Harlequin5942
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User ID: 1062
Harlequin5942
11mo ago
(ii) I have a weird sympathy towards Retributivism as a theory of justice and crime. More specifically, I have a lot of negative animus towards what I see as excessively utilitarian approaches to criminal justice, that regard criminals as just another type of citizen to be managed. As soon as we stop regarding criminals as people, but just factors of (dis)production, then I think we do them and our society a disservice; it's treating them as cattle. Instead, I'm sympathetic towards a more contractualist approach that mandates we treat all citizens as autonomous individuals who enter into an implicit social contract by virtue of enjoying the benefits of society, such that we would be doing them a disservice of sorts if we didn't punish them for their crimes. Let me try to put that in a maxim: you're an adult, you're a citizen; you fucked up, now you pay the price. If we didn't make you pay the price, we'd be treating you like a child or an animal.
Yes, the reductio ad absurdums of the alternative theories of punishment are very persuasive to me. If you go down the deterrence road, you end up with something like Gary Becker's approach: punish harshly but monitor laxly, since this is more cost-efficient as a way of deterring crime.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gary_Becker#Crime_and_punishment
If you go down the rehabiliation road, then it's hard to explain what's wrong with a Clockwork Orange view of crime: neuter the capacity of the criminal to commit crimes, even if they want to do so. If you say, "They need to appreciate why their crime was wrong," then this goes beyond rehabilitationism, and introduces an abstract concept of justice that is more appropriate in a view like retributivism.
Finally, there is expressivism (punishment is an expression of society's disapproval of the criminal act) but that doesn't explain why we should punish criminals, rather than any group that society tends to dislike, e.g. Satanists or Morris dancers.
Harlequin5942
1mo ago
I came to similar conclusions based on reading/hearing the thoughts of Mark Noble, a neuroscientist:
https://feelinggood.com/2019/11/18/167-feeling-great-professor-mark-noble-on-team-cbt-and-the-brain/
Basically, a good rule-of-thumb in neuroscience is "what fires together, wires together." So classic talk therapy (going over thoughts again and again with an interested but passive, unjudgemental or supportive therapist) might actually strengthen neural pathways that lead to depressed, anxious, angry, or otherwise undesired mental states.
This also explains why, if possible, just ignoring thoughts like "I'm useless" or "This is going to end terribly" or "It's SO unfair!" can be remarkably effective at avoiding the concomitant emotional problems; I think there was some research on this recently. It also explains why men's "just don't dwell on it" coping strategies are associated with lower levels of depression, anxiety, and suicide attempts than among women, despite the ideology that "repression" is a bad thing. Men have more successful suicide attempts, but this can be explained by higher levels of aggression. It also explains research suggesting that the behavioural activation methods in CBT are the most effective, since these are focused on rapidly removing negative thoughts/habits (e.g. by falsifying your hypothesis that holding a house spider will kill you with its venom or that your old friends will hate you if you get back in touch with them).
Mark Noble argues that approaches like David Burns's TEAM therapy, which aim at rapid recovery, will be more successful, partly because they minimise the amount of time spent on therapy or brooding outside of therapy. Noble also thinks there also reasons to think that each element of TEAM (Testing emotions/therapist performance before and after sessions, Empathising with the client, Agenda-setting to deal with client resistance to change, Methods for rapid and client-calibrated recovery) has a neuroscientific basis for effectiveness.
However, even if TEAM doesn't have these properties, I think that the idea of gradual change and the elevation of emotional expression have quite possibly damaged millions of people's mental health.
Argentina has very limited credibility to offer concessions to anyone. Even its people have lost faith, e.g. in its currency. It is a worthless sinkhole for development aid, taking billions from the IMF and refusing to implement reforms:
“In the last few times that the fund has been involved in Argentina, it has always tried to push some of the reform agenda Argentina needs, but that has always failed,” Monica de Bolle, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said during an interview with Marketplace’s Sabri Ben-Achour. “That story has just been repeating itself over and over and over again. It’s like a ‘Groundhog Day’ type of thing.”
https://www.marketplace.org/2023/06/02/how-argentinas-economy-crumbled/
For almost 100 years, Argentina has moved between left-wing populist stupidity and right-wing populist incompetence. China can act as a predatory lender, and like other predatory lenders, take advantage of their borrowers' lack of alternatives. The only sensible reason for China to invest in Argentina is to milk Argentina's geographic and political (UN vote etc.) resources dry.
Not all societies are created equal, and there are varying degrees of misalignment. If I look at a woman in lust, I am clearly sinning and am condemned; but at least my desires are in alignment with God's ideal. It is only the object of my desires that is inappropriate, as being attracted to my wife is not only not a sin, but is a key part of a relationship that is a representation of Christ's love for the Church. Same-sex attraction is more disordered as both the object and the desire itself are misaligned. Transgenderism is completely disordered: the object, desire, and self are all misaligned.
This sounds like ranking sins, which is commonsensical and popular in e.g. Catholicism, but hard to reconcile with ideas like the Divine Command Theory of ethics. If what's wrong with sinning is disobeying God, then committing adultery in your heart is bad in exactly the same way as raping and murdering a baby. There's no moral sense in which you are better or worse than the cruellest, most perverted person you can imagine; the only possible difference of moral significance between you and a baby-raper-killer is that God may have chosen (and I stress "chosen") to save you from what you morally deserve. Focusing on e.g. the difference in harms is swapping the DCT for something like consequentialism or care ethics.
(I leave aside https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pelagianism and non-DCT metaethics as interesting but very widely condemned by Christians.)
If Jesus or the Bible had provided a comprehensive ranking of sins with varying degrees of sinfulness, then it's obvious consistent with a Christian DCT, but as you know that's not the case.
Societies that venerate increasingly disordered behavior will inevitably sink into corruption and decay.
I think that this is the better option for what you want to say. Even if all sins are equally sinful, you can still coherently argue that different societies have different propensities to sin vs. redemption. A hardline Christian DCT fan can still reason in a consequentialist way about maximising the probability of redemption and minimising the probability of sins.
Harlequin5942
2mo ago
But when the same people who convinced you to subscribe to a consent-only sexual ethic
How are you using the word "you" here?
I have never subscribed to a consent-only sexual ethic.
Harlequin5942
10mo ago
Based on my experience of Ukrainian women, a lot of conservative motteizeans might find those women TOO unwoke.
As I understand it, the standard Christian position is that nobody deserves salvation, but God sometimes grants it. So the Christian answer is that there is no reason. Whether that is satisfying is another debate, but it's an important aspect to understand if one is going to understand them charitably: from a Christian perspective, God is not morally obliged to save anyone. In fact, from a Divine Command Theory perspective, the very notion of moral obligations for God is a category mistake, like a moral obligation for the number 11. God behaves morally not because he is obliged to e.g. keep his promises, but because that is what a supremely benevolent being does. In contrast, from a Christian perspective, a supremely benevolent being does not necessarily save anyone from the consequences of their nature which he created.
else Brexit would have falsified it
It took multiple constitutional crises (including a proguation of parliament, which many regard as undemocratic), a general election in 2017 where parties promising won over 85% of the vote, the biggest defeat of those parties ever in the 2019 European election when they reached deadlock over Brexit (and 30.5% of the vote for the Brexit party, a completely unprecedented rise for a new party in UK political history), and Labour losing their MP in Bolsover.
It also involved setting up internal trade barriers in the UK, against the wishes of most people in Northern Ireland.
You can’t expect the state to act on every whim of the populace.
True, but it is typical that if the state seeks a mandate from the populace in a referendum for X, it doesn't choose to do X even if the referendum goes against X. Can you imagine what would have happened if the Remain side had narrowly won the referendum, but the Conservatives implemented Brexit anyway, saying that membership of the EU was unworkable? Or even had a second referendum a few years later, saying that the Remainers had misunderstood the issues?
Still, even if you argue that Brexit was a transient and uninformed whim, it's still not comparable to the public's desire for less immigration, which is a very persistent preference in the UK, and many other EU countries. The problem is that, at least on this issue, democracy has been ineffective as a means of incentivising politicians to act in accordance with that preference. I think that this is a general flaw with democracy: people generally vote for candidates, who come as package deals, and who can afford to change parts of that package after the deal in order to appeal to special interest groups who are better organised than most voters.
You might argue, with Churchill, that "Democracy is awful, but it is the worst system of government, save for all the others," but that's a prima facie argument for less government, not more democracy.
Harlequin5942
2mo ago
Ah, well, then I'm sure you have some other, non-consent reason why children can't have sex. That's fair enough, but it's a bit surprising considering your comment that I responded to. There, it seemed like the pertinent question (which is the only question to the consent-only folks) was about consent
Your confusion seems to be because you are missing the distinction between "inability to consent is a sufficient reason for children not to have sex" with "lack of consent is a necessary condition for sex to be wrong." It may help you to do some work on pen-and-paper using Venn diagrams: for example, you see how "All non-consensual sex is wrong sex" is logically distinct from "All wrong sex is non-consensual sex."
Similarly, that consent is one pertinent question in sexual ethics doesn't imply that it's the only question.
I also suspect that even many people who sometimes say, "As long as it's consensual, it's fine," actually make exceptions for things like "power dynamics" and "developing bad habits," but I'm not interested in rationally reconstructing their views.
Harlequin5942
5mo ago
It is the possibility of smashing their idols, of redacting and retracting the belief in liberty, equality, and fraternity.
It's not clear to me that those aren't the value of the American right, at least since they kicked the Royalists up to British North America. The differences between the mainstream American right and the mainstream American left are marginal:
Liberty: The right tends to put more emphasis on negative freedom rather than positive freedom. There have been times when, on social issues, the right has been sceptical of particular cases of negative freedom, but the basic assumption of the US right has almost always been individualist rather than paternalist; things like the Religious Right and the anti-woke movement have to justify themselves in terms of "This person's exercise of liberty X actually affects our liberty Y," which is fundamentally different from, "God says no" or "The man in Whitehall knows best."
Equality: Equality of opportunity (not in the silly sense of an equal chance, but in terms of equal legal rights and no unjustified discrimination) is the ideology of just about every last American. American conservatives might argue about the existence of certain types of discrimination or whether some particular case of discrimination is justified, but equality has always been integrally part of the American right's ideology, if not their practice. Of course, there will be the aberrant Nietzschean, Dominionist, Blood and Soil nationalist etc., but they are as alien to the American right as a working class Stalinist in the US left.
Fraternity: The US is unusual in being founded on an ideology (classical liberalism) and with the supposition that religion, ethnicity etc. are personal and/or local, rather than an integral part of the federal state. Trump is fraternal with gay people, trans people, hispanics, blacks etc. Some of his best friends are black. Some of his biggest supporters are hispanics. Friendship across race, religion, and "lifestyles" is as American as apple pie, and as American conservative as loving the US military, which itself has been multiracially fraternal for as long as most people can remember.
As you suggest, for the terminally online, it might seem like a different kind of conservativism had an ascendency in 2016. However, in fact, Trump and Trumpism was just mainstream US conservativism with balls. The average Trump supporter is as fundamentally opposed to reactionaries, Nazis, and the like as the average Hillary supporter.
This is starting to sound like the noncentral fallacy, and perhaps a particularly bad version of it. "I can stretch the meaning of X to include Y, therefore I can extend judgements about central cases of X to Y" is not a good argument.
Is a woman wearing makeup to attract men "bargaining" too?
Harlequin5942
3mo ago
Russia is not going to dominate Europe, force of arms or otherwise.
It's in the process of conquering the second largest country in Europe and would have succeeded if Trump had been president.
It's not so much that Russia is stronger than Europe, it's that it's crazier. Someone willing to fight can dominate a room full of equally strong people who aren't.
Harlequin5942
9mo ago
I'm not stretching the meaning of 'bargaining' here at all.
You don't think it's stretching "at all" to extend it to interactions with no agreement on sufficient conditions for the exchange, articulated negotiations, or legal enforcement? And from a political or commercial context to a romantic one?
It doesn't change the fact that most men have to learn that just being themselves isn't good enough. They need something more. Which is where the entire self improvement become masculine and worthy crap comes from.
But I totally agree with your first two sentences and I don't know what the third one means. My complaint is that thinking of "You have to work hard to gain the romantic approval of others" as "bargaining" is trying to generate a specific emotional response by including the former in the latter category (which, sure, you can do with the right defintions) where the archetypal form of similar bargaining would be e.g. prostitution or arranged marriages.
Kind of. She's leveraging what she already has.
She's amplifying it, granted. But that doesn't make it bargaining.
To help elucidate a bit, a part of the frustration monetarily successful women have described in media is that they want to be able to bargain for a better man than their looks could command but can't since a lot of men don't care about their money. I.e. their money has no bargaining power over the men they want. So they write articles about how men are intimidated by successful middle aged women or whatever.
Why put it in terms of "bargaining power", rather than "men are largely indifferent to money in a partner, at least for deciding whether to have sex with them"?
(Maybe it also extends to whether they consider women to be marriage-material, but the evidence I have seen is about women's sexual success. And some of that has been dubious e.g. relative frequency of simultaneous partners, but that presupposes that a sexually attractive woman is more likely to have multiple simultaneous partners, something I don't know to be true. Sleeping around seems to require attractiveness on the part of men, but desperation is a sufficient condition for even unattractive women.)
Harlequin5942
10mo ago
He implemented some reforms, but the overall situation was still awful in 2016-2017: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Argentina#Data
Also, the inflation target was raised by 5%: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/28D
Harlequin5942
11mo ago
Art only has to inspire emotions in people.
Is that true?
If we could inspire the same emotions by taking the relevant pills, would art be redundant?
Harlequin5942
9d ago
You need to consider demand for relocation as well as supply in the analysis. The expected gain in 1500 AD from moving from e.g. West Africa to Europe, given the risks and the relative differences in quality of life, were pretty small compared to the expected gain from moving in 2024. It wasn't like Europeans were fighting off hoards of African immigrants. And in 1900, what would the average African villager going to do in places where they don't speak the language, don't have much marketable skills, don't have immunity to local diseases, and don't have a welfare state to use?
In the Imperialist period, the transfer was the other way: hordes of European economic migrants swarming to the Americas and Africa.
In the UK, a lot of the black immigration was driven by things like African nurses coming over for work after 1945, during a period of labour shortages in the UK.
I would say that the key factors were (a) the Great Divergence in economic prosperity between the West and the Rest, due to the rise liberal capitalism in the former; (b) differences in population growth, and (c) better information transfer, so that even poor Africans could know that the poor in the West enjoyed a better standard of living.
Restrictions on immigration, with a few exceptions (like the White Australia policy) were less important than the above factors, I think.
Harlequin5942
1mo ago
I'm definitely not a fan of the Divine Command Theory, but I think you're being unfair here. Why not posit a difference in degree of disobedience? Surely murdering someone is more disobedient than committing adultery in your heart.
What's more disobedient about it? Both are breaking God's commandments.
On Matthew 22, the key term here is magos (μεγας) which is used in the New Testament to mean largest or highest in rank, just as "greatest" is ambiguous in English. One clever thing about the commandment Jesus gives is that it is both largest in scope (every violation of every other commandment is an instance of it) and rank. If humans truly had complete faith and love for God, then they would neither commit adultery in their hearts, nor murder.
Note I'm not saying that this is common sense, but just a natural implication of an unranked DCT.
I think the better question is why you'd give your own interpretation of Divine Command Theory any time at all, given the many times in the Bible when it's explicitly contradicted.
Oh, that's just teasing! Don't be so coquettish, show the goods.
Harlequin5942
2mo ago
You mean, why can't children and animals consent to acts they lack the mental capacity to understand?
Before you ask, no, I don't think that retarded adults with childlike levels of understanding of sex can consent to sex. Nor do I think that children can consent to e.g. "have parts of their body hacked off, and keep it all secret from their parents!" So neither of the reductios you have mentioned so far are worrying for me, but as I've indicated, I'm probably not the type of person you were addressing above, which was why I was curious as to whether you were addressing me when you used "you" or you were using it in some hypothetical/indirect sense/whatever.
There's also the problem that 50-50 is not actually a neutral probability, if you're a coherent Bayesian and you don't have an ultra-simple sample space. For example, if I think that the probability of each possible bloxor being greeblic is 50%, then I am committed to thinking that the probability that 70/100 bloxors being greeblic is 0.004%. So my "neutral" prior commits me to extremely strong confidence that the distribution of greeblic among those 100 bloxors is not 70!
If I set my prior for each bloxor being greeblic to 69.5%, then it is approximately neutral with respect to 70/100 bloxors being greeblic. But now I'm obviously far from neutral with respect to any individual bloxor being greeblic.
This is one of the limitations of Bayesianism as a formalism: it can model neutral belief with respect to any individual partition of the sample space, but not all partitions of the sample space. So, Scott is just wrong and frankly hasn't understood the mathematics, given his statement "If you have total uncertainty about a statement (“are bloxors greeblic?”), you should assign it a probability of 50%," since this norm implies incoherence, but coherence is a fundamental Bayesian norm.
Put briefly, what Scott is saying requires that you reject Bayesian epistemology/decision theory. I haven't read the whole post yet, but I would be surprised if he realised that.
This isn't an adult forum (or a mature one - we're thoroughly immature, much of the time) but basically just dating Ukrainian women in various parts of Europe, where I work. Unlike other Eastern European women I've known, who were thoroughly Twitterized culturally, the Russian, Romanian, and Ukrainian women I have known (intimately or casually, with a sadly small sample of the former) have been anti-abortion, trad or moderately trad about gender roles, racially insensitive (including towards other Eastern Europeans, e.g. gypsies and Albanians) and softly anti-Semitic. Often Christian in a vague, spiritual way, e.g. sexually liberated and suspicious of clergy, and just as into Asian mumbo-jumbo as Christian mumbo-jumbo.
Personally I liked them because they were forthright, insensitive, and really, really liked debating, which are the top personality traits in a woman for me. I happily date both conservative and progressive women with such personalities, as long as they don't mind me speaking my mind and they don't hide their own opinions. And, while Eastern European women often drink too much, they are also very often good at not eating too much, and I like tall/slim women.
Harlequin5942
8mo ago
I think affluent African parents are more relaxed about their kids marrying white than many Asian (especially South Asian) and Arab/North African parents, possibly for cultural and religious (they're usually Christian) reasons.
And because parents, like women, tend to be hypergamous, and a white son-in-law is higher status than an Asian/Arab/Indian/etc. son-in-law.
Harlequin5942
9mo ago
Where the accuracy or utility of the terminology is disregarded due to it being too vulgar.
Not too vulgar, but as potentially misleading. For example, simply changing the denotation of a word doesn't automatically change its connotations. Hence, one's reasoning can be affected by associations with a word's old reference.
what are you insinuating my argument is when I use the term 'bargain'?
Well, you said:
"You can't be 'masculine' when you have to bargain with women for access to their genitals."
Well, if "bargaining" specifically means something like handing over money for sex, then certainly masculine traits are irrelevant to the sexual encounter. A femboy, a coward, a dishonest man etc. could do that.
But it seems that you also want to say that anything a guy does to make himself (more?) attractice is also bargaining:
"You are bargaining with the hypothetical woman when you decide to become a tall guy working at Goldman Sachs to garner her interest. You bring being tall and having money, she brings whatever."
However, the connection between masculine traits and attraction becomes more integral here. For example, most women find the ability to obtain resources as more attractive than the mere possession. A trust-fund baby is less attractive than a self-made man, because the latter (if the wealth was acquired honestly, not purely by chance etc.) can provide under a wider range of circumstances, e.g. the loss of his wealth. And if you think of your own (platonic) difference in regard for the two men's characters, it's at least because of the masculine traits required to obtain wealth are admirable, whereas the luck required to be born into wealth deserves no admiration at all.
Similarly, you want to say that a woman who buys and uses make-up to attract men is bargaining. However, in that case, feminine traits (delicacy, attention to the comfort of others etc.) are also usually relevant to the success of the woman, in a way that isn't the case in archetypal bargaining, e.g. a woman who gets a hot husband by her family offering a big dowry.
The extension of "these behaviours aren't really masculine/feminine" seems to depend on the claim that there are bargaining for sex, which is true if you stretch the scope of 'bargaining' far enough. However, it doesn't follow from that subsumption of these behaviours into the category "bargaining" that we can infer that they have the properties of archetypal cases of bargaining for sex (or companionship or whatever). The problem is that such non-sequitur inferences are very tempting due to the connotations of "bargaining", even given an explicit change in its reference.
You're right to make the analogy with "sexual marketplace", which is misleading for similar reasons. I have been in brothels and I have dated, and while there are similarities, it's a reciple for loose thinking to refer to both as "sexual marketplaces". Devoted as I am to capitalism and economic analysis, I'm more devoted to rationality and clear thinking, which are harmed by expecting that the associations (descriptive and normative) of words will change simply as a matter of broadening their definitions.
Harlequin5942
1mo ago
All of these are quite clear examples of more disobedience.
But all of them are punished in exactly the same way, according to traditional Christianity. So while there is more disobedience, it doesn't seem to make a moral difference: someone who commits one sin is treated by God exactly the same as if they've committed them all.
You conveniently ignore the second part of that, which is loving thy neighbor. I agree that all sins violate the first commandment, but not all sins violate the second, so why, according to Divine Command Theory, is it explicitly placed above all other commandments?
If all other sins (breaking of God's commands) are implicit in the first commandment, then it isn't.
You should at least address both of my examples before accusing me of not providing enough. Jesus explicitly says that judgment, mercy, and faith are "weightier" than small tithes; a strong implication that obeying such commandments is straightforwardly more important.
That's one possible interpretation of the text. However, the text itself is not a contradiction, since it's not clear that Jesus is saying that these are more morally important, as opposed to e.g. important for spiritual development (the context is condemning the religious practices of scribes and Pharisees.
I'm interested in why you think DCT holds any weight at all. What evidence is there for it?
Biblically? One advantage is that it (allegedly) explains why a benevolent Father would punish his children in a lake of fire for the slightest infraction of his will, excepting grace. More generally, it neatly answers the Problem of Evil which otherwise perplexes the Bible (Job in particular; the Jews' efforts to explain their suffering in spite of being God's people; Jesus's partial revelation to humanity) as there is no separate standard of morality by which God can be judged. On a DCT view, God being anything other than perfectly good is a category mistake. This is not so much grasping one of the Euthyphro Dilemma's horns as try to ride it off into the sunset.
Harlequin5942
2mo ago
Ok, what is the nature of the mental capacity that they are lacking?
Not sure what you mean by "nature" here. Do you deny that children, in general, have weaker abilities to understand the implications of their decisions than adults, in general?
Is there something about sex that requires a different type of mental capacity than what is required for children to consent to the variety of other things that they can consent to?
Yes, probably quite a lot of things, but one major respect (which I alluded to with the example of becoming a heroin addict, and which I later suggested with the example of transgender interventions on kids) is the gravity and breadth of the moral implications. A child consenting to buying sweets without parental supervision is a less serious decision than a child choosing to have sex. This is one reason why parents, as a general rule, should have a lot of social and legal authority over children. Why doesn't that authority extend to choosing to let (or require) children have sex, without the child's consent? That's a good example of where a consent-only ethics (or legal doctrine) falls short and something like a harm or corruption principle does work.
Can you help explain the theoretical mechanism to me and to the professional philosophers who have written entire books on this topic, but seem to have just missed the super simple and super obvious way of doing this?
(1) There's no reason to expect it to be super simple and super obvious.
(2) In many (all?) of those professional philosophers, they have various background moral beliefs that (a) lead to implications they don't want regarding pedophilia/pederasty/etc., but (b) they'd rather hold onto at least most of them. You correctly alluded to some examples, e.g. their desire to avoid being X-ophobic or (perhaps worse for some people) being regarded as X-ophobic. As you might have guessed from my presence on here or my comments on how I find male homosexuality physically disgusting, I'm less worried about that than a lot of people.
(3) Professional ethicists are seeking a level of rigour that is neither required for law, nor that I expect from my own moral beliefs. It's akin to how I don't need to know professional physics or engineering to do DIY. If you're aspiring to that level of rigour, then great; I only hope you don't have better things to do with your time than working out really carefully why it's wrong to have sex with children.
They can't consent to sex. Whatever consent to sex is (not an easy concept to analyse, to put it mildly) it's not the same thing as not wanting to have sex. I definitely wanted to have sex when I was 11 (and pre-pubescent). A cat in heat wants some sexual activity and doesn't particularly care with what. The problem is that children and animals can't engage in consensual sex, whether they want to or not, any more than they can make a mature decision about whether to become addicted to heroin.
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