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Dean

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joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


				

User ID: 430

Dean

Flairless

15 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

					

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


					

User ID: 430

And this is, again, demonstrating that the issue is not, in fact, the possession of classified documents, despite it being the claimed and presented reason for why it was a Significant and Serious Offense at the time.

'Trump played lawfare badly' is certainly a useful stick given his skills, but it remain a different stick.

The would be the 'insert context of choice' demonstrating that it's not about the underlying issue, but rather the search of a stick. Note how the stick is now 'compliance with a subpoena' and not the relevance of the classified documents that drove the subpoena.

Trump's declassification authority is relevant to the discussion because the injustice of violating process relies relies on the perception of the legitimacy of the process being applied. 'Resisting arrest' takes completely different tones and perceptions if the nature of the arrest is perceived as legitimate or arbitrary. Likewise, the relevance of complying with subpoenas relies on the legitimacy of the subpoenas. If the argument of Trump's classification authority (that he could not commit illegal storage of the classified materials because the President is who decides what is and is not classified, and Presidents have an acknowledged history of deciding what documents to take with them) is taken as legitimate, then the NARA demands for documentation, and FBI decision to raid to enforce, are illegitimate as a consequence because the NARA doesn't have a right to documents.

Trump's declassification authority is also relevant in that it is, by and large, unique to the President, and does not apply to the Secretary of State (Clinton), or Vice President (Biden). Turning the argument into 'compliance with the subpoena' just underscores the nature of the subject as a process crime, and not, say, the claimed-at-the-time justification of the importance of national security information whose improper storage could cause severe damage to the national security of the United States and thus justify subpoenas and a publicized FBI raid to recover.

Now, maybe some very damning facts will come out in the Biden case. It is a developing situation after all. But on the basis of the facts I know so far the differential response by law enforcement and related entities seem totally explicable.

The 'damning' fact comes down to declassification authority. The legal architecture of the American classification system is such that bar maybe a few categories of information (nuclear, iirc), the President is the ultimate classification and declassification authority. The legal argument in favor of Trump was that, as it was his decision / auspice to move the documents while President, it wouldn't be a criminal action for the President to do things in the purview of the President.

The NARA / FBI saga relied on the Biden Administration's legal position of 'nuh uh' and for the FBI to conduct a highly publicized raid in the context of then-ongoing Jan 6 hearings by the Democratic Party, as opposed to less obtrusive means.

The issue here is that these Biden documents, coming as they did from a time when Biden was NOT the declassification authority, lack even the 'I was the President at the time' defense. And, with multiple locations now identified, this is indicative of a pattern... but not a pattern being treated with the same urgency, publicity, or even legal rationals for why the Public Should Care.

To which most people will shrug, and go 'why should I care if -context of choice-,' and proceed to not care. Which is the point- the caring is not based on the legality of the situation (post-fact cooperation does not mitigate pre-discovery recklessness), it was based on people wanting a reason to go after someone they wanted to go after, while finding reasons not to go after people they don't want to go after.

Which is what was expected, and assessed/predicted during the Mar-a-Lago incident, when people were claiming it was a Very Serious Thing, as opposed to the cynical take that it was a Very Opportunist Thing.

That depends on who is being attacked by whom. As we saw with the Rittenhouse, self-defense after attempted murder after being pursued after attempting to flee a confrontation is a partisan privilege, not a right.

I'm not seeing this as a war within a culture. By the general article, less than a tenth wanted the statue to remain unchanged, and of the remainder not even half wanted to keep it anywhere as a historical item. Even destroying it was a majority (just over 50%) in the poll cited by the EuroNews article behind the reddit post.

The factor that made various statue removal/vandalism stories a culture war item in the United States was the dynamic in many cases that outsiders, not the locals, were the one pushing for/demanding the removal or conducting vandalism. These were cases of imposition, or ideological colonization of a area by outside groups that lacked local community support.

That dynamic doesn't really exist when over 50% of the poll of local residents is for outright destruction of the statue.

The same claim is always made by hawks against ceasefires. The North and South Koreans at the time opposed ceasefire - it was only due to pressure from their great power patrons that they accepted the armistice. They would gladly have continued fighting. Hawks, at the time, warned against it, saying that the dastardly North Koreans would attack again once they saw a chance. In that time an entire generation of Koreans has grown up and become old. You think Putin has another fifty years of life in him?

This, uh, is an awkward choice of historical comparison, considering North Korea absolutely did attempt on multiple times to attack South Korea in ways intended to topple the government, ranging from decapitation strike on a Blue House to attempted insurgencies to a provocation campaign intended to drive the Americans to withdraw so that the North Korean buildup could go against the relatively less built-up South.

The 'hawks' were absolutely correct that North Korea would attack again once they saw a chance, as demonstrated by them doing so, and so the hawk-influence on an armistice as opposed to a treaty was vindicated.

A seductive thought, but still wrong. If the young man had changed himself, it would have been merely to be a cog in the machine, with no impact and not having changed anything at all. Railing against the machine may have no effect, but so does self-modifying to fit into it.

Without defining this injected 'machine,' or what qualifies as 'impact', 'change', and 'effect', this means nothing in a way that demonstrates the claim is wrong.

If it's sophistry in one direction, it's for the same reason it's sophistry in the other. It is precisely because money is fungible that the argument that one's personal money is going to unacceptable cause X ('why should my money be going to Ukraine') is as valid as the refutation that you might as well say it's to a preferable cause Y ('no, your money is going to services you use'). Money doesn't start as fungible for government services, but stop being fungible and start being individual onus for other causes.

Nor does the American (or any other modern) taxation system work on the principle of 'figure out what the fiscal year's requirements are, then decide tax rates for the year,' so arguments that if Expenditure A was absent a person's taxes would be correspondingly doesn't hold water. No modern government works on the principle of 'only citizens who want to support X have to pay taxes to support it,' and that's a pretty basic misunderstanding of how governments works to confuse government taxation and expenditure systems with the structure of a purpose-structured non-government organization. This doesn't even touch on how much of the aid to Ukraine is actually conveyed, ie in the form of government inventories not seeing use and often slated for destruction without use.

Of course, this diversion too is all sophistry to avoid the pretty blatant and obvious answer as to why Citizen Whomever's tax money should go to Ukraine: because the representatives elected by Citizen's fellow Citizens voted so in accordance with the laws and established legitimate processes of the land, to the general support of Citizen's fellow Citizens, and Ukraine is not unique in this respect. Citizen Whomever's money is also going to water treatment, electrical infrastructure, schools, hospitals, police, tax incentives, procurement, government worker salaries, and so on. This is fundamentally the same complaint for all government expenditures for things an individual tax payer doesn't like. Not liking what the government spends taxpayer money on is not the same as taxpayer being spent unjustly.

IIRC, there was one amusing point in the Minsk negotiations where Russia was demanding the Ukrainians pay for the gas bills of the separatist states. So there was that point where they were NOT gassing.

The irony when the support comes in the forms of billions dollars of aid and weapons from the American militaro-industrial complex.

Not particularly ironic when financial/economic military support has been the cornerstone of American international strategy since the American colonies were gleams in the British eye.

A reasonable border conflict, similar to the Cuban missiles crisis.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was not a border conflict.

Again, there's a whole series of convenience store robberies you haven't looked at if Russia is the main perp in your eyes.

I am glad you are on the position that Russia is a perpetrator.

Not going to happen unless Russia is destroyed. Having a de facto NATO protectorate on your border is a matter of life or death for Russia.

Not really. Russian nuclear deterence, and on top of that there's a general lack of interest in any of its neighbors to invade Russia. Any death of Russia will be self-inflicted.

Now, running into a wall headfirst is a way to commit suicide, but it remains self-inflicted.

Russia's GDP is square miles. Square miles of resource-rich land, that Russians have been doing quite a good job at keeping under control, compared to say the West in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Russia's GDP is 1.7 trillion dollars. Russia's land area is a bit more than 17 million square kilometers. This is an average GDP per square KM is 100,000/km2.

A few years ago, Russia's closest GDP comparisons, right above and below, were Canada and South Korea.

Canada's GDP is about 1.9 trillion dollars. Canada's land area is about 10 million square kilometers. The average land GDP would be 190,000/km2. Canada, notably, has 90% of its population within 150 miles of the US border.

South Korea GDP is about 1.8 trillion dollars. South Korea's land area is 0.1 million square kilometers. The average GDP/square KM would be about 18,000,000/km2. South Korea is, notably, a country about the size of the US state of Indiana, only without the oil.

Russia's GDP is worse if you want a land comparison.

How well did the Arab Spring go for liberal democracy in North Africa and the Middle East?

As a Chinese communist said about the French Revolution, it's still too early to tell.

Kind of the opposite of pushing, really. The Donetsk and Luhansk separists, who started their uprising in April 2014, were only spared a quick defeat in 2014 due to the direct intervention of conventional Russian forces in August, about five months later. Before they did so, the separatists were basically being blockaded in the cities they controlled, as the broader pro-Russian/anti-maidan uprising the Russians were expecting fell flat.

Eastern Ukraine since 2014 is absolutely one of those contexts where the war only lasted as a long as it did due to external life-support and regular intervention. Donetsk and Luhansk had more in common with Kabul than Ukraine vis-a-vis Russia, right down to the tepid-at-best local support making local fighters dependent on external military forces.

If the goal was to protect ethnic Russians, the best course of action would have been to let the separatist states fall. Not only would there have been no war around the two cities, but they would have been quickly re-integrated into the post-Maidan political system, which actually would have allowed pro-Russian interest groups a chance to affect internal Ukrainian politics, rather than Russia's attempt to force the Minsk II constitution order change as peace terms. That method had the effect of taking all the pro-Russian influence groups out of Ukraine's politics, a mistake that was noted at the time as a gamble.

Is it that likely that a ceasefire would just lead to another war?

Depending on how you want to categorize the intervention, last February was the second, third, fourth or even fifth incursion by Russia against Ukraine in the last decade. First being Crimea, second being the NovaRussia 'uprising', third being the 2014 direct military intervention to save the NovaRussia uprising into what remained of the separatist micro-states which saw a major defeat of the 2014 Ukrainian army, the fourth being the various escalation-spikes in the not-so-frozen conflict, and fifth being the most recent.

The Russian Federation as an institution has set out goals that a cease fire on current terms would not meet, with very heavy-handed measures intended to ensure no major Russian political figure of significance could backtrack (the annexation of not-occupied territories, the early-war 'we all support Putin' public statements, the various filtration measures including systemic torture and executions that no figure has repudiated, the abduction of Ukrainian children and systemic adoption by Russians), while Putin in particular has demonstrated a pretty consistent and unchanging view on an end-state that doesn't exactly accept the status quo.

While there could be an argument that Putin could be indefinitely persuaded until his death that he isn't ready to attack Ukraine yet again, this is undermined by the fact that- by the public reports of those world leads who've met with him- Putin seems to really believe he can still win this current war, even as the strategic tools Putin had been counting on this war (specifically European gas dependence) will not apply in the medium-term future. In this context, Putin's use of a cease fire would be operational so that he could still operate before full European gas dependence, not indefinite like the Korean War.

And that's before we even get to the question of why my tax money should be the money that Ukraine gets.

What makes you think it's your tax money that's the money that Ukraine gets, as opposed to your pro-war fellow citizenry's money?

Your money tax money could be the tax money covering the roads and services that directly and indirectly support you. There's more than enough government expenditures to go around.

Well, yes there is something strange about it. A person is far more likely to die if he's at war than if he's under occupation; a person is far more likely to have all his infrastructure smashed if he's at war than if he's at occupation.

So why do people keep not surrendering?

It's not historically unusual for people to keep dying for abstract concepts like "statehood", but it certainly is strange from a cost-benefit analysis. History is unreasonable.

If the model fails to match reality, the failure is in the model, not the reality. People sacrifice for abstract concepts all the time because they place value in these abstract concepts over other abstractions like 'infrastructure', and whatever model of darwinian evolution you prefer has consistently upheld this as not just a reasonable group dynamic, but a dominant one. History is not unreasonable- it's unreasonable to suddenly expect people to diverge from their norms.

...which is, of course, a common theme in history, as various groups who think themselves above such baser thinking regularly fall victim to the same when they're the ones in such contexts, and their abstractions of what's reasonable give way to impulses much more real. States do not fight for their infrastructure- nations fight for their homes. Failing to understand the distinction is failing to reason with the known reality.

nothing odd about people supporting a victim of unjust aggression to anyone with a familiarity of social dynamics.

Anyone having empathy for any actors in wars a thousand miles away is extremely historically unusual and strange. For all of human history up until about T-100, what the Cossacks were doing in Zaporizhia would have elicited a shrug from anyone outside of Tartary. Why's anyone mad now?

Because people outside of Tartary are now able to be aware of it, of course, and with that awareness comes political pressure and expectations to do something about it.

For most of human history until about T-100, the technology did not exist for people to know about happened further away. Within a century of the telegraph, most of the traditional empires present at the time were dead or on their way out the door. Within a century of the radio, all of the traditional empires were. The information revolutions brought the far-away places no one could know or care much about into closer awareness, and as the technology spread, so did the pressures to care.

What changed was not human nature, but the technological revolution of communications that allowed human nature to extend it's range of awareness.

Maybe they did, but that should not translate into bombing civilians with strong ties to your much bigger and stronger next door neighbor.

Russia is much bigger, but not much stronger, as demonstrated by their offensive culmination in the first three months, before major land combat systems began being shipped to Ukraine in earnest.

The Soviet Union was much stronger- hence the access to Soviet economic stockpiles fueling the contemporary Russian military- but this outside-actor advantage has been countered by the Western economic stockpiles fueling the contemporary Ukrainian military. Given that the Soviet stockpiles are increasingly finite, while the western economic production is forecasted to remain overwhelming even with the economic difficulties forecasted,

Wars still need to be fought. It's very impressive that the comedy actor Zelensky was able to parlay billions of dollars from the EU and US, but all it takes is for the general sentiment to turn in either or both for 'his' country to go down the drain.

Fortunately for Ukraine, the Russians have been very effective at fortifying general sentiment of the western alliance network to maintain support, which has in turn allowed western supporters to develop the internal political-interest coalitions to continue support for reasons beyond sentiment.

It turns out, when the patrons of influential interest groups becomes a pariah, domestic political actors will take the opportunity to tear said groups down and apart as part of the churn of internal politics.

Furthermore, if the average Ukrainian man is a strong nationalist willing to die for Ukraine (whatever that is), that he considered very very different than the next door Russian neighbor his ancestors shared hundreds of years of destiny with, he's in for a big surprise when he finds out what kind of people the EU and NATO have been importing on their side.

Citation needed for existence of 'years of destiny', but also irrelevant- if he's in a position to be surprised, he will have already beat the Russians decisively enough to have the time and space to turn attention to western europe and care about something like that.

Nationalism is not really a strong value for the NATO camp, and aside from the Reddit brigade, there aren't that many people that care enough about the personal, individual fate of any Ukrainian to put their life on the line for them.

That's the neat point- there don't need to be. The Ukrainians don't need foreign manpower on the front line.

Any other year, they would have assumed the man to be some kind of patriarchal racist/xenophobe, and to an extent probably correctly.

Fortunately, Russia has a way of helping other people come together in a more inclusive way.

History is written by the victors, that's true.

Not really. Enduring histories have frequently been by the losers with more time to grouse than the winners too busy with leading to focus on their memoirs.

But, if we do take what you say as true, then Russia' strategic defeat will be appropriately recorded by the victors.

Russia looks like an aggressor to you but everyone else sees their behavior as restrained compared to US hegemony.

*Citation needed on everyone.

US might win that game, at the cost of destroying all their Western European allies.

There is no credible scenario in which all of the US's Western European allies are destroyed. Or any of them, really.

Germany is a central-European state, and while the disruption to their economic model will truly be difficult for them, it was the predictable consequence of decades of German industrial policy that they were warned about by other partners.

Nobody else cares about Putin invading his neighbor.

This is, of course, why majorities in the UN condemned the Russian invasion, and the Russian annexation, and why Russia's closest allies have been so generous with their economic and military support, to the extent that CSTO is not at all floundering.

If anything else, every other country is going to be even more distrustful of the US, as they can just break all rules of international trade and blockade you for minor border disputes.

*Citation needed on every other country

Ukraine has been bombing civilians in the Eastern parts of the country, and is forcing men within its borders to join its armies, it's not exactly a model of 'consent to be governed'.

Sure it is. Ukraine has been bombing the eastern parts of the country because the Russians militarily intervened and have been occupying it for several years, a counter-intervention effort that remains extremely popular within the Ukrainian demos-politic with access to the Ukrainian electoral processes, which consists of non-Russian disrupted parts of Ukraine. Conscription is not controversial.

Russia is doing this with their invasion and allowing Russia to be reward for breaking this rule sets an unacceptable precedent.

Here is on the other hand John Bolton bragging about overtaking other countries' governments.

As John Bolton is not a Russian, and also did not lead wars of conquest, it's not really relevant to perception of Russia being rewarded.

Why do I somehow doubt the people on the side of John Bolton when they tell me that Russia has no good reason to be wary of their next-door neighbor inviting John Bolton and his buddies to build up military installations on their border?

Possibly because of your skill level at understanding the implications of Russian nukes on neighbors desire to invade Russia.

Expansionist tyrants like the ones attacking North Africa, the Middle-East, setting up puppet regimes in South America for decades...?

Since no one has been conquering nations for their territory in North Africa, the Middle-East, or South America for decades, apparently not, since those were neither expansion-wars or recent.

Kind of an own-goal on that one, not going to lie. If you're going to do false equivalence, at least drop the qualifier for what kind of war.

What's TheMotte's opinion on the legitimacy of protecting individuals from inadvertent value drift? Or in other words: is it okay to let people degenerate, so long as every step is taken out of their own will? Is it liberating to just not let them? It seems to me like answers explain one of the core differences in conservative versus liberal schools of thought. This is rather low-effort, apologies.

What's the saying? Enlightenment is hard, which is why so few people will ever reach it, and none can be forced?

My position is that self-discipline is is a good thing, but that enforcing discipline others is to be avoided as possible outside of broadly agreed upon contexts because of it's propensity to abuse by people without self-discipline. There is no system of evaluation or screening that ensures only self-disciplined will have power for pretty much the same reasons there's no way to ensure that only Good Kings will reign- not only is it not reliable for the (wo)man at the top, but it's the system from top to bottom that matters. Insert the ever-useful insight about self-righteous tormenters, the people who would censor information, the rationalization of self-interest by those who see themselves as enlightened, etc. It's all old hat, and if you weren't convinced before, you won't start now.

Value drift occurs. It's a part of life in all directions and connotations. You yourself refer to your own with what you call an overly frantic escape from Russia. This is a characterization / connotation that can only exist due to value drift brought on by perspective- at the time, while you were certainly in a maniac-depressive state, your values were different. In the coming months/years, there is liable to be future developments and worsenings in Russia that may make your escape seem wise and insightful in a way you don't credit it now. As the fable goes, this too shall pass. There is never a point in your life where you will have the 'correct' value perspective and insight to be qualified to decide it for others.

Instead of top-down impositions, lasting changes to individuals come from the bottom-up, from affecting the common culture of shared beliefs and values. But culture is shared beliefs and values, not the values you compel someone to state. Nearly all deliberate social engineering efforts struggle with this, as the values they claim to espouse are not the things actually motivating behavior or being shared- hence the common refrain of the those being loudest about their selflessness are really most out for themselves, and that's the values being taken. You can ask for someone's consideration of your values, you can share your values, but you can't force it on the unwilling.

There's an old internet poem, probably not actually adopted from a Christian monk but with plenty of regional/cultural variations, that's long stuck with me that seem relevant to this topic.

“When I was a young man, I wanted to change the world.

I found it was difficult to change the world, so I tried to change my nation.

When I found I couldn’t change the nation, I began to focus on my town. I couldn’t change the town and as an older man, I tried to change my family.

Now, as an old man, I realize the only thing I can change is myself, and suddenly I realize that if long ago I had changed myself, I could have made an impact on my family. My family and I could have made an impact on our town. Their impact could have changed the nation and I could indeed have changed the world.”

In this comparison, you are the man-who-is-not-yet-old. I note in your piece, while you spend considerable words on how he has so much less to say, you make only a passing note on that you have talked with him increasingly less over the years. I do not know what you have talked about, if/how you have raised concerns with him directly, but per your own mutability as seen over just the last year, you still have the opportunities to change yourself, and thus impact your family and friends, and through them, more.

It's a lot less heady and gratifying than ambitious reform, but it's there.

Withdrawing from Ukraine would mean that Russia is essentially allowing NATO to forever expand and threaten its borders,

Russia has neither the authority to allow or not allow other countries to have their own relations. Russia does, however, have a nuclear deterrent if faced with invasion.

and also that genociding Russian minorities on Russia's borders is not a big deal.

The Russian minorities on Russia's borders are not being genocided.

Per the standing international law defining genocide, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide-

Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with

intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as

such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its

physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The Russian state's claims of genocide of Russian ethnic groups tends to rely on language policies, such as whether Russian is taught in schools or as a language of governance. Language policies of these sort do not constitute genocide. While the Russian intervention in the Donbas has been used to claim the Ukrainians are targeting the citizens there, this has not been reflected in areas under Ukrainian control, indicating a lack of deliberate targetting.

By contrast, the Russian policies in Ukraine, ranging from filtration camps, torture centers, artillery campaigns on civilian infrastructure, targeting of essential power infrastructure during the winter, and the population relocations of Ukrainian civilians into Russia would qualify.

That's not cutting losses.

Accepting an undesirable state is precisely what cutting losses entails. Even if what you claimed were all true, it would still be a lower cost than suffering the Ukraine disaster AND having all of the other items still occur.

Sounds like head cannon from the same people that came up with WMD in Iraq for what?

Your hearing and/or memory is off.

To a lot of countries the problem of nuclear proliferation is probably not whether or not it's happening but who is holding the nukes above their head.

You framed in a global perspective, you get a global perspective response. The regional/local perspective will, of course, be based on observation of what other nuclear users are able to get away with in the multi-polar order that Russia pre-emptively claimed success in creating.

Go tell the Donbass civilans they gotta keep taking the bombs because otherwise nuclear proliferation bad.

The Donbass civilians are being bombed because of a multi-year Russian intervention in the Donbass following the failed NovaRussia campaign intended to spark an anti-maiden counter-uprising, not because nuclear proliferation is bad. The Russians turning the Donbass into a warzone was a policy choice.

Isn't it worth it to start conscription when the US are attacking you in a proxy war?

If you're stupid, sure.

Setting aside that the US is not attacking Russia in a proxy war, resorting to conscription in the face of a proxy war is missing the point of asymmetry in proxy wars. In strategy terms the worth/cost/value-analysis of a proxy war is not for the proxy to win at any cost, but for the cost of aid given to the proxies to increase the costs incurred by the parties fighting the proxy. Mass conscription is an exceptionally expensive way to fight a conflict, as it generally combines increasing military costs and inflicting political costs and economic opportunity-loss costs of robbing the civilian economy, and often does so for marginal military utility. Directly fighting the proxies is the proxy-fighter win state, and thus the worth/value state to be avoided by the person fighting the proxies.

For a power facing proxy war, value-strategies of worth are cost-mitigation strategies. You either interdict the proxies with cost-efficient interventions, you bypass/ignore the proxies to the best of your ability in order to complete your objective and minimize the wasted time/resources spent dealing with proxies, or you cut losses and no longer engage, withdrawing as needed.

The Russians are unable to interdict western aid to Ukraine, and cannot bypass/ignore the Ukrainians who have received western aid. From the worth/value model, the best worth response remaining is to cut losses, which in the context of Ukraine would mean withdrawing from Ukrainian territory.

My understanding of the Russian situation is that Russians as a people have a very high level of resilience.

The average lifespan, suicide, and emmigration statistics indicate otherwise.

Russia can still cut its fertilizer exports if they decide that they really want to go all out against the rest of the world.

Not really relevant, since it's as credible and helpful to the Russians as saying they could nuke random countries. Less credible, actually, since famine is a self-resolving problem that, while terrible, is rarely state destroying, and wouldn't be benefiting Russia much in the interim.

It's possible that Russia will suddenly collapse in a hundred internal revolutions or something, but that does not strike me as a good outcome for somebody that values the overall safety of the world.

Accepting the gains of a nuclear armed power conducting a war of territorial conquest against one of the few countries in the world to have actually given up nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees by said power is considerably worse. Libya was bad enough, but Gaddafi didn't actually have nukes, just the program. In Ukraine, Russia created direct nuclear proliferation justification for any power with either territorial designs or fear of territorial designs from nuclear weapons, and only a comprehensive Russian defeat will demonstrate on a world-level that both sides of the paradigm (that nuclear weapons enable territorial conquest / that nuclear weapons are required to resist conquest by larger powers) are false. Minimizing / delaying proliferation requires that both aggressors and defenders not feel that nukes are decisive/critical enablers.

A Russian collapse is bad from a nuclear proliferation perspective in the sense of nuclear terrorism from loose nukes, and some countries aquiring a nuclear deterrent without the production capability. A Russian victory is terrible from a nuclear proliferation perspective in the sense of mass production capability proliferation corresponding with territorial wars of conquest, which will also provide loose nuke risk.

While the preferable option is a comprehensive Russian defeat without a crack-up, there are bad problems and there are worse problems.

To anyone who has discussed the issue with pro-Ukraine people.

Why do people support Ukraine fighting against Russia, with a strange militaristic fervor, instead of supporting surrendering / negotiating peace?

There's nothing strange about nations resisting invasion to anyone with a passing familiarity with history, and nothing odd about people supporting a victim of unjust aggression to anyone with a familiarity of social dynamics.

Anglin makes the points that:

-the war is severely impoverishing Europe due to high energy costs

Anglin is anticipating, not describing. Europe is not impoverished, and the past year has demonstrated that the energy doomers on both sides were significantly over-estimating the near-terms impacts of energy disruptions.

Germany is not going to have a great time, but that's because Germany's economic model relied on a number of assumptions of below-norm energy prices and globalism dynamics that increasingly no longer apply. However, Germany was also on the course for a major economic fundamentals shift this decade anyway due to German demographic shifts resulting from their top-heavy age distributed work force exiting the work force.

-the war is destroying Ukraine ( population + territory / infrastructures / institutions)

Anglin is failing to attribute agency. 'The war' is a consequence, not the actor. The Russians are destroying Ukraine, and have demonstrated they will continue to do so even even in areas not part of the front in ways that do qualify as genocide under post-WW2 international law. Since a lot of people don't view the cultural genocide clauses and mass abduction of children to destroy ethnic groups as 'really' genocide, we can just go for 'crimes against humanity.'

-continuing the war increases the chances of a world war

Anglin is being amusing, and does not make a credible argument for who else in the world would be a meaningful participant on Russia's side, considering how limited (and mercurial) the support of even Russia's closest international allies has been.

Is it cheering for the possible destruction of Russia?

It probably would be cheered, but that's generally because of the recent invasion and crimes against humanity.

Something to do with the current leadership of Russia, anti-LGBTQ, pro-family policies?

The invasion and crimes against humanity are problems with the current leadership, yes, but not particularly pro-family.

Is it about the 1991 borders of Ukraine, issues with post-Soviet Union border disputes?

The invasion and crimes against humanity are problems since 1991, yes.

Notion that 'if we don't stop Putin now he will never stop no matter what'? Is it something about broadly standing up against aggression of one state vs another, supporting the 'underdog'?

The invasion and crimes against humanity have been self-justified by the Russians by historical revaunchism ideology in terms that applies to several other regional states, meaning no relevant ideological self-limiting factor to just Ukraine, yes.

The issue with that one which seems to be central to Alexander's March 22 post is that there isn't much that seems capable of stopping Russia.

This seems curious to raise now, since one of the obvious trends of the conflict has been the Russians were quite literally stopped in multiple respects in multiple axis, including an infamous 40-mile traffic jam that preceeded a total retreat from the most important front of the war's opening in under a month. Not only did the Russians strategically culminate in most fronts by the summer, but the consistent trend of the last 6 months has been the Russians not only being stopped, but actively reversed and losing territory.

Sending another 100k Ukrainians to the meatgrinder for that end seems a little bit harsh coming from people with very little skin in the game.

The West has sent 0 Ukrainians to the meat-grinder, and has no ability to send any more, because the West does not control the Ukrainian state, both of whose constituency maintains extremely high support to resist to the state whose maximalist goals would result in even more rampant crimes against humanity against the Ukrainian nation.

Just signaling what they are told is the correct opinion?

It's strange that the greatest Russian military catastrophe since 1941, surpassing even the Chechnya and Afghanistan embarrassments to the point that the Russians are turning to North Korea of all places for military procurement, would be confused for 'just signalling.'

Is it about saving face, sunk cost at this point?

Sunk cost implies that significant costs have been incurred for no meaningful gain, which assumes a conclusion.

Western military support for Ukraine has not been a significant cost to the states providing, and has directly resulted in clear effects on Russia's intended military-political goals in the conflict. Western economic costs have been higher than the military costs, but neither impoverishing or obviously not worth opposing an attempt to fundamentally change European security politics to re-introduce wars of conquest.

What would be the best case scenario for a Ukraine/State Department victory?

Russia immediately leaving Urkainian territory, returning the kidnapped Ukrainian children and other forcibly relocated persons, paying reparations to the victims corresponding to the costs of the war including the forced conscription in occupied territories, and begin a long series of internal accountability efforts bringing war criminals to justice in international forums, hopefully accompanied by internal political reforms dismantling the security state responsible for planning and executing the war.

To my understanding, Putin is not the most radical or dangerous politician in Russia, and an implosion into ethnicity-based sub-regions would cause similar problems to the 'Arab Spring'. Chechens for example would not appear very West-friendly once 'liberated' from Russia.

The Chechens, however, would not be capable of invading European states or attempting ethnic cleansing on the scale that the Russians are attempting to.

The problem of a Russian break out isn't that various successor states wouldn't be western friendly- this is functionally no change from the current macro state- but rather the issue of nuclear proliferation. Which is why the west isn't making efforts to destroy the Russian Federation as a polity, which would be reflected in efforts to target the internal security state aparatus.

Not only that, but economic crisis in Europe could generate additional security risks.

Security risks from economic crisis in Europe are considerably less concerning than the security risks of a revaunchist invader willing to attempt wars of national eradication when he thinks he can win it during a window of opportunity, but the poor sense to not know when that is not possible.

I buy your industrial development argument but they're also buying modern Abrams from America. While they're hoping to do some local production with the K2, it seems very much like they're scrambling for more firepower now. They're also buying Apaches, howitzers and so on.

The Abrams are for defense of a different part of Poland than the Korean tanks. Broadly speaking, Abrams are for the flat plains leading to the capital region, and less heavy, more rough-terrain tanks are for the more restrictive terrain areas.

This also comes back to 'just because you don't think a current threat is valid doesn't mean others don't.' Projection of one's views onto others, and all that.

The Poles clearly see this as a priority, they're paying a heavy price for a great deal of firepower. The Polish economy is not especially large. Their 1500 tank plan is very ambitious, significantly more than Germany, France and the UK combined. It's a ridiculously powerful army for a non-nuclear power.

Not really. 1500 tanks is only ambitious relative to the multi-decade draw-down by Germany, France, and UK since the Cold War. Much larger tank armies were managed by relatively more modest economies during the Cold War. Moreover, the Poles are doing this from a pretty modest procurement perspective- they're not approaching this tank force as in addition to a world-class major airforce, navy, and what have you that traditionally dilutes budgets. The Poles are structuring their military to bring the armor and the close-air support, which very nicely compliments the Americans bringing the Air Force, Navy, and rapid-reaction but limited capability ground forces to a contingency.

It does not particularly matter if Poland has 500, 1000, or 5000 tanks as far as self-defense is concerned. If the Russians are at war with Poland, the key factor is nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons haven't been a decisive factor in any war since the invention of nuclear weapons, including the only war in which nuclear weapons were used. They haven't even been key in mitigating western aid to Ukraine, let alone stopping multiple major and embarassing operational defeats that have rendered Ukraine a strategic disaster.

Why do they need 'good enough' tanks in the interim? Do they think that Putin is deterred from attacking Poland by the marginal addition of 200 Abrams?

The Polish use for a tank army is less for if Putin attacks Poland, and more if Putin were to try and attack the Baltic states to Poland's immediate NE, were Poland would be the only realistic force beyond American immediate buildup able to interven in a Baltic scenario. While Russia is many years from being able to threaten Poland, smaller Baltic states don't need Ukraine-war sized forces to be threatened, and here we come back to projecting one's own judgement of the probability of such a thing from the regional actors' perspectives.

The development of a Polish tank industry is less for Russia, and more of creating a non-German/French arms supplier in the EU. This is a matter not only of profit, but supporting the creation of an eastern-European block that won't be dependent, and thus can't be held hostage to, German/French supply line influence in occasions where German/French interests would be willing to sacrifice eastern European interests, as was repeatedly tried in recent years. Poland's development is generally consistent with a nation trying to set itself up as a regional power able to counter-balance other regional powers. It doesn't need to out-produce Germany, it needs to keep the neighborhood from becoming dependent on Germany.

If you REALLY wanted to be paranoid, the Poles may also be preparing for post-Russian security concerns centered around future attempts to centralize the power of the European Union, but that's far more hypothetical than probable motive.

Are you saying that the Koreans hope to import parts from Poland in case their own factories get blown up by the North Koreans/Chinese? If South Korea's domestic supply lines are in danger, I think Poland will be last on their list of priorities.

Poland doesn't need to be on their list of priorities. Poland just needs to be part of the American alliance network and able to fly highly-valuable supplies in relatively short order in case of crisis, thus helping the higher priorities.

A key lesson of the Ukrainian war, besides that nukes don't decide conventional wars, is that no one nation can run a high-intensity war on their peacetime buildup. The Russians started a medium-scale war with an entire superpower's stock of military surplus and depots, and started running out of operational stocks of precision munitions in the first two months, and tapping their contingency stocks until the point of buying Iranian drones in lieu of cruise missiles. Even the US is seeing real dips in select categories of munitions, and it's not even directly involved. Whether you stockpile PGMs that go out in weeks, or dumb-rounds that are exhausted in months, high-intensity makes support needs immediate.

But another key lesson is that while no one can beat the logistics strength of the American alliance network, compatibility matters. The Ukrainians spent the first months of the war dependent on Warsaw Pact systems and aid delivery, first because it was all they were familiar with and then because it was all they could shoot. Trying to incorporate new artillery systems and ammo trains- even when made available- has been a real hurdle. Speed of integration can have operational relevance, both in immediate pre-war buildups, but post-war resupplies.

Sharing common production systems is what clears this hurdle, and is a key strength of being mutual members the American alliance network. In theory, the French and the Germans have been trying to do this for some time with their European Strategic Autonomy proposals for a common EU procurement, but 'Buy European' has tended to be 'Buy French/German,' and French/Germany wrangles have delayed numerous projects past the point of relevancy. What Korea has achieved is that someone else really will be maintaining a lot of compatible tanks, and is probably going to be more willing to part with armor (parts) than the Germans.

Setting aside projecting one's own viewpoint of someone else's interests onto them, the key point of the armor procurement is likely tech transfer and modernization away from Warsaw-pact era templates with an eye for future European market competition. The Ukrainian purchase Korean tanks has indicators of a technology transfer and local production deal, with the potential for a future Europe-based tank co-development program between Poland and Korea that could try and compete in the European market.

In general arms procurement, the seller wants to make the tanks at their own home, and keep the techs involved to themselves, while the buyers want the tanks made in their home, and to get technology transfers. The major western tank producers- US, UK, France, and Germany- have export-variants, but are generally tight-fisted with technology transfers. In the European military market context, the German Leopard 2 is the main legacy main battle tank of Europe, and has a preponderance of scale, but with modernization techs controlled by the German industry. The Koreans, by contrast, have a low-key reputation of being a bit more flexible with technology transfer concessions as their way to try and break into other markets, and Polish government's press on their priorities indicate Polish manufacturing base was a key priority. Add in that one of the model purchases is a model which allegedly hasn't even finished the design phase yet, as well as some floated discussion of future joint ventures, in the context of the European market dynamics where many military sales in most European countries must de facto come from another European country outside of technology-specific offerings...

In the near term, the immediate purchase of Korean tanks is more akin to a ring-swap replacement of the legacy Soviet-era T-##s the Poles still have. These Soviet tanks remain a major part of the inventory, but are long-term dead ends. These are almost certainly going to be sent to Ukraine in some form or fashion in the next year, when an infusion of armor would simultaneously give Ukraine armor and maneuver capacity and reduce the Polish logistics burden. Whether you agree with it or not, the Poles believe helping the Ukrainians throw the Russians out entirely is a major national interest, and playing a key role in doing so is almost certain to get them far more reconstruction access and integration for longer-term alignment for the post-war. Your evaluation may differ, but in consideration of future transfers, the immediate purchases is a substitution for 'good enough' tanks in the interim, but also the hook to open/expand the longer-term benefits.

In the medium term, Poland- which while it's had a large tank industry hasn't had exactly a modern one- will likely receive Korean technology transfers as part of the manufacturing/maintaining the current and future design tanks. The Korean technology transfer will be used to modernize Poland's own military industrial base, increasing its competitiveness inside the European market and abroad and reducing dependence on the primary European tank supplier, Germany, for non-warsaw pact tanks. This is, on its own, raising another competitor for the Koreans, but the opening purchase and Korea's own strategic prioritization is a 'worth it.' The Koreans get market access into Europe, expand production lines and logistics support that could be used to support Korea in case of a future conflict disrupting South Korea's domestic supply lines, build internal rapport with a fellow American ally, and so on.

The longer term prospect, more tentative and possible than decisive, is the prospect for Korea and Poland to do future joint armor/APC/combat vehicle design projects in the future, with the goal of competing with established European producers. The Koreans on their own would have virtually no hope of breaking into the European arms market, where many domestic procurement pressures are for European-production lines, but a 'Polish' vehicle could easily become a standard in parts of Europe, especially if it comes with the sort of integration/technology transfer that the Germans and French resist. In turn, joint ventures could also have variants aimed at other regions, whether the South Koreans and the Poles could work their separate lines of influence when lobbying for the sale on joint projects that- because of tech alignment and shared base- both would split the profits. This is all tentative, but possible, if developed on the basis of a techs-for-tanks transfer.

I wonder how this will be remembered, if it will be remembered, in future discussion of the prisoner's dilemma. The standard nash equilibrium is pretty stale and well known- everyone should cooperate- but this is a pretty good case where cooperation with one party is highly suspect given his current, and previous, acts the undermine credibility.

What coming war ? You mean the US / China match that they're trying to get Europe involved in ?

What sense do you think they're trying to get Europe involved?

For lack of a navy, Europe is not a credible contender in the Pacific, nor is it a decisive economic, political, information, or social influencer in the region. There would be no time to move European forces militarily, and the availability of European navies in the region would make them more useful as neutral observers than active participants.

Given that Europe does have some armed forces, probably enough to stop Turks from doing something stupid, and that France has nuclear weapons, why can't Europe just sit it out ?

Aside from that no one east of France trusts French to provide nuclear guarantees for anyone but France? It's the wrong question. Sitting out is expected. The question is one of ongoing trade with China during a China-US war.

'Strategic autonomy' from the US isn't being forced to fight in the war- the US has had more than enough wars with sit-outs that it's not a credible issue- but being able to keep economic trade going with both the US and China, and not being forced to divest from one side or the other. The Americans, for various reasons, are not particularly interested in protecting the maritime commerce of allies into a country they would be in a hot war with. Many European countries, also for various reasons, are not particularly interested in cutting off key export markets they've become economically dependent on to sustain their domestic economies.

The American nightmare wasn't if there was a war, but the Europeans didn't come when called. The American nightmare was if the US embarked a naval blockade, but then German cargo ships showed up to sail on through anyway. Or if the Americans called on the regional allies, but French and European arms suppliers leveraged their supply chain influence on countries like Australia to keep them neutral and isolate the US from necessary partners. Or if the US called for sanctions on China, and the EU said 'no thanks' and threatened retaliation against the US if the US went against companies doing business in the US for also maintaining business in Europe.

Of course, the Ukraine war has a way of reframing things. What 'Europe' might have tolerated if it were Taiwan was not tolerated in Ukraine, and in doing so set precedents for divestment and de-globalization that have set normative expectations for a US-China conflict in case of a Taiwan. There will be no European Consensus of threatening EU-level retaliation against the Americans enforcing China sanctions, or even the prospect of major European actors pressuring the Americans to let Taiwan lose in the service of protecting European economies.

The Europeans will not be expected to send forces or fleets to help the Americans or defend anyone else from China. They will be expected not to prioritize their Chinese economic ties over American economic and security ties, if they wish to maintain the later. The choice will be sovereign, unless one's definition of sovereignty entails an unconditional commitment of American military guarantees and access to American markets even when trading with American enemies during an American war.