FtSoA
1mo ago
I was raised religious and it's always fun to have to turn on my "religion modeling circuits" to keep them from totally atrophying.
FtSoA
1mo ago
Weird that they went for Iraq and not Iran at the time, no?
Since Iran actually had a nuclear weapons program and was far more opposed to Israel than Iraq was.
FtSoA
1mo ago
- They've been dealing with that for a couple of years now.
- That's a big reason they're so motivated to decisively end the threat from Iran.
FtSoA
1mo ago
This take ignores the ideological motivations of the Islamic regime and analyzes them if this is just a par-for-the-course geopolitical rivalry.
It also ignores the Arab distaste for the Iranian regime.
FtSoA
1mo ago
Thanks for the analysis.
Here are some issues I see:
- The decapitation strikes necessarily needed to happen right off the bat to hit the targets before they went into full defense mode. Gotta have a "surprise" to have a surprise attack. This was indeed before Israel had achieved full air superiority/dominance, as those operations in the early phases were in parallel.
- In the early phases, yes, using air-launched missiles is a way to avoid air defenses and increase aircraft range. Had the conflict continued more bombs would have been employed.
- I do not think this is an accurate description of how the interception rate went, but yes interceptors are expensive and finite.
Obviously, the Israelis have not tried to significantly restart the conflict because of Trump. I see no way to justify the view that Israel stopped because of a newfound fear of Iran's retaliatory options. Iran was almost entirely militarily ineffective on both defense and offense during this conflict.
I also think it's incredibly backwards to conclude from all this that Israel can't handle Iran alone. Certainly, it would be far harder without U.S. support, but that's a lot different than saying they couldn't do it.
As to the fate of the Iranian regime, frankly it's probably in the strongest position it's been in decades.
I can't even comprehend how someone could think this for some definition of "strong." In terms of military power, they've taken immense damage and been shown to be incapable of air defense. Everyone can see the craters and coffins. The Axis of Resistance is a shadow of its former self. For domestic power, they have maintained control of the public (and there have been no major attempts at protests, smartly), but the economy is now even more in shambles and everyone is even more paranoid than they were before about Mossad agents everywhere.
The advocates of negotiating with the US look like chumps and the hardliners who proposed building ballistic missile cities carved into mountains look like brilliant strategists.
This take is directly contradicted by the NYT article I cite. I'm not sure exactly how accurate that portrayal was or is now, but the IRGC hardliners look like they just died a lot.
I suppose the IRGC warrior caste might increase it's power relative to the clerical caste
I don't think this is a good way to map power dynamics in Iran. The IRGC is devoted to Khamenei and Islamic jurisprudence.
At this point if Iran wanted a nuclear weapon there's very little Trump or Israel could do to stop them
Assuming such activity was detected in advance, do you think Israel would not attempt nearly everything possible to do this? Do you think they'll be incapable of maintaining/reestablishing air dominance? Do you think they're bluffing about doing an airborne operation if necessary?
One could argue that the Islamic regime is better off than I make it out to be, but I can see no way to judge it as stronger than before the 12-Day War.
FtSoA
1mo ago
I agree.
We've generally restrained Israeli desires to retaliate against Iran. E.g., my understanding is that they wanted to kill Soleimani for quite some time, but the U.S. did not want to risk an escalatory spiral.
I'm trying my hand at public writing. Evaluating the potential actions of a unique geopolitical actor like Iran is an interesting challenge, and there are a lot of strange ideas about it out there. Read the whole thing for an attempt to apply rational actor theory to Iranian leaders.
https://ftsoa.substack.com/p/assessing-the-troubled-future-of
Selected excerpts:
This is I think an unprecedented occurrence in history—enforcing a neutralization of an adversary’s key military programs from the air after an unnegotiated ceasefire. Iran invested an immense amount into its “mostly peaceful” nuclear program, its missile industry and forces, and its proxies as part of its strategy for regional domination and ideological opposition to the U.S. and Israel. For Iran to accept this neutering would effectively be an unnegotiated surrender of several of the Islamic regime’s key objectives, and acceptance of domination by its bitterest adversary. It would be untenable to admit that publicly. It seems hardly tenable to concede it implicitly.
There are perhaps three broad courses of action for the Islamic regime:
Open Defiance: As soon as possible, directly confront the U.S. and Israel by restarting military/nuclear programs and aggression.
Tacit Acceptance: Maintain defiant rhetoric, but do nothing to actually aggravate Israel or the U.S. indefinitely and focus on maintaining domestic control.
Covert Defiance: Maintain defiant rhetoric and domestic control, and “secretly” hit back at the U.S. and Israel via “undetectable” means like cyber warfare and terrorism, and attempt to “covertly” rebuild military/nuclear capabilities in a way that will actually work next time, like managing to rapidly build a nuclear warhead or figuring out how to actually shoot down an F-35.
Anyone remotely sane would recognize (1) is suicide by IAF. The problem with (2) is that eventually it’s going to be obvious to at least the hardline military and security class—the regime’s key believers and protectors—that Iran has in fact implicitly surrendered. And (3) means hoping that Iran can, unlike every other time, “get away with it” and actually put up a real fight down the road. Additionally, Iran’s economy and the regime’s popularity were already on thin ice before all this. Not great! Historically, (3) is the obvious choice for Iran as it’s something of a compromise between the hardline and the pragmatist camps. But in what manner and on what timeline and with what level of risk acceptance? The ongoing work to uncover Fordo is evidence for (3) being the chosen course of action. How long will the IAF permit that activity?
Given the above considerations, here’s where my gut is on the blurry probability of broad outcomes:
Possible, but unlikely:
Neutered Islamic regime at least tacitly accepts defeat and survives indefinitely as a shadow of its former self.
Quite possible, even likely:
Defiant Iran and Israel go back to war in coming weeks/months; economic and/or regime collapse.
Very likely:
Israel mows the grass; a mostly neutered Islamic regime survives indefinitely.
Very likely:
Israel mows the grass; economic and/or regime collapse within a few years.
I think it’s almost certain that Israel will have cause to mow the Iranian grass because I have a hard time imagining the Iranian regime, or at least some rogue hardline element, will not try to cross Israel’s red lines (and be caught doing so). I also struggle to imagine that pragmatist and reformist camps will transition the regime into something more tolerable without hardliners reasserting control. I have much less certainty about the chances of economic and/or regime collapse, but it’s certainly a very real possibility. Probably more likely than not in the coming year or two.
The obvious cop out is that any number of curve balls could enter the scene such that I am shown to have been insufficiently imaginative or wise. In my defense, President Trump did a 180 from “total surrender” and “regime change” to “ceasefire now” in like 72 hours. The Israelis and Iranians, however, are more consistent in their underlying goals and behaviors. The Israelis have been openly advocating for regime change, in recognition that’s probably the only real solution to Iran as an enduring threat. The Iranians remain at least rhetorically defiant. Something has to give.
Famously, Scott's post on "witches" addresses this. Also, I think EY on "evaporative cooling."
Has a lot of use for modeling the group dynamics of just about anything, whether online spheres or say academia.
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