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Dean

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joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


				

User ID: 430

Dean

Flairless

15 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

					

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


					

User ID: 430

WTF would you even attack a music festival?

They probably didn't know it was one. It was just there and easy to hit as a soft target.

The Hamas objective appears to have been to kill as many civilians as possible, to maximize the initial terror and perception of Israeli impotence. This, in turn, is likely for the strategic purpose of derailing Saudi-Israeli normalization, which has been in the works for some time. It may have also had a tertiary goal of trying to draw out an assessed increase of Palestinian support in various (particularly European) countries to demonstrate/lead to Israeli diplomatic isolation in the response.

For this purpose, a music festival meets the nominal purpose of the objective. It will probably turn out that the music festival was the single biggest source of deaths during the night, as you have a combination of large numbers of people, density, poorly defended, and isolated from response or natural strongpoints to rally a defense.

However, I doubt it was chosen per see. The time-day timing of the attack was almost certainly done for historical, not contemporary, purposes, while the rave was for a weekend because they were expecting to need time to sober up / get over the drug use before the weekend.

Further, the rave almost certainly wouldn't have been targetted deliberately had the multinational nature been known. The night without the raid was a disaster for Israel, but the prominent multinational victims- most notably the German girl- killed and worse internationalized the impact to a much broader audience in a way not-good for the likely intended 'we think this is bad, but you shouldn't retaliate too much' goal Hamas was likely going for.

How is demolishing mosques, spitting on Christians, urinating on dead Palestinians and bombing entire apartment buildings less gruesome?

Body gore prominence seems like an obvious one. Self-congratulatory spectacle presentation of the corpses is another. Israelis typically aren't doing their misdeed to chants of how great their god is over the bodies of the victims, and that's without their established roof-knock technique.

I would be curious which mosque demolishment or Christian spitting or urination incident you felt was more gruesome than, say, the Palestinians' self-advertised raid shelter results. One category is boorish, and the other might as well have come out of Daesh propaganda.

As the saying goes, they've never missed and opportunity to miss an opportunity. And hijack a few more airliners worth of opportunities along the way.

No, as the isolated nature of Gaza is a consequence of the Gaza-stirp Palestinians, and specifically Hamas, ability to manage their relations with Egypt (who manage a border) and even the West Bank Palestinians (who were a major political force for enabling cross-Palestinian transit concessions from Israel), not solely Israel.

The lack of willingness of Arab states to hold / give refuge / assimilate Palestinians is a broader Palestinian failure, but one that far predates Hamas.

Gaza is many terrible things, but a state of slavery isn't one of them.

It's not technically culture war, but Hamas has just attacked Israel en-masse, overwhelming the Iron Dome with 5000 rockets and even sending raiding parties into Israel. It looks like Haman and/or Shabak haven't done their job at all, and Israel has been caught with its pants down.

That's probably how this will be remembered / talked about going forward, but discussion/forecasting regarding a third infatada has been increasing over the last year. It's just been overshadowed in the western media due to the war in Ukraine / focus on Israeli politics.

This is more operational surprise than strategic surprise. Iranian arms shipments to groups across the region hasn't exactly been a secret.

The tactical surprise is the relishing in brutality against civilians that's been part of the operation, including the raid shelter killings that have already been publicized. That sort of thing isn't intended to communicate valorous resistance to garner international solidarity, that's the sort of thing intended to provoke reactions expected to overshadow the initial atrocities in public memory.

For the culture war angle, I think the biggest question is of retribution. On one hand, Israeli public will now demand a reaction that makes the ongoing Hamas attack pale in comparison. On the other hand, what can Israel do to a very densely populated Gaza strip that won't be branded as a war crime or ethnic cleansing?

Given that anything they do would be accused of being a war crime or ethnic cleansing regardless, that's probably not the deterring question it would have been a day ago. Especially given multiple examples of large-scale ethnic cleansing in the last year, and even in the last month, that so far have not exactly manifested any coordinated international response.

That's not to say Israel could get away with it- the gaza strip has an estimated 2 million people, which is almost as many as Armenia the country proper (2.7 million) and the middle east is not the global commons at all- nor is it to say Israel should even try, but it's not exactly the taboo guaranteed a universal response.

As for what Israel will do... I suspect that's going to depend on what Hezbollah does, and more importantly what Iran wants to happen. Hamas isn't quite the proxy that Hezbollah is, but I would be amazed if Hamas conducted this without significant pre-launch coordination with Iran.

I know that my solution (radical wealth redistribution, red-black shit at large, etc and so forth) isn't popular here; but even conservatives have got to recognize there is a problem.

How do you solve it without the revolution? Is that question even coherent?

Not really, because you didn't actually describe a problem that class-revolution would solve, or even a problem.

You described a consequence of a long series of pro-social behaviors that were contingent on a number of factors of other people beyond your control doing good behavior. Because you had a family line that could get together mid-six figures of money in investments AND sit on it for 1.5 generations AND-NOT lose it unproductively, along with several other AND's and AND-NOT functions thrown in. (Such as no one else, such as the government or class revolutionaries, stealing the money during the 1.5 generations, not having catastrophic impacts that require you to expend the investments, that macro-economic trends don't devalue the investments, etc.)

Not everyone has the fortune of those things. Even fewer who do have those things avoid fucking things up for their own or others inheritance. The classs warriors are frequently part of the later in making things worse, not better, for those preconditions to hold true.

However, this doesn't describe a problem, this is just a statement of reality. There are always a lot of a people who would happily 'solve' the problem of only some people being able to acrue wealth-inheritance enabling people to live off investments. It just consistently is in the form or to the effect of ensuring no one can.

Sure, but also not particularly relevant to whether Kenya's perception of whether it can garner more influence in its region by doing something outside of the region.

Honestly WTF? Can anyone explain what kind of geopolitical interests Kenya has in Haiti? Even descendants of the slaves there are from west africa.

In a word, Pan-Africanism.

Kenya released a statement earlier this year when they initially offered. In their own words, from media articles back in late July, “Kenya stands with persons of African descent across the world, including those in the Caribbean, and aligns with the African Union’s diaspora policy and our own commitment to Pan Africanism, and in this case to “reclaiming of the Atlantic crossing,” the statement said.

The geopolitical interest isn't from Kenya in Haiti in particular, but rather in Kenya positioning itself as a leader of Africans in general, and thus as a leader both the broader world can work with (and should consider the opinions of) on 'African' questions, and for other 'African' nations to work with/through.

In other words, by treating this as an African diaspora issue, the Kenyan government is playing to African identity sentiments for more local interests.

The US is looking for new clients since all their current ones are moving into - we play also our own game instead of being obedient?

'Client state' is not really applicable here, since by most accounts this was more of a surprise offer than a specifically sought arrangement. The US will definitely provide aid / support to Kenya in doing this, but Kenya wasn't exactly coerced or contracted into doing something it didn't want to do.

Indeed you are. It was kind of a point you skipped.

Still avoiding the arguments, I see. No surprise.

Dude. I don’t know what to say.

Not surprising.

The basic point I was an am making is that the Cold War is no guide contra to what you said. You haven’t provided any evidence it is.

I have repeatedly provided examples of non-threshold aid types and degrees. You have not provided evidence of an actual threshold. You are the one making a positive claim of a risk to justify a decision- it is on you to validate it.

Seems like you are trying to use some weird “debate trick” as opposed to address the substance of the argument.

You have been avoiding the arguments every reply so far, from the start to here.

I’m not making the claim that “we shouldn’t send weapons because it would cross nuclear thresholds.”

To which you immediately follow with...

I’m saying that sending weapons may cross that threshold (likely depending on Ukraine success) and therefore I don’t judge it to be worth the risk.

Which is an argument from the position that sending weapons would cross the threshold, or else there wouldn't be a risk.

You have not established why anyone should believe Ukrainian success is a credible threshold for Russian nuclear use, particularly when the nominal red line has already been crossed repeatedly already. Rather, you have had to waive away the reasons why the pass crossings didn't actually cross the threshold... which is the point. It's not actually a threshold.

I don’t need to.

You do, if you wish your judgement to be considered grounded in something more than propaganda narratives from a combatant who regularly and routinely engages in nuclear scaremongering for the sake of affecting decisions without reflecting actual nuclear risk.

There is nothing magical about the year of 2014 versus 2022, and it's not even a claim the Russian military make regarding their nuclear use considerations. This goes back to treating the Russians as irrational nuclear actors.

Indeed, most of your argument comes down to “your argument relies on assumptions and judgements.” Yes.

No. Most of my argument comes down that there is a good deal of historical examples and Russian doctrine and nuclear risk mitigation theory that goes against your judgement that conventional weapons equate to nuclear risk, and you are ignoring it while inventing conditions that even the Russians don't claim.

Trying to play this weird gotcha game isn’t really all that interesting.

There's not much of a gotcha to get for a void of justification.

That’s a lot of words undermined by your first sentence. My whole point is “this war is categorically different from what happened in cold war proxy wars” and you confirmed in the first paragraph that I am correct.

No, not really.

You may need to re-read it, and then read the second, and the subsequent paragraphs, because that is not the concession you are looking for. Especially in light of response paras 4 and 5, which actually do address what you think paragraph one addresses.

You can’t say on one hand the Cold War established when nuclear weapons would be used and we haven’t reached that point while on the other hand acknowledge this situation never occurred during the Cold War.

Of course you can. The application of category qualifications is a basic skill.

If you understand what makes something qualify for a category, you can look for whether a new thing has the prerequisite characteristics to qualify. If we know that, categorically, something has characteristics X, Y, and Z, then if something we don't know doesn't have X, Y, and Z, we may not know it well, but it's not the category. In this case, 'the Cold War established when nuclear weapons would be used' is a category- the category of what sort of things would lead to nuclear weapons being used, i.e. the thresholds, i.e. existential concerns.

As the category already exists, then for novel example (war nearby rather than a ways away) to qualify for the category, you need to establish it as meeting the criteria. When the criteria are existential risk, you need to establish existential risk. If it does not, you can absolutely judge that it doesn't meet the category of concern.

At the end of the day, new things don't simply fall into pre-defined categories they haven't qualified for.

Now, you could try to argue that a starting premise is wrong- that we don't know Russian thresholds- but that would undermine the argument that we shouldn't send weapons because it would cross nuclear thresholds. The argument presumes an understanding of thresholds. If you don't, then there's no basis to the claim. If you do, then it's just discussing where the threshold is- and so far you've retreated from examples of non-threshold advanced weapon use.

Finally, my scenario hasn’t been falsified. My position is that if Russia was seriously threatened in Crimea or Moscow, Russia May use nukes which creates a spiral. Since the only way Ukraine could possibly threaten Russia this way is with our support, you just have your causal mechanism.

Your position fails to have a causal mechanism because there is no objective relationship between claimed components due to in-build subjectivity and assumptions.

You don't define what a 'serious' threat to these areas is which allows retroactive retraction of any standard. You don't provide a causal relationship dynamic to explain how Crimea substantially differ from other areas Russia claimed are categorically the same but didn't nuke over and which thus demonstrate that control loss alone is not a threshold. You didn't establish why NATO should be automatically assumed to nuke, or why Moscow would choose to do so on the understanding of that, or why Moscow would escalate to MAD if it was willing to be nuked on that understanding in the first place. The is the classic conflation of rational and irrational nuclear actors- Moscow is simultaneously rational enough to resort to MAD, but irrational enough to instigate MAD.

You even conflate Crimea and Moscow for the same opposition point, despite that the scale of resources to remove Russian control from one is of entirely different magnitudes than the other. The Moscow-based Russian Federation does not face existential risk if it loses Crimea- it does if a force is capable of taking Moscow. The two forces are not the same, and the aid shipments that have to date not even allowed Ukraine to capture its own territory are demonstratably not enough to capture Moscow.

This is not a causal mechanism- this is basic assuming the conclusion on handwavium, while throwing in non-falsifiables that wave off the counter-examples.

Finally, one need not find this example compelling to be worried about an existential threat. Let’s say there is a 5% chance. That is clearly a valid concern when giving weapons to Ukraine

It's not clearly a valid concern at all, since you pulled 5% out of the same source that you assumed the conclusion, but didn't actually contrast it to the existential risks that follow from NOT providing weapons sufficient to defeat an invasion and annexation of territory against a country that actually did give up nuclear weapon potential in the past.

This is a classic example utility monster logic application, which struggles with infinities and resorts to smuggling in the framing while denying other fictional metrics that would counter the desired conclusion. You can say there is a 5% chance that conventional arms leads to a nuclear war, and someone else could say NOT sending enough arms to conventionally defeat Russia leads to a 5.00005% chance of nuclear proliferation by security-concerned countries that leads to nuclear war. Both are negative infinities.

If you want to say infinity is equally bad in either direction, it doesn't matter- negative infinity either way is still infinity. If you want to say a more likely infinity matters more, you need to actually justify why. Otherwise, there's nothing valid about it- it's just an arbitrary claim to relevance.

This is nonsense. During the Cold War, neither the US nor the USSR gave weapons in proxy wars that resulted in incursions into the other sides’s territory let alone amped up the exchange.

Neither had the opportunity, as neither directly invaded an adjacent neighbor and started a sustained urban bombardment campaign.

In terms of preparation, the Russian position on NATO as a threat is that this is precisely what NATO has been from the start: a US proxy threatening incursions or worse into peaceful Russian territory. The Russian narrative, propaganda it may be, is as relevant to precedent for Russian nuclear deterrence posturing as anything else, or even more so, because one can take Russia's own words and actions for what both represents a threat but demonstratably does not represent a nuclear-retaliation trigger.

Mentioning Korea is besides the obvious point

You seem to have missed the original point as much as the previous replier, so that's not a surprise.

The Cold War did not have anything close to the current situation.

The Cold War had numerous examples of both sides engaging in massive conventional arms shipments that resulted in tens or even hundreds of thousands of casualties to the other in the other's wars of choice where losing would not threaten to trigger state collapse and existential risk thresholds that drive nuclear weapon use.

As the relevant comparison being invoked was nuclear risk, that is incredibly relevant, especially as the Cold War had multiple contexts were nuclear war was far closer than the current Ukraine war.

Finally the causal mechanism is clear — weapons are provided that help Ukraine make serious inroads into say Crimea and Russia uses tactical nukes. NATO responds and the world ends.

That is not a causal mechanism, as the threshold criteria has already been falsified in this very conflict.

If 'serious inroads into Russia' were the standard that would invoke nuke use, nuclear weapons would have been used last year, because the Ukrainians have already made 'serious inroads' into de jure Ukrainian territory that Russia annexed. This is just one of the reasons why Putin's annexation gambit of the eastern parts of Ukraine last year was panned as a strategic mistake- in his attempt to box himself and any would-be successor into continuing the conflict to victory, he demonstrated that Ukrainian military successes in internationally-recognized but Russian-annexed Ukrainian territory were NOT something Russia was going to go nuclear over, a dynamic that was furthered with the Kherson defeat and which is ongoing in the southern front in late 2023. The obvious rheotrical off-ramp- that these aren't 'serious' inroads- just undermines the central premise, because the Russians can always claim that a major defeat is not 'serious', which moves the nuclear retaliation from objective criteria to subjective criteria, which goes to rational or irrational actors, which drives back to what observable indicators there are of nuclear thresholds and if they've already been passed X number of times, why they should be believed to be nuclear on X+1 time.

A similar lack of credibility occurred with claims that any attack on Crimea might meet a nuclear response- there have been many, many, many attacks on Crimea since the war started. They have not made the war go nuclear. Attacking ships in port did not make the war go nuclear. Conducting operations from within Russian-claimed territory, and even internationally-recognized Russian territory, did not make the war go nuclear. There was never any particular reason to believe they would besides people claiming clear causal mechanisms, but like many, many other Russian red lines, these have not been nuclear. That the Russians claim Crimea is a part of Russia as any other is itself undercut by the other areas they claim is part of Russia, ie. the territories they claimed not only when they didn't already hold them, but also lost significant major portions of. The precedent is already set, because Crimea is only as indisputably Russian for nuclear deterrence purposes due to being annexed as the also-annexed Ukrainian east, which has not been basis for nuclear retaliation.

A third extension of this theme of undermining nuclear-threshold criteria is, of course, Russia's own attacks into the other's territory: Russia set precedent in the world that strikes into urban centers were an acceptable form of non-unacceptable activity, and when the Ukrainians reciprocated, the Russians demonstrated it was not, in fact, a nuclear threshold. These were, notably, established with Urkainian strikes not dependent on Western advanced munitions, but from Ukraine's own stocks of Soviet-derived (and in some cases Soviet-produced) munitions. The actions doable from non-American sources demonstrated the lack of threshold criteria in claimed thresholds, and so western-provided munitions have to have something more than a magical western aura to be nuclear-escalation risk. Maybe if Urkraine began some sort of population-targetting WMD campaign... but the Ukrainian bio-weapon labs have not exactly materialized.

Between strategic mismanagement and precedence, the Russians have demonstrated that Ukraine taking Russian-claimed cities, reciprocating strikes, and other forms of military engagement remain below the level of nuclear threshold criteria, which is typically only associated with the survival of the state or WMD retaliation. Throughout the war, the Ukrainians have not significantly impacted the Russian state's ability to maintain internal control of the population, or even the military, which might cause a threat to the continuity of government, which is also credible nuclear thresholds. The most relevant threat to the state's capacity to control in the last two years have been overwhelmingly self-inflicted internal politics, which would not- and did not- lead to a credible nuclear threat.

If the argument is that aid packages will eventually allow Ukraine to march on Moscow, which would threaten state survival, that's not an argument against current aid packages. That's an argument against hypothetical future packages well, well after the point of Ukraine taking its internationally recognized borders.

And this is aside from the assumption of the Western response, for which leading to MAD results from the typical muddling of whether actors are rational or irrational. Even setting aside the nature of assuming the NATO response would be nuclear, if the Russians are rational nuclear actions, and NATO nuking is a given, then the Russians would not conduct the nuking that leads to MAD, because they are rational and the use of the nuclear weapon would not be worth it. As the Russians have not used nuclear weapons to reverse battlefield setbacks even without the threat of NATO nuking, the non-Russian observer is going to have to justify why a particular Russian battlefield loss will precipitate nuclear use when it hasn't been rational to do so to date, but also why- if the argument twists to that the Russians are irrational- why the irrational Russians haven't done so to date.

Which goes down to the typical muddling of actors being simultaneously rational and irrational which tends to retreat for the motte when challenged.

Would we really nuke Russia over some smallish number of mushroom clouds in Ukraine though?

You are as equally unlikely to nuke Russia over Ukraine as Russia is unlikely to nuke Ukraine over Ukraine, or the Afghans over Afghanistan, or the Chechans over Chechnya. The Cold War, and the post cold war, has a number of examples of both powers accepting losses in wars of choice- even when internationally humiliating- rather than invoking nuclear weapons.

I'd like to think not, as it seems fantastically self-defeating -- but guess I could imagine the pitch.

Maybe the democrats are playing a variant of the 'madman' strategy here -- if your opponent is so dumb that you can't predict whether he will blow off his head to spite his face, you need to be very cautious?

Common misconception of what Madman Strategy counter-play is. When someone is suspected of invoking madman theory, the equilibrium is to be less, not more, cautious.

Ultimately, there's only two general conditions when dealing with a nuclear madman: either they are faking it, in which case they are actually rational, or they are not faking it, in which they are not rational. This is binary, not spectrum- you can't be both simultaneously rational and irrational from a nuclear deterrence perspective, because deterrence itself is a binary. You are either deterred from an action, or your are not.

If they are rational, you don't make concessions in the name of caution, because doing so is unnecessary (they aren't actually mad), it incentivizes the rational-madman to continue to continue to fake madness (as a rational means to get further concessions), and it also obfuscates the ability to identify actual madmen. You continue to operate below assessed nuclear thresholds, you just do so based on your own analysis of what the actual thresholds are, not what the fake-madman claims (because he is a liar), based on common lines of assessment.

If they are not rational, you don't make concessions because if they responded rationally to concessions, they wouldn't be irrational, but faking irrationality. When dealing with truly irrational actors, the counterplay isn't rationality-based deterrence, but capability degradation that limits their ability to inflict harm, which cannot be assumed to be traditionally deterred. This means a lot of things, many of which harmful, but critically targeting the irrational-madman's rational support network whether that is domestic or abroad.

The common mistake people have with Putin and nukes in Ukraine is being bound up in a general narrative where Putin is simultaneously a rational actor and an irrational actor, and that nuclear actions will be done for simulateneously rational and irrational reasons.

Amusingly, in a late 200X with no Iraq War, then the Iranians still have a nuclear program in its later stages, only for it's initial target. Who would still be, at best, maintaining the strategic bluff of ambiguity in hopes of deterance, as they did before, but with the understanding that their most significant enemy truly was pursuing greater WMDs.

Black humor, but humor none the less.

The Cold War isn’t even close to analogous.

In so much that the Cold War is an aggregate rather than singular thing, this would be true. In so much that the Cold War was filled with examples that serve as analogies for what does / does not trigger nuclear war, including direct conventional combat between nuclear states or conventional military support resulting in tens of thousands of deaths, this is false.

I also not that you fail to identify how conventional arms deliveries meaningful risk nuclear war, which was the subject of the risk comparison.

Now because of advanced weapons, the US can give Ukraine weapons that easily and frequently do hit Russia’s territory (including Moscow). That never happened during the Cold War as far as I know.

If you mean that the US or Russia never gave advanced weapons to allies or proxies against their superpower adversaries, this is false. Notable examples included the Soviets giving the Koreans entire armored divisions of equipment and then giving the Vietnamese state-of-the-art surface-to-air systems and various forms of rockets, and the Americans giving stinger missiles and other weapons to the Afghans, and major military packages to the Europeans and even the Iranians for use against the Russians.

If you mean that 'the US couldn't give weapons that could easily and frequently hit Russia's territory', this is also false. The entire point of many of the ballistic missile treaties in the cold war was precisely because the US could give weapons that could easily and frequently hit Russian territory, and US military aircraft and missile technology only stopped being unique in so much that it proliferated to the point that many nations had the ability. This doesn't even address dynamics of Russian/Soviet (and, most relevantly, allegedly Putin's) perspective of the power dynamic between the US and NATO countries, which diminished perceived relevant differences between the US military launching a missile from German territory and German forces launching a missile from German territory.

If you mean that weapons provided by the superpowers were never used to do so, this was because the superpowers never invaded their adjacent neighbors who were in range of their territory, not for a lack of willingness to do so. The willingness to do so was a rather significant part of NATO's architecture.

There are interpretations and angles you could have meant that would make your intended statement true, but none of them particularly validate the contested claim of how conventional weapons meaningfully risk nuclear war. Casual mechanisms are consistently lacking, or downright silly.

Why did support for Ukraine split along the left/right the way it did (at least in the U.S.), when typically one would expect it to go the other way.

Did it? How does what we see now differ from bog-standard American political polarization?

I'd be the first to note that the Republicans have a more vocal wing that's openly Ukraine-skeptic, but that wing notably isn't even charge of the Republican party, let alone 'the right' as a whole. It's also incredibly typical of American political party tradition of the party out of power flirting with more radical peace movements right up to the point they come back into power. Cindy Sheehan was a darling of the Democratic party up to the point the Democrats were in charge of Iraq and Cindy kept protesting the war. Republicans are an isolation party until they're in charge of foreign policy.

From my perspective, the American right is much more skeptical about how the US goes about supporting Ukraine, than about whether to. When things get tied to, say, anti-corruption measures, people who aren't just using corruption as an argument-soldier tend to be more accepting. When actually challenged to explain how, say, conventional arms delivery meaningfully risk nuclear war despite an entire cold war to the contrary, that doesn't seem to be a particular close-held belief when put into context by even casual inquiry. The closest thing is a consistent concern is cost... which is both a framing narrative but also one that the government can easily undercut at will by simply explaining how it chooses to frame costs.

These are far more indicative of 'I don't trust how the other party handles things' skepticism than actual opposition. If a Republican had been at the helm at the start, we'd have Republicans being the pro-support party and the Democrats warning how Trump was recklessly going towards nuclear war, etc. etc. etc.

Factions of the American right far more organized, far more coherent, and far larger lack the ability to meaningfully dominate the American right's perspective on policies far closer to the party base, let alone Trump's likely coalition. I hear far more from the opponents of the American right about how the right is against Ukraine than I hear any sort of chorus from the right against it.

If these allegations are even 1% true Canada is not picking a fight with anyone. India is picking a fight with Canada.

If, as the Laconics say.

I agree with your point, but there's oddities about this that I'd want answered before picking a fight one way or the other. India isn't exactly known for regularly running assassination campaigns abroad, and there's nothing I've seen so far that makes this case a particularly compelling or particular one to make an exception for.

That's not to say it couldn't have happened, but before I went with [India] picked a fight, I'd be interested in if it was closer to a rogue/unsanctioned op. This would be far from the first time the hidden hand of government did something without the knowledge or blessing of the top- just in the last year we had the Chinese weather balloons over North America on the even of a major high-level PRC-US trip- and there's plenty more that could be pointed to historically. The US certainly isn't immune to having parts of the security state do their own thing for their own reasons, and the US government is far more centralized than India is in many respects.

Given some of the... colorful?... reputation of the Indian government, I'd honestly believe a chaotic / not-controlled-well-enough element as play as being in the same magnitude of a formal state-sponsored-from-the-top decision.

Which, to be clear, would still be a big problem. But it wouldn't be a 'the government is picking a fight' problem.

I reject your framing.

That's nice, but since I was asking for yours, that's kind of illustrating the point.

Your use of the FVEY acronym does not lend weight to your argument that because 'Well acktually, Five Eyes is just a SIGINT focused intelligence sharing apparatus', and because of this it does not imply other deep historical alliances based on shared cultural backgrounds and systems of government under the international rule of law.

Since that was not the argument, it doesn't really matter that it doesn't lend weight to an argument I didn't make.

It does, however, demonstrate the criticism that you're not actually addressing the point of what alliance is not being honored to do what.

You seem to be asking for an NATO article 5 or the like formal agreement signed by the US and the other partners, the absence of which implies that partners are under no expectation to intervene when their allies' territorial sovereignty has been violated. There is precedent that this has not been necessary in the past to provide support and retaliation when assassinations have been conducted against allied nation's citizens on their home soil.. Note the response of non-NATO members (such as Australia) in expelling diplomats in solidarity in the example.

I'm not asking for a NATO article 5. I'm asking what alliance you think is supposed to do what that they refused to do. You are avoiding all three parts of the question - what alliance format is relevant, what that alliance should do, and who refused.

Moreover, you've already countered your own position repeatedly, because your own prior post already had the alliance structure provide support- in identifying that it was India- while your own latest example actually has both a relevant alliance context- NATO which stands in contrast to the perpetrator identified- and is an alliance structure where the US demonstratably has not been able to bend the alliance to accept policies the US government wants. This not only undermines the appeal to ambiguity of general-form alliances vis-a-vis alliances for a purpose, but does so by counter-examples to American hyperagency

What, beyond rhetoric, is Canada even asking for?

Various news articles have described that this discussion took place out of the public view.

While this certainly is one form of the motte and bailey the site is named for, inventing grievances from an admitted lack of information is poor grounds for justifying cynicism.

I presume Canada has asked for support in sanctioning India in some form, potentially expelling diplomats as occurred in the example above.

Ass the saying goes, assuming makes an ass out of you, especially when the assumption serves as the justification for further condemnation.

As for the rest of your post, I will concede that perhaps all of the Five Eyes partners decided together that they would not support Canada beyond toothless statements of concern and it wasn't the US doing so unilaterally with their outsized influence. It does not change my cynicism of the value of these alliances when partners have other interests.

Your cynicism is currently unsupported, and immature at best... not least because you have not actually identified what Canada could, let alone should, be doing to produce different results.

Calling statements toothless is a pejorative, but not particularly relevant as far as subjective benchmarks. Sanctioning India in some form could be called toothless. Expelling diplomats is practically pro forma as far as these sort of incidents go, the epitome of doing something just to be seen as doing something, and so would be just as guilty of the condemnation of being too weak and insignificant to deter future infringement. Even a formal declaration of war would be pretty toothless given the, well, toothiness of the Canadian navy.

If everything upto and including war can be dismissed as weak and insignificant, the criticism loses all merit. Hence why you are being asked to proffer a credible standard.

Not that my cynicism was purely directed at the alliances themselves. It was also concerning the ability of Middle Power western nations to individually defend their sovereignty against the interests of their suzerain and the machinations of neutral/friendly contemptuous powers. Not doing so will only encourage future acts of interference.

Since you've yet to establish that the claimed failure occurred, or even a line of response that couldn't be dismissed as toothless and only encouraging future acts of interference...

It will abide, at least until the war is over.

The issue for the Indians isn't that the Canadians can overrule the Americans, but rather that the Canadians can refuse to expand alliance-structures that they are a part of to include the Indians. The US has great influence, but there are plenty of contemporary examples of the US being unable to force allies to play ally to partners they really don't want to.

In some respects, Canada isn't at risk of this because it has (deliberatly) stayed out of alliance-like blocks that might have brought it into conflict with China, whose investments it was pursuing for much of the last decade. Canada isn't a part of the Quad, AUKUS isn't intended to encompass India, and India isn't exactly trying to join NATO. This lack of overlap is likely part of why India might have felt free enough to do this, if they did indeed do it- there wouldn't have been much institutional backlash from relevant institutions that India wanted access into.

But on the other hand, Canada absolutely can play the US lobbying game better, more skillfully, and more persistently than India can. The risk here isn't some sort of Indian Ocean reversal, but rather that on any meaningful major concession the Americans might consider to entice the Indians into something, Canada can play to the favor of the people looking for excuses to stop it as not worth the cost, and for any specific concessions the Indians really want, Canada could play the spoiler as well. Both factors limit the potential for integrated relationships of depth and scale, as Canada does have ability to spoil that.

Since that wasn't the claim...

Legally or practically?

Legally, it doesn't. Practically, it means cost-benefit considerations change in the general terms. Canada is under no obligation to extradite anyone to India; Canada is also not under no obligation to not extradite anyone to India. How willing Canada is to extradite people in general is going to shape how other actors approach it on the subject of dissidents abroad.

Refusals of extradition leading to unilateral as the requesting country considers other methods isn't an uncommon thing, it's an established part of history. That's why extradition agreements aren't a political favor, they are a mechanism to limit score-settling abroad or permitting other country's internal political disputes from being based in one's own territory. Just as the premise of providing support to another country's dissidents from your own territory to weaken them is a tactic as old as time, so is the tactic of extraditing another country's trouble-makers back to them. Canada refusing to do so is a position- it's not the end of the matter.

Canada is a sovereign country under a Westphalian model. So is India. The Westphalian model offers no endorsement to India's alleged activity, but it also offers no remedy to Canada, because there is no legal appeal to enforce corrections for violations between Sovereign countryies, because if there was they wouldn't be Sovereign.

This is why international politics is generally described as amoral and anarchistic- because the ability to enforce one's preferences is limited to one's own willingness to retaliate.

I apparently have not been cynical enough with regard to sovereignty in the middle power Western nations.

I don't know. You're not actually indicating a standard of anything to be done that anyone has failed to meet.

You've implicitly criticized the FVEY allies for not presenting a united front, and accused the US of telling other members to do nothing, but the thing about a front is that it advances on an objective. What actual policy is not being done due to the alleged US telling others to do nothing? What, beyond rhetoric, is Canada even asking for?

Before something can be denied, it must be asked for. If it's not being asked for, if there's not a clearly reasonable alternative as opposed to vague gestulating of 'do something!', it's not a cynical take to blame others for not providing it, it's just projection of impotence onto external actors.

Which besides not being cynical, doesn't exactly make sense in the context of specific alliance contexts. FVEY, for example, is an Intelligence alliance, not a defense or economic alliance or common migration zone. There's no obligation or implicit expectation to, say, enact sanctions, conduct retaliatory strikes, or so on in the context of FVEY. It would be quite reasonable if Canada requested/expected Intelligence-related support... which by your implications they did.

The type of alliance matters because it means the type of influence authorities that matter changes. If this assassination is to be treated as, say, a potential casus belli, that wouldn't be a FVEY matter- that would be a NATO matter. But every NATO member's interest in [insert unstated desired response here] matters, because NATO is a consensus-based organization with multiple contemporary examples of the United States not being able to force to decide to its preferences.

So before you be cynical, I'd recommend you be specific. Which alliance structure that Canada is in- and it's in a number other than FVEY- should be responsible for this, in what way, and when/how has Canada even asked them to?

Because Vice is an outlet associated with caring far more about party affiliation of sinners than the sins, presumably.