forces out of it, you're getting back to the technology differentials of the Desert Shield era.

Which is how this serves as a strategic-level defense even if no territory or town is fought over street-by-street. Even if this offensive 'only' takes a month for the Russians to roll back to the border, that's a month of disruption to the Russian offensives elsewhere, at higher system vulnerability than in the positional defense paradigm. The Ukrainians could blunder this, of course... but even if the Russians tried to follow them right across the border, that would be a relative Ukrainian win, as there was a reason that the Russians weren't attacking that border anyway, and forces the Russians commit there aren't fueling the advances elsewhere.

And this is without the other anciliary costs and benefits. Aside from the propaganda value, including the value of Ukraine having a high-profile success near the end of the American election cycle (good news encourages continued support, when the Russian strategy has been hoping for a negative narrative to encourage American withdrawal of support), there's also the matter of western aid policy. The Ukrainians have been faced with real significant limitations on how some weapons can be used from Ukraine into Russia, such as what would allow them to go after Russian airfields. (Or- more recently- how the Kharkiv offensive was allowed to build up strength because the Ukrainians weren't allowed to fire into the clearly massing forces.) The Ukrainian offensive- in which various systems are now being used from within Russia in Russia- has had such a muted response, that this will very likely lead to relaxed restrictions in the future. If it does so, then Ukrainian gains in better utilizing western aid will further increase their overall defensive effectiveness against the Russians, and mitigate some of Russia's main enduring advantages (such as military airfields for the glide bomb campaign.)

Put all together, and I think your question of 'is this a defensible salient' is a qualified yes on an operational level (maneuver defense is a form of defense), but a much stronger yes on a campaign level (undercutting offenses in other regions by requiring commitment of Russian reserves), and especially at a strategic level (shaping western weapons restriction policy, information/vibes impact of the US election season).

But it's not necessarily the right question. It's not whether any square kilometer of the salient will be held- it's that by putting the Russians in the position of having to take it back in the first place, multiple defensive interests have likely been advanced.

Hope that helps.

/

Returning back to your specific questions-

But it's not clear to me what the strategic objective of this operation is. Is it essentially a feint to draw Russian troops away from defending conquered Ukrainian territory?

No.

In military terms, a feint is a diversionary attack to draw enemy attention away from the decisive operation. There has to be an intended 'real effort' the feint is supposed to enable via the distraction. A feint with unexpected can translate into a genuine attack, and a feint needs enough support behind it to be credible to work as a diversion in the first place, but a feint is always in support of some other primary operation.

Instead, the primary purpose of this attack is almost certainly not to draw Russian troops away from defending conquered Ukrainian territory, but to draw Russian troops away from attacking not-conquered Ukrainian territory.

The nature of the positional struggle further south is that the Russians and Ukrainians there both have significant defensive setups with overlapping systems. The same factor that has prevented Russian breakthroughs despite months of incremental advances at high attritional cost also prevents Ukrainian breakthroughs. However, even on the offensive Russia needs reserves on those fronts to sustain the advance (as if there weren't the reserves to replace attrition, the front forces wouldn't be launching the sort of attritional attacks they have), and were Ukraine to attack there, the Russian reserves powering the advance would also be there, in more favorable defensive systems, to counter the counter-attack.

Given that a significant part of the Russian overlapping systems are systems like electronic warfare equipment to mitigate western-equipment advantages in things like precision targetting or drones, large artillery formations, and other defenses, the same X Ukrainian forces committed to the Kursk attack would almost certainly not have had the impact were they committed further south.

What the Ukrainian offensive has done is force the Russians into a very awkward position of taking forces that would otherwise be supporting the attacks further south, and bringing them around to Kursk. The Russians could conceivably try to rely on the normal conscript cycle manpower for this- except the political costs to Putin of such is why the Russians switch from the first mobilization conscription wave to the current volunteer model- and taking the forces from eastern Ukraine, reduces the ability to advance in Eastern Ukraine.

Is the plan to claim Russian land to negotiate land swaps with when the time comes for peace talks?

No.

In terms of 'claim,' the Ukrainians aren't making the claims the land is theirs. That doesn't mean return wouldn't be a part of negotiations, or relevant, but this isn't a 'you claimed our province so we'll claim yours.' (Probably not what you meant precisely, but it's important to be clear.)

Also no, in that the land doesn't need to be held until the point of peace talks to serve the purpose of taking it.

Per the points above about the different types of defense and the difficulties of a counter-attack on different parts of the border, the land itself is not the point. The land is a context, a battlespace with different advantages/disadvantages, but more importantly one with implications for Russian force allocation and utilization further south. Even if Russia takes back all of the Kursk salient next week, that's a week that those Russian forces aren't spending contributing to attacks further south.

I don't see how it directly gets the Ukrainians any closer to their goal of evicting the Russians from Ukraine.

Several ways, though that's not to say any one of these is 'the plan' or the decisive reason the Ukrainians did it.

Among other things, the offensive has or will likely-

-Be a more efficient attritional tradeoff of Ukrainian forces versus Russians than would be used further south, at a relatively low risk

The current Kursk attack is really not that big of a force danger to the Ukrainian forces involved, because the primary tool Russia relies on to drive up the casualties- artillery- isn't present, and many of the compounding factors- prepared defenses, covered minefields, EW to mitigate drones, etc.,- also are largely absent. Without a significant maneuver capability to isolate and cut off the Ukrainian forces, and the Russian mechanized forces are both committed to the front and have downgraded over the years to reduce that- the risk to the thousands of Ukrainians involved in this is... relatively low. Even if/when the Russians bring the forces to bear to push them out, it will generally be within the Urkainian ability to do a fighting withdrawal, picking when and where to fight until they go back behind the border (at which point if the Russians were going to invade that way, they would have before this).

Instead, the Urkainians have a significant opportunity for more selective engagements in more favorable conditions due to the Russian requirements to move forces quicker, and thus without the sort of defenses that exist on the static front. We've seen this with ambushes, the flanking / surrounding / surrender issues, the columns attacked by US precision weapons, and so on. Russia's mechanized capabilities are already heavily degraded, and their motorized forces are very vulnerable in transit when the western missiles / drones aren't being as countered by EW / drones, and the Russians are having to make that transit.

Even outside of the 'does it relieve pressure further south' dynamic, this is likely to be a more favorable attrition opportunity, and the long-term Ukrainian strategy continues to be a fundamentally attrition-based strategy in which Ukraine attrits Russian offensive capabilities (such as the forces that will be moved to conduct the counter-attack) while Western production (and thus potential aid) spools up. (It feels trite to still be saying this, but 2024 is / has been since last year expected to be the year of maximum relative Russian advantage vis-a-vis Ukraine+ backers on a production footing, as the Western investments in increasing artillery production and such are expected to start resulting in expanded production next year and grow at faster rates than Russia. Hence why Russia's strategy this year was higher manpower attrition rates than in 2023, as this year is the one with which they wanted to set conditions for potential talks with a potential new US administration / after the European elections of 24).

-Force Putin into politically difficult positions that reveal the limits of his manpower strategy to win the war by volunteer-attrition

The Ukrainian offensive was only possible because Russia has functionally bled every other front and posting in Russia white to the degree that it thinks it can get away with. While Russia has demonstrated it's willingness to keep burning through it's manpower in high-attrition rates- and we've seen the increase in recruitment offers as a monetary example of the escalating costs in both casualty and monetary terms- as long as the conflict was constrained to the established front in, say, Donetsk it was a suitable enough solution. What the Kursk incursion has demonstrated is the limits of this manpower sourcing, as the ability to fill the Russian manpower needs on a relatively narrow front doesn't mean that the only manpower Russia needs is on that narrow front. If Putin needs to garrison the frontier, he's going to need considerably more manpower- and probably the use of the conscription cycles.

This matters, because Russia lost approximately 800,000 people in 2022 not from combat, but as mass emmigration events after starting the war and the mobilization. Putin has very repeatedly not repeated the experience, but transitioned to a money-for-recruitment model after the prison-pipeline largely died out. Putin is very sensitive to the Russian public being directly involved in the war, which is what the use of Conscripts also entails, and has repeatedly demonstrated a preference to decrease military effectiveness over compelling that sort of service. Forcing Putin into that position has multiple benefits, especially since the Russian limiting factor is now the reactivation of equipment, not personnel, so even a mobilization wave wouldn't produce a practically equipped army for anything but high-political-cost garrison duty.

-Undercut Russia's information strategy of the year of presenting the entire year of one of one-sided Russian advances

Russian force utilization over the last year has been focused far more on consistency of marginal gains over military efficacy over a multi-year campaign, with an expenditure rate that almost certainly couldn't be repeated next year bar significantly more inflows from outside parties at considerable cost. The most likely (competent) reason for this is trying to frame the information environment for potential talks next year in the framework of 'Ukraine should make all the concessions, as we made all the advances last year and they were unable to do anything.'

Instead, the counter-attack (this late in the year even) illustrated Russia's continued weaknesses, demonstrated that Ukraine still had the political and material ability to launch meaningful attacks, and that Russia's position of strength in one front isn't a position to be conflated everywhere/elsewhere. That matters not only in terms of negotiations, including resisting diplomatic pressure form those who want the Ukrainians to make further territorial concessions in the name of peace, which is the Russian theory of victory on how to compel Ukraine to capitulate when the Russian military has demonstrated it really can't do so miltiarily.

Note that this also undercuts some of the anti-Ukrainian narratives in the global information environment. One of the common narratives since the start of the war has been that Ukraine is on the cusp of a failure cascade for lack of forces / equipment to resist, and that every operation is throwing what they have away and etc. etc. etc. Successful counter-offensives, even 'small' ones, counter this by demonstrating that the force generation surpluses needed to take to the offense and not just defend still exists. This will likely be more relevant in the future when rebutting criticisms of the 2023 counter-offensive as inherently doomed to fail, as the current Kursk offensive is demonstrating that offensives are potentially successful, and that the factors that determined whether Ukraine can succeed are factors that can be accounted for (say- having the right aid policies to counter russian capabilities), rather than being beyond control or recreation (dismissing the 2022 offensives as flukes).

-Bolster western supporters by generating a high-publicity win

This goes into aid politics. Just as the Russian propaganda incentive has been to present the conflict as a futile struggle with an inevitable conclusion that Western countries shouldn't bother sending Ukraine aid for because of the futility, Ukraine has an incentive to show partners that it's weapons enable good results. People like backing underdogs, but also winners, and especially underdogs that can produce wins, which improves the (foreign donor) political support for continuing to donate aid. Sometimes launching offenses isn't even a 'we do it for the fans' priority, but 'the patreons demand it of us' dynamic, which was seen in 2023 when the Ukrainian offensive that year had a degree of western pressure to conduct to justify the sizable aid buildup.

Even though the Ukrainian offensive is not presenting itself as relying on western kit (to avoid donor fears of escalation), it is being enabled by western kit elsewhere, and in turn facilitating future aid delivery in a way that committing the forces further south wouldn't.

(If you really wanted to expand this argument, you could claim that generating a win is intended to help the Democrats in the US election, as the Ukraine support is a broadly more-popular-than-not thing for the Democratic coalition, and that a high profile success may indirectly boost the Democrat's prospects. However, there's no particular reason to believe this was the motive, as opposed to a welcome anciliary benefit, as the motives for the Ukrainians to act remain.)

-Improve western weapon efficiency by breaking down sensitivity restrictions by demonstration

One of the dynamics of the western aid to Ukraine has been the amount of usage-restrictions imposed in the name of avoiding 'escalation' with Russia. I use the term in quotations because there is now a multi-year pattern as Russian explicit/implicit threats if a category of aid were to reach Ukraine, the aid reaching Ukraine, and the threats not materializing- rather the threats served primarily to delay the arrival and limit the utility of capabilities provided. This has had multiple operational impacts, ranging from undercutting the 2023 counteroffensive (Russians were able to use helicopter aviation much more aggressively against the forces trying to breach minefields because ATACMs and similar missiles that could disrupt airfields were being witheld because they could range into Russia; the ATACMs were unlocked later in the offensive), or even this year's 2024 Russian Kharkiv offensive, in which Russian buildup was observed and well within potential fire range, but western aid restrictions prohibited attacks onto Russian territory where the buildup was occuring (the restriction was relaxed for the adjacent areas).

What the current offensive is doing is further breaking down the Western weapon usage taboos by demonstrating that the sky doesn't fall if you attack into Russia. It's notable that the Ukrainians are mostly doing this with Soviet-era kit for this reason, as it limits the political perception risk, but likewise the Russian response is, well, something the Ukrainians can plausibly point to to justify being able to strike military targets in Russia.

This matters because the current restriction that would mean quite a bit is the ability to more aggressively target Russian airfields not just in Crimea, but Russia proper, where the Russians have been launching the glide-bomb campaign. The Russian glide bombs are one of the main Russian advantage points in the current context, arguably more so than artillery due to the heavy glide bombs ability to destroy fortifications, and being able to use western weapons against such airfields would matter.

Indeed I did. Thank you, and corrected.

Kinda / sorta / it doesn't need to be to serve the purpose of overall defense. The issue isn't the specific-holdability of this specific terrain, but rather what the Russians would need to re-secure it, particularly since while they have 'more resources', they don't necessarily have more of the right kind of resources to counter a mobile defense without compromising the offense in other sectors.

In military doctrines, there are generally two main types of defense: positional defense, and mobile defense.

A positional defense is what you generally think of in the Ukraine War over the last 2.5 years- trench lines, artillery duels, relatively static air defense needs and placements. This has its advantages for the defender in increasing cost-ratio, but disadvantages in that the opponent gets to choose when and where exactly to the attack. Similarly, it has its disadvantages for the attacker, but it also has it's advantages in some respects. Because it's mutual trenchworks, counter-attacks face the same general disadvantage, even as the general attack can establish overlapping mitigation measures for things like counter-drone / anti-air / artillery / etc, which can let the participant move forces in 'relatively' safe conditions. Positional defenses are costly, but generally more one way in favor of the larger party.

This is what Russia has reorganized its military to fight over the last two years. Tanks are used to support attacks on specific positions, mass concentrations of artillery forces and depots to support suppressive fires on static positions, etc.

A mobile defense, on the other hand, is a far more aggressive form of counter-force defense which terrain is given up for time / opportunities to maneuver and strike where most advantageous, with the goal of targetting enemy forces so that they are unable to advance / must retreat and reconsolidate, preserving the defender's control of key territory further behind and having out-sized effects on forces. It is harder to pull off in both terms of contexts and skill level, but it also has the potential to be even more efficient in terms of cost-to-the-defender, as the defender can be fighting over ground that the other side doesn't already have prepared with the sort of over-lapping systems of artillery / AA / counter-drone EW that could mitigate the force effectiveness, as only the stuff that you can carry with you can move with you. The defender can thus be more proactive in choosing when and where to counter-attack, avoid fights over specific terrain that is unfavorable, and because the attacker has to press the advance- and thus leave the advantages of positional defenses- to pursue.

The issue with mobile defenses is that you need to give up terrain for time and space for when to counter-attack the enemy force. This could lead to retreating until the war is lost, or you have to go into positional defenses you can't abandon. It also requires the political capital for a leader to be willing to tell his nation 'no, we're not going to fight over all the terrain.'

But if- hypothetically- you could get a lot of the enemy's terrain to maneuver through, which you wouldn't pay a significant political cost to give up...

This is where we start hitting the defensive context of this offensive. It's not that the surprisingly rapid advance of Ukrainian forces means a new static front line to be defended in Russia. It's that the fact that Ukrainian forces were able to maneuver so quickly forward, also means they will be able to maneuver backwards, and laterally, and thus have the capacity for a mobile defense. And because this is so far from the Russian-Ukrainian front lines, the Russians have to leave their static position setups and try to maneuver- and in doing so, open themselves up for attacks that wouldn't be possible against forces under the defensive-position envelopes.

We've already seen some of this happen. There was reportedly a HIMARs attack in Kursk that destroyed a column of Russian forces in transit. This would simply not have been possible in a normal static defense, because (a) the units wouldn't have been consolidated, (b) would have likely been in defensive positions, and (c) the area would have been under various AA/missile-defense envelopes. Similarly, there were reports of Russian platoons surrendering after being flanked and enveloped. The point isn't that the Russians are in a catastrophic defeat- the point is that the same sort of expenditure of Ukrainian resources wouldn't have achieved these sort of results if just pushed into the positional defenses.

What this means for the Russians is that they need to bring in maneuver forces of sufficient capacity / protective capabilities to push back the Ukrainians, and that this requirement increases with time. The more the Ukrainians are able to advance, the more terrain they have with which to maneuver and trade away- and the more they have, the more Russian resources are required to contain the pocket.

The issue for the Russians is that they don't have the extra army to spare. If it did, we wouldn't be discussing the Ukrainians advancing over a relatively under-defended Russian border, but the Russians advancing the other way across the relatively under-defended Ukrainian border. Unlike the Ukrainians, who built up the resources for this offensive rather than put it into the front lines, the Russians have been prioritizing beefing up the front lines over additional fronts- as seen with the recent Kharkiv offensive, which could be the analog here, but which was apparently under-resourced as a light-infantry push without significant technical/mechanized support.

Which will likely mean that Russia will need to take forces from the front lines. This likely means the reserves, not literal front line troops, but front line offensives won't be conducted with the same level if there's no reserve force to sustain the losses / exploit a success.

And in the process, those reserves are being exposed to much greater risk. This is why that HIMARs-convoy destruction is notable- the Russian maneuver warfare capability has sharply degraded over the last few years as the Russians have reverted from a post-Soviet era to a Soviet-era army, and maneuver warfare is one of the contexts where technological differentials matters more and more. The Russians are able to mitigate some of the risks of modern western capabilities when they have nested EW/AA capabilities, but when you take Russian forces out of it, you're getting back to the technology differentials of the Desert Shield era.

Which is how this serves as a strategic-level defense even if no territory or town is fought over street-by-street. Even if this offensive 'only' takes a month for the Russians to roll back to the border, that's a month of disruption to the Russian offensives elsewhere, at higher system vulnerability than in the positional defense paradigm. The Ukrainians could blunder this, of course... but even if the Russians tried to follow them right across the border, that would be a relative Ukrainian win, as there was a reason that the Russians weren't attacking that border anyway, and forces the Russians commit there aren't fueling the advances elsewhere.

And this is without the other anciliary costs and benefits. Aside from the propaganda value, including the value of Ukraine having a high-profile success near the end of the American election cycle (good news encourages continued support, when the Russian strategy has been hoping for a negative narrative to encourage American withdrawal of support), there's also the matter of western aid policy. The Ukrainians have been faced with real significant limitations on how some weapons can be used from Ukraine into Russia, such as what would allow them to go after Russian airfields. (Or- more recently- how the Kharkiv offensive was allowed to build up strength because the Ukrainians weren't allowed to fire into the clearly massing forces.) The Ukrainian offensive- in which various systems are now being used from within Russia in Russia- has had such a muted response, that this will very likely lead to relaxed restrictions in the future. If it does so, then Ukrainian gains in better utilizing western aid will further increase their overall defensive effectiveness against the Russians, and mitigate some of Russia's main enduring advantages (such as military airfields for the glide bomb campaign.)

Put all together, and I think your question of 'is this a defensible salient' is a qualified yes on an operational level (maneuver defense is a form of defense), but a much stronger yes on a campaign level (undercutting offenses in other regions by requiring commitment of Russian reserves), and especially at a strategic level (shaping western weapons restriction policy, information/vibes impact of the US election season).

But it's not necessarily the right question. It's not whether any square kilometer of the salient will be held- it's that by putting the Russians in the position of having to take it back in the first place, multiple defensive interests have likely been advanced.

Hope that helps.

Not particularly. From a Russian legal perspective, the freer hand has already been secured via the annexation of the un-held territory. Putin doesn't need more political capital to change a law or anything, that's already been done. From a domestic politics perspective, the defensive casting probably doesn't sell, at least not in a way that doesn't invite semantic quibbling about how much Russians believe the propaganda versus parrot it.

This was one of the elements that distinguished Tracingwoodgrain's actions from the Sokal Hoax defense. Sokal's hoax relied not only on self-apparent nonsense of the arguments presented- physical impossibilities that simply dressed in ideological language- but also the lack of follow-up. Tracing not only provided claims that were not inherently nonsensical- marital concerns are absolutely a factor in what people would / would not talk about in ways that could impact them- but also provided further information upon being challenged.

Part of the construction- and the point- of a Sokal hoax is that it wouldn't survive being challenged. The point isn't to fool an inspection, but to reveal a lack of inspection. By intervening to sustain the deception, Tracing lost the plot on any Sokal analog... which was admittedly not the point, and never claimed as such in the original presentation.

I am pleased our discussion as always has retreated so far from the bailey from which it started, where we were discussing a fanfic of an American-involved insurgency installing an illegitimate government by force, to one where we can trust the truth-finding capacity of the Ukrainian court and investigation systems nearly a decade after it's takeover of the system...

...which did not find that said right-wing sniper protestors were a coherent part of Maidan strategy or American-aligned, but which has (repeatedly) also found the involvement of the government in the crackdown to rise to criminal levels. And which did not find extremist agitators to be a controlled factor of the Euromaidan key leaders or even to be American led, at a time when the Americans were publicly advising the Euromaidan protestors to not escalate. But which has repeatedly found substantial indications of resistance and obfuscation by the Yanukovich-era FSB and internal security forcesduring attempts of investigation the use and activities against protestors, including not just destruction of evidence but also the significant number of defections to Russia by possibly involved parties, including and up to Russian-requests for individuals of interest in the context of prisoner swaps.

I was worried you wouldn't want to believe anything that came out of the post-Maidan government and would dismiss anything they said as a pack of lies, or that the post-Maidan investigations couldn't be raised as reliable due to the amount of evidence tampering potentially done by interested parties including many which have since died or defected, but as I am sure you aren't just selectively cherry-picking any possible item in blatant confirmation bias, I am glad we can now both reference and agree with the results of Ukrainian reporting, investigations, and other government positions of the post-Euromaidan Ukraine...

...including that Yanukovich was credited as giving the order to open fire 20 Feb, and Internal Affairs Minister Zakharchenko announcing his (not legislature-derived or approved) authorization to security forces the same day to use live ammunition against protestors going forward, on a day when a lot of live ammunition was used against protestors, and no one claims primarily by Maidan elements sanctioned or otherwise.

Instead the discussion has simply moved on to the motte of verisimilitude, and what you do or do not find too odd to believe about a government giving itself the right to shoot protestors...

...after increasing pressure from both its primary briber and the pro-Russian elements within the government publicly and privately pressuring Yanukovich to escalate suppression tactics, after the protest movement did not disband and was not thrown into turmoil after the failure of Yanukovich's unity government gambit to divide the opposition but instead empowered them as part of his own government, after the protestor demands had evolved to not only the still-maintained issue of EU-to-Eurasian Union switch but also demands for credible investigations that were likely going to be costly to Yanukovich personally (such as investigations into his possible links to pre-20FEB attacks and kidnappings of protestors).

And why this sense of verisimilitude finds those factors less credulous than characterizing the Euromaidan as an insurgency fighting its way into the halls of power at American direction.

But we are talking about a sense of verisimilitude who believes the primary goal of protest leaders is always to get security forces to kill people, and even less odd senses of verisimilitude often struggle to accept the nature of history. History, after all, doesn't have to be plausible- it just has to happen.

And thus we go back to your history by caricature and alternative contexts.

Like, say, how the armed protestors, government security forces, and significant parts of the cabinet being in concurrence rather than in opposition when a minority of the cabinet- including the President and the pro-Russian wing in control of the FSB- granted themselves the right to shoot opposition forces after the sustained lobbying of said foreign power. Leading to the breakdown of the cabinet when the parts of the cabinet not on board with such a policy had their own supporters being shot by snipers, and were being accused of supporting the same sort of sniper attacks on the police in a week that led to triple-digit deaths. Or the general stance of the parliament on the power play of an unfolding attempt by the government to purge factions of the government without parliamentary approval, particularly when many of them were associated with the parties to be purged. Or that the security forces on the ground really didn't appreciate being sniped at with the same sort of weapons as the FSB snipers that the government denied were present even as they were being broadcast on international media, even as the government insisted it was totally the protestors who had suddenly escalated to sniping the police and other protestors.

It would certainly be a more convenient historical narrative if the government was on board with shooting protestors after months of not, but it wasn't, hence why the career communist official balked on joining Yanukovich's crackdown and withdrew the riot police. And it'd also be a more convenient if the government and the opposition were different sides of the government-non-government line, but they weren't, because Yanukovich had already created a unity government that included opposition figures. It'd even be good for the narrative if Yanukovich's Cabinet could be presented as a united force behind him... but it wasn't, hence why the pro-Russia wing was isolated when it called for a crackdown and the rest of the government didn't want to support.

But an unsanctioned purge of the opposition- even thought that is 'an armed clash between protesters and government'- is not an insurgency, even when it fails so badly that the instigators lose the support of the rest of the government and flee before they can be tried and sentenced by the legislature.

Characterizing the Euromaidan protest groups as an insurgency would be the caricature you're painting, yes.

A useful pejorative for an alternate history, but still an alternate history given it's reliance on twisting the conventional usage of active revolt or uprising. Particularly in the context of 2013, when the Syrian Civil War, Afghan War, and even the Iraq Wars were the contemporary standards of what an insurgency entailed. Truly, the battlefield of Independence Square could be fairly compared with any of these.

While seeking the categorical equivalence would be useful to those who want to exaggerate the Euromaidan protests, just as calling January 6 an insurgency (or a coup, or an uprising) is useful to those who want those categorical insinuations, such claims remain false and their usage appeals to historical fanfiction.

Hamas moved it's political headquarters from Syria to Qatar in late 2011, at the end of the opening year of the Syrian Civil War, rather than join in on Assad's side at a time Assad was trying to pressure anyone approaching a militant group to pick a side or else. Afterwards, it generally supported Qatar's pro-Sunni-jihadist position, rhetorically and possibly with manpower/supplies it had, even as Hezbollah responded to Iranian requests to support Hezbollah.

The dispute between them wouldn't be called a feud, though there were allegations by Hezbollah that Hamas support to anti-Assad parties led to Hezbollah casualties. The Hamas-Hezbollah split was part of the basis of narrative accusations that the Syrian Civil War was an outsider ruse to split the anti-Israeli resistance, with Hamas and Hezbollah being the resistance in question.

The issue largely subsided around '13 a manner I've heard framed as 'agree to disagree,' particularly as Iran increased it's influence with Hamas via supplying it's military wing in Gaza (part of the military-political wing split in Hamas itself). By being patron to both, Hamas-in-Gaza, which is dominated by the military wing, largely stopped agitating for/ publicly supporting the anti-Assad side of the civil war.

However, to the point of being opposite sides: yes, Hamas's default response when Iran needed to invoke allies was to support Iran's enemies, not Iran. This is, and will always be, why the Hamas-Iran relationship is more transactional/utility-driven than the Hezbollah-Iran relationship.