Dean
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High ranking foreign policy officials greeting and handing out cookies to actual insurgents - people in armed militias engaged in violence against the state, not just 'pretend' insurgents who are there to create a spectacle.
And here we are appealing to more alternate history caricatures, for a third time. That bored with this timeline, huh?
Feel free to keep on. I promise to go 'Uh-huh' for any more efforts.
You know, you're not a weird person. You seem more like an NPC.
Uh-huh.
I'd like to thank you for recommending it to all, and double-endorse it. This is one of those rare amateur-historian passion-works that is well worth the read, and shouldn't be looked down upon for not coming in prestige media. An excellent piece, well aware of its own limitations, and doing it's best to do quite well.
Without implying where I agree or disagree with it, I can sincerely recommend it for doing a good-faith attempt to present multiple angles and elements that often go unnoticed.
Why turn up public fear about the Iranian nuclear program? Why do it now? Why do it so subtly?
In short, shaping context about the pending Hezbollah-Israel conflict spilling over to Lebanon. Hezbollah recently launched (yet another) a rocket strike that created a mass-casualty incident in Israel. Israel is pretty heavily signaling its intent to strike back, something that's been building up for awhile. If Israel does, Iran- which directly coordinates with Hezbollah and other proxies for attacks on Israel- will likely get involved as well.
The 'subtle' reminder of the Iranian breakout capacity thus serves as a reminder / shaping device to signal / pressure against Israel responding with any strikes against Iran directly, either as part of the plan or in retaliation for Iranian support to Hezbollah. The Israeli-Iranian exchange earlier this year did not cause breakout capability, but it's not something western governments want repeating either.
Sure. Not least because January 6th didn't have insurgents.
If you have to invent alternate history comparisons- twice- to validate your conspiracy theory parallel, that in and of itself is indicative of the quality of the original metaphor.
Why wouldn't it be? 'Radical' and 'novel' are not synonyms.
Read it. Not to put too fine a point on it, but the 'Bukele only succeeded by cutting deals with gang leaders' has been a rising argument of the last year, but also mostly a cope argument from his political opposition which writes to the Anglophone audience and tries to undercut Bukele claims to success.
There's a couple significant weaknesses in the article, both on its own front and on it's meta-context.
On its own it has some significant gaps which indicats it's being written for a foreign audience rather than local analysis, one of which is the total lack of acknowledgement of geography and demographic dispersion when comparing El Salvador versus its regional neighbors, and what that means in general.
Central American countries are geographically small relative to their larger neighborhood giants, but in terms of state control of the interiors they are even smaller, with extremely limited government ability to exert control / contest usage of significant parts of the territories. You can't even meaningfully drive from western Honduras to eastern, which is why eastern Honduras has a reputation for being where drug smugglers fly or sail to en-route to the US. The amount of territory to retreat to, and the dispersal of small-but-present human terrain, means that gangs outside of the capital have plenty of space to hide / influence / establish themselves in when the government isn't asserting itself, particularly via leveraging political rivalries / alternative power centers outside of a ruling party's maximal influence.
El Salvador, by contrast, is basically just a city state centered on San Salvador. The country is the size of New Jersey, and the overwhelming majority of the population is within the capital region. If you get kicked out of San Salvador, there is no alternative power center to hide in the shadows of, and the government doesn't have the sort of federational subdivisions that limit jurisdiction and reach in the same way a larger country does. As a result, anti-gang successes in the capital are far more effective for nation-wide effectiveness than in other countries.
This is absolutely an argument against the Bukele model in other countries- but rather than leave that as a point that what can work in one location may not work in another, the argument has to be flipped to insinuate that what doesn't work in other places thus must not be working in El Salvador, and thus undercut the legitimacy of the Bukele administration. It's not enough for something Bukele did to be unsuitable for elsewhere- it must be a mark against Bukele.
This is similar to the reversal of argument used to insinuate that a decrease in gang weapons seized in 2023 compared to 2022 indicates a failure rather than success, first by framing it as a failure to meet a higher standard of success (gangs weakened, but not outright defeated). Gangs actively hiding their arsenals is a good indicator, it implies they (a) feel the need to, and (b) indicates they previously didn't feel a need to- but this is framed in a way to undercut rather than support the administration which led to this effect. Even the repeated returning to 'but he talks with gangs' doesn't acknowledge what would be also relevant facts to the regional audience: that everyone has to in some form, and that his alternatives were widely considered to be worse. Bukele's anti-crime bonifides and ability to go against the normal democratic insittutions was in no small part possible because many of those institutions were considered to be corrupt and even complicit with the pre-Bukele gang activity levels.
This isn't the only place where the article transitions from a commentary on crime or nominally informative analysis to more audience-shaping agendas. It is, for example, absolutely true that Bukele expanded the Supreme Court, which the article notes... but what's also true, and not noted, is that the Court issue came about in the context when the opposition tried to stonewall and prevent globally- and regionally-normal COVID-19 policies. Rather than recognize Bukele's (actually-is!) concering actions in the context of a domestic political back-and-forth, it is presented as baseless beyond what it implies in isolation for authoritarianism. It is also absolutely true that Bukele is open to Chinese investment... but what's also true, and not noted, is that Bukele is open to anyone's investment. Chinese investment is not a domestically or regionally controversial prospect, but Bukele's failure to go beyond even what the opposition or close American allies would do is presented as a moral/strategic vice.
And this is without the various tangents and allusions to things that matter of an implicitly-American audience, but are bizar if the audience is expected to be more aware of a Central American perspective. The crypto-jabs, the Xinjiang province analogy, or the pejorative references to relations with other regional actors considered bad by the American audience- these are American preoccupations, not local concerns.
None of this is indicative of particular insights of the local situation as opposed to relying heavily on anglophone source biases... which is unsurprising. The article's author is a Florida-based contributor to American foreign policy media. He is writing to his anglophone audience, but especially one dominated by a particular subset of state department / international academics of a generally left-persuasion, and what a lot of that audience wants is narrative justification to undercut Bukele.
Daily life in our modern world isn't enough to do that?
Given the routine failures of people on a daily basis in the modern world, obviously not, unless your daily life includes daily reminders as to why things are they way they are, which it generally does not.
And still, much like "raising awareness" in general, this isn't actually doing something about the issue.
Raising awareness is always a prerequisite for doing something about an issue, whether to advance an agenda when you have the power to, or to resist the imposition of an agenda when you don't.
Hence why the common anti-resistance tactics to undermine resistance often start at countering awareness. This can be by denying there is anything to resist (this doesn't happen), obfuscate coordinated or concurrent efforts (no one is trying to make this happen), and to denigrate even minor opposition as futile and pointless effort that should not be pursued (you can't change it and so shouldn't bother doing anything anyway).
Eh, I'd say tempest in a teapot is right. The Argentina Election last year was sort of a capability-demonstration of what AI-powered campaign support can do, and there's really nothing you can do to stop AI-propaganda given both the decentralized and also international dynamics to it. But that's not even new in and of itself- social media influence efforts are far more ubiquitous than most people realize, and so while in terms of volume greater AI role is increasing volume, that doesn't correspond to an effectiveness increase due to how people largely disassociate from high-volume propaganda they don't already gel with.
And third, that Google is politically biased and Silicon Valley hates the right should not be news to anyone at this point. So what's the point of making a fuss about it, or any other similar little issue in the endless flood of them? And the more important question, the one I find myself asking more and more when people vent about this or that "outrage" by the other side, and the one I'd like to ask all the people griping on Twitter, is "so what are you going to do about it?"
...remind people that relevant truths remain relevant, duh?
This seems far more like an appeal to fatalism than an argument. You re-issue safety reminders regularly not because 'things be dangerous yo' should be news to anyone, but because there are a lot of reasons people may not be thinking of it at a specific context- whether they are districted, unfamiliar with a specific context, or they've just forgotten. You warn people that the stove is hot not because the idea that heat = pain is novel, but because they may not notice the stove is on / they are drifting dangerously close.
You also remind people that other people do not love them / hate them so that they are appropriately on guard, less likely to expose themselves to bad faith actors, and spare themselves the many harms and heartbreaks that can come with emotionally investing in the wrong people. And you do this regularly, because people are stupid / the heart wants what the heart wants / people always vulnerable to emotional appeals or deliberate manipulations which bad-faith actors know to use. If anyone has figured out a way to perfectly protect people via one pro forma briefing that people have to sit through, they're keeping the secret very closely, and everyone else has to regularly revisit topics and refresh awareness and retrain on already trained things.
Even setting aside that the human population is not eternal and static and not holding the sum total of human knowledge in their heads, and thus new people are learning new things every day, 'it is not novel' is not the same as 'it is not news-worthy.'
It seems like endowing anyone outside the family with VP levels of power is going to screw Trump in the long term. Pence continues to say Trump's unfit for democratic office as do many of his previous associates. Vance has previous form of the same hate reaction that many Dems find themselves having in response to Trump, and may revert to that once it's no longer advantageous to support Trump. So he adds distrust to the ticket.
Pence chose a losing team when choosing sides in the post-2020 Republican coalition leadership struggle. Vance recanted for reasons that align with the coalition Trump needs for him to have a longer term. Trump's children do not make up a meaningful part of the electorate, or have narrative sway within them.
Pence's denunciations of Trump ultimately resolve that in the post-Jan 6 fallout, where he (like many people) thought Trump was doomed, and he had personal and professional incentives to distance himself and low-key cooperate with the Democrat/Never-Trump Republican alliance that was lead in part by Liz Cheney, who at the time was one of the most senior Republican Party officials and attempting to lead a Republican establishment re-takeover of the Republican party apparatus that Trump disrupted. She lost- so badly that she was functionally ejected from the party- but for Pence, in cutting himself from Trump to attach to the never-Trump wing, when they sank so did he.
Vance's alignment fits with the coalition-narrative Trump needs, which is for people who may have been moved by, but since rejected, the Demcoratic-media's accusations. Trump can't win with only ever-true-believers, nor has he ever been the sort of person who never forgave opposition, and so the disloyalty argument doesn't really hold: Vance never claimed to follow Trump and then betray him. Vance's narrative is closer to conversion, of change of belief the likes of which Trump needs from others, and in any such metaphor you can't grow if you don't accept converts. That Vance isn't as free-wheeling is irrelevant- neither was Pence, and yet Pence served his role in the first coalition. No one judges Trump on the basis of whether he was consistent with his Vice President or not.
Trump's children provide no coalition-building narrative. Your argument that they are more loyal in the long-term is irrelevant if there is no long-term for lack of a broad enough coalition to win, and people who want to join the coalition for Trumpiness already have Trump as a reason to vote for the ticket. If they wouldn't vote for Trump unless it was Trump and a dynastic VP, they were never a meaningful Trump vote in the first place.
It's very amusing in some respects how strategic rivals in geopolitics have come to view population movement. Back in the Cold War, control of the population was an ideological imperative, and Soviet-block governments often took great difficulty to prevent free movement of populations out of or even within the country. Now, some of those successor states- or in the case of Cuba and Nicaragua, the same elites, deliberately expel population for domestic security measures, and with a level of 'if the westerners don't like it, it must be bad for them and good for me.' Which is just such a paradigm shift in the last half century or so.
And it's not without its consequences either. As more and more of the latin american populations go abroad and especially to the US, various forms of US influence increase, as the US diaspora becomes significant financial and even political influence vector. The current President of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, is an US citizen (dual US and Ecuadorian, born in Miami but raised in Ecuador), which is wild not only for the fact that a Yankee capitalist was elected president of an Andean Ridge country where Chavismo was part of the leftest wave earlier in the century, but also in terms of population.
Because of how much migration has occurred from various sending countries, small countries in particular can have, well, surprisingly high ratios of their nominal census population present in the US. For example, there are an estimate .95 million of so Ecuadorian diaspora in the US out of a census population of 18 million, which is to say over 5%. There are something like 100,000 Guyanese who have arrived in the US/naturalized, when Guayana is a country of only about 800,000, or nearly 12%. The Cuban diaspora is nearly 2.7 million, to a Cuban island population of about 11.2 million, which is approaching 25% of the islanders.
Well, not quite- many of these population figures include naturalized US citizens, and they don't factor in the diasporas in other countries (far more Venezuelans stay in South American than come to the US, for example)- but it's hard to emphasize just how weird this is in a historical context, especially in a region historically sensitive to external influences. A historical justification for intervention and even annexation during the age of colonialism has long been having the presence of associated communities on the other side of the border, be it ethnic enclaves or cultural kin or even just linguistic relatives, and how this creates a basis of intervention. It's not even just an archaic practice- see the Russian justifications in Ukraine, or PRC claims on ethnic community grounds, or various brushfire wars in Africa, or the Armenia/Azerjiban ethnic enclaves, or the Arab-Israeli conflict over palestinians. Demographic ties matter, and matter a lot.
And if the American government wanted to, it has access to a whole host of justifications along similar lines.
Not that it will- not anytime in the near-term future at least- but in other times and other places, other empires would use having control of 5-10% of the population of country as grounds to control the remainder.
Not intended as anything for you to concede to! Just an addition of tangential context.
(Warning- more opinion / tangential context to follow)
In so much that anyone should get hate or praise on the issue, Biden's immigration signaling during the 2020 election, and execution thereafter, can be credited for signalling to migrants a more receptive regulatory environment due to the signaled and executed reversals of Trump's established migration arrangements (which specifically relied on Mexico, which Biden dropped and then couldn't re-enforce).
Biden's party-line position on in 2020 on various procedural items, from 'we will accept your asylum claim as legitimate unless/until we find otherwise' (rather than requiring evidence/determination in advance), followed by the known weakness of post-initial release enforcement, and public rhetorical shifts (such as avoiding the term illegal immigration whenever possible in favor of euphisms such as 'undocumented' or 'irregular') very much contributed to a (justified) perception that mass illegal migration was viable. Part of the social media how-to networks referenced before include things like coaching applicants on what to say on first encounter to appeal to the migration policy directives that Biden signalled and executed. In much the same way Trump began his foreign policy term in 2016 with an 'Anything but Obama' difference-for-difference's-sake, Biden approached migration policy with a 'anything but Trump' mantra, which was a theme leading up to 2020 and was publicly carried out.
While some of these policies were later reversed to various degrees- and there was even an especially a notable (if temporary) disruption in 2023 that roughly corresponded to the administration publicly signaling new application rules for a system that introduced a new way to remotely apply for asylum from abroad, and can be used as evidence against asylum claims if someone doesn't utilize it before showing up at the US- there was a significant perception shift in Biden versus Trump immigration enforcement intentions, and not for the stricter.
I'll just note that some of the bigger primary drivers for change in the Northern Triangle sending countries were largely driven by factors beyond Harris's influence, and even against Administration preferences.
One of the big ones, for example, has been the decrease from El Salvador... which almost certainly was caused by President Bukele's draconian tough-on-crime policies which broke the back of the local criminal gangs that increased instability-driven migration. However, this crack down came againt the objection of, not with the support from, the US State Department. Regional efforts of emulate such tough-on-crime issues and restore local perceptions of security are more often opposed rather than supported by the US. (This is because these legal authorities come at the cost of due process rights and have potential for authoritarian abuse- a concern I'd want to emphasize is valid, but also not one shared by much of the local population.)
Another is the implications of the rise of Darien Gap migration. Not only did this change the proportion of non-Northern Triangle migration sources of a whole (increasing absolute numbers of migrants, reducing relative numbers), but it provided local countries a means to pressure the US to gain migration concessions in exchange for access / cooperation, which is to say by offering more opportunities for legal northern triangle migration (reducing absolute numbers of illegal migrants by transitioning them to the legal migrant category). This does come with some genuine benefits that shouldn't be discounted- a greater willingness of the northern triangle countries to take back migrants kicked out for criminal reasons, cooperation if someone of actual concern is recognized- but it's also a bit of a categorical shell game on how to count numbers.
There have also been two non-Northern Triangle factors in particular that have grown in relevance of the last year for increasing the non-Northern Triangle numbers. Again, the US really hasn't had much influence here.
One of these is the role of Nicaragua. Not only is Nicaragua not in the northern triangle by definition (it's considered part of the southern triangle), but over the last years it has deliberately facilitated migration trough it, such as with direct charter flights which- if you're willing to pay- you can fly directly to Nicaragua and then as long as you're gone within the time limit, they don't care if you go north (wink wink). This is similar to migration-practices Belarus did during the 2021 migration crisis on the Polish border, as way both to make money and pressure a neighbor who you have more confrontational relations with.
But more important is the role of social media in making it ever-better known that migration to the US is possible, and the bottom-up facilitation networks of de jure legalization making it safer and better known (and thus better able to support larger volumes). There was an excellent NYT story- a Ticket to Disney World iirc- late last year on how this process works, and suffice to say American 'don't come here' stories pale in comparison to social media channels dedicated to the 'how to' combined with local authorities who can make more money facilitating migration through than by paying to stop an unstoppable flow.
And yet, the reply did not begin with that. It began with-
As opposed to covering up the context of an ongoing indirect fire conflict that had already seen hundreds of thousands displaced?
Which, in turn, was the subject of the next two paragraphs of text, which when you remove the part you chose to focus on consisted of-
northern Israel has been subject to a bombardment campaign for nearly 8 months now as part of Hezbollah and Iran's attempts to open a second front, and the Israeli-Jews and others evacuated a long time ago. Something like 80k Israelis were evacuated by March, not including those on the Lebanese side, and while reliable numbers on rockets fired are hard, we are talking in the relative ballpark of ten thousand, and part of the reason Israel withdrew its people is to reduce the cost of trying to intercept all those rockets by, well, not needing to. And thus letting them land.
When you are willing to launch thousands and thousands of rockets, even low probability events will keep happening. The low odds of a Hamas rocketing it's own hospital in Gaza didn't make it an Israeli strike, and it's not like Israel is timing its diplomatic engagements to the US with Hezbollah attack planning, or Hezbollah/Iran changing their attack plans during Israeli state visits to the US.
None of which hinges on the narrative parallels of your theory. It is non-central to the point- and by virtue of not being central, it is to the side.
Sometimes a potential argument or line of critique is acknowledged, and bypassed as being noncentral to the argument being made. This is regularly done if one wants to demonstrate that a different line of attack is available, and that a presenter is aware they could pursue that line of argument, but is to be distinguished from the argument being made. This is one of those times, just as this is a time you chose to advance your argument by ignorring the counter argument to focus on a non-central issue.
(Which is it's own rhetorical technique, but lets keep it plebian here.)
We are discussing an event that just transpired, and my original comment is inquiring whether we can find evidence. It’s odd that you’re asking for evidence for my… question of whether we can find evidence and then mention of a possibility.
And I was quite willing to set aside the blood libel parallels, hence noting the credulence given but explicitly focusing on different elements that worked against the premise. You chose to ignore those and turn the topic to what was set aside, and then awkwardly doubled down on it.
Which you are doing so again, not only by further doubling-down on false flag parallels without evidence of a false flag, or attempting to deny the relevance of a common contemporary antisemtic conspiracy theory format, but even via further choice of expertise to reference. (Mearsheimer is definitely a poor choice of academic to cite for his IR views, given his history of commentary on both the regional subject and on international affairs beyond the theoretical in general.)
You don't seem particularly interested in addressing whether there were factors that would normalize the occurrence of a tragedy, you seem more interested in arguing the credibility of a conspiracy theory... including on the basis of a separate incident that was proven to be an unfounded conspiracy theory.
Which, itself, is a symmetrical counter-argument to the claim that past Isaeli naughtiness is itself evidence, as you also have narrative counter-evidence that others will falsely blame the Israelis for what Israeli opponents have done. Choosing which of these to dismiss and which to hold as evidence is little more than rhetorical gerrymandering to assume the conclusion.
I find that boring, and a common failure mode of unsubstantiated antisemetic conspiracies. So far, you're doing little to distinguish your theory from them.
...
To an abstract Realist, not enough to change a position without ascribing to non-Realist values.
...
Sure it is. Neither the question or the answers are either an argument for or against a position born from Realism as an IR theory. Realism doesn't have any caveats or rules of 'if X% of your 18-35 population is killed, realism says do [policy], but if (X+1)% of your 18-35 population is killed, do [alternative policy].' The metric only serves if you bring in other models- which was the point of the critique of the appeal to Realism.
(Disclaimer: this is not a counter-argument, or even a disagreement, though it may sound like one. Maybe a tangential diatribe. Ahem.)
I can sympathize with this perspective, but only to a degree, as I feel it ignores that sources can be evaluated on various factors for credibility to support a claim, and the basis of these are appropriate grounds of conversation/debate such that 'source, please' is a relevant and reasonable thing.
Source credibility matters, and it can come from many observable factors that don't need mind-reading. These can be their consistency over time (do they have an established bias), their willingness to issue retractions and corrections (i.e. how likely are they to stand behind a lie if challenged, versus correcting a mistake), their self-interests in taking a position (does a claim inflate or decrease their social standing at the time it is made), and so on.
(This is one of the reasons that Epstein's claims are weaker than they might otherwise be, because he had a history of lying in favor of himself, and the specific claim itself could be self-benefiting, both before and after he got into serious scrutiny. Beforehand it could buff his prestige and imply he had powerful friends to help him get away with things so best not challenge him, and afterwards it could be used to deflect blame and responsibility away from himself. Note that these interests are valid whether the connection is true or not.)
The issue with 'providing sources is a waste of time because it's a trap card' is that, well, many sources most commonly used are indeed bad, and their usage is often used also bad. Time Magazine is not immune from political bias or propaganda, and using a citation in the form of an appeal to authority is double-bad both because of the fallacious form of the argument, and that the argument ignores why the source could be doubted. Pointing out either of these can be true and relevant, and also dismissed as 'poisoning the source.' The accusation itself is a means to counter an accuasion that would undermine the argument if true, thus letting the argument remain stronger than if the challenge went unchallenged.
The solution here isn't to disclaim sources entirely, but to use- and expect them to be used- in a more measured faction. But that measured faction goes back to the credibility of the source, as how far a source can be taken is going to vary significantly depending on context.
(Which I don't think you'd disagree with in general, but I wanted to write down those thoughts.)
There's obviously an extent to which words matter, and symbolism matters, but that extent is not infinite, and I suspect that if you're very good at wordsmithing, or in a language-focused industry (like journalism or much of academia or much of politics), it can be easy to overestimate the power of words, or indeed to confuse words for reality.
Agreed. See also the terminally online, and anyone in an industry where their paycheck hinges on the belief that propaganda is decisive. There's the saying it's very hard to convince someone that the job that pays their paycheck is unnecessary, and it's equally hard to find someone in the convincing-people industry that too much money is currently being spent on trying to convince people.
Do you have evidence to your claim, or do you not?
If not, why should your accusation not be analyzed in the context of unfounded anti-semitic conspiracy theories it shares notable parallels with?
You are not exactly countering that unfounded blood libel accusations exist or are invoked. Your own list of events to rebut the structural parallel... doesn't, on a trifacta of ignoring the structure (Isaeli claims on Iraqi actions is not structurally analogous to accusing jews of killing children), of invoking a demonstration as a counter-point (yes, the NYT and other global media parroting Hamas propaganda falsely accusing the Israelis of bombing a hospital and killing children is an example of spreading Jews-kill-children conspiracy theories), and a general composition fallacy (even were all your examples valid, it wouldn't mean anything on how others invoke anti-semetic conspiracy theory tropes and usages).
Nor are you countering that the context of this event is an ongoing conflict of such danger that over a hundred thousand displacements already occurred nearly half a year ago, or that such attacks are routinely ongoing without respect to Israeli foreign policy travel, or that the act of launching tens to hundreds of thousands of rockets into northern Israel will, over iterations, reasonably result in killing people on the ground in northern Israel.
Israel is routinely a target of conspiracy theories, so many that it ranges from the victim-blaming (accusations that the current government deliberately let the Hamas atrocity occur) to the comedic (the entire genre of local arab authorities arresting animals as jewish spies if tagged by Israeli universities). As such, charges that share the structure of conspiracy theories can be expected to provide supporting evidence, rather than just vaguely claim interests... not least because the demonstrated interests of large numbers of commentators in the topic also aligns with spreading and insinuated unfounded conspiracy theories.
What made the Ukraine - Nord Stream bombing story funnier, and helps explain some of that needle-not-shifting, was that it was the anti-Ukrainians/pro-Russians who most pushed in the 'it couldn't have been Ukraine' angle before the story broke, arguing on grounds that it was clearly beyond their capability and must have been the US instead, hence the credulity given to the Seymour Hersh article, while it was relatively pro-Ukrainian posters noting that the Ukrainians were potential culprits with means and motive.
The revelations that it was (probably) the Ukrainians were awkward for most people you'd expect to trumpet it, because it undercut a number of the propaganda narratives of the people previously most invested in the Nord Stream topic who you'd expect to trumpet it. The anti-Americans didn't want to acknowledge that their previous year of accusations would have been unfounded all the while, the Russians didn't want to acknowledge that Ukraine could destroy their infrastructure and thus Russia didn't have a monopoly on sabotaging underseas infrastructure to pressure the Europeans with, and the European energy-import/pro-Russia-business lobbies didn't want to have to acknowledge that the investments were far more vulnerable than previously thought (and not just from American pressure). Not only did it make previous positions wrong, but it undercut the arguments for Russia as an alternative when any 'break with the West, build a pipeline to Russia for your own interest!' project could be destroyed.
For the pro-Ukrainian factions, in turn, few of them had any major reason to be vocal about it. Setting aside that it had been inactive at the time and thus limiting the actual effect, the Nord Stream pipeline had been a long-standing friction point between Germany and most of its regional neighbors. Not only did its destruction given the German government the political cover to drop what had long been a priority project of the merkel era, it suited the interests of a number of the parties Germany had been ignoring the protests of to leave unstated that if Ukraine could sabotage such a pipeline, so could anyone else. The conspiracy theory before may have been only the Americans could, but the security-planning reality after was that anyone else could. No one, to my knowledge, has made any direct threat, but post-Nordstream Germany entered a series of substantial (and costly) policy changes to re-align itself with its neighbors.
(This is not as ominous as it may sound, and is far from the only European realignment on security / implicit capability threat terms. Political history ties the Franco-British alliance of the 20th century to the rise of Germany, but said changed also coincided with the rise in technological capabilities for the French to contest the English channel without needing a Blue Water navy thanks to torpedo boats. British-French relations shifted without an explicit threat, but with a coinciding sharp rise in the implicit relative costs if Britain chose a more confrontational approach. Similarly, the Franco-German conventional rivalry died with the advent of the French nuclear deterrent: with the value of conquest removed, cooperation becomes far more palatable than alternative arrangements. This does not mean that the French made nuclear threats to compel the Germans into the proto-EU.)
The credibility you granted to a currently unfounded conspiracy theory of Jews secretly arranging the murder of children for their nefarious ends.
I am all for recognizing the potential of false-flag operations, but setting up one in the format of a cliche is, well, a cliche. Hence setting it aside after recognizing it.
As opposed to covering up the context of an ongoing indirect fire conflict that had already seen hundreds of thousands displaced?
Blood libel credibility aside, northern Israel has been subject to a bombardment campaign for nearly 8 months now as part of Hezbollah and Iran's attempts to open a second front, and the Israeli-Jews and others evacuated a long time ago. Something like 80k Israelis were evacuated by March, not including those on the Lebanese side, and while reliable numbers on rockets fired are hard, we are talking in the relative ballpark of ten thousand, and part of the reason Israel withdrew its people is to reduce the cost of trying to intercept all those rockets by, well, not needing to. And thus letting them land.
When you are willing to launch thousands and thousands of rockets, even low probability events will keep happening. The low odds of a Hamas rocketing it's own hospital in Gaza didn't make it an Israeli strike, and it's not like Israel is timing its diplomatic engagements to the US with Hezbollah attack planning, or Hezbollah/Iran changing their attack plans during Israeli state visits to the US.
Not high enough to be relevant to the original argument. I believe I already said that, and your rejection of that without actually contesting the conclusion rather illustrates why the number is not necessary.
As do other aspects of your latest position. For example, this-
It's strange to make the argument without providing the numbers. If the number of deaths is something like 1%, then that makes the argument stronger, and if it's 50%, the country is facing a demographic collapse even if it wins.
Is a poorly structured argument for the value of the number in the context of the prior argument you responded to the response to.
For one, it is assuming a conclusion on how a specific number would be used. You say, for this context, that a 1% statistic makes the argument (presumably that Ukraine should continue to resist) stronger, but the same 1% could just as easily be used or presented to argued as evidence of catastrophic damage that must be ended at all costs. For just one example as to how, it is a trivial technique, in general and in the course of Ukraine War itself, to simply convert absolute numbers into %s or %s into absolute numbers to make it seem larger or smaller for the sake of argument. There is no way of knowing what you, or anyone else, would consider a 'small' or 'too big' number for the sake of an argument's strength.
The number also does not imply the distinguishing factor you imply it would. You present an argument that the number is relevant to whether Ukraine is facing a demographic collapse as a consequence of its resistance. The later does not imply the former. Ukraine can be facing a demographic collapse even if it wins regardless, regardless of whether that % is 1 or 99%, if it was already facing a demographic collapse without the war. (Ukraine, and nearly all of Europe is facing a demographic collapse, for factors that trace back to the last century.) Ukraine can also be facing a demographic collapse if it looses, independent of whether it was already facing a demographic collapse before the conflict. The % killed in conflict only matters to a demographic collapse concern if the deaths as a result of fighting are the dominant factor in what determine the demographic trajectory of the Ukrainian nation- but they are not.
This is because the % requested also doesn't matter in terms of understanding the degree of harm at a national level. You are asking for a % killed from a subset of a subset of a demographic (an age bracket of men), but while this is most heavily impacted demographic (conscription-age men), it is neither the most relevant statistic for that broader demographic category, or even the most relevant demographic for discussing the implications for Ukraine's future (the women). It's not even a particularly impactful number in the context of the demographic consquences of the Ukraine war- like the 6 million or so refugees in Europe from the war. Whether the men of your demographic range killed is ten thousand, thirty thousand, or even three hundred thousand, 300,000 is peanuts to 6,000,000.
And this is without getting into which data sets to use, which you have demurred on specifying. So the magical % number could come from highly suspect sourcing, with highly maleable categorization... for a ratio that doesn't mean much in the first place.
You provided a bunch of intermediate nodes without anchoring them to the particulars of the situation. The absence is conspicuous, as if the argument were deliberately structured to avoid providing the number.
Of course the argument was deliberately structured to avoid providing the number- that was part of the critique of the appeal to realism.
Realism is a theory of international relations, not an accounting mechanism or paradigm. It doesn't have a meaningful input factor for specific numbers. How numbers would be considered or used is bringing in other preferred systems of consideration- systems that are not realism in and of itself.
Should I assume this means that you don't know?
No, you should assume I reject the potential implied arguments.
I want to judge for myself. What is the number?
If you want to judge for yourself, take whichever number you feel most credible and divide by the relevant 2020/2021 demographic numbers. Since what number you find credible is up to you, you'll need to do it yourself.

I'll just note that some of the reasons you won't hear much about it is that the elections-for-sanctions had at least three... let's not call them ulterior motives, but ancilliary benefits.
One was that it allowed the US a face-saving way to readjust the sanctions-format between what was originally there and what has/will snap back. Even on its own terms, not all sanctions (including energy) worked as desired, and so while fundamentals are shared, not all the technicalities will be the same.
This, in turn, gave a second benefit, which was a diplomatic bone to US allies struggling with high energy/oil prices. While Venezuela isn't so much a gas producer, and its oil market contributions aren't market-shaping, there are a lot of regional and global countries- especially US European and Asian partners- for whom any energy relief matters more than Latin American politics. Letting themselves get 'persuaded' into sanctions relaxation in turn gives that little bit of 'I'm reasonable' trading card in the conduct of other relations for those who care more about the energy econ dynamics than the US. This means that those countries who appreciated the energy boost are much, much less likely to criticize the decision.
Third, this was also a... not a trade, but a card with Brazil in particular, especially after the role the US played in the Venezuela-Guyana Essequibo dispute over the winter. While the elections deal was announced in October 23, and thus negotiated before the crisis began to rise in visibility also in October, one of the major regional proponents was Brazil, where Lula has mixed feelings (sympathetic but only so far) for Venezuela, especially vis-a-vis the US sanctions. Agreeing to the sanctions relaxation was a Brazilian 'win' that demonstrated Lula's regional influence and the US's responsiveness to/respect for Brazilian efforts- even as the sanctions jump-back meant that the Brazilians lost grounds to critique a deal they supported when the Venezuelans broke it. Further, in that interim the US's earned political favors could be leveraged to... not pacify, but mitigate some of the potential pushback when the US fully backed Guyana in Venezuela's late-year pressure campaign. This let the US do something Brazil might have pushed back more directly, the military relationshp building in northern S. America, as the US both was (technically) on the same side of Brazil in opposing the border pressure, and had proved it's 'reasonableness' by maintain the same sanctions relief.
By making a concession that would be only temporary if Venezuela broke the general spirit, the Biden administration largely set up a win-win. If Venezuela went along with an election it didn't control all the processes of (which was a possibility in the pre-deal context), it would likely lose (as it did) due to the uncontrolled polling-exposure effect, and that would be a US win in and of itself. But even if it renenged (as it did at the very end), Venezuela going along with an election but renenging on the free or fair parts legitimaized a number of US policy positions, increased US access to the region, and diplomatically separated Venezuela from its more conditional regional supporters.
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