@FtSoA's banner p

FtSoA


				

				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users  
joined 2025 June 30 02:04:24 UTC

				

User ID: 3796

FtSoA


				
				
				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2025 June 30 02:04:24 UTC

					

No bio...


					

User ID: 3796

I'm trying my hand at public writing. Evaluating the potential actions of a unique geopolitical actor like Iran is an interesting challenge, and there are a lot of strange ideas about it out there. Read the whole thing for an attempt to apply rational actor theory to Iranian leaders.

https://ftsoa.substack.com/p/assessing-the-troubled-future-of

Selected excerpts:

This is I think an unprecedented occurrence in history—enforcing a neutralization of an adversary’s key military programs from the air after an unnegotiated ceasefire. Iran invested an immense amount into its “mostly peaceful” nuclear program, its missile industry and forces, and its proxies as part of its strategy for regional domination and ideological opposition to the U.S. and Israel. For Iran to accept this neutering would effectively be an unnegotiated surrender of several of the Islamic regime’s key objectives, and acceptance of domination by its bitterest adversary. It would be untenable to admit that publicly. It seems hardly tenable to concede it implicitly.

There are perhaps three broad courses of action for the Islamic regime:

  1. Open Defiance: As soon as possible, directly confront the U.S. and Israel by restarting military/nuclear programs and aggression.

  2. Tacit Acceptance: Maintain defiant rhetoric, but do nothing to actually aggravate Israel or the U.S. indefinitely and focus on maintaining domestic control.

  3. Covert Defiance: Maintain defiant rhetoric and domestic control, and “secretly” hit back at the U.S. and Israel via “undetectable” means like cyber warfare and terrorism, and attempt to “covertly” rebuild military/nuclear capabilities in a way that will actually work next time, like managing to rapidly build a nuclear warhead or figuring out how to actually shoot down an F-35.

Anyone remotely sane would recognize (1) is suicide by IAF. The problem with (2) is that eventually it’s going to be obvious to at least the hardline military and security class—the regime’s key believers and protectors—that Iran has in fact implicitly surrendered. And (3) means hoping that Iran can, unlike every other time, “get away with it” and actually put up a real fight down the road. Additionally, Iran’s economy and the regime’s popularity were already on thin ice before all this. Not great! Historically, (3) is the obvious choice for Iran as it’s something of a compromise between the hardline and the pragmatist camps. But in what manner and on what timeline and with what level of risk acceptance? The ongoing work to uncover Fordo is evidence for (3) being the chosen course of action. How long will the IAF permit that activity?

Given the above considerations, here’s where my gut is on the blurry probability of broad outcomes:

Possible, but unlikely:

Neutered Islamic regime at least tacitly accepts defeat and survives indefinitely as a shadow of its former self.

Quite possible, even likely:

Defiant Iran and Israel go back to war in coming weeks/months; economic and/or regime collapse.

Very likely:

Israel mows the grass; a mostly neutered Islamic regime survives indefinitely.

Very likely:

Israel mows the grass; economic and/or regime collapse within a few years.

I think it’s almost certain that Israel will have cause to mow the Iranian grass because I have a hard time imagining the Iranian regime, or at least some rogue hardline element, will not try to cross Israel’s red lines (and be caught doing so). I also struggle to imagine that pragmatist and reformist camps will transition the regime into something more tolerable without hardliners reasserting control. I have much less certainty about the chances of economic and/or regime collapse, but it’s certainly a very real possibility. Probably more likely than not in the coming year or two.

The obvious cop out is that any number of curve balls could enter the scene such that I am shown to have been insufficiently imaginative or wise. In my defense, President Trump did a 180 from “total surrender” and “regime change” to “ceasefire now” in like 72 hours. The Israelis and Iranians, however, are more consistent in their underlying goals and behaviors. The Israelis have been openly advocating for regime change, in recognition that’s probably the only real solution to Iran as an enduring threat. The Iranians remain at least rhetorically defiant. Something has to give.