Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being a reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man. No one yet has guessed multiple people, or a scholar. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
Setting up a nation-wide panopticon is only as hard as is forcing the population, at gunpoint, to install the right brand of spyware app onto their phone.
And if we ignore all the other requirements, it's only as hard as the exceedingly hard and expensive part that will take a substantial period of time and be subject to all sorts of expensive disruptions.
Which returns to assuming the conclusion, or rather assuming you have the police state in place to pre-empt the problem that could prevent the establishment of the police state following an invasion.
This is fundamentally a categorization boundary difference. This is the sort of thing where we may simply have different categorization hierarchies/boundaries.
What you quoted is / was intended to be a reminder against the fallacy of composition without calling it such, since overtly calling on a fallacy can come off as an attack / belittlement. Which was not the intent, but lost some clarity, particularly on the categorization hierarchy.
The fallacy of composition is the error in which what true for a part of a whole is assumed to be true for the whole. It is a common categorization error when sub-sets are conflated with broader overarching categories. What is true for a subset (all dogs are mammals, A = B) does not necessarily apply to the over set (all mammals are not dogs, B =/= A). (Part of the error is that it's not actual the same category in both sets, as 'mammals' and 'all mammals' are not the exact same group- that is, they are not both 'B'.)
Reciprocal relationships are a category of relationships, distinct from other, non-reciprocal relationships. It itself is a subcategory of [relationships]. Reciprocal relationships as a (sub-)category can in turn be broken down into further sub-categories.
Obligation-based and transactional relationships are subcategories of reciprocal relationships. There are additional subcategories as well, types of reciprocity that are also not obligatory or transactional. Mutual love and mutual hatred are both reciprocated relationships that have no intrinsic obligatory or transactional element. More can be found.
The fallacy of composition limits the application of any of them to characterizing the others- what is true for a part (a specific subcategory) is not true for the whole (other subcategories / the broader category). What is true for one subcategory (god's relationship with man is not a specific type of reciprocal relationship, i.e. not a transactional relationship) does not disprove another subcategory, or the overarching category.
Dean
Flairless
22d ago
Yes, but if the processing system uses dollars and US banks (or banks that eventually connect to US banks) then US can control it. Dealing with a ton of different currency without having an intermediary one where you can align everything to the single common measure could be challenging...
The other point is that if the actors using the system also want to use dollars and US banks separately, the US can still influence it. This is why the attempted Iran-EU exchange program died after the JCPOA fell apart. The Europeans mooted building what would basically have been shell companies to serve as intermediaries who would never touch dollars for Iran-EU trade, and the US simply moved the threat of secondary sanctions to any European companies that did work with the shell companies doing work with Iran.
This is part of the classic misunderstanding of the influence of the dollar in the international system. It doesn't actually matter if you use dollars in the transaction. Dollars are just a lower transaction cost medium of exchange, but everyone already had the ability to pay a higher transaction cost if they wanted to do currency swaps and such. What matters if you also, elsewhere, want to do business with the dollar system.
Dean
Flairless
3d ago
She's a member of the United States Cabinet!
Which is a collection of individuals with distinct and often contrasting opinions, not a hive mind, or an avatar summoned from the collective unconscious of parts of the electorate.
Dean
Flairless
23d ago
Individuals also tend to consider it to be very different in terms of moral responsibility, and culpability, when helping other people do things they want to do versus when you do something yourself. Individuals have agency and individual responsibility for the actions they choose to do.
Of course, that there is the rub. A common stumbling block in characterizing international affairs is the hyperagency versus hypoagency bias, where the a country's agency is inflated and anyone else's agency and responsibility is diminished / ignored.
Dean
Flairless
28d ago
If you're speaking metaphorically, you are directionally correct, though so time abstract I can't take any real position. If you're speaking literally, the reason your concept is an exaggeration is because drones are no more immune to the concept of cost-efficiency and opportunity costs and geopolitical balancing than anything else.
But, again, the context is so abstract there's not really much to disagree with.
Dean
Flairless
28d ago
Thanks for the summary, that was excellent. Did you find anywhere a further breakdown of who responded to the survey? I'm specifically interested in figuring out who the people in the UK are who responded saying they need more social media enforcement, because those people... have an interesting perspective.
There is a fair bit more source diving in the fuller paper, and more of the raw data stuff on the website that was linked in the 'billed as' section. IIRC, the main trend was 'political left consistently favors more content moderation of social media.'
Dean
Flairless
2d ago
I agree that often duty based ethics is framed in terms of mutual duty. But @Clementine is still correct with the assertion that duty without reciprocity is virtue, not exploitation. You may not be required to discharge your duty towards someone who doesn't discharge theirs to you, but it's still praiseworthy to do so. For example, Judaism and Christianity both depict how God continuously acts benevolent towards humanity despite them not deserving it. This isn't framed as "God is a sucker", but rather as God being the exemplar of virtue whom we should strive to imitate. Not all religions frame things that way, of course, but when you have some 3000 years of one religious tradition which does, it seems fair to call that just as established as the reciprocal duty that you outlined.
This misses the argument previously made.
Religiously-derived deontological ethics aren't a duty towards the person you are doing the virtue towards, but the duty to the god who sets the paradigm of right and wrong action. Other people don't need to reciprocate your execution of virtue because the duty relationship isn't to them, but to god. The execution isn't praiseworthy because the recipients or human observers praise it, but because the worthiness is set by god regardless of the beneficiary.
In turn, the sucker being raised is the deontologist if god does not exist, not god if the deontologist fails. Being the root of deontological legitimacy challenges any premise of obligation to god by those without deontology-setting power, but people who do something on the grounds that derive from god are being suckers if that belief was always wrong, regardless of how socially commendable their niceness may be.
edit: forgot to mention that your explanation of Christianity is very much not how it works, and is in fact a heresy! Salvation is explicitly not something that God owes us because we upheld his law, but rather is a freely given gift. Thus our only choice is to say "yes, I accept" (out of which comes trying to uphold God's laws, again not out of obligation but out of love for him), or to reject his gift (because we would rather do our own thing). Salvation as a gift rather than earned by our conduct is a core tenet of Christianity.
Reciprocal relationships are not the same as obligation relationships, much as they are not synonymous with transactional relationships. The duty (deontological obligations) to god for freely given grace is still a reciprocal relationship, even though it is not a transactional relationship nor does is obligate god in return.
Dean
Flairless
4d ago
It is still weakmanning to insist that [someone] else speaks for [group X] because arbitrary-subjective sections of [group X] weren't sufficiently vocal in denouncing [someone].
Dean
Flairless
23d ago
Imagine the sci-fi plot hooks for aliens who only know groups by reputation.
Maybe in the sense that as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps becomes ever more entrenched as a state-within-a-state, the corruptive influence of all that money and administrative self-interest will secularize it like the Egyptian Army?
Of course, then you get dynamics where the IRGC's perks and privileges derive from a permanent proxy-war footing, which merely means they'd increasingly rationalize sustained proxy conflicts on increasingly secular grounds, as Pakistan does.
Dean
Flairless
24d ago
Specifically, North Korea had enough artillery in range that the casualty estimates for the first day of shelling were on the scale of a Hiroshima/Nagasaki, i.e. a nuclear weapon.
Dean
Flairless
4d ago
I would like to first say I appreciate your contestation / elaboration. It was certainly a quip to move that can be contested on 'well, actually...' grounds. Kudos!
That's why I am only going to clarify my intent / dispute against two sub-elements.
They're cheap, good, and half the world's nations actively use them to wage war in some capacity. If that is not a good rifle I'm not sure what is.
The rifle the AR-15 is based on is better in part for the functions that differ it from the commercial AR-15. Which is to say- deliberate design access to to limited automatic as appropriate, as opposed to reliability-decreasing ad-hoc modification access to quasi-auto. Plus the additional attachments not used here, but that's getting into broader kitting options rather than potential.
The AR-15s the anti-ICE attackers used were modified AR-15s, nominally for that additional ability, but which may have compromised their reliability. Reliability (at least when maintained) being a key point of why half the world's nations actively use the M-16 and derivatives.
But that's not what I said in what you're responding to, so fair rejoinder.
But when we're actually fighting- we're shooting at targets that are actively trying to avoid being shot at, and trying not to be shot ourselves- and not just trying to score bullseyes on a static range, we want it to be as easy as possible for us to make hits.
My view is that this context, the Praireland Texas attack, is closer to the shooting range context than the 'actually fighting' context. And this probably the context anti-ICE facility attacks will have for any sort of anti-ICE insurgency.
Consider the attack at The ICE attack was done at range of 100-300 meters (or more), from cover / concealment, over a relatively brief amount of time. We know this by the criminal complaint report tying the shooters to nearby woods/treelines (100m and 300m away), and only 30-ish rounds being reported despite more-than-semiautomatic weapon fire rates. The only injury was implicitly in the initial salvo, before the defenders fell behind cover, and this salvo was the surprise/opening attack in terms of introducing gunfire. At which point, the officers at the scene were suppressed until the attackers withdrew, supported by the shooters in the forest, one of whom had enough concealment to remain hidden beyond the initial search response.
This is something that should be expected as a norm for anti-ICE attacks, in part due to the sort of government building design the Americans adopted after 9-11. The American federal government has been incorporating stand-off distance in new / security / detention facilities basically ubiquitous since 9-11, and in many contexts even before. Part of this is terrorism fears of truck bombs, part of this is security fears to prevent infiltration / unauthorized access, and part of it is wildfire management.
When- as is the government's preference- it has more freedom for standoff space, this creates longer sight lines, and thus requires longer weapons range which makes the post-opening cover movements more effective, and hasty counter-fire less effective. And when- as a matter of legacy- thick vegetation is far closer, so is the concealment advantage to the shooters from within the woods, who have to set up their own sight lines through the vegetation.
I recognize you and I may have different opinions, but I'd consider either of these dynamics more akin to (semi-)static rifle ranges than the close-in maneuver / counter-maneuver that I suspect you mean by 'actual combat.'
But this, too, is not exactly what I said in what you're responding to, so still a fair rejoinder.
The problem with false flag theory of this size is that the ten people arrested would have to be genuine. You can't find ten people willing to do a decade in prison over a false-flag attack.
As opposed to the 10 people who demonstratable were willing to do a decade in prison over a non-false-flag attack?
Present culprits aside, you should probably update your sense of scale of people willing to accept severe consequences to act against their enemies. There were more than 1000 suicide bombings, which is to say more than 1000 suicide bombers, in Iraq alone between 2003 and 2011. Iraq during that period was about 1/10th of the population of the US, and hardly had a monopoly on whatever virtue/vice you think it takes to accept guaranteed death for a chance to kill the target of your animosity. Whatever your view of the relative hardiness of the average radicalized American versus the average radicalized Iraqi, finding 10 people to take much lower risks for much lower costs is not the bottle neck.
In fact, we can find far more than ten Americans willing to risk a decade in prison merely by going to the prisons where people are serving sentences of ten or more years. These prisoners are a group who are, by necessity, a smaller subset of the group of people who take risks that could result in a decade or more of prison, since the people who did the same but were not caught/convicted will obviously not be there. And the people who are actually did take the risk is a smaller subset of the people willing to take the risk, and so on.
If your formulation was meant to specify people intending to go to jail as part of the plan would be impossible to find, that would indeed be a lot harder... but it would also be unnecessary. Getting caught isn't required for a false flag any more than it would be for a non-false flag.
Well, they didn't seem to have practiced or thought this out. A competent cell could have modified rifles for fully automatic, controllable fire. I'm sure if you do a bit of research you can find accurate blueprints on how to modify the receiver to allow full auto..
They could, but this would be the sort of tacti-cool that serves as an even greater indicator of cell incompetence that works against a false flag from a competent group hypothesis. It's not that modifying for full auto is something a competent could do and this group failed to do it right, but rather that modifying for full auto for the purpose of this attack is something the competent would not do, and this group thought it would be good to pursue.
Part of this is because 'fully automatic, controllable fire' is more of a video game hollywoodism than a practical advantage for this sort of attack. The physics of recoil are why the sort of squad automatic rifles that use the AR-15's 5.56mm ammo, and larger caliber automatic weapons, are braced against the ground with bipods for full auto. It's also why shoulder-braced SMGs use correspondingly smaller ammo with less kickback, so the body can more easily absorb recoil. Recoil is why militaries train both in terms of small bursts rather than, well, 'full auto.' Unlike video games, where automatic rifles put out more shots on target for more damage, in reality the role of automatic fire is far more for suppressing the enemy for movement and maneuver. You don't control fully automatic fire onto a meatbag target unless that target is particularly numerous, like a WW1 wave attack, particularly close, or both.
And part of this is that this is the google maps image of Prairieland Detention Center. This sort of image is the bare minimum you should expect the weapon-modifiers to have for their planning purposes.
Note that the closest treeline is 100m away from the parking lot. Note that the other woods- the ones large enough to be where Song hid- are closer to 300m. These are not 'close' targets for automatic weapons to effectively hit the target.
And then there's combining the role of an automatic weapon, suppressing for maneuver, to the terrain and how the attack initiated.
From the initial criminal complaint describing the attack in the original Ngo post-
…around 10:59 p.m., an Alvarado Police Department ("APD") officer arrived in the parking lot at the Prairieland Detention Center in response to the 911 call by the Correctional Officers in order to assist the Correctional Officers in their official duties. Immediately after the APD officer got out of his vehicle, an assailant in the woods opened fire, shooting the APD officer in the neck area. The assailant in the green mask, standing near the woods on Sunflower Lane, then also opened fire at the unarmed DI-IS correctional officers. In total, the assailants shot approximately 20 to 30 rounds at the Correctional Officers. Police later recovered spent 5.56 caliber casings at the locations of both of the shooters.
An unmodified AR-15 in its purely semi-automatic function of a shot a squeeze could go through 30 rounds in about 30 seconds.
A M16 on full-auto, the military basis of the AR-15, would go through 30 rounds in about 3 seconds.
Even if you double or triple the shots fired if the weapons didn't jam- a jamming made more likely by the modification to fire faster- you still aren't having a maneuver element do a 100-meter flank assault in 7-to-12 seconds from the closer tree line. Even Usain Bolt took over 9 seconds for his world-record 100m dash, and he wasn't carrying a roughly 6 lb / 3 kg two-handed rifle while doing it.
Again- modifying for rate of fire here is tacti-cool, not tactical. It is anti-competence to expect or pursue, and this group's effort to do so is an indicator against the false flag hypothesis.
(Which is part of why I wish Ngo's article had mentioned it from the start. It would been a helpful balance against his weird flags. Ah well.)
Dean
Flairless
23d ago
It wasn't chuck Norris - you would only need 1 plane, not 6.
Well, clearly the other stealth bombers are diversions to disguise Chuck Norris's actual entry point for as long as possible.
I can tell by the lack of responses that this comment didn't really resonate with anyone else either.
Looks at OP vote count of -10 at time of writing.
Looks at response vote count of +29 at same time.
Raises eyebrow
It's been awhile since I last saw someone try and pull a 'no one agrees with you' bandwagon fallacy from a nearly 40 vote deficit and from negative resonance.
Is this just "Nothing ever happens, stop overreacting" in more words?
No, it is 'words have meanings, and making false accusations don't make them true.'
False accusations can, however, push people towards motivated reasoning sillyness where they confuse the justified response to their sillyness as tyranny.
Again, you (and your cited paper) are running away from the issue of scale, and comparing proposal requirements versus production prospects. This is the shell game, and always will be the shell game, much as how calling renewable energy production 'cheap' is inevitably made apart from the subsidy costs and the opportunity cost impacts to other issues.
A very simple test to separate the renewable energy proposals that are solicitations for subsidies from serious engineering proposals is to check if they address issues of 'where.' Your Masterplan 3 (producer: Tesla), for example, has a section titled 'Land Area Required.' Tell me if you can spot the issue in one of its only paragraphs.
Solar land area requirement is estimated based on a US Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) empirical assessment of actual US projects, which found that the median power density for fixed-tilt systems installed from 2011-2019 was 2.8 acres/MWdc57. Converting MWdc to MWac using a 1.4 conversion ratio yields roughly 3.9 acres/MWac. Therefore, the global solar panel fleet of 18.3TW will require roughly 71.4 million acres, or 0.19% of the total 36.8 billion acres global land area.
If someone cannot, this product was aimed at them. But for electrical engineering considerations, this is making a global production requirement estimate based on where already-existing projects are- not where future projects would need to be be.
Existing solar generation projects in the US are, by the nature, where it is most economical in the US to build the systems for the people they would support. A lot of that is in or near US deserts. Most of the global population does not live near within US deserts, or even within the US. Nor does most of the US population. Nor it is economical for even the US to transmit electricity 'merely' from the productive deserts to cities far away. It is considerably less economical to charge batteries on site and then physically ship them by truck or train to distant destinations, only to bring them back once drained for a recharge. Moreover, these are already occupied good sites. Additional solar panels farms will be, on average, less cost-efficient as the most cost-efficient locations are farmed first, and subsequent farms are added elsewhere.
Metaphorically, this is analogous to taking an average of output of some group of exceptionally bright students at a highly selective university producing Y amount of quality players, and then claiming that if only you only expanded the class by X, then you would have XxY output of quality papers from the university. It ignores the screening that went into the initial group selection.
What does this mean? Well, it means Masterplan 3 is deliberately underselling the solar panel production requirements- and possibly by quite a bit. Not some mere 5-10% margin, but potentially magnitudes more, depending on where the solar panels will be installed and under what policies. Germany's energiewende policy is an example of, well, extremely bad solar panel policy, not least because it chose bad places for solar generation potential. (Namely- Germany. Energiewende was a policy that started with the conclusion- build solar energy in Germany, then figure out where in Germany- rather than whether the policy should be.)
Similarly, look at where Masterplan 3 expects the increased mineral extraction to come from. These are, after all, the critical inputs for those refining investments.
If you are still looking, or haven't started looking yet, save yourself time and stop. It doesn't.
You can CTFL-F all the most relevant global producers of minerals, and none of them will show in the report, let alone an assessment of how much they can feasibly increase production. In fact, you won't even find the word 'country' in the entire report. National polities do not exist in this report, any more than funding sources, backers, or second-order effects of driving production to this proposal to the measurable detriment of others.
Heck, it doesn't even raise the issue of transmission loss between countries. It vaguely handwaves the issue on the US (the only country it addresses to any depth), and when it actually does...
For purposes of estimating material requirements, 90% of the 60 million circuit miles will be reconductoring of existing low-voltage distribution systems and 10% will be new circuit-miles from high-voltage transmission, which is the current ratio of US circuit miles between high-voltage transmission and low-voltage distribution.
Translated into plainer english- while assuming all the new power generation will be produced in places comparable to the highest cost-benefit solar generation potential, where it already does not make economic sense to transmit the generated solar power long distances, fractionally few new power lines will be created to transmit (via high voltage) the new generation to the (often distant from the high-potential areas) population centers to use it.
Translated into even plainer english- this proposal is not so much about building a new and far more capable power transmission network than already exists, but ripping out the existing one and replacing it with Something Better.
This is not a serious proposal. It does not address actual engineering problems it raises. It doesn't even have the virtue of existing to justify handing people money to try. It's primary purpose is to convince people that renewable energy in mass is cheap and affordable, and as proxy there will be increased demand for Tesla.
This is advertising to justify subsidies, not a master plan.
Dean
Flairless
24d ago
Pretty much. People radically overestimate how hard it would have been for the Ukrainians to disassemble the Soviet nukes and make their own triggering device.
Which is what most of nuclear arms security comes down to. When nuclear munitions have unlock codes in the first place, the 'failsafe' mechanisms are failsafes in the sense of 'this trigger device will be borked.' They are not failsafes in terms of rendering the underlying material unable to be used, only unable to be used by the specific device.
Replace the device, and you have a possibly less efficient, but still effective, nuclear device. Which is among the less challenging parts of the nuclear problem.
I agree, which is why I didn't raise the issue or make an argument based off it. Eliot did, and did so as part of a wave of next-day response posts to dismiss objectors. The 'I can tell your post didn't resonate with anyone else' only works as a dismissal if a lack of 'resonance' is indicative of quality.
I am quite happy to agree that voting is tangential to quality. I also agree with you that it is 100% indicative of agreement/disagreement. An exceptionally high degree of agreement is the evidence of 'resonance' that makes eliot's attempted engagement flex, well, eyebrow worthy.
After all, if there's one thing more cringe than a dude-bro conspicuously flexing how they can pick up heavy weights, it is someone trying to do the same with light weights. It is all of the same arrogance, but none of the capacity.
Also for some reason it seems like most people picture a Chinese invasion of Taiwan like it’s Omaha beach in 1944 with Higgins boats full of Chinese soldiers getting mowed down on the beach, it wouldn’t be like that at all. It would be 2000 cruise missiles a day for three weeks before there was any kind of landing attempt.
The reasons why are threefold (or more).
First, if the Chinese used their cruise missile potential like that, they'd have blown through most of their stocks in those three weeks, with relatively few left for the landing. (They'd have some, but proportionally). The nature of a missile that you can launch from long range is that throughput is high (you can fire them faster), and the diminishing returns of bombardment over time is low (you get less value per cruise missile on week three than on week one, and on week one than on day one, because everything easily killable either dies or becomes less-killable with time). It doesn't really matter what the specific number is, the nature of the munition is that you can shoot your stockpile far faster than you can sustain it, and your incentives are to do so early when it's most effective. If you're going to wait three weeks regardless, you'd might as well just hold fire, so those munitions could paralyze the Taiwanese ground force when you do move.
Second, the opening weeks of that sort uber-overt conquest scenario is a race against time, with the time being the ability of the US navy from the rest of the world's oceans to relocate to the Pacific. This is measured in weeks. Add however long you expect you ground force to take onto that. In a sustained offensive, the Chinese want their bridgehead established and expanding before American carrier airpower can bring, lest the reinforced carriers start cutting the sea lanes supporting the attack. That doesn't mean a day-0 landing attempt, but it does mean there's an optimal point before the island is bombarded into dust, but more importantly before the US carrier airpower in the pacific quadruples, to land.
Third, there is a non-trivial chance that Xi or whomever gives the go-ahead convinces themselves that the Taiwanese would collapse / surrender promptly once landed, whether because they convince themselves there won't be any resistance, that the resistance they will face will be brittle and easily crushed, or that once a landing is made the authorities will surrender, especially if if they believe their agents will defect. This is the sort of belief that leads to judgements that prioritize speed and audacity over preparation. Remember- in the 'don't screw up like this' invasion of Ukraine, the Russians did make the vast majority of their gains in those opening days and weeks, even when the ran into a wall, and a lot of that was because there was a bunch of actually-worked preparartions of corrupted government types who were bought off in advance. If that sort of optimism seems unreasonable, consider what level of default optimism you'd need to approve a landing in the first place, and then consider the system and identify who will tell Xi the optimist 'no.'
It also helps to remember that Omaha Beach 1944 was... not actually that well fortified, in the grand scheme of things. As much as it's been valorized / dramatized in the decades sense, even at the time it was attacked because it was a less fortified part of the coast, with the closest German reserve further away. It was not exactly held by the German best (or most). That D-Day remains (for now) the greatest amphibious invasion in history is a testament to how hard the logistics of amphibious warfare is, not the combat-intensity at the point.
Dean
Flairless
10d ago
'The entire rotten edifice will go down with one good kick' ranks up there with 'and then the enemy will lose the will to fight' in my personal list of 'big indicators of really bad strategy.' There are historical examples of it happening, and you can even identify trends that make it more likely to happen, but strategies that bet on it happening, as opposed to factor in the possiblity, tend to be poor strategies.
The one thing that really baffles me is whether Hezbollah also failed to reign in its own militants itching for action given their lack of full greenlight from Tehran or likely Nasrallah himself. For all its failures and cosplaying at being a fighting force (uniforms for nasheed tiktoks, journalist vest for publishing in reuters, the senior Hezbollah leadership must have known that keeping its cards in reserve for any Israeli incursion was the right play no matter what Hamas did.
This presupposes that they didn't have as much of a greenlight as could be expected, with the patron parties distancing themselves from Hamas's decision after it became clear it wasn't going to spark the regional bonfire. Which, from my memory of those first few weeks, was pretty apparent in the first day(s). Hezbollah in particular had a pretty big anticlimatic drawdown in which they spun up the media organs like they were going to directly enter the conflict, demurred, and then 'quietly' began the artillery campaign after a bit later.
Though to be fair to past considerations, I am on record as believing that Iran has kind of lost the plot on managing its proxy warfare strategy. The curse of the deep state / cult of the offense strikes again, conflating strategic means with strategic ends and over-leveraging a strategic asset (the proxy network) beyond diminishing returns and into outright counter-productive tendencies.
Laddie, you posted the incident where the American leftwing actors were willing to risk 10 years or more in federal prison for an attack on ICE agents. You have been provided a decade-long historical example of magnitudes more than 10 people were willing to suffer far worse than 10 years in jail. Are you really going to try and insist that not even 10 of their rightwing equivalents would cross the line at a lie?
An AR-15 modified for an automatic rate of fire is not a LMG. People pretending they are the same would very much fall under the tacticool coolaid.
Spraying and praying beyond effective range not being very useful is why doing so is often teased / mocked as playing Rambo.
If all you mean by 'fairly controllable' is 'in the general direction,' this would be missing the point, much like firing at full auto at the ranges of this incident.
Unless they missed because they were playing with full auto beyond the effective range of auto. Like what happened in Texas.
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