Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
Not exactly an expert on neon production, though for a good pop-culture roundup on the importance of neon production that overlaps, try this-
https://www.rdworldonline.com/why-theres-a-neon-shortage-and-why-it-matters/
That is where the current situation in Ukraine enters the picture.
Air separation plants are expensive to build and operate. The products aren’t particularly difficult to transport, whether as a cryogenic liquid or compressed gas, but they are expensive to transport. Air separation plants generally serve a relatively local market or a large consumer. Distillation processes scale well, benefitting from what is commonly called the “two-thirds scale factor.” This is a mathematical relationship between how big something is and how much it costs to build. The capital investment to build an air separation plant grows at only 2/3 the rate of the capacity. Stated simply, bigger is better.
The neon industry in Ukraine takes advantage of very large air separation plants associated with steel manufacturing. These have economies of scale. They are a source of low-cost, crude neon-containing material that is a great starting point for making the purified neon used in lasers. Two manufacturers, Ingas and Cryoin, came to dominate the neon supply. They built on a feedstock advantage, gaining a further scale advantage. By some accounts, Ukraine was supplying about 70% of the world’s neon. Others estimate closer to 50%. No matter what the exact figure, the result is a dramatic and significant drop in the supply due to the war.
The current disruption is making many re-evaluate the global neon supply chain. It will likely lead to new entrants into the high-purity neon market. It is also causing a re-examination of neon use in excimer lasers. There is no replacement for neon, but use patterns are being examined in an effort to reduce consumption. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 prompted a flurry of research on reducing neon usage. Recycle systems for neon are commercially deployed, but are costly.
So to guess at your questions-
-From what I've read, the chip market is going to suck for the forseeable future, and this is separate from the US lawfare against Chinese chip-making capacity. (One may even suspect that it was timed and launched with this expectation.) Chip production bottlenecks for the next several years- easily 5-to-10?- are going to hurt a lot of industries, and compound the economic woes of anyone currently either unable to afford relevant industries (potentially Europe with energy prices), legally access relevant technologies (China and Russia), or just weren't a player.
-Ramping up production elsewhere is possible, but difficult, and it's unclear how fast/able anyone is able to do this. Ukraine was used during the Soviet Union for reasons including steel production and logistics. Steel production- which provided the economies of scale mentioned before- is very energy intensive. The European energy-intensive industries were based on assumptions of cheap Russian energy imports... which aren't here anymore. I'd bet my blouse that China and the US have efforts, but I'm not familiar with anything specific.
-While in the longer term I'm given to understand a lot more people will develop neon production capacity out of need, the issue isn't so much the final price of neon then, but what the dynamics of the interim are between now and then. By the time neon supply restabilizes, the world could go through some major economic transitions or inflection points that radically reshape the global economy. Europe's efforts to combat Russian energy warfare are disguising a lot of the industrial pain behind consumer price controls. China has basically given up deflating some serious economic bubbles in the name of social stability... which means worse effects if they pop. Global demographic changes are accelerating, as rich countries get older and smaller. This great chip disruption could be the sort of thing that snarls a lot of countries on that front for a few years... by which point it's too late.
Or maybe that's over-stating it. Regardless, having any sort of control over a vital high-technology input resource is useful.
This irrelevant to my post about economical prospects, nationalist corrupt oligarchs are still corrupt oligarchs that prevent any meaningful raising of quality of life.
This is entirely relevant, because nationalist corrupt oligarchs have priorities greater than solely self-enrichment. Hence the qualifier.
I know why would you think that I am talking about recent military help by US but I not.
You didn't talk about any specific sort or amount of aid. Raising military aid as an example demonstrates the shortcoming.
This text could have been written and posted before the war with almost no changes. I'm talking aid and loans that were given before and didn't help Ukraine reach at least Belarus level.
Are you? Because you're not actually identifying any specific aid packages, by any specific amount, with any targetted goal that they failed to meet. You're continuing to conflate different types and targets of aid, and inventing a metric they failed by. This is basic assuming the conclusion.
Even the metric you're probably referring to- GDP per capita- doesn't actually speak to corruption or failure of aid. Belarus is a country of about 10 million people, whose economy is a not particularly impressive but still established manufacturing economy in value-adding industry. Ukraine is a country of about 40 million, but far more of a farming and resource-extraction based economy, much further down on the value chain. The fact that Belarus has a GDP per capita of about $8.5k USD to Ukraine's $5k USD is neither particular surprising.
Nor does it indicate a failure of aid, because- again- you're not identifying any actual aid amounts give, or what their target effects are. Raising to $5k GDP/capita could be an amazing result, or a normal result, or a terrible result- you're not indicating. Raising GDP per capita may not be the goal of aid at all- the aid could be going to other purposes, like developing civil society institutions, or developing state capacity, or other things for which raising average citizen salaries is neither the point or the goal.
Do you disagree with the factual statement talks of the euro integration started in the 90s?
Sure. I disagree it's the relevant facts to assessing or characterizing the situation that you are describing, and thus an unfit argument. If you are almost two decades out of date of relevant context, you are two decades out of date.
The nature, characteristics, level of social and government commitment, and reciprocal interest in Ukrainian association with the EU is entirely different between now and the 90s. Making a like-to-like argument of the conversations of the 90s to today is a false comparison, even if individual facts are true.
In my opinion this is objectively true and this is why I written it like I did. I don't say that ascendancy to EU is impossible in the next 20 years. I just showing of countries like Montenegro that widespread support isn`t enough to join quickly. If war related campaigns will succesfully pressure European countries into accepting Ukraine with all of its barrage of problems than it will be great but I don't think this is likely.
To restate- you're not giving relevant facts, because the relevant fact isn't 'widespread support,' but a collection of dynamics of which 'widespread support' is just one. You did not make the argument on the basis of broader contexts.
You can list similar benefits for any country bordering the EU problem along this pros there are cons, some them not so obvious.
Of course I can, but the topic of your post isn't other countries bordering the EU, it is Ukraine, and you were the one making on argument on the reasons, or lack of reasons, for the Europeans to consider it.
If you intend to make an effort post on the pros and cons of Ukraine, I expect you to be able to competently speak to the pros.
But why is it poorer than Belarus - this is the issue.
While I am always pleased to see a motte and bailey alive in the wild, this is not the issue you were basing your argument on before, and is not actually an obstacle to joining the European Union. It's also appealing to a selective metric- while GDP per capita is poorer than Belarus, GDP is richer, and this is without considering other factors like the ongoing consequence of the multi-year war.
For some reason corruption perceptiveness and other indexes don`t show it. Corruption in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus is staggering, you can't talk about it lightly. You at least should agree that your view of EU is quite unusual.
Of course it is. It's also coming from someone unusually well read, and unusually interested in understanding how states interact. It doesn't change that "treason never prospers, for if it prospers none doth call it treason" has been an insight older than most of the modern states of the EU.
The reason that corruption perceptiveness doesn't register for most forms of corruption is because they aren't perceived as corruption by the societies doing them. It's 'just a way of business,' or cultural tradition, or some other euphism. What makes corruption distinct is that it is treated as a pejorative... but if it's treated as a euphism, or a beneficit thing, it's categorically different. That's why it's a corruption perception index, and not a patronage network index, even though patronage networks are one of the most classic forms of corruption.
In the European Union, one of the various systemic patronage network on the continent is the European Cohesion Fund. Between 2021-2027, it is allocated a 48 billion euro budget. The description of the fund, in its own words is: The Cohesion Fund provides support to EU Member States with a gross national income per capita below 90% (EU-27 average) to strengthen the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU. It supports investments through dedicated national or regional programmes.
This is not some secretive conspiracy. It's proudly announced in the European Commission website, including a nifty map graphic tool to look up individual projects to see just how much is being spent in your country or region:
It American political terms, this is pork barrel projects. In systemic power structure terms, this is a 8-billion-euro-a-year patronage network system in which richer countries pay the poorer countries for deference and continued alignment with the policy preferences of the EU's leading (donor) powers... and, as demonstrated in 2022, punish the poorer dissenters by withholding the patronage until compliance improves, when Hungary and Poland had their cohesion funds suspended (or threatened to be suspended). This is power of the purse politics.
In outsider terms, this is also a pretty basic form of monetary influence influence over elected leaders. Legitimately elected politicians are variously being bribed to support policies their electorates may nor, or being fiscally punished to coerce them into changing policies that do have electorate support. This is being done across levels of society to create parallel influence structures outside of electorate control, as these pressures can be used to target national leaders (nationally-distributed funds) but also bypass national leaders to pressure select regions or targeted dependencies (regional funds) to apply political effects in exchange for cash. These funds are broadly going into efforts that are not, and would not be, economically viable without these grants, developing dependencies by special interest groups hooked on maintaining, and expanding, these artificial funding stream and do so by applying influence from the inside of the power politics in favor of external monetary interests.
But it's not going to be perceived as corruption to most Europeans because this is accepted business, and the petty nuances of political policy changes in exchange for money aren't bad if you use the right words. It's about Fortifying Democracy, or Countering Far-Right Governments, or Restoring Rule of Law. It's Good Things, and thus cannot be corruption because Corruption is Bad.
But it's still a patronage network aimed at creating political effects in favor of the patrons. Corruption is a pejorative, but at its heart most corruption at a social level is various forms of patronage networks and groups making deals with eachother. Corruption is just what people call these dynamics when they don't approve of them- it's just a 'who, whom' instead of actual opposition to patronage networks trying to influence politics.
Why would EU want the poorest European country after Moldova, with the highest corruption and similar to Georgia problems(that of course could be theoretically solved in the near future but this is beside the point)?
Global food stability, advanced chip making, strategic depth, sentiment, internal European power struggles over the political center of gravity take your pick. The question is not 'why', but rather 'why are not you aware of the following?'
To start, being poor is not the issue for Ukraine. A poor GDP per capita in the European context is a cheap work force, which is a significant part of corporate viability in the European model. This is absolutely a mixed bag, but also kind of the point for the european economic model of the internal market and internal migration from east to west. Nor is the monumental costs of rebuilding Ukraine the objection- this is, after all, money that will be spent by European countries on their European companies to do business in Ukraine, in the name of integration. Different stakeholders have different interests, but no one expects Ukraine to circle a drain of constant recession and de-investment, which means there is profit to be made.
First, global food stability under European influence. Ukraine is poor in many things, but very, very rich in food, and had roughly a global share of nearly 9% global wheat, 10% barley, and 16% corn. This is 'regional famine prevention' levels of food production, and having it under European auspices- and not under Russian, where the food pressure has been used already for macroeconomic blackmail attempts- is a major global asset in the expected decades to come of global demographics. When the third rail fear of European politics is mass migration, having the food stability of the middle east not under Russian influence is rather important.
Second, Ukraine was responsible for 50% of global production of neon gas, which was a byproduct of industrial plants specifically built for it during the Soviet Union. This is relevant because industrial-grade neon is a key resource in high-value chipmaking. Any polity wanting to play for the advanced technology spheres needs a good source of neon, and while the war has degraded/destroyed a lot of Ukraine's, it's still a strategic interest to have regardless of corruption.
Third, strategic depth between Europe and Russia doesn't just go in Russia's favor. One of the key shocks to the European public was the realization that war was literally only a long day's car drive from Berlin, and the prospects of a Russian-dominated Ukraine on the border of Poland is a significant concern to countries like Poland. Among other things, Ukraine is a buffer, and like Finland a demonstrably capable buffer able between Russia and others.
Fourth, sentiment is not to be overlooked. European governments are broadly accountable to their voters, and the pursuit of re-election does mean that things that are popular with the voters will effect decision maker cost-benefits. This is most obvious in leading power Germany, where the government's obvious resistance to aiding Ukraine- from the helmet fiasco to stated fears of escalation- have been regularly overpowered by not just external pressure, but internal pressure. A German government whose voters supported neutrality would be much more resistant to pressure- a German government whose own voters want it to deliver arms finds itself backtracking its prior concerns. The same applies to corruption- corruption of Ukraine is not the most significant emotional concern European voters have about it, and corruption is only an obstacle in so much as people are otherwise neutral.
Fifth and finally, internal EU politics. There are two key nexus of interests that have an interest in resisting Ukrainian entry regardless of corruption- EuroFederalists, who fear a new nation will be too emotional to defer to the EUropean nationalism intended to replace nation-based nationalism, and the French-German axis, whose power within the EU frays as more members join, to the point that the French-German alignment is no longer the 'motor' of European policy in the way it once was. To those groups, any entry of a state of 40+ million people (half of Germany) would be a major barrier to the centralization of European Union power over European states, or the ability of France and Germany to jointly dominate that power over the other European states. To other countries, this isn't a bug, it's a feature, and expansion-of-the-EU-to-weaken-it has been a core policy of much of the European Expansion advocates, which has included powerful countries (UK, previously), weaker countries (who want to keep the EU loose instead of centralized), and especially the Eastern countries (who doubt Germany/France having their interests at heart vis-a-vis russia policy). Regardless of any level of corruption in Ukraine, people who want to move the political center of gravity eastward, or at least away from France and Germany, and who are not on board with a European unitary state will have an interest in Ukrainian ascession. Notably both parties are flexible on this as part of the give-and-take of European politics- the French and Germans have raised the prospects of watering down the veto as a precondition to allowing entry, others have used the Ukrainian issue to leverage the French and Germans into Russia policies that both were inclined to resist until dragged across the line.
There are plenty of reasons, and whether you find them compelling or not, you should at least be aware of other people's perspectives.
EU had enough of one Hungary with Orban stealing economic aid with his cronies, it doesn't need a second one. These internal problems will have to be corrected on their own, before, and not after, entry.
The EU's problem with Hungary and Orban isn't 'stealing economic aid,' it's that he uses the patronage network funding for non-pro-EU patronage networks. He's a fly in the ointment, but the ointment has always been largess to build patronage influence.
All in all, my position is you radically misunderstand the corruption dynamics involved in both Ukraine and in the EU itself, and are over-fixating on this issue. Corruption isn't why Ukraine will be barred entry by the likes of Germany or France- corruption will be the pretext used to facilitate, further, and defend their own interests within the European Union, that a Ukrainian entry might disrupt. The Europeans engage in their own corruption a plenty, and are quite willing to turn a blind eye when it suits them- what matters more is not that there is corruption, but the sort, and the tradeoffs.
A paragraph of questions is generally not one actually looking for them to be engaged, but I'll take a stab.
War that will make patriots out of corrupt oligarchs? It started in 2014.
And has had multiple decisive impacts against Russian intentions since 2013.
Multiple Russian efforts failed due to various sorts of nationalism by oligarchs refusing to cooperate with Russian pressure efforts. This started with the elite split over the Russian pressure on Yanukovych's corrupt reversal on the European Union association agreement in favor of the Eurasian Union in 2013, and dramatically escalated when many of the oligarchs in Yanukovych's own power base refused to support his Russian-pressured effort to start shooting protestors during Euromaidan, and then the major flop of the NovaRussia uprising in Eastern Ukraine where oligarchs generally supported post-Maidan Kyiv rather than join the Russian effort to astroturf a grassroots popular revolt. This doesn't even touch on the 2022 government cohesion in face of Russian invasion.
It's not that war has made patriots out of corrupt oligarchs. There is a war because a surprising number of corrupt oligarchs were already nationalists even before 2014.
A new president who promises to fix everything and fix corruption? It's happened so many times it's not funny anymore.
The relevant consideration for Ukrainian corruption considerations isn't because there's a new president, but that the war has created a new legal contexts and oversight measures with Ukraianian political support. This has not happened so many times before.
First, let's just be clear on something. The primary donor of economic aid, the states of the European Union, are not out to 'fix everything and fix corruption.' This is a false standard.
It also misses a key point of the European Union, which uses what others might call obvious corruption via patronage networks as a standard cohesion mechanism. The European Union is absolutely involved in the patronage system, and the way that even internal EU aid works is that governments taking aid are expected to use it broadly in the categories intended (agriculture subsidies on agriculture, not yachts), but who, exactly, gets the funds and how are left to the governments. It's a basic pro-European incentive scheme to build pro-EU interest groups who really like getting money and so are positively inclined to European influence in order to keeping it coming. This sort of pork is not what the Europeans consider unacceptable corruption, and patronage network of government elites building pro-government business elite networks is not the problem.
Since the war has started, Ukraine has gotten not only increased aid, but increased attention and various oversight mechanisms. Western donors, after all, have strong interests in seeing where their increase goes, and that it's having the desired strategic effect. The Ukrainian government, which is dependent on them in a way it was not under previous presidents, is in little position to refuse access, and has actually had an interest in granting access to its own information systems just to underscore how desperate the situation is. What has resulted is various access and tracking systems to western backers, which both gives institutions like the IMF insight on what is needed economically, and the Americans access militarily, but also also establish mechanisms. While some level of fraud is unavoidable- just look to the various western corruption issues around COVID monies- the war has brought new access into systems were the unacceptable corruptions rely on being opaque.
The war has also changed the political dimensions for western-pressured reforms. The Europeans have absolutely used the leverage of aid and Ukrainian desires/desperate to join the European community to pressure the Ukrainian government to make legal and administrative changes to improve on corruption. One of these results- something no previous president did- was dissolve the Kyiv Administrative District Court, one of the most notoriously corrupt court systems in the countries.
Between a confluence of crisis letting the government act, unique access and leverage by westerners pressing reforms, and domestic political support for the both, Ukraine has been undergoing major legal and structural shakeups no previous president of the last decades has matched.
Additional grants/loans/Marshall Plan 2.0? Didn't billions of dollars and euros already have go one way into Ukraine? Where did they go?
To the front, to salaries, to infrastructure and item purchases, and many other things needed in a war.
This is what I mean by question streams not actually being asked with the intent of receiving answers. The first is not a question or even referring to a specific thing (or, in the case of Marshal Plan 2.0, a thing that has happened), the second conflates the value/cost all forms of assistance, and the third presumes corruption for unanswered questions, even when the question doesn't even make sense.
Where does aid go? It depends on what the aid is, and when, and how one calculates. Since Ukraine is in a war, let's just take a single example: a single vehicle donation to the Ukrainian military.
Let's take a BMP-1. A BMP-1 is an early Soviet-era armored personnel carrier. It's not particularly good, but it serves a purpose. A google search says a single one costs roughly 1 million USD. But what is the cost? Not, actually, 1 million USD. BMP-1s are old, the cost of production was already consumed long ago, and in many cases are just legacy hard ware not intended for current use by their own militaries, and were slated for eventual replacement by more modern kit. Giving 30 BMP-1s is not equivalent to taxing your citizens $30,000,000 and then handing it over to the Ukrainian government for them to turn into yachts.
The answer to all unknown expenditures is not 'it was all wasted due to corruption.'
It has been talked about since the 90s and European leaders are now talking about "the long road ahead for Ukraine", the status of a candidate is not at all a guarantee of an early entry, ask Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro.
Appealing to the 90s, when Ukraine's elite and public were very indifferent about European association (and the European Union did not exist), and not 2014, when a major seminal moment saw the Ukrainian body politic actively affirm a desire for European association, is willfully ignoring quite a bit of context. Euromaidan wasn't a pro-European fanclub protesting, it was a result of long-established European-supported engagement structures successfully connecting with both publics and key elite interests to such a degree that a Russian-pressured lethal force crackdown was rejected by key members of the ruling coalition. The pro-EU political base in Ukraine has not been fair-weather or transient, enduring almost a decade of war now and demonstrating both enduring strength and conviction in a way that many of your examples have not, divided as they were for internal reasons.
Turkey is an interesting argument if you want to make it, but I'd argue Turkey was more interested in joining in the 90s/early 2000s than the EU was in letting them in... but this is due to factors not relatable to Ukraine, such as being a large muslim country and UK internal politics. The Ukrainians are not seen as outsiders in the way Turkey was, nor are they an election or two away from a conservative muslim government.
MTF for character limit.
Executive Outcomes was a lot better at fighting than the state militaries of Angola or Sierra Leone. That said, state armed forces usually make up for being inefficient by being able to marshal vastly more resources than any company could dream of and it's rare that a PMC/political paramilitary is bestowed enough resources to really compete on a major battlefield (the Waffen SS is the example of this).
There's also a matter of the difference between 'efficiency' and 'completeness.' In high-risk/high-cost endeavors, multiple measures of efficiency are meaningless if compromised by a lack of completeness to things outside the scope of the efficiency matrix. 'Efficiency' might be measured in metrics like 'ability to fire X rounds in Y time at Z range,' but completeness might be other factors as 'is there an entirely different unit capable of providing protection to allow the asset to live.' In the Moskva case, the Moskva was likely a very efficient cruise missile launcher right up until the point it sank for lack of a complete air defense concept being implemented.
This is a function of resources, but it's also the sort of resources that differentiate efficient private actors- who focus on cutting costs and unnecessary expenditures- to effective government actors, who use those resources for things other than the primary mission but which support other purposes in aggregate. Even if the governments were to chase 'efficiency' in the private-sense, there's no guarantee that the efficiency won't compromise the non-evaluated metrics and make things more-efficient-but-worse.
Sorry if that was the case. That being said, I don't think there's a point in relitigating the object-level justness of this war for either side yet again, since this has been done on this forum many times already and presumably hardly any opinions were shifted.
That's a shame, because I find it quite relevant.
For example-
(For the record, my position is still that all sides are morally in the wrong - the current Ukrainian government for seizing the country in a revolution in 2014
This is a factually incorrect object-level claim. Not only is the current Ukrainian government not the post-Maidan government, but the post-Maidan government did not seize the country in a revolution in the sense of words where revolutions are militarily factions seizing countries.
The Yanukovych administration fell when the President pre-emptively fled the country on 22Feb following the removal of riot police from contested Kyiv and the imminent voting of the Legislature against the pro-crackdown elements of the government including Yanukovych. These, in turn, cannot be separated from the previous week of violence which changed the domestic politics of Ukraine when Yanukovych succumbed to Russian pressure to escalate a crackdown of protestors, which instead destroyed his own domestic power base among the oligarchs and security forces.
Opposition elements joining the government was already a negotiated point by mid-Feb, due to protests and negotiations for a unity government earlier in Euromaidan. That negotiation period towards a unity government was the context of the leaked US diplomat phone call that is regularly raised as proof of a US coup, where the American diplomats are discussing people who could be included for a viable government. However, while the Americans were pressing for a unity government involving the protestors, the Russians were lobbying for Yanukovych to escalate violence and crush the protests, with Russian-aligned media framings being of 'insurrection' and 'terrorism' to justify crackdowns.
A major escalation in the final week occurred about 17/18FEB (depending on time zone dating), when what are now believed to be Ukrainian security service snipers (but at the time were also alleged by Russian-aligned spheres as protestor or american false-flag) opened fire into mostly protestors. Initial reporting was around 20 persons, and at the time the escalation was seen as being a result of direction/pressure by Moscow due to media and Putin associate statements, as well as the Russian sanctions. Putin authorized sanctions against Ukraine when Yanukovych began to make concessions to protestors in Jan that included the dismissal of Yanukovych's cabinet as part of creating a unity government. The sanctions were reversed the day before the 17/18FEB escalation, during which Ukrainian media leaked that Yanukovych had a phone call with Putin coinciding with the start of the operation. The 17/18th escalation, which was a marked increase in state violence with lethal shootings, was accompanied by further destabilization of Yanukovych's faction, as he fired the Chief of the General Staff and had some party members flee his coalition.
This already-destabilizing escalation then escalated further on 20FEB, the Interior Minister Vitali Zakharchenko- the minister in charge of those police snipers from earlier- announced signing a decree authorizing the use of live ammunition against protestors. This time ~50 people were shot, mostly protestors but at the time reports also included police At this time, the presence of Interior Ministry snipers was already circulating in social media but also international media for weeks since late January when the first wave of gun deaths had happened. At the time snipers had started, Ukrainian police were reportedly not being issued guns to shoot with, with the presence of snipers being contested as Interior Ministry, but also claims of radical protestors / false flag attacks. However, the 20FEB escalation, and the Interior Ministry live ammunition decree, drew shifted significant political perception back towards 'it was the government all along' theory of who was responsible for the earlier shootings, even as the government was beginning to try and involve the military (including transferring military forces to counter-protestor interior security control).
However, again, the escalations, even if supported by pro-Russian factions in Yanukovych's administration, were fragmenting Yanukovych's own political base. Remember that Yanukovych had just fired senior military officials for unreliability in the last week. On 21Feb, the Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff resigned in protest, but even more importantly the mayor of Kyiv, Volodymyr Makeyenko, a Yanukovych appointment who was also a former Communist Party official and graduated from Leningrad, announced he was leaving the President's party.
To re-iterate: the Russian-educated former communist party member turned appointed mayor with influence over the city riot police didn't want to go along with his own political patron's plan of shooting the protestors.
Long story short, that same day the city riot police gave up contesting public squares, the Ukrainian legislature voted to resciend the President and Interior Ministry powers that were being used to shoot 100 people in the capital streets, and Yanukovych and the pro-crackdown politicians, generally pro-Russian, were fleeing the country and claiming it was a coup to whoever would listen.
But at no point did revolutionaries storm the government.
I am fairly sure you did not know half of this, probably will not believe it, and will otherwise dismiss because position inertia is a hell of a drug and no one likes having ignorance on a topic turned into a bad essay, but object-level justifications continue to matter because object-level things happened, and the object-level claims of these things is being used to perpetuate massive amounts of human suffering that is scaling into the tens millions in the current war.
A war which which was started by Vladimir Putin in 2023 on the pretext of protecting separatist republics.
Separatist republics which only still existed because Putin ordered conventional military interventions to to preserve them for the sake of the Minsk negotiations to codify Russian influence Ukraine.
The Minsk strategem being necessary because Russia defanged all pro-Russian political parties for electoral influence by taking the most pro-Russian regions out of the Ukrainian electorate.
The Pro-russian regions being taken out of the Ukrainian election because Putin ordered the 2014 military intervention to sustain the failed NovaRussia campaign.
The NovaRussian campaign failing because Putin thought he could spark a massive pro-Russian popular rebellion against post-Maidan Kyiv.
Putin thinking NovaRussia would work because of the Crimean success.
The success in Crimea being ordered by Putin to secure the Crimea port from a post-Maidan government hypothetically changing its mind on a then-uncontroversial presence.
The post-Maidan government existing because the Ukrainian oligarchy wasn't willing to shoot the Maidan protestors at Putin's behest.
The Maidan protesting starting because Putin made a very transparent bribe/pressure campaign to have Ukraine join the Eurasian Union.
The bribe to join the Eurasian Union coming because Putin didn't want Ukraine having the already agreed, and politically popular, Association Agreement with the European Union.
For the better part of the last decade, at nearly every stage in the Ukraine crisis, Putin has had agency on how to proceed, and keeps fucking it up, and it's object-level incompetence to confuse the series of events with some sort of Ukrainian revolutionary civil war, which Putin just so happens to be supporting the losing faction in, which is losing due to Western support for the other. Yanukovych did not lose against some sort of American-funded military force.
Yanukovych did not fleet the country because the protestors started to overwhelm the government by illegitimate violence, or any sort of violence. Yanukovych fled the country because he tried to conduct a lethal crackdown at Russian pressure without the necessary support of the Ukrainian oligarchy, and the Oligarchy refused to go along with it.
Yanukovych was firing senior military officers for unreliability, only to have others resign rather than participate in a crackdown, paralyzing the military support. His personally appointed leader of city administration, who had been willing enough to contest the squares, refused to go along with a lethal-force decree. And this was after members of his party were jumping ship, after he had already made significant concessions to protest groups to bring in opposition politicians into the government and dismantle his own core cabinet, before the 20FEB lethal force decree.
And this is all in the capital city itself, where the political strength of a national government is normally strongest. In other parts of the country, various institutions- and thus their associated oligarchs- were already sympathetic or siding with the protestors outright.
Yanukovych was not couped or ousted by revolutionaries. He was a politically weak leader in a national oligarchy who didn't have the backing of the oligarchy to conduct a purge of the citizenry at the behest of a foreign power. He tried, he failed, he fled, but it wasn't the revolution or foreigners who did him in, it was his own power base abandoning him.
Some relevant links from the time. Yes, they are English speaking media sources, and western. Feel free to dispute object-level claims central the points being made.
Soldiers who shoot at any moving target during battle - yes. The massacre of combatants, whom the soldiers consider to be combatants (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haditha_massacre) - yes.
And in the Bucha case, the shooting of people bound in basements and in other places and forms of captivity.
But when a party that clearly has a conflict of interest and uses the statements of the Ukrainian government, which is quite often lying, starts telling stories that are clearly designed for an emotional reaction and are implausible from the point of view of hypothetical actors - I show a lot of skepticism.
Fortunately, the UN is not a party of the conflict, and used the statements of people they themselves interviewed along with sites they were granted access to, including sites and personnel that incriminated Ukrainians.
Well, this post kinda exemplifies my point: @Dean is living in some sort of fantastical propagandistic counterreality where Russia is engaging in Warhammer 40k levels of no-prisoners, collateral-damage, occult-civilian-torture Khorne worship tier warfare.
Citation where I said this, please.
Which they're not, as the very existance of POWs attests.
Please identify the argument I made which the very existence of POWs attests. (Or contests.)
Having norms of war that you're not supposed to violate ever, is therefore a good idea, because you may, as in the case of @Dean, find yourself deranged with bloodlust and disconnected from reality, and without those (hopefully) inviolable norms you may thereby be led to doing something stupid, like playing dehumanisation chicken with an enemy who holds hundreds of thousands of your people under occupation.
My position is that the Russians already engage in dehumanization of the Ukrainians in their occupation zones, entered into the war with an intent of cultural genocide, planned for filtration camps to target non-combattants, and that there is no game of 'chicken' going on because the Russians intended to do this from the start.
Sure, maybe Ukrainians under occupation, and POWs in Russian hands, are not quite as sprightly as one would like, but they're not all literally dead, and therefore ipso facto we have proof that Russians are showing (some level of) restraint / respect for the humanity of Ukrainians under their boots. So I reiterate that Finland's dehumanisation race to the bottom has ample space to make things worse via retaliation.
Please identify what policies the Russians will inact as retaliation as opposed to what they have already been doing before and were already going to do regardless of Finnish politician positions.
Is your position that the Russians will move from limited torture and murder of civilians on the basis of imperialistic ethnochauvenism to significantly less limited torture and murder on the basis of Finnish politicians, as opposed to increasing war-stress of conscript troops in need of catharsis amidst a grinding war they are poorly equipped or trained to handle professionally?
It would have remained a mostly peaceful special operation if the US and EU had not meddled like they did in so many other countries in the last few decades.
Even setting aside the factual inaccuracies, this doesn't explain your own inability to understand other people's viewpoint or priorities.
Clearly not, or else migrants would be going to the wealth in Africa, which is the highest it's ever been in human history, and not to wealthier countries elsewhere. This distinction in grades of wealth is itself held within the European Union, where Ukraine would not be the wealthiest, and thus not in the area where migration flows would be intending to go.
Yet the EU intended to distribute them to Hungary and Poland.
Ah! So you're not arguing the immigrants are going to Hungary and Poland because they're wealthy places now, I see. Will you update your prior argument accordingly?
Plus at some point being overrun by migrants will have an impact on the Western economies.
This does not explain your inability to understand why other people may not care about this as much as a quite violent invasion.
There is not.
Then why did you raise Poland as an example?
Mocked and derided by whom, exactly? Probably not by other pro-war people.
Probably not, no, and there's no much I can say beyond that without coming off with an unintended tone.
With few exceptions (usually shortly preceding that side's failure to attain its objectives for the foreseeable future), most wars are supported by most people on each warring side.
And yet, only one side in a war of aggression by choice can be responsible for starting the war. Hence the need to resist deliberate or inadverdant efforts to smuggle in the connotations of equivalence via a generic 'support' to equivocate non-equivalent causes and forms of support.
It really does matter if one supports a war because 'that land and its people are ours, and we're going to take it from them whether they like it or not,' and 'this land and its people are ours, and we are going to defend it.' Supporting offense and supporting defense are two substantially different dynamics, in terms of ethics and agency and the principles of Just War which are relevant to discerning the worst of wars and the best of wars, which is what distinguished when pro-war types of the worst of wars are mocked..
If I remember correctly, you are one of the pro-war people for your side in this war, too.
You mis-remember, or at least mis-understood.
I am one of the people who said that a war was a credible prospect given the Russian diplomatic plays of 2021, predicted that a war would be long, bloody, and costly for the Russians (though I did predict 'NATO-supported insurgency' rather than 'conventional match'), claimed that the Russians would offensively culminate around the summer and not overrun the Ukrainian army during the second (and third) phases when the conventional mis-match was still solidly in Russia's favor, and assessed that the dynamics involved with key actors, ranging from emotional electorates to domestic political dynamics, would see the Russian political strategy for Ukrainian/western capitulation fail. I regularly write on what I view various government perspectives to be beyond the level of claimed positions, and why I believe they are doing things they do at the time beyond government public-facing narratives. I have consistently held the position that the war is a tragedy, hoping the Russians cutting their losses and abandoning the sunk cost fallacy of a war they've engaged in, while also acknowledging my long-held belief that Putin is a strategic medicority driven more by ego than calculus who won't do that, thus driving key actors to continue opposing him as there are no viable political blocks in Ukraine or in Ukraine's key backers who could survive (or want to) make the argument in favor of concessions to Putin for reasons ranging from domestic politics to long-term strategic interest.
These were predictive, and descriptive, but not advocacy that merits the term 'pro-war' in any non-equivocation sense.
But, if you need a category, I am generally inclined to 'pro-Just-War' based on the principles of Just War Theory, both Jus ad Bellum (conditions in which using military force is justified) and Jus in Bello (conduct by warfighters in war), and generally find the Russians failing in both while the Ukrainians passing.
Something like a "but this is morally different because the others started it" also is not so compelling when the others plausibly believe the same about you, as I figure each side also does in just about any war since the "we shall gloriously seize land because its current owners are weaker" narrative has gone out of fashion centuries ago. (Claiming that this is what the other side believes hasn't, but that's a different matter.)
People believing stupid things is both plausible and still stupid, and the sincerity of someone's belief in their beliefs does not really affect the correctness of their arguments. As the fable goes, only one woman actually gave birth to the child, no matter how many claim, or sincerely believe in, their mothership.
Ultimately, I am not the sort of post-modernist who believes subjectivity trumps all, or that all things are subjective, or that even subjective things are beyond dispute.
Get rid of bureaucratic nonsense. I think that this word in everyday use has a completely different meaning.
No, I decline to defer to your appeal for definition gerrymandering.
Many people use words wrong, but this is one whose context was specified, and whose definition for the scope of genocide has been an established part of international law longer than you've been alive.
And, you know, was refered to via the reference of international standards, to prevent confusion.
Both Russians and Ukrainians constantly claim that they find torture chambers in the occupied territories, this is probably just information garbage.
Well, that's one way to describe inconvenient UN investigations.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/637/72/PDF/N2263772.pdf?OpenElement
If we talk about Bucha, then we are talking about the alleged incident with the execution of men mistaken for artillery spotters, a guy on a bicycle who unsuccessfully rode onto a convoy preparing for battle and many civilians killed by Ukrainian artillery.
No, we're talking about the one involving torture and summary executions of civilians, as well as bodies being left in the streets for over a week as identified by commercial imagery despite Russian claims that the bodies were staged by Ukrainian forces as part of false allegations.
I don't think it's intellectually fair to use the word "genocide" (which most people associate with the physical extermination of people) in relation to a situation where children from an orphanage in Mariupol are sent to an orphanage in Russia.
If you don't think it's fair to apply the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, a convention of over 70 years of establishment international law, which even Russia is a a party to, for international standards of genocide, I question your standards of intellectual fairness.
Do you consider restrictions on the study of the Russian language in eastern Ukraine a genocide?
No, nor do they meet the international standard of it. Per Article II of the convention-
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
The Russians will be brutal regardless, and will continue to be brutal over any Ukrainian territory they control both now and potentially in the future.
Probably the exact opposite is true. Russians will not be cruel to the local population no matter what, because they consider the local population to be Russian.
Black Comedy can be found in thinking the Russian state wouldn't be cruel to Russians. Evidence of Russian cruelty to Ukrainians under Russian occupation can be found from Bucha to Kherson.
There's a number of ways you can take that further as well. One of the key insights of Clausewitz- the 'war is an extension of politics by other means' as it's often raised- is also relevant in this. When war is remembered to achieve political objectives, the conduct of soldiers- if that conduct carries political impacts- also impacts the political strength of the state to resolve the conflict favorably. Given the ever-increasing cost of war, both when it extends in time and the 21st century quality of arms support, political impacts from war crimes can far, far outstrip both short-term advantages of breaking laws of war, but also the direct military impact of poorly disciplined forces.
One of the key points in the early Ukraine war, what I would call a seminal moment that galvanized war support for an extended conflict and moved 'a cease fire as soon as possible, to mitigate the costs' outside the Overton window, was the Bucha massacre. In the last week of March, there was an ambiguous period where it was clear that the Battle of Kyiv had been lost by the Russians, but it wasn't clear what should follow next- the Russians had major gains in the south, the east wasn't lost but was precarious, and while the Ukrainians were starting their counter-offensives in the north it wasn't clear how hard the Russians would fight for the territory. There was quite a bit of discussion in the foreign policy / diplomatic circles about what should follow, and 'Kyiv should make concessions for a cease fire at least vaguely on its terms, even at territorial cost' was still being mooted in key circles, especially in Europe, which was just getting over the initial crisis response but hadn't worked a consensus on how much / how long to support Ukraine.
If there was a time Russia might have been able to use a near-miss and leverage it into a diplomatic concession, this was probably the last time... until Bucha.
Bucha changed both domestic and foreign Ukrainian politics. For domestic Ukrainian politics, the massacre in Bucha- a city northwest of Kyiv and so outside of even the most 'moderate' of territorial concessions or Russian-speaking areas of influence- served as a demonstration of sorts for Russian intentions for all of Ukraine. Ukrainians already under Russian control from occupation- not combatants, but under the administration- being imprisoned, tortured, murdered, and in some cases raped- was a natural template for what Russia was likely not only already doing, but would continue to do, to other Ukrainian areas. Leaving members of the nation-tribe to Bucha- where the atrocities preceeded the fighting and couldn't even be blamed on fighting for the city- made a national-level political concession basically untenable in the short-to-medium term. That alone would have extended the conflict by several months- and thus a considerable amount of Russian military expense of prestige and hardware.
But Bucha also affected the international space, because it suddenly discredited everyone who had been willing to argue that leaving the Russians in part of Ukraine wouldn't be so bad, and that Russian actions would be limited to the ethnic-russian areas of interest and could spare the rest. Bucha- far outside any claimed Russian area of interest, and not in the context of ongoing military operations- made that sort of concession, a requirement for any sort of Russian sphere of interest in eastern Ukraine, a politically impossible stance for even the most war-fearing European diplomats to push, lest their own publics vote the governments out. And so European elements who might have tried to pressure Ukraine to concede were disempowered, and were largely unable to gather any sort of force for another several months, leaving the gates open for expanding European aid across time and types.
For Russia- whose war plan success hinged on a political capitulation by the Ukrainian government, and political concession by the Europeans- Bucha was an absolute disaster and counter-productive incident at a decisive part of the war. Whatever the goal was at the time, the consequence to the war was absolutely against Russia's strategic interests.
Which is not claiming the point is false, or invalid.
There is a reason that pro-war people for the worst of wars are often mocked and derided. That it is not Russian-specific doesn't degrade the relevance to the current Russian context.
Only as a qualifier as totality of options, not as an assessment of what will play. If analysis dismisses other options as not going to happen, it doesn't become factually untrue in the normal construct of conversational language.
At which point this becomes a selective demand for rigor on the totality of bounding language, which is itself smuggles in a framing context expectation not claimed by the speaker. Note, however, that the objection wasn't to the totality of the bounding language, but the sub-claims, the disproof of which was by other claims of the same sort.
I just find it odd that 'nationalists' would run from the Russian Empire to immediately jump into the Western EU Empire.
This is indeed a curious limitation. Why are you unable to understand why people might want to run from an empire that has, is, and signals a clear intent to continue brutalizing a people, to an association that does not?
Between the two immigration policies, the one that doesn't have the migrants bringing in heavy artillery and conducting war crimes would indeed seem to be the preferable immigration policy.
voluntary association
Haha yes 'voluntary'. We just choose to go along the propaganda. How lucky we are to suddenly have a desire for transgenders and gay marriage and open borders!
If you have a desire for transgenders, gay marriage, and open borders, that's on you and your electorate, but that really has nothing to do with voluntary association of a nation to voluntarilly associate without a threat of war for not doing so.
Well, I suppose other than the 'will be invaded by Russian' context, but this isn't an ultimatum extended by Europe, and so any dismissal of the voluntary nature leaves the blame with Russia, not the Europeans.
migrants (who have not, to date, prioritized going to the poorer eastern countries over richer parts of Europe)
It's inevitable. These Ukrainians are apparently attempting to become wealthier. With wealth comes migrants.
Clearly not, or else migrants would be going to the wealth in Africa, which is the highest it's ever been in human history, and not to wealthier countries elsewhere. This distinction in grades of wealth is itself held within the European Union, where Ukraine would not be the wealthiest, and thus not in the area where migration flows would be intending to go.
Not clear why you're unable to understand why people might have different levels of care about the importance of migraiton policy over threat of invasion, though. That still seems weird.
Unless by this statement, the brave Ukrainian soldier means that he wants to be like Poland and refuse to take in the refugees that the EU asked them to:
'everyone has the right to exist and live in our country.'
Seems like you've solved your racial objection.
If your objection with association with a less brutal neighbor is refugee policy, and have identified a European model that does not entail having to take in refugees, you have just resolved your own objection.
Well, (a) this isn't very charitable, given that Russia's stated aim is denazification and prevention of crimes against humanity against Russo-Ukrainians,
Russia's stated aim is irrelevant to charity. Russia's revealed aim and policies have included multiple crimes against humanity that do amount to international standards of genocide, and in line with Russian narratives justifying such on the rejection of the legitimacy of Ukrainian nationhood.
and (b) even if all Ukrainian-US propaganda is true and Russia really is capping any Ukrainian who ever looked fondly at an EU / NATO flag... there is always more brutality to be had.
The Russians will be brutal regardless, and will continue to be brutal over any Ukrainian territory they control both now and potentially in the future.
Daring Russia to sink even lower by engaging in anti-Russian dehumanisation will not, I think, have the long-term salutary effect Halla thinks it will: any Ukrainian lives saved from acceleration in victory are likely to be more than counterbalanced by Ukrainian lives lost from the incrementally more brutal Russian counterreaction.
That's an interesting claim, considering Russia retains maximalist war goals that are not limited to 'just' the 4 claimed sub-regions, let alone the occupied areas.
I ask you not to be obtuse.
I ask you to be competent and historically literate.
If it weren't the US but Russia, or any other nation you don't sympathize with, engaging in such an information campaign, would you earnestly say that it's a real attempt to convince through words, or would you dismiss it as blackmail / strong-arming?
I would indeed say that a country warning of an invasion months in advance, publicizing normally unannounced state visits on the topic, engaging in public diplomacy with regional actors who in turn give public dismissals, and publicly changing its defense policy for public visibility at the expense of operational secrecy is, indeed, engaging in real attempts to convince through words, and not conducting in blackmail / strong-arming.
I would also note that blackmail / strong-arming ARE ways to engage in persuasion via words, but this is why I ask for competence and historical literacy.
Also, you're talking about something that was done in 2021. But this conflict very obviously didn't begin in 2021.
Only if you move the conflict back to 2014, which is not the context you have been speaking of. The military buildup for the February 2022 invasion very obviously did begin in 2021, with a non-trivial amount of publicly available imagery of the arms buildup where equipment brought west for Russian exercises in early 2021 was not returned with participating units, and imagery of expanded weapons buildups over time were publicized.
Not only is this in recent contemporary history not even a year old in some cases, but basic knowledge of logistics would recognize that the war had a substantial build-up phase that began well before February 2022 to enable the Russians to conduct the invasion. Hence the request for competence and historical literacy.
Multiple commenters here made the argument that I'm being obtuse/autistic if I'm taking the words of a politician literally. Fair enough. Let's then be honest with ourselves: we know that when a politician makes a public argument in the context of an ongoing war, and says that 'one side could not be convinced through words, so they now need to be compelled through force', the message he means to communicate is 'we're the good guys, so we tried everything to resolve this conflict through diplomatic means', not 'we tried blackmailing them into staying passive while the other side gets to do everything it wants'.
I disagree this is honesty, and instead would characterize this as incompetence at best, and demonstrating historically illiteracy for what preceeded the February 2022 invasion.
This seems a curious deficiency. Why are you unable to understand that people have different views on armed invasion versus voluntary association and the travails of dealing with migrants?
Was this intended to be a reply to someone in particular down-thread? It's not really structured as a general argument.
It's anything but. First of all, it completely ignores the jus ad bellum <-> jus in bello distinction and pretends it doesn't even exist.
You also ignore that they aren't making an argument on jus ad bellum philosophy.
If you want to make that something more than an isolated demand for rigor, we can, but the Russians failed that metric at the first stages, while people helping Ukraine can pass it pretty trivially.
It also assumes that anyone ever tried to convince Russia with words (When? Who? Of what?),
This is less of an assumption and more you showing your ignorance. The Americans were publicizing the buildup and raising the potential invasion in late 2021 with the Russians and the Europeans, and ended the year with an international attention campaign in late 2021/early 2022 about the impending planned Russian invasion down to the level of detail of Russian manufactured false-flag casus belli before they were conducted. While doing this they burned intelligence sources in a way rarely seen, even as they publicized years of military assistance and ongoing weapon deliveries with the obvious insurgency implications, such as ATGMs and MANPADs, which in internal signalling terms is a very un-subtle deterence message of 'if you try this, you will get fucked up.'
The American information campaign was derided at the time, for various reasons- the Russians denied they were going to invade, the French thought the Russians would have to be too stupid to invade for the Americans to be correct, and publicized European diplomats at the time made allusions to Iraq War intelligence failures, and everyone thought the Ukrainians would be beaten- but whatever one can say, it's not a lack of attempting to convince Russia with words.
And this is just the American-centric one, and doesn't even include the French efforts, for which Macron endured no small amount of mockery.
and claims to adhere to the universal moral code that only the side that attacks first bears any responsibility for the conflict (I'd be very, very surprised if these people actually believed that).
Who made this claim when?
This statement is, very obviously, factually untrue, as the war will also end if enough Ukrainian soldiers die, or if Ukraine sues for peace, or of any combination of outside actors forces both sides to enter a ceasefire,
This doesn't make the state factually untrue, it adds additional truths not included in the statement. Which is true of all true statements, because there is always more true things to add.
Just by adding addition end states of the same categorization scheme, you are supporting the claim of the statement.
Indeed, "more dehumanisation please" is an ESPECIALLY dumb argument to make when it's Russia occupying Ukrainian land and not the other way around, lol. This is surely the time to ask for more clemency, not less?
This presumes the Russians are willing to provide clemency if plead to, and is countered by point that Russia invaded Ukraine with the premeditated intention to set up filtration camps and start kidnapping, killing, and otherwise abusing pro-Western Ukrainians as a matter of policy and part of a broader cultural genocide effort in a war to destroy the Ukrainian nation.
To appeal for Russian clemency is to appeal for the Russians to reverse the policy objective which was a goal of the invasion itself.
There's also the third and fourth one, in that war crimes generally do not work to advance victory, and do contribute to bad order and discipline in your forces. These are related, but not synonymous, with the 'bad optics' role.
While 'war crimes' is a broad category, ranging from deliberately targeting religious structures (often used as observation posts for local tactical advantage) to mass atrocities, in general the arguments for expedience often disguise broader issues of national capacity. The conceit of 'we must break the rules in order to win' is more a relic of intellectual delimmas, or just self-justification, than a meaningful evaluation of national capacity. War crimes in general just don't help you win wars- by the time you could pull them off and win, you could generally win without them, and if you can't win without conducting war crimes, your margin of strategic victory is far more dependent on other factors... including external support, which comes back to the implications of 'bad optics.'

I don't disagree that you can have that perspective, but this gets back to my point that Orban's sin isn't running a corrupt patronage network, but in running a corrupt patronage network in the wrong way. The patronage network itself is not the problem- the European Union system wouldn't care if Orban was sending your tax euros to some guy's companies if Orban was singing the right tune, just as the American system doesn't really care when the family members of leading politicians end up as well compensated members of corporate or charity boards, or retired from government directly into media gigs of the Fourth Estate supposedly watching them during time in government.
At the end of the day, the European Union, and the governments of Europe that compose it, are groups of people grouped by political alliances and mutually beneficial arrangements. 'I scratch your back and you scratch mine' is one of the oldest quid pro quos there is, and it only sounds nefarious if you call it quid pro quo as opposed to 'compromise' or 'horse trading' or 'coalition building.' Different words can be used to re-characterize the same pushes and pulls of power.
There's actually an argument I've read before that corruption- at least in these more modest forms of mutual benefit- is a key part of building and maintain broad social groups, which would fall apart into zero-sum infighting without the common largess. This does seem to be a deliberate point of the European Project- a sort of bribing everyone to go along and get along- and is one reason the Polish and Hungary 'rebellions' are so politically disruptive. It's not about the money itself, but the rejection of a social contract that used money to mitigate the issues / autonomy of minor states, even as the European Project focused on the highest priority issue of controlling the risk of conflict between the most power (and richest donors), Germany and France (and, to an extent, UK). The EU, as a project designed to keep peace on the continent, has no higher priority than keeping Germany and France at peace, and certainly not beneficit corruption to keep others happy enough.
Where it falls apart, however, is when people start stigmatizing the natural, or the common, and losing sight of what their euphemisms actually decide. When people talk about Ukraine as a corrupt system, it's not a corrupt system in the sense of 'the cartels have intimidated the government into turning a blind eye,' or 'the police chief is always drunk and just does what the occupying army says.' It's important to understand that there are different types of corruption, the types that are relevant in different ways, and how different they are from your own euphisms and accepted practices before you point them out as the Obvious Reasons This Won't Work.
(Which you didn't, but I'm just rambling.)
More options
Context Copy link