Dean
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The question: In sociopolitical contexts, what is your personal, off-the-cuff definition or interpretation of the term NPC?
Nuclear Proliferation Concern.
Ok, then where is there any evidence of some genocide
Sigh.
This is where I note that I did not use the word genocide, but national destruction, precisely to avoid this semantic debate.
Which is a shame, since it was as a courtesy and non-insinuation towards you, because the Russian war crimes both in execution and occupation do amount to criteria of genocide by the standards of international law, as codified by Article II of the Genocide Convention, which was established precisely to set such a criteria.
that happened in Kherson that was controlled by Russian forces for almost a year and was generally pro-ukranian city with absolute majority of Ukranians?
The current definition of Genocide is set out in Article II of the Genocide Convention: Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
This is, indeed, arguably broad, which is why genocide charges will generally follow after statements denying the existence, humanity, or legitimacy of a group being targeted by the targetter. Which Putin helpfully provided with the Russian pre-war narrative buildup denying the existence of a Ukrainian nation, pre-emptive victory articles asserting common Russian identity, and the subsequent execution of the war.
Which has included, among other things- A- Easy check, bombardment of civilian population centers with indiscriminate fires when more precise measures exist as an alternative munition, and massacres of detained civilians B- Also easy check, given not only bombardment of refugee evacuation corridors but establishment of torture centers and target lists to go after Ukrainian nationalists C- Another easy check, as there was an entire winter campaign about targeting civilian power infrastructure to the neglect of military targetting with the only appreciable target of mass denial of power required for civilian services such as winter heating E- A matter of record at this point, as the forced evacuation and subsequent processing of Ukrainian children for adoption in Russia is precisely what this category covers
If you expect Russia to want kill any pro-Western person in Ukraine and see average as pro-western(so strike on soviet bloc is strike against the enemy) we should see tens of thousands of deaths in Kherson as it happened in history where one side of the war had national eradication as the goal.
We... have seen tens of thousands of Ukrainian casualties in the war so far.
That the Russians did not establish Nazi-style concentration camps for industrialized slaughter during the midst of their first campaign season does not change that, nor is it a standard or prerequisite for genocide to categorically meet the definition of genocide.
Moreover, this would go back to you not understanding the logistics involved again. The Nazi concentration camps were so horrendous in large part because of how much industrial capacity and investment they took for that one purpose, which was outside the norm for genocidal campaigns. It was a massive function of logistics... which have been a noted weakness of the Russians over last year, even if it were their intended style, which is not the allegation or the requirement.
What's more important, however, is that you are rather unsubtly shifting the frame of debate to try and joust with strawman. The point was not that they were prepared to kill any pro-Western person in Ukraine. The point was that the plan- as in, the thing they had before they went in based on what they thought they knew- was built on what they thought the allocation of sentiment was like. Which goes to the critical mistake of Putin believing his own propaganda and believing that there was a pro-Russian majority eager to side with a Russian intervention against a despised Ukrainian government, and thus that pro-westerners were a minority to be suppressed and filtrated.
In other words- the Russians vastly underestimated the number of anti-Russian/pro-Westerners they'd be dealing with, because they were incompetent, and didn't prepare the logistics of scale needed despite the intent for what they were planning.
In this I agree with Macron - words do have meaning.
In this, you and Macron would be wrong, precisely because words do have meaning. The legal definition of genocide has been quite a bit broader than just 'Nazi-style concentration camps' for longer than you've been alive.
Macron, of course, has the excuse for motivated disinterest in the truth because he is a national leader who in late April 22 was still hoping to salvage some sort of cease fire and return to status quo ante rather than face the economic and political setbacks that would be more likely if he called Putin and Russia particularly unflattering but true things.
The Bucha massacre and then-ongoing bombardment of residential zones with occasional refugee columns kind of undermined his position, and that of the European 'peace' movement that was sharing in the pro-Russian denial mode of the early months precisely because acknowledging Russian crimes against humanity undermined appeals for immediate cease fires and peace talks.
Horse trading implies you get something of equivalent value for the horse. In this metaphor, the charge is that the person you trade horses with is a horse-thief, and that their horse-trade is that you hire more of their possible horse-thieven associates to guard future horses in exchange for a current horse.
Am I wrong in thinking that regardless of evidence in specific cases probability of this happening is so low that we should expect to see almost zero cases of it?
You will generally be wrong if you ignore evidence, yes.
I can't recall any country that engaged in the open terror bombing campaigns from, again, WW2,
To be fair to you, you're probably not old enough, or had any particular reason to have been paying attention, especially since 'terror bombing campaign' in the WW2 model implied air fleets, while most civilian-targetting bombardment campaigns are by artillery.
and if you decide to go this route you should be open about it.
There's no need to. A terror campaign doesn't work on the basis of the perpetrator boasting about it. Fear campaigns are also often incendental to other goals- a secondary or even tertiary purpose.
I'm interested in the process that happens before such strike as imagined by people who disagree with me. Does Russian/Ukrainian command has a secret policy of terror bombings but to keep it secret limits it to some fraction of its forces?
I'm not sure what your actual position is, so I can't say whether I disagree with it or not. It seems you're denying documented things because it doesn't make sense to you and so you're projecting 'sensible' substitute explanations.
The Russians didn't have a secret policy of terror bombing. They just denied it was a policy of terror bombing. That's not a secret campaign, but it is completely consistent with how the Russians approach information warfare, which really does amount to outrageously lie and deny the outrageous things done in order to muddle the information space.
What do they or some random rogue commander hope to gain from it?
Optimistically, a destruction of the will of the opposition to continue fighting, which not only includes the Ukrainians themselves but the will of the Europeans to continue supporting Ukraine's resistance in the face of massive humanitarian suffering, thus compelling a capitulation.
Pessimistically, to destroy the long-term viability of the Ukrainian state in the contested territories regardless of the outcome of the war, thus rendering Eastern Ukraine unable to be a productive part of an 'independent' but 'non-aligned' Ukraine that Russia was trying to compel.
Pragmatically, not getting punished for disobeying orders to continue firing.
Practically, because they burned through their better stocks early and got progressively worse as they used less accurate ammo.
How do they justify wasting precious ammunition on targets that aren't relevant to the war effort?
By believing it's not a waste, and that the Ukrainian nation is the target of the war.
Russia intended to launch a war of national destruction. It didn't expect to have to fight to hard to do it, but the target lists for anyone thought to be pro-Western/anti-Russian were always part of the plan.
How is the argument that it's self-executing assuming the conclusion?
Because the self-executing argument assumes that Trump meets the criteria for the sanctions to be leveraged against him without Trump having been charged through the processes that would bestow that criteria.
Moreover, the opening argument claimed legal validity and influence by appealing to claimed influence of originalist principles, without actually validating that the claims mast originalist muster or that that the events of Jan 6 would be considered a rebellion by the standards of the original authors of the amendment.
You have consistently retreated from these points when challenged, and you will continue to do so, and they will remain points that undermine the thesis. The claim that this interpretation is based on actual as opposed to self-claimed originalist principles has not been supported, and the amendment does not negate the need for the government to establish guilt before moving against people on the basis of guilt.
They argue that the text supports that, especially in comparison with other texts, like the age requirements, I believe.
Then you believe wrong. The text of the Constitution does not support that Donald Trump is guilty of insurrection or rebellion without trial by appropriate institutions. This is trivially verifiable via any CTRL-F search of the text, as there is no mention of Donald Trump and thus no Donald Trump exception.
Do you have a problem with any part of the constitution being self-enacting?
Have you stopped beating your wife yet? Probably not, if you never started, but it would remain as invalid a question when the premise itself has been challenged.
The Constitution not being self-enacting in this legal argument, the claimed justification is being executed by the Executive branch because the Judiciary has not taken the case and the argument is that the Legislative branch does not need to.
The American Constitution sets out rules by which the branches of government act through their various powers. The advocates are ignoring the Constitution's own outlined procedures for establishing guilt on the pretext of self-enacting, and ignorring Constitutional principles on presumption of innocence and separation of powers to argue that the agencies of government controlled by the ruling party can ban political opponents from running on their say-so without going through said processes on the basis of implied repeal.
As such, there's no reason to believe the argument that the de-listing / banning / whatever measure is presumed to occur would be self-enacting, as opposed to being enacting by partisans with no sincere belief in the theory and no intention to uphold it as a standard, at which point it's non-enaction outside of the context of Donald Trump (not having been done before, or against contemporarier,s or with any credibility of consistency in the future) would demonstrate that it is not, in fact, self-enacting Constitutional action, but the actions of a branch of government.
I'm not making any assertion that other acts of violence wouldn't qualify (again, assuming the authors are right on all this).
Then we have already identified the issue, which is that no one in contemporary American politics who would be responsible for de-listing Trump has held that standard. Thus, a lack of sincere belief in the standard, and instead nakedly partisan motivation.
Nor am I claiming that it wouldn't be politically motivated, or inconsistently applied.
Then this wouldn't be based in Originalist principles or Conservative legal thinking, which emphasize consistency and continuity, and we're back to skinsuit theory of argument by smuggled insinuation.
The difference is that now they can claim to be doing it because of law, and it will have to go through courts instead of being shot down right away.
Things that get shot down 'right away' have already had to go through the courts, where they take varying degrees of time depending on how sympathetic the initial judge filed with. This is not a change- this is how lawfare works, and has been working vis-a-vis Trump for some time. There is no shortage of politically reliable judges who have signed off on things that 'inevitably' get shot down on sufficient higher appeal, but whose initial support is claimed as legal validation.
As no one has established why this claimed theory would credibly pass constitutional muster at higher legal levels, beyond the appeal to Federalist credentialism, this is no different than any of the other anti-Trump lawfare theories that could reliably get lowest-level support and use that for political maneuvering efforts.
I can't respond to the first half until I'm able to access the pdf again, since that's still not working, last I checked.
Given that the nature of political violence in the last half decade has been quite considerable with more than a few cases with far more violence and damage than conducted on January 6, you absolutely can respond as to what sort of standard might meaningfully identifies January 6 as a rebellion and other acts of violence in and around the capital and country in the years prior as not.
It certainly wasn't the timing that would make it a rebellion, as there is no requirement nor does proximity automatically qualify. It wasn't the death count. It wasn't the property damage. It wasn't the degree of organization. It wasn't the amount of backing from political elites. It wasn't the proximity to Congress persons.
But to the ending, they might be persuaded that this could present at least the possibility that it might be the correct and legal thing to do—there's no way the indictments would disqualify, and the impeachments weren't agreed to by the margin required in the Senate.
Neither would trying to delist the opposition candidate on charges he has never been convicted of, and yet here you are taking it seriously.
So I ask- why on earth should anyone believe a Democratic politician was sincerely persuaded of the correct and legal nature of an unprecedented attempt at political attack against an opposition party candidate... by an opinion piece of non-authoritative lawyers associated with an organization the Democratic party has regularly identified itself in ideological opposition to?
Does this hypothetical Democrat find all of the Federalist Society writings convincing, or just this pair of writers? Or just this article? Do they plan to apply this standard consistently even if it means coming to odds with their own party, or is this new novel legal theory they sincerely believe in only going to be used to the broad approval of their caucus before being put away?
We have Bayesian evidence.
Which is to say you do not have evidence, hence why you are inferring to assume there is rather than demonstrating there is.
Two Fed Society authors have published a paper arguing for the position, and a Republican-appointed judge has already removed a low-ranking official from office under section 3 for his involvement in Jan 6.
And as has been noted elsewhere, that case did not rise, and came with very different political contexts.
These things do not prove that this is a mainstream position among conservative legal thinkers. But they are much more likely to happen in a world where it is.
They are also very easy to happen in a world where Trump Derangement Syndrome driving novel legal theories is a thing, and we actually are in that world.
The Originalist perspective would be, of course, the viewpoints on what rebellion meant to the people whose framework of rebellion was the civil war.
Correct. The paper spends a considerable amount of time talking about what the original meaning of "insurrection" and "rebellion" was, to the people of that time. You don't have to agree with the authors' conclusions, but they explicitly deal with that question as the central one.
Then you should be able to answer the question regarding the standard, and its consistency as a standard.
I believe their argument is that later amendments to the Constitution override earlier versions (otherwise amendments would not be possible). So to whatever extent Section 3 is in conflict with earlier Constitution provisions, Section 3 prevails.
But this isn't an argument that Section 3 is in conflict with other provisions of the Constitution. This is an argument that execution of section 3 by the executive over the conduct of elections prevails over other elements of the constitution, which obviously does not hold to any limit because otherwise any executive could claim that any action in support of a later constitutional amendment is inherently constitutional if it conflicts with others.
There is not, in fact, an unlimited blank check to the American executive drawn just by claiming a more recent ammendment. Where Section 3 does not require overruling other parts of the Constitution, it doesn't. The arguments to date do not indicate that Section 3 requires doing so, on that Section 3 would have to do so to permit the interpretation, which is the sort of backwards reasoning previously noted.
Nope. You can look at the New Mexico case for example - state law allowed private citizens to sue to remove disqualified officials from office, a group did so, and a judge decided to remove him. No executive action involved.
And yet, yup. This isn't state law- this is Federal-level. Moreover, this isn't something the judiciary has made a conclusion on (i.e. that Trump has engaged in Rebellion), and the legal theory is to explicitly leave the Legislature out of it, and thus the only branch of government to make the conclusion and enact and enforce it is the Executive.
Sorry, by contemporary I meant to the time, not to today, if that wasn't clear.
It was clear, and I am still awaiting a standard that distinguishes January 6 as a rebellion but which does not also catch many more non-contested politicians to the point that it's not an arbitrary special pleading.
I can't go into details because I can't get the pdf to open, but I believe they referenced assorted earlier cases that were smaller than the civil war (the one I remember was the Whiskey rebellion, but they referenced a bunch more). I don't know the details, but I wouldn't be surprised to learn that even those were larger than the Trump events.
Then the comparisons are not validating the necessary claims that the events of January 6 are a rebellion from an Originalist perspective. If January 6 is not a rebellion from an Originalist perspective, then banning Trump from running would not be an argument based on Originalism, but something else trying to claim the mantle of originalism to disguise smuggled assumptions. It's still assuming the conclusion that Trump conducted rebellion, and then arguing that the assumption warrants ignorring the sort of due process that is set out for actually establishing the conclusion.
Sure, it's novel and not authoritative, but it being more mainstream could make an impact, since all that it needs to do so is convince a few officials.
But there's nothing here indicating it's any sort of mainstream. Again, no claim has been made this reflects a common or shared viewpoint of the Originalist legal establishment, let alone the non-Federalist legal schools of thought, let alone the opposition party that has been deriding the Federalists for years.
For something to be mainstream, it needs to be, well, not novel and actually be authoritative.
If no one else, I could see state officials in democratic states not listing Trump, and that could make a big difference in the primaries if it doesn't get to the supreme court before then.
What, besides political cover of preferred justifications, makes you think Democratic states would de-list Trump based on this, and but would not de-list Trump on grounds that Trump has been indited and impeached multiple times?
Because they are heavily involved in the conservative legal movement, so ideas that gain traction within the conservative legal movement are likely to have traction with them.
But we don't have evidence that the ideas have gained traction within the conservative legal movement.
This is assuming the conclusion by backwards reasoning that because the two members are Federalist Society affiliated, both the reasoning is conservative in nature and shared broadly amongst conservatives.
If this argument was coming from a fringe Marxist or something, I would expect it to carry much less weight among the Republican lawyers that make up the majority of the court. But it's coming from Republican lawyers, written from an explicitly Originalist perspective.
That is what is what is being challenged!
The Originalist perspective would be, of course, the viewpoints on what rebellion meant to the people whose framework of rebellion was the civil war. Hence asking for by what standard the January 6 is being held as rebellion, but which other actions in that year did not. If the original framers wouldn't recognize something of the scale of January 6 as a rebellion, then the originalist interpretation works against the claim that it's an originalist interpreation of the amendment. If the legal argument is that they were all insurrection, but this legal standard has not, is not, and will not, be enforced consistently, it's not an Originalist perspective, it's an argument for arbitrary political interference on grounds of special pleading, which is not an Originalist principle, as one of the points of the original writers of the Constitution was to prevent arbitrary use of government power against citizens.
Moreover, the amendment isn't the only Originalist perspective relevant to the subject, since the implications to division of powers of course broach on the other parts of the Constitution, and those originalist perspectives, for what self-executing would imply when functionally meaning giving the ruling party to ban opposition party members doing what potentially election-winning pluralities of the American public view as legitimate democratic processes.
This has nothing to do with executive branch authority. Their argument is that the disqualification is automatic, with no executive act to make it happen.
And this argument is nonsensical, because nothing in the government happens automatically, but is executed and enforced through the Executive branch.
As the saying goes, organizations don't make decisions, people in organizations make decisions, and the people who would decide to execute- and then enforce- this policy proposal are the executive branch.
They go into the cotemporary legal definitions, and note that there were smaller scale insurrections that were considered insurrections.
Insurrections smaller than January 6, but which other events in contemporary American politics haven't surpassed? Which?
Their main argument was that the January 6 mob was an attempt to use at least the show and threat of force in opposition to the constitutional order, and maybe, but more dubiously, that the assorted plans, second sets of electors, etc. could be considered rebellion even without force.
But the argument made was that this is an interpretation should qualify as a rebellion to the perspectives of the people who drafted the amendment- but the amendment was drafted by people whose concept of Rebellion was intrinsically one of mass, organized force on the scale of war.
So again- why should anyone believe the Amendment drafter's views of Rebellion were such that Jan 6 qualified?
What makes this newsworthy to me isn't so much that people are arguing that January 6th was an insurrection, for the reasons you say, but the fact that actions could be taken because of that that could have a substantial effect on the upcoming election.
Which actions can be taken because of this that couldn't have been taken already?
This is not a position claiming a consensus of Federal Society legalists, or concurrence by government lawyers, or a position made by anyone else in the last several years of lawfare. It's novel, not authoritative.
Again, why?
I hate to consensus build, but this seems a pretty transparent 'the definition means what I want it to mean at the time, not consistently applied,' and the argument that the conclusion is self-enacting is just assuming the conclusion in a way that would drastically expand the power of the executive branch vis-a-vis the other branches by creating a precedent that the people who would make the determination can invoke magic words to make the appropriate un-appealable conclusion.
I see no reason why the members you cite would suddenly be onboard with a very expansive and novel interpretation of the executive branch's authority to arbitarily ban opposition politicians for conduct less severe than members of the ruling party that remain in good standing.
In reference to Trump, they argued that the events on and surrounding January 6th intending to overturn the election would constitute "insurrection or rebellion" as understood at the time of the passing of the amendment.
Why?
The 14th amendment was, after all, passed after the Civil War, a conventional war in which field armies were marshalled to fight against the uncontestedly lawfully elected government. (The Confederates did not deny that Lincoln won the election, which is why they cited other casus belli.) The contemporary acts of insurrection included federal garrisons being overrun, cities sacked, massive civil destruction the likes had never been seen in North America since maybe the fall of the Aztecs, and millions dead directly or indirectly. In the drafters' own lifetime, non-insurrectionary violence in the capital included beating Congressional representatives with canes and honor-duels.
January 6, by contrast, wasn't even in the top 5 violent acts of political violence within a year of it happening.
I can't see this not being important,
Why not?
Trying to frame January 6 as an insurrection or rebellion has been an attempted narrative line since January 6, 2021, with generally only partisan effectiveness. It has been approximately 945 days and American public polling has consistently held viewing this along partisan lines. What, besides the appeal to Federalist society credentialism, is supposed to make it more significantly more persuasive after day 950?
I mean, take out the very subjective word "terrorism"
If you disagree that Iran supports groups that are broadly and internationally recognized as terrorist groups, feel free to disagree with the object level claim, but you haven't actually said you disagree.
and this is the same thing that the US is currently doing in Ukraine.
And if a Russian politician tried to make a series of major concessions to the US without the US reciprocating with major policy changes, and without convincing their political base of the appropriateness or necessity or usefulness of doing so for even marginal effects, their efforts would probably not last very long.
If you want to make a deal with an adversary, you need to sell it to your political base. The saying 'only Nixon could go to China' reflects the belief that only Nixon had the political capital and credibility to sell a deal as a valid thing, as opposed to being seen as a sell out. Without the popular legitimacy that requires buy-in, the deal itself means nothing. This is why weak leaders can rarely make enduring changes, as the changes they can implement through their formal power rarely outlive their terms in office. By contrast, strong leaders can make changes to public perception that even their political opponents accept the reframings on some level.
It's not like the Iranians were blowing up Americans who were peacefully sitting on bases in the US.
Why would a reasonable American political establishment or voting base would only care about Americans blown up in the US?
Your claimed confusion why Americans would dislike the Iranians. Part of this is because, regardless of whether people supported the Iraq War or not, only a relative minority are indifferent about the Americans who were there being blown up, or indifferent about who helped blow them up. The US government- even the Democratic parts of it- has long memories of people they have spent in some cases literal decades in conflict with. It only required a short-term memory- contemporary even- to find personal and living grievances with Iran.
For true rapprochement to happen, generally both sides have to make compromises, not just one.
That was one of the arguments against the deal, yes- a lack of equivalent Iranian policy compromise.
The functional compromise the Iranians were agreeing to in the final versions of the deal were... breakout capability, for a limited period of time, without the sort of verification systems that would prevent the Iranians to cheating and completing it unnoticed if they wanted to. This is the same capability the iranians have without a deal.
Ultimately Obama wasn't actually interested in true rapproachment, and didn't even try to sell the deal as such.
As for breakout capacity, I don't see why the US should try to stop Iran from building a nuke to begin with. Why should I care if they have a nuke?
Why should anyone care about the nuclear proliferation opinions of someone who doesn't value nuclear non-proliferation?
The answer is of course your opinion doesn't matter- the question was about why people didn't care for Obama's plan.
Whether you agree or not, most politically-engaged people are not, in fact, indifferent to nuclear proliferation. They tend to be opposed to it in fact. The deal did not stop nuclear proliferation. As a consequence, the deal's maintenance could not be credibly be argued to be needed to prevent nuclear proliferation, because by the design the deal wouldn't do that because it lacked verification and enforcement mechanisms at Iranian insistence.
Also, being belligerent towards Iran is pretty unlikely to get them to treat homosexuals better. Soft power could potentially do it. A full-on invasion could also do it, but that was not an option in 2008 and even if it was, it would have killed probably hundreds of thousands of people, so the tradeoff is questionable.
You seem to have missed the message to the domestic audience. The point isn't that the Obama administration had any hope of making the Iranians change policy (nuclear or gay). The point is that the Obama administration was willing to make major policy compromises to a major abuser, while using far lesser alleged character condmenation to justify not making domestic political compromises.
For his own base, who broadly considered the line of attack valid on a domestic front, it served as an easily co-optable tool against the Iran deal, which they would have a hard line refuting. For the opposition he used the attack against, the contradiction spoke of hypocrisy and insincerity, which undermined any political argument that the opposition should try to maintain a deal whose maintenance could be used to validate a line of political attack against them.
That is partly because Iran consistently goes out of its ways to not only be bad by generally neutral standards, but especially the standards the Obama administration claimed to care about.
Rapproachment with Iran wasn't something that could be neatly simplified as 'de-escalating American hawkishness in the Middle East.' It involved things as over-the-top as flying literal planeloads of cash to a known state-sponsor of terrorism, who was involved in killing American soldiers in Iraq and made no promises to stop, for a deal even its adherents claimed would only result in Iran reaching breakout capability, i.e. what it would reach without it. You don't need to be 'hawkish' to think that that's not a particularly good play, and that was even as Iran was one of the most extreme global examples of the institutionalized homophobia (as in, literal stoning the gays) and gender discrimination. Not only was the later a flaw on the human rights front, Iran's sins were the sort of accusations that the Obama administration and the progressive-millenials were using as political cudgels in the domestic culture war at the same time.
Obama seeking rapproachment with Iran by fiat and trying to avoid Congressional scrutiny didn't come across as 'at last, reason will give peace a chance!'- it came across as a really short-sighted stupid bit of political hypocrisy, for which the primary beneficiary on the American side was Obama himself in terms of international laurels for giving the Europeans endorsement to trade with someone who at the time was helping blow up American soldiers and was in no way required to stop doing so.
It also would have proceeded better had Obama not tried to approach foreign policy without the buy-in of the opposition party in general.
Later-term Obama basically ran foreign policy conflating executive fiat with presenting a fait accompli. This was done on the assumption that there wouldn't be an opposition party succession, let alone willing to pay the political costs of not going along with it, which was hubris.
I realize this is late and you may not have been actually asking for 'have you tried this?', but heck a friend and I brainstormed various trans-character concepts when we were scoffing at ham-fisted character insertions, and it feels a waste not to put some of the points.
One of the basic premise we agreed on is that if you want a character who is trans to not have their trans-ness be the thing, it's not enough for the writer not to focus on it- other characters need to not focus on it to, even if made aware. And one of the best character roles to do this is when antagonists- not sympathetic characters- didn't make a deal of it. In a hamfisted approach that could be a 'even evil has standards' trope, but a more thematic way would be for utilitarians in the setting not to find utility in it. When even disagreeable antagonists don't bother to jump on, then it's truly Just A Thing.
For us, since one of the premise here was that a successfully passing trans person should be, well, passing to casual inspection, that made inspections with ulterior motives a primary venue. As in, someone goes looking into the person for dirt... and doesn't find the transness the most relevant point. At which point, since transitioning persons often make breaks with the past as part of the transition, the narrative hook that could be tugged is those gaps in missing years / continuous contacts before/after transition.
One example was a mystery setup, where the antagonists/players are both chasing a (secretly/passing Trans) person of some repute/influence who has a Mysterious Past. For reasons the someone who is assumed to have a fake identity... because none of the public records / school book photos / etc. show the post-transition person during their pre-transition youth. As the person's post transition identity is assumed to be 'fake', the question of the miniplot was 'why?'- with various theories being witness protection programs, identity theft, etc. When the person's pre-transition name is discovered, it was even framed as a case of a family scandal being shushed up, with speculation like the current persona being a once-illegitimate child legitimized after the 'death' of their dead-name 'sibling,' a case of someone hiding gender to escape the notice of the law for some mysterious crime, or so on.
The antagonist's- and thus the protagonist's- motives for finding out the past weren't about the gender per see, but for the implications of what a mystery box sort of answer might allow them to do to influence the person. Say they're looking to blackmail to force the trans-leader's cooperation, to protect the reputation of the (completely unrelated to trans) cause they trans-person is aligned with, or whatever.
The kick in the plot concept was that the antagonist could find the secret... but then not find it worth exploiting/insufficient leverage, to the point that they give it up rather than try and exploit it, and go on to something else instead. By having the antagonist with utilitarian motivations dismiss that part of the trans-person's identity as relevant, it was signalled to the audience that in the setting, being trans wasn't some overwhelming thing. What made the person relevant wasn't their transition, but what they were in a position to do- and the society was such where the insinuations of misconduct conflated with the transition overwhelmed the social relevance of the transition itself.
Who desires that framing seems to depend largely upon who's currently in possession of the podunk towns -- I certainly saw Bakhmut referred to this way in Western media as Russia was on the cusp of occupying it; ie. "Look how hard it has been for Russia to capture this one little town, they are so dumb/ineffectual/whatever". Now that Ukraine is making progress (?) on retaking it's bombed out husk it has suddenly been framed as a more important place. I have limited exposure to Russian/Ukrainian media, so IDK how it's framed to the people who are actually getting killed over it.
You're confusing propaganda narrative for assessment of value.
Bakhmut was referred to as strategically insignificant by non-Russian analysts because it's capture was (correctly) analyzed as not going to allow Russia the sort of breakthrough or impact to Ukrainian offenses to meaningfully change the strategic posture in a way to facilitate more effective follow-on Russian operations. Early in the war, Bakhmut falling was a pre-requisite for the Russians having a pincer attack that threatened the entire Ukrainian position in the Donetsk, one of the key territories in Russia's nominal casus belli for the administrative boundaries of the Donetsk separatists they claimed to be fighting for. As a pincer at a theater level, it would have allowed the Russians to deny the pocket access to artillery, given localized air superiority, and greatly diminished the ability of the Ukrainians to defend, as we saw earlier in the summer elsewhere during the grinding artillery offensive. After Kharkiv, the Russians lost both the territory and the logistics hubs required for any sort of pincer, negating the potential for overlapping artillery to keep out the Ukrainian artillery, greatly limiting the effectiveness of aviation, and so on. Without the second pincer to weaken the Ukrainian defenses by denying them safe space for artillery in the 'pocket', the advance from Kherson became the same general prospects as the advance into Kherson, which was not only massively wasteful in manpower, but the political consequences ended up resulting in a mutiny. Analysts didn't know the later would happen, but they were completely correct about the former, hence why it was a fight for a city and not what was beyond because the city became it's own target regardless of anything else.
By contrast, referring to the current offensive as over (non-specific, temporally isolated, inherently insignificant) podunk farms ignores that the podunk farms are simply where a defensive line is that- if broken, would radically reshape the viability of follow-on operations in war-altering ways. Namely, that the southern offensive threatened to reach the black sea, or at least put it into artillery range, thus cutting off land-based resupply of Crimea. Russia was highly dependent on the Crimean bridge to move forces and supply the Crimean peninsula, a logistics lift which was throttled by the bridge attacks but somewhat mitigated by the land corridor. Compromising that land corridor forces the Russians to be far more dependent on a far more limited supply chain itself still vulnerable to disruption, and by limiting that supply chain would enabled the Ukrainians to have future more favorable operations against the Russians in those undersupplied areas (i.e. by going from the sea and then west, towards the peninsula's opening).
The Ukrainians don't/didn't care where particularly the southern lines were breached, but no matter where it was, it would be through podunk farms. Framing the offensive as over podunk farms, as opposed to being over what the podunk farms are in the way towards, is a propaganda framing, not an analysis of what the target.
The Ukrainian support for the war is sky-high
I believe it -- just that it seems not-unreasonable to think that this might change at some point before NATO tires of spending single digit percentages of its military budget on having other people kill Russians for them? "Ukraine is little puppy, we are big bear" seems like a pretty easy sell for the Russian leadership?
And yet, the Russians don't believe this (which I believe is correct), and are focusing their propaganda efforts at the west instead (which is reflected in the prevalence of themes and prioritization of efforts).
The question is not whether you think the Russians are doing the sensible thing. The war was not a sensible thing. The question is what the Russians are doing, and how we might know it.
Framing the war as being a futile struggle over nothing important is a messaging theme for westerners providing Ukraine support. It is an entirely temporally-isolated narrative framing that focuses on ignoring what came before and what could come after, and stresses material value contrasts in the present tense (podunk farms vs billions in military/economic aid to continue fighting). This creates a maximally unfavorable framing for supporting the Ukrainians in terms of people providing things of value to them, which works in parallel with Russian efforts to use political proxies in Europe to act as 'peace activists' for pro-Russian settlements, signal boost or inflame opposition/dissident actors framing domestic complaints in terms of the war.
None of this is working, at all, though?
'At all' is totalizing language that would be inherently wrong. There are anti-war / 'don't support the Ukrainians' movements, and there have been diplomatic flareups between the western coalition that Russia has signal-boosted and amplified.
It is not working enough at the moment, but that's why the Russians are playing for time in Ukraine while trying to shape the western information sphere via propaganda over time.
"Current Thing" support for weapons delivery/profile flags seems strong as ever -- and even if it weren't there would be a long ways to go before public opinion stopped the Pentagon from doing as they please, no?
Hence why they are strategically playing to the defensive and buying time and going after the long-term viability of the Ukrainian government (which would collapse without Western aid).
The Russian wish-fantasy-strategy is that someone like Donald Trump comes into power on a wave of discontent (that the Russians help amplify), and once in power overrules the military / fundamentally breaks the alliance / does things that Russia would like.
It doesn't matter that even Donald Trump didn't do that when in office, that's just what the Russian hail mary is, and Putin is well into hail-mary territory.
I mean it's probably the only plan -- full retreat would be the end of Putin I should think.
Putin still has full control of the internal security forces, and the ability to shoot dissenters. He'll be paranoid and miserable, but it's not like he'll lose an election. Wagner's mutiny was worse for showing how little the military was able/willing to stop it, not for it's (in)ability to take over Moscow or a lack of government control of the internal security services. Moscow would have been bloody and embarrasing, but not the end of Putin for the same reason that the war itself isn't: Putin has made all his potential successors complicit, so that they would share his fate, so they have an interest in avoiding it.
Selection of propaganda framings. Framing the conflict as being over unimportant podunk farm towns is the Russian-desired framing fit for westerners, not for Ukrainians, which is rather the point.
The Ukrainian support for the war is sky-high because the Ukrainians see this as an existential struggle that wouldn't end with a cease fire (because Russia could consolidate, regroup, and try yet another continuation war in what is already a series of continuation conflicts). If the Russians were trying to target Ukraine, they would focus on themes undermining this perception, and conceal, rather than amplify, narrative claims about how Ukraine was a fake country (that does not deserve to exist) and Nazis (for which total war and destruction is jusitfied) and properly russion (annexation). Anti-Ukrainian resolve IO would try to dissuade that Ukrainians in their power will be killed / kidnapped / tortured / moved as demographic pawns, and cast such allegations as ridiculous.
Instead, the state media and state-influenced media spheres practically revel in it, validating Ukrainian perceptions of Russian threat.
Framing the war as being a futile struggle over nothing important is a messaging theme for westerners providing Ukraine support. It is an entirely temporally-isolated narrative framing that focuses on ignoring what came before and what could come after, and stresses material value contrasts in the present tense (podunk farms vs billions in military/economic aid to continue fighting). This creates a maximally unfavorable framing for supporting the Ukrainians in terms of people providing things of value to them, which works in parallel with Russian efforts to use political proxies in Europe to act as 'peace activists' for pro-Russian settlements, signal boost or inflame opposition/dissident actors framing domestic complaints in terms of the war.
There were also the really unsubtle narrative campaigns regarding last year's energy cutoffs and Nord Stream Pipeline politics. Germany has long been the target of Russian information efforts. It failed, but not for lack of Russian trying.
Returning the previous post's point: at some point when beating their head against walls didn't work out, the Russians had to make a choice between cutting losses but also loosing gains, and playing for time in hopes they could end up keeping gains. They chose to play for time. The strategy to make that time turn to their favor is to change the conditions that enable the Ukrainians to resist against Russia's larger economic mass, which is to say the even larger Western economic mass. If Western mass can be disconected, then the conflict may go back to one Russia can 'win.'
Is it a probably stupid plan? Yes. But it's also very characteristic of Putin.
That article claimed Russia was openly waiting for Ukraine fatigue to set in but never provided any evidence to back this statement.
I'm not sure what you'd consider 'evidence,' but it is consistent plausible end-state motivations for most Russian strategic efforts since last summer. After it became apparent that Russian conventional offensives would be generally ineffective and disproportionately costly even as Putin demonstrated that mobilization waves would be a resort rather than a primary means of maintaining offensive mobility, there were three general dynamics for Russia: to keep trying to attack irregardless, to try and escape the conflict, or to adopt a defensive posture to conserve power and extend the clock. Putin has progressively tried to axe any viable Russian withdrawal route by various means to limit the political viability of such (the annexation of unoccupied territory, blowing up dams), and redirected offensive capabilities away from conventional targets towards things like the attacks on civilian power grids, which is classic economic transition that had the effect of running up the bill for western support, i.e. trying to strain western electrical industrial support and increasing the economic costs if Europe wanted to rebuild Ukraine after a war to incentive a shorter war.
The spring offensive aside- and that was at least conceptually supposed to be a more limited offensive to get territory that was part of the initial nominal casus belli- Russia has generally adopted the defensive posture to extend the clock, even as it has tried to continue its usual sort of IO efforts to fan anti-war efforts or actors and encourage divisions in the western coalition backing Ukraine. I'd personally consider that 'waiting for Ukraine fatigue to set in' a fair characterization, though it's a bit more proactive than that.
Of course, this is not 'evidence' as much as 'assessment,' based on things that are presumably open knowledge but not claiming any Russian internal document saying 'this is the goal,' a standard which would largely preclude evidence from being relevant.
No, because you're switching connotations of acceptance from 'willing to tolerate' to something more like 'acknowledgement / recognition.' 'I acknowledge that this is bad, but I will not/ do not have to tolerate it' is not acceptance in the form that stoicism advocates.
This is a sentiment I hear often, but it's a cop-out to some degree. During the early days of the war, there were many who wanted the sanctions to entail full isolation of Russia, and India's refusal to sign on caused a few minor diplomatic incidents. Eventually the West decided that the oil price cap was all they could reasonably achieve, but that in turn has meant that Russia's economic situation is far more stable than it otherwise would have been. Saying after-the-fact that "we never actually wanted a FULL oil embargo" is Western cope more than anything.
Fortunately, I am not many people, and I never said that, nor did the people who were proposing the oil price mechanism, who were separate from the people who wanted a full embarge (or, good heavens, a blockade).
The people who wanted the sanctions to entail full isolation of Russia were never realistically going to get that, and I noted at the time that sanctions were crafted from the start to leave critical parts of the Russian-European trade, including significant parts of the energy relationship, untouched. That the oil price cap was all that they could reasonably achieve does not change the point that the oil price cap is not nothing, and that it is having the intended impact by the people who won the push for that instead of an embargo.
I meant that no Indian power has tried to conquer outside of the subcontinent. I wasn't referring specifically referring to the modern state of India. For the most part it's true for the thousands of years of recorded history, apart from brief incursions trying to control Himalayan passes like Kabul, and notably the Chola empire which I had never heard of until this thread.
More most of the thousands of years of recorded history, there was no technological ability to meaningfully conquer outside of or into the subcontinent. The two primary historical actors that conquered into the subcontinent at all (Alexander the Great and the Mongols) fractured from their outside polities almost immediately, and even the Mongols were promptly stuck in the functional non-unity of the system which was so busy locally competing there was no meaningful point in trying to conquer outside of the continent, far away and technologically unsustainable, when there were still immediate neighbors who weren't conquered.
This has nothing to do with cultural character, and everything to do with a lack of means and opportunity. The hindu kush is big and expensive to move armies through. Armies that hadn't even dominated the much richer neighbors. Even the Romans prioritized their conquests.
I wasn't specifically referring to binding treaties here, but rather future intent. The US clearly signaled an intent to defend Taiwan IF Taiwan actually chooses to resist (which is still an open question at this point, admittedly). Japan has also indicated that its open to the idea. There's near-zero interest from anyone else though, including Europe and India.
And yet, you're still not explaining why they should, which was the point of the question.
This is, again, a selectively claimed standard based on, well, not even a notional obligation. If only two countries maybe- conditionally- without any binding obligation to- might involve themselves, where is the obligation of expectation for future intent coming from. That Europe- formal treaty allies, openly aligned- are not interested in such a position only weakens any basis of expecting India to take a higher position than them.
You're claiming India fails some nebulous standard... but why should anyone care about this standard in the first place that they never pretended to agree to?
What major international aims does it need to have?
You could ask a similar question to basically any geopolitically active country.
I... am. India is a geopolitically active country. You may be unaware of its activities, but this just sets up the point that your understanding of India's priorities and interests and the Indian government's are not aligned.
For India it could be countering the BRI, countering Chinese influence in SE Asia, building a Middle Eastern network to isolate Pakistan, forging diplomatic and economic links around the rim of the Indian Ocean to turn it into an Indian lake, etc.
These are nice for you to want India to seek, but that's not what I asked ('needs'), or a position of what India believes its needs are.
This is a pushback against a sort of typical minding of 'India makes no sense for not pursuing its interests as I see them,' without actually identifying if those interests are what India agrees are goals ('countering' BRI means what?), practical (how is a Middle Eastern network going to practically isolate Pakistan rather than the same Arabs maintaining relations with both), or not already in the process (forging diplomatic and economic links around the Indian Ocean).
Building on this, I saw no recognition by the OP of the distinctions between types of strength, or even the distinction between power and strength. Weak leaders can have much power, and use the power of their position / context / brute force to paper over their weaknesses against those with less power.
Moreover, the 'strong men are where the survivors are dominant' easily misses that Darwinian selection doesn't select for strength, it selects for survival. Survival only correlates with strength when the selection force is targetting weakness- but it often doesn't. Wars will kill the brave and the selfless first, while cowards who flee live. Purges will select for those with the strength of the (wrong) conviction, but spare the sophists or the deceitful. Darwinian survival isn't survival of the best, it's the propagation of those most likely to multiply. Calling those features 'fitness' is assuming the conclusion.
I don't know any specific paper on that specific claim, but this article might point towards something. The general framing is that smart people are more able to rationalize their biases away as something else.
https://bigthink.com/the-present/the-dangers-of-being-smart/

There are innocent contexts, but the problem for Biden is that he is associated with repeated, consistent, and public denials that he was involved in any for Hunter Biden's business deals. Any emails to that will be another albatross to Biden among non-Democratic voters, in much the same way that Hillary had her own email scandal that just sapped over time.
If Biden has said from the start that he did personal business with Hunter, the Republicans would have pounced but voters wouldn't have cared as much unless there's something actually disreputable. The bigger issue is the contrast in insisting there was no business overlap, and now even the more sympathetic media are acknowledging that family and business mix, even as they avoid directly addressing questions about Hunter. It's probably meant to mitigate, but it's a context where the innuendo (false deniale, followed by non-denials) are damaging in their own right.
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