site banner
PaperclipPerfector  5mo ago (text post)   30002 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of July 1, 2024

This weekly roundup thread is intended for all culture war posts. 'Culture war' is vaguely defined, but it basically means controversial issues that fall along set tribal lines. Arguments over culture war issues generate a lot of heat and little light, and few deeply entrenched people ever change their minds. This thread is for voicing opinions and analyzing the state of the discussion while trying to optimize for light over heat.

Optimistically, we think that engaging with people you disagree with is worth your time, and so is being nice! Pessimistically, there are many dynamics that can lead discussions on Culture War topics to become unproductive. There's a human tendency to divide along tribal lines, praising your ingroup and vilifying your outgroup - and if you think you find it easy to criticize your ingroup, then it may be that your outgroup is not who you think it is. Extremists with opposing positions can feed off each other, highlighting each other's worst points to justify their own angry rhetoric, which becomes in turn a new example of bad behavior for the other side to highlight.

We would like to avoid these negative dynamics. Accordingly, we ask that you do not use this thread for waging the Culture War. Examples of waging the Culture War:

  • Shaming.

  • Attempting to 'build consensus' or enforce ideological conformity.

  • Making sweeping generalizations to vilify a group you dislike.

  • Recruiting for a cause.

  • Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.

In general, you should argue to understand, not to win. This thread is not territory to be claimed by one group or another; indeed, the aim is to have many different viewpoints represented here. Thus, we also ask that you follow some guidelines:

  • Speak plainly. Avoid sarcasm and mockery. When disagreeing with someone, state your objections explicitly.

  • Be as precise and charitable as you can. Don't paraphrase unflatteringly.

  • Don't imply that someone said something they did not say, even if you think it follows from what they said.

  • Write like everyone is reading and you want them to be included in the discussion.

On an ad hoc basis, the mods will try to compile a list of the best posts/comments from the previous week, posted in Quality Contribution threads and archived at /r/TheThread. You may nominate a comment for this list by clicking on 'report' at the bottom of the post and typing 'Actually a quality contribution' as the report reason.

9
Top Bottom Old Controversial Comments
Jump in the discussion.

No email address required.

The French elections ended in a vast underperformance for Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National. They won more seats than previously, but nowhere close to their hoped majority, with the big winner being the leftist NFP coalition and Macron's supporter parties also performing reasonably well compared to expectations.

This seems to show that the right-wing populist parties still have a major hurdle to pass on their path to power; they have a lot of fervent supporters, sure, but even more fervent opponents of the sort that would vote for a fence post or a dead dog to keep them out of power. In France this was made easier by leftist and centrist candidates dropping out from three-person races to concentrate votes against RN, but vote concentration might have happened to a lesser degree even before the dropouts.

The right-wing populists are predictably blaming elite machinations, migrant voters etc. but the true reason is genuinely that a lot of their agenda is unpopular, such as their opposition to EU (usually moderated in recent years but still in the background), past or present favorability towards Russia, or simply the fact that their rows of candidates are often full of perceived extremists (fundamentalists, supporters of historical movements of the goosestep variety, antivaxxers and conspiracy theorists, monarchists in countries with a strong republican tradition etc.) or people who just come off as plainly too incompletent for people to vote for them.

These things could of course be solved, and the leaderships of the parties usually want to solve them, but such parties are also affected with a heavy bunker mentality where any accusation of extremism or stupidity aimed at a genuinely extreme or stupid candidate is just taken as more leftist lies that everybody in the party will face, and if the party leadership goes too heavily againt such candidates or touches some pet causes, there might be a revolt amongst party membership who are always looking for signs of their leadership betraying them and going over the side of the establishment.

The French government will probably be formed by some combination of centrist parties, ie. everyone expect RN and LFI, the most left-wing party in the leftist coalition, but if such a coalition is unstable or gets other parties tarred with Macron's current unpopularity, it might create opportunities for RN to do better in 2027.

I'd say this is about a 30th percentile from expectations. They were about 12% to win straight up this time last week. People assuming a majority didn't actually do any research on the matter, but I think it'll actually provide a good foothold for the next Presidential elections as it's a not a particularly consequential election to lose but it should lead to 2-3 years of minority government dithering by the powers that be.

I also feel if there was a grand rally in turnout to 'stave off fascism' that it's unlikely to come a second time in a few years.

I don't see how the 'moderate' left could or would turn their back on the popular front that got them elected, and tie their fate to an extremely impopular central bloc, headed by Macron. IMO this would guarantee electoral annihilation in the next polls. Similarly, I don't see why the traditional right (LR) would do this. There may be very informal and punctual agreements on specific issues, but I don't expect there to be any formal coalition.

That being said, I have no idea how or when a new government will come into office. The current PM offered his resignation, but Macron refused to accept. The left request that the next PM be one of them.

IMO this would guarantee electoral annihilation in the next polls.

At some point a political party that wins elections, or even has a chance, will also have to exercise that power, and exercising power always risks electoral annihilation (and usually leads to at least some setbacks).

The NFP sorta won the election. You suggest to subtract LFI from that, and for the rest to govern in the center. This is what destroyed the socialist party when Hollande was president, and I would assume the memory is still fresh enough among those who did not go over to Macron to not repeat this manouver.

But you are right, Hollande has risen from the dead, so maybe they'll finish off the non-LFI left for good this time.

The problem is that the AfD, Sweden Democrats, RN etc have a lot of respectable voters, because of the secret ballot, but a dearth of respectable candidates, because that invites public humiliation, career blacklisting, insult and pariah status - particularly in higher-status circles.

If you’re a competent and successful lawyer or business owner you can vote for the RN without any opprobrium, because of course nobody knows. If you stand for them, everybody knows.

One problem specific to the RN is that it is a family business, and not a normal political party. If you are an ambitious young politician, and your name is not Le Pen and you are not dating a Le Pen, the RN is not a good place for you, if you don't agree totally and all the time with the current head of the Le Pen clan.

Mégret and Phillipot tried, but nothing came of that.

or simply the fact that their rows of candidates are often full of perceived extremists (fundamentalists, supporters of historical movements of the goosestep variety, antivaxxers and conspiracy theorists, monarchists in countries with a strong republican tradition etc.) or people who just come off as plainly too incompletent for people to vote for them.

also, higher density of clowns, idiots and weird people, and weird people of different variety than weird people promoted as fine

(left to reader how much it is "you needed to be more weird to go to far-right party and far-left is as weird but got more normalized" and "it is actually direct result of far-right ideas" and "overreaction to currently promoted ideas, both terrible and fine ones")

Having been active in a (far-)left party, I have personal experience with party being dragged down with weirdos and people with outlandish views. In a local punk forum (ie. place where you'd expect the far left to have a reliable base of support) there have been more than one post to the tune of "I was thinking of voting for the Left, but I met one of their guys in a bar and he was drunk and shouting that Soviet Union should still exist, so fuck this, I'm voting for the SocDems."

I talked to some french relatives and they said that plenty of the RN candidates just are embarrassingly incompetent and that plenty of them were publicly humiliated in debates and such in the run-up to the election by the candidates of the more established parties.

I don't speak french or paid much attention to the election so I don't know how true this is but similar things are true in Sweden where SD has reasonably competent top leadership but many of their candidates (especially on the local level) are abject clowns who survive electorally not in small part due to not being directly elected.

In Poland actual far-right also has share of extremists (actual monarchists, supporters of theocracy, Russia and people who want to ban woman from voting).

And clowns. And people unusually incompetent, even by standard of politics.

And people who prefer to produce Tik-Tok materials over achieving anything, see Braun with fire extinguisher.

plenty of thr RN candidate just are embarrassingly incompetent

I wonder how much is boosting them and hiding the same from other parties and how much RN having much smaller pool of candidates and how much is RN being structurally stupid.

There's a genuine structural factor. For example, in the European Elections, Finns Party refused to accept one of their MEPs, Teuvo Hakkarainen, as a candidate again, because he was a pitiful drunken failure and a national joke. The said MEP went on to be a candidate for a minor fringe party and got absolutely nowhere, but there was also a fair amount of comments around social medias from Finns Party supporters going "They didn't take Teuvo so I don't trust them any more, they've become too elitist and not for normal men of the people any more". Clearly the party's supporters pay close attention to stuff like this and this limits the party's opportunities to clear away chaff, even if they had to do it in this instance.

and a national joke who views

what does it mean?

This was intended to continue with other stuff that was probably inessential. Fixed.

The winds seems to be shifting

Joe Biden's twitter account posted

https://x.com/JoeBiden/status/1809310761933525304

Let me say this as clearly as I can: I’m the sitting President of the United States. I’m the nominee of the Democratic party. I’m staying in the race.

To which the official sopranos account pinned this gem of a tweet

https://x.com/TheSopranosX/status/1809560815952867476

a picture of tony soprano saying "If You Gotta Keep Saying You're the Boss, You're Not the Boss"

First - whoever did this - this is real sniper shot aimed at Biden's biggest vulnerability. Not that he is senile, but that it is not in charge.

Second - the disarray in the bluish part of the purple blob is public - so in the last few days - Trump campaign can make literal clips of prominent democrats and left leaning people explaining why Biden is not fit for president. And other big part of the blue blob is busy suppling the Trump campaign with hot takes why Kamala Harris is not fit to be president. All in all clusterfuck.

One of the historical dangers of coups is that if the forces are evenly matched they could turn into nasty civil wars - seems the direction the dems are going.

Edit: Another point not about lately is Kamala Harris best shot to be president is just to be elected vice and then wait for him to die in office which is not that implausible. And she gets no negatives if the election is lost and is in a strong position for 2028.

https://nypost.com/2024/07/04/us-news/bidens-inner-circle-has-shrunk-to-these-two-men-sources-say-with-one-liked-to-rasputin/

I don’t know if this is true or just gossip. But this gay Mexican from no where college might be the one running our country now.

In a strange twist of fate it appears as though we all need to hope Hunter is the one in charge. Whose a manageable alcoholic degenerate rich kid likely with well above average IQ.

Now I think the deep state exists but there is obviously no puppet master, Tywin Lannister, behind it. But a form of psychic history where a million members of the blob attempt to maintain their seat in it.

Hunter Biden having any influence is hilarious and horrifying. I’m not sure why no one is talking about this. His past drug use isn’t the issue. The issue is that he’s the most blackmailable person in America. His texts talk about Russian prostitutes, he did god knows what in Ukraine in his free time, he did god knows what when he met with the spy chief on China. He demonstrates poor impulse control and poor ethics (selling access to his father to sensitive foreign countries). And now he’s the one influencing the President. He has been so immunized by the media that, like, what the fuck can the media do to even take him down at this point? We’ve all seen the sex tapes, crack pipes and strange messages, we know he was illegally possessing a firearm, we know he took money from China and oligarchs banned from entering the US. I guess you reap what you sow — if Democrats go down because Hunter influenced Joe to stay in the race, that’s beautiful justice.

When the Hunter conviction came out there was a popular quip along the lines of "That settles it, I'm not voting for Hunter for president". What a fun reversal that now Hunter sits in on meetings with his dad and is his dad's top advisor along with Jill.

Yes that was all over Reddit as the response that had to filtered down as what your suppose to say.

I forgot about that, but he is literally like 20-30% in charge right now. Jill a similar percent. Gay Mexican? Blinken?

What would you blackmail him over? Almost any accusation you make, everyone on the right would believe but it wouldn't shift their opinion, everyone on the left would pretend not to (and it still wouldn't shift their opinion), and Joe's still got the pardon pen. Maybe if you had photos of him in flagrante delicto with an obvious child, but so far as I've heard, Hunter Biden doesn't swing that way.

I've been around long enough to remember when, pre-election, the attempt to focus on the Hunter Biden laptop was dismissed with the blithe response along the lines of 'We're not electing Hunter to office', roughly paraphrased. Amoung others, yes, but that's one that stuck in my mental craw.

And yet, here we are.

There's a lesson to be learned here, but the people whom need to learn it will never listen.

Edit: Another point not about lately is Kamala Harris best shot to be president is just to be elected vice and then wait for him to die in office which is not that implausible. And she gets no negatives if the election is lost and is in a strong position for 2028.

No it's not. Joe Biden will very assuredly lose and Kamala Harris would only very probably lose.

Excepting extremely popular incumbent Presidents (which Trump obviously isn’t) a red/blue party nominee likely has at least 20-25% chance of winning even if polling makes it unlikely.

Yeah. Even Biden in his corpse arc still isn't below 30-40%

Edit: Another point not about lately is Kamala Harris best shot to be president is just to be elected vice and then wait for him to die in office which is not that implausible. And she gets no negatives if the election is lost and is in a strong position for 2028.

Very much not, I would think. It's looking very much like she will not be elected vice-president again, barring some immense turnaround in the polls. If she goes into a primary in 2028 I would not think she is going to finish among the five top vote-getters. Her unique advantage and only asset is that at this point she is the candidate the Dems can pivot to without risking fragmentation, especially if Biden gives her the Official Blessing.

So her best play to be President at this point is to sit back and let others push Biden out, and then gracefully (if mock-regrettingly!) accept the scepter.

Hey, you called it.

This felt less like a prediction and more like a lay-up. I couldn't see any other course of action for the Democrats.

As in not be nominated for the upcoming cycle? I don't really see any reason for Biden to turf her out, nor is there really a heir apparent. Her best shot to be President is either Biden resignation after winning, or getting essentially handed the nom by an exiting Biden now. It'd be very surprising if she won the nomination in a 2028 primary.

As in not be nominated for the upcoming cycle?

I think @johnfabian's claim is that Biden will very probably lose if retained, which would mean Harris would not become VP and would not be able to become President upon Biden's death.

He might step down immediately in which case she would be President for 2 months, I guess.

The sitcom Veep had this exact arc. One of the great lines was 'thanks to you this country will never have a female president again, because we had one and she SUCKED'.

Or something to that effect. The VP is cut out of the loop, playing petty power games in her own isolated world and desperately seeking the Presidents attention which is never given.

The Harris vice presidency is basically Veep, but Harris is somewhat less consequential.

I think Selina is much smarter and more calculating than Kamala, though.

And she gets no negatives if the election is lost and is in a strong position for 2028.

Eh next nomination will be a contested field. I think this is why Newsom's gotten behind the Biden run since he'd be way more handicapped by Harris running-and-winning than anything else. Practically all the other non-Harris challengers are better off with Biden running and losing than potentially getting sidelined behind somebody who actually wins and has a second term of eligibility.

Biden win means it's pretty open slather next cycle.

Issue at the moment for the replacement enthusiasts is that they need Biden to resign.

Yes, Harris is best served by Biden winning 2024 and handing the presidency to her after an agreed-upon period (six months, a year, it doesn’t really matter) OR, if it has to happen, by him dropping out at the very last minute such that she has to be the nominee. Newsom is best served by Trump winning in 2024, which would both give momentum to the Dem candidate in ‘28 and mean a longer open primary.

Thoughts on Trump v. United States:

There were five opinions. The Conservatives joined Roberts' opinion, except for Barrett regarding one section. He set out the following:

Presidents have absolute immunity for core constitutional powers.

For official acts more generally, he at least has presumptive immunity, but maybe absolute immunity.

They have no immunity for unofficial acts.

This judgment was based on large part on structural considerations of the constitution. For one, if the Constitution says that the President shall have some power, like the veto or the pardon, Congress cannot, by regulation, limit that or take it away. That would counter the separation of powers and intent of the Constitution. On the other hand, some things have authority from both, so maybe Congress could regulate those.

Additionally, this was based in large part on extensions of precedent from several prior cases, especially Nixon v. Fitzgerald. There, they ruled that presidents could not have civil suits leveled against them for official acts in Congress. While there is a greater interest, there is also a greater danger to the president, as jail is more serious than a financial burden.

The concern is that not having any immunity would allow frivolous criminal cases to proceed, which would seriously limit the bold action that the founders would have wanted a president to take. In such things, the dangers of intrusion on the executive branch must be considered: subpoenas were ruled to be fine in Burr. Executive privilege has long been held to exist. In all such cases, the risk of intrusion is weighed against the interest of the people, and so in this case, because criminal proceedings are a serious matter, they are allowing them, but they are permissible, but cannot pose any danger of intrusion upon the authority of the Executive branch.

Roberts applies this to the particular cases. The conversations with the DOJ officials, including threatening to remove the Attorney General are held to be absolutely immune, as they have past held that deciding who to prosecute, as well as removing officers, are within the exclusive authority of the President. Conversations with Pence are official, but the government may attempt to rebut that it will not impose dangers, as Pence arguably was carrying out a ceremonial role, and as a member not of the executive. Conversations with state officials to form alternate slates of legislatures, they do not rule on whether they are official or not. Public speeches and tweets, they do not rule whether they are official or not, as it is tricky to discern whether he is acting in the capacity of a candidate or of a president. All these they remand to lower courts to work out.

They also rule that official acts may not be used as evidence in courts, especially since it could be prejudicial. Barrett did not join this.

Roberts then rebuts the various arguments of the dissents, points out that they are giving Trump less than they asked, and are still leaving room for most of the charges, and argues that this is not the "chilling doom" that they are making it out to be. And that it is needed to prevent an executive cannibalized by itself, with each administration prosecuting the last, and so in fear of acting itself.

Barrett joins in large part, except the note on evidence. She would prefer to frame it differently: "immunity" is shorthand for saying that the President may challenge whether criminal statutes are constitutional as applied to him, and he can do that in interlocutory review, before the trial. All agree on the first point in some form, at least, even the dissent. And interlocutory review is "necessary to safeguard important constitutional interests." She would prefer to resolve some things the court left open: most importantly, that the president is not absolutely immune from all official conduct, as Congress has concurrent authority over many government functions, and so they should be able to regulate those, including criminally. Barrett would assess whether charges on official acts are valid in two steps: first, by looking at whether the statute reaches his conduct (e.g. maybe the murder statute prohibiting "unlawful" killings doesn't apply), and second by looking whether it poses danger of intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive branch. For example, the electors case would not intrude. This is the usual case in criminal law. The difference is interlocutory review, and this is necessary because even the mere existence of the trial itself threatens constitutional interests, and so they must be addressed at the outset. She disagrees on whether immune official acts can be evidence, though—it may be necessary in some scenarios, and they can follow the ordinary route of instructing juries only to consider them in specific capacities.

Thomas writes, in something of a sideshow, on the whole office of "Special Counsel." The appointments clause requires the President to appoint some listed offices, and other offices to be under Congress' jurisdiction, but by require it to be done by law. The President may not merely produce offices; some of the motivation for this was due to the history under England, where the King could create new offices and fill them. Congress often explicitly created offices. But there does not seem to be any statute authorizing the appointment of the Special Counsel. He doesn't think the ones cited work. Further, if he is an inferior officer, such a statute would require that the statute give the Attorney General the authority to fill it.

Sotomayor dissents, joined by the other liberals. She sees this as putting the president above the law. Sotomayor thinks that the majority expanded the core immunity beyond any reasonable bounds, baselessly created immunity for official acts, and nonsensically ruled that immune acts cannot be used as evidence.

Starting with text, the Constitution makes no provision for immunity, whereas it did in the Speech and Debate clause for Congress, and some states did for their governors. Additionally, the impeachment clause contemplates prosecution. Turning to history, Hamilton, in Federalist 69, thought the president could be prosecuted, (he says that he was no more secure than the governors of certain states). Pinckney said there was no privilege, and Madison proposed the convention consider privileges of the executive. It was generally agreed that Presidents could be prosecuted. "It seems history matters to this Court only when it is convenient" (citing Bruen and Dobbs). Third, Presidents past understood themselves to be liable, looking especially at Watergate: Ford pardoned Nixon.

Sotomayor thinks the majority's opinion is too broad, when it says no dangers of intrusion, as practically everything has some danger of intrusion. And so their not deciding whether it is absolute hardly matters. Further, they read official acts too broadly. And their basis for it is solely based on Nixon v. Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald considered weight of interest vs. dangers of intrusion. A criminal prosecution is an interest on behalf of the public, and is much greater than the private interest from a civil suit. And she thinks that criminal suits are going to be less serious with regard to the executive: in civil suits he's an easy target from anyone, where as there can only be one criminal suit per act, and further, there are all the ordinary protections in the process of bringing to trial and the trial itself. She does not think bare allegations of malice would suffice. Further, every executive to date has long thought they were vulnerable to such, and it hasn't stopped them from acting boldly, so the Court shouldn't worry as much about that. Sotomayor also rejects that it is a narrower immunity, as Trump's case thought that those impeached could be convicted on those acts, whereas here they are immune.

Sotomayor grants that core immunity would make sense, but that it should not have been at issue here, should not have been addressed, and was made too broad. She does not think he should be immune regarding conversations with the DOJ. She also thinks that the evidence is rule is unprecedented. It is strange to bar official conduct: e.g. barring using speeches to establish mens rea. Nor is the majority's justification any good. And she thinks this case is also bad in its application to the case: they did not conclusively say anything was private, or anything that anything was prosecutable. The follows the passage you may have seen online, where she says that this sets up a law-free zone, and that he would be immune for coups or assassinating rivals with Seal Team 6, or bribes for pardons. And finishes with, instead of "respectfully," "with fear for our democracy."

Jackson agrees with "every word of [Sotomayor's] powerful dissent" and writes to go through "the theoretical nuts and bolts" of how this changes how presidents are accountable. No one should be above the law, and immunity is an exemption from the law. She calls her preferred model and "individual accountability" model: the legislature makes crimes, when someone violates them, a grand jury is convinced there's cause to indict, they gather evidence, go through a trial, with a jury, where he may make various defensive arguments concerning that trial, even some before trial (including that the law would be unconstitutional as applied to him, or that his conduct, if proved, still would not violate the law). He may also present defenses that excuse otherwise punishable offenses, including that which Government officials sometimes invoke when carrying out duties.

She thinks the majority's opinion is worse. For every allegation, they must go through and parse whether it violates core constitutional powers, is an official act, and if so, whether the immunity is there rebutted. And this must be run through even in extreme cases, such as assassinations or coups. Under her preferred paradigm, there are no exemptions from criminal law, but they can still use legal arguments of its inapplicability, and defenses. The majority's opinion can give immunity "even for unquestionably and intentionally egregious criminal behavior." And she reminds that under her preferred model, the president could still present affirmative defenses that it was justified, whereas the majority's allows crimes even when no one thinks there is any excuse.

This opinion increases the power in the judiciary and executive, and lessens the power of Congress. The court, in this immunity decision, has taken from Congress the ability to bind the President to its mandates, and so increased the power of the Executive. The president may take care that the laws be faithfully executed, but is under no obligation to follow them himself. The court also gives itself power, as it does not give a clear enough definition of the extent of any of the things: what is core vs. not, what is official vs. unofficial. (She thinks, unlike Barrett, it seems, that it is challenging to apply the reasoning to the slates of electors.) And so the Court has arrogated to itself the ability to draw lines regulating the President, rather than Congress.

This decision also reduces deterrence, by the threat of criminal liability being largely gone. Presidents are far less accountable. She sees the majority as mainly motivated by what would be good and bad, not law. But she does not think that they consider adequately the need for restraint upon the executive.

This plants the seeds of absolute power. She cannot stand their discarding the rule of law. It is now rule of judges, instead. She thinks that they do not adequately appreciate the risks, and so dissents.

You can tell that she has a background in criminal law.

Thoughts on this, then:

This case is striking in how it differs from other constitutional cases the court has taken: it hardly considers founding-era context, turning rather to structural concerns and precedent. And much of the motivation for individual concerns is closer to "this seems like it would be needed to get the results the founders wanted" rather than "the Constitution says this." On the other hand, Sotomayor's argument is significantly more originalist than the majority, which is an unusual turn.

I found this piece, by Baude, to be pretty good. This ruling, like the Trump v. Anderson ruling, were not adequately justified. Trump v. Anderson was far worse, failing to consider that states have discretion to choose their own bodies of electors essentially however they wish, per the Constitution (Here's a length complaint about it, though nowhere near as lengthy as his arguments leading up to that point.). But this too was different from the principled way that they more often act, turning in large part to precedent. The part that was most egregious, in my judgment, was the evidentiary rule (pages 30-32)—they hardly bother to justify that, I think. Unless, is this previous immunity caselaw? I guess if there are any lawyers who know about that, that would be helpful if you could weigh in.

While I agree overall that having some level of immunity is sensible, I would have appreciated it if they had, for example, tried to show what exactly could be done to founding-era Governors of states, if there exists any history to that effect. But the Burr cases were practically the only founding-era history they cited, and they were not relied on very much.

Their arguments for core constitutional powers being absolutely immune, and for unofficial acts being not immune, seem rather compelling. What is not clear is the central holding, about presumptive immunity for official acts. It must be noted that they left a lot of ground here open: they left it open that it could be absolute immunity (I imagine there was at least one justice who thought it should be?), and left a lot of room as to what exactly is official, and made no attempt to assert what would involve infringing on executive powers. They make clear that this deals with things that are not under Congress' control, but I do not think they argue for why this is needed aside from that this is necessary to bring about a bold executive. Actually, I'm now wondering, after seeing the word "chilled" on page 13, how this compares to first amendment cases—the reasoning being that such things in effect strip of constitutional powers. I don't know that I'm all that happy with that, and it feels a little like judicial legislation ("balancing tests"), but alright, fair enough, I suppose.

I would also be interested in looking at whether, for example, at founding era times, it would make sense for Presidents to be able to be bribed for pardons or vetoes in the founding era, and that be pursued by avenues other than impeachment. Can presidents, after being impeached, be convicted of treason or bribery in their official acts, for example?

Now, finally, I'll turn to the differences between the Roberts' opinion and Sotomayor's dissent, and try to examine which I find more compelling. I'll organize this around claims from Sotomayor's dissent.

Text: Sotomayor: There is no immunity in the text. (Page 5)

Roberts: A specific textual basis is not needed (citing Fitzgerald). (Page 37)

Sotomayor: I didn't say that it was, but there are three reasons it's relevant: First, the framers knew how to provide immunity, looking at the speech or debate clause. Second, state constitutions applied some immunities, but Congress does not. Third, the impeachment clause allows for liability for former presidents. (Page 5-6)

Roberts: Regarding the first, it's implicit; there's no separation of powers clause. Roberts does not address the second argument. For the third, Roberts notes that it does not say whether the clause thinks that official conduct may be prosecuted. (page 38)

My thoughts: I think Roberts largely addresses the arguments successfully, but he could have looked a lot further regarding state constitutions. Both sides are reasonable.

History: Sotomayor: Hamilton thought that Presidents would be "liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law," unlike the king of Great Britain. He would stand "upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware."

Roberts: These do not specify whether they are talking about official conduct, or private crimes.

Sotomayor: Madison proposed the Constitution consider privileges to be allowed to the Executive, but there is no record of it. Pinckney, a delegate, said that no privilege was intended for the executive.

Roberts: This is the best of your historical arguments, but they only represent the claim that no mentioned immunity exists, don't mention that whether it's official, and Pinckney isn't reliable on separation of powers, anyway. (page 39)

Sotomayor: James Wilson and Justice Story recognized that federal officials may be tried. (pages 7-8)

Roberts: This doesn't specify whether it's official, and further, they don't even say whether the President is also in mind here. (page 38)

Roberts:Further, Nixon v. Fitzgerald recognized that all this evidence is fragmentary.

Sotomayor: Nixon v. Fitzgerald was only talking about history for civil cases, and in any case, it still looked to them and showed that it was best, where as you merely try to show it permissible. It seems this court only cares about history when it suits them.

My thoughts: Roberts generally successfully rebuts on most of this, but the Hamilton quote needs to be examined, because of the reference to state constitutions. Let's take a look. He references New York, Maryland, and Delaware. But Virginia was afterwards substituted for Maryland.

New York: The representatives can impeach, and the party convicted shall nevertheless by liable and subject to indictment, etc.

Delaware: The president is impeachable when out of office, and within 18 months after. If guilty, then subject to such pains and penalties as the laws direct.

Virginia: The Governour. when out of office, and others offending, whether by maladministration, corruption, or other means, is impeachable. And subject to laws of the land, including under pain and penalty of the law.

So Hamilton seems to be talking mainly about when they may be impeached: New York doesn't specify, but Delaware and Virginia are later.

But I think it might need to be noted that Virginia seems to be including official conduct as under judgment. Sotomayor's case would have been stronger if she's looked into that.

Aside from my own Virginia question, and Sotomayor's point that the court seems selective in when it wants to use history, Roberts seems to come out on top.

Established Understanding:

Roberts: That's only an understanding, not any evidence of it showing up in actual practice, because no one's been prosecuted. (page 39)

Sotomayor: "Settled understandings of the Constitution are of little use to the majority in this case, and so it ignores them." (page 10)

My thoughts: A consensus, it seems.

Overall result of the judgment:

Sotomayor: No dangers of intrusion? Everything seems to have dangers of intrusion. That's practically absolute. (page 11)

Barrett: The setting up slates of electors, even if official (which, by the way, it's not) would not pose intrusion. (pages 3-4)

Roberts: The vice president things would maybe not pose any dangers of intrusion, we're sending it back down to lower courts to decide. (pages 21-24)

Sotomayor: But that shouldn't be the standard. What about needs to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress, or of the Judicial branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions? (page 11)

Silence, so far as I can see.

Sotomayor: The majority reads official too broadly, including whatever is not palpably beyond his authority. And motive may not be considered, which would mean that even action for corrupt purposes would then remain immune. (page 12)

Barrett: The elector stuff is clearly unofficial. (page 3)

Roberts: The elector stuff might be unofficial, and maybe the speech stuff, we're sending it back down to decide. (pages 25-30). Anyway, motive shouldn't be considered, as then merely alleging improper purpose would open everything up to liability, which would be crippling, as Fitzgerald says. (page 18)

Sotomayor: This makes the president above the law. (page 12)

Roberts: No, this just preserves executive authority. He can still certainly be subject to prosecution in his unofficial capacity (pages 39-40.)

Sotomayor: Of course he can, that's not in dispute. (Page 11.)

My thoughts: Sotomayor's concerns are valid, but I don't think they'd be applied that way in practice. Barrett's made it quite clear that she reads this narrowly, and I imagine that that would apply to at least one of the others, which would put a five-member majority including the liberals, if it ever makes it back to the Supreme Court in the near future.

How Fitzgerald applies:

Sotomayor: Criminal cases can't just be brought by anyone, so there'll be fewer of them. (page 15)

Roberts: Yes, but it's still a bigger threat, because the punishment is a far stronger deterrent. (page 13)

Sotomayor: There are procedural safeguards, before a criminal case is brought. "Bare allegations of malice" would not suffice to bring about a trial. (page 15-16)

Roberts: These are important. Nevertheless, regarding the claim that grand juries, etc. will prevent the bringing of baseless prosecutions, "we do not ordinarily decline to decide significant constitutional questions based on the Government's promises of good faith." (page 37)

Sotomayor: The President can argue that it's unconstitutional as applied to him at trial, as a protection. (page 16)

Barrett: Glad to note that you agree that there are some unconstitutional prosecutions. (page 1)

Roberts: These fail to address that there are some things that can't apply in the first place, so all this has to be addressed at the outset. And a trial is itself a negative. (page 36)

Sotomayor: Presidents have long considered themselves open to such a threat, but that didn't hurt them. And some caution is necessary.

Roberts gave no response that I could see.

Sotomayor: The majority seems concerned not by truly criminal acts, nor are they concerned about the President thinking for a second, but rather it must be baseless accusations. But this would be doomed to fail. They should trust the President's to be bold despite that. (page 18)

Roberts: Section 371 covers conspiracy to impair the lawful function of any department of government. Practically every president is criticized for not enforcing enough in some zone or another (e.g. drugs, guns, immigration, environment). There you go, open to prosecution. It'd be easy to fall into a norm of always prosecuting your predecessor. (page 40)

Sotomayor: On the other hand, the public interest in prosecuting presidents is greater than the private interest in a civil suit. (Page 19)

Roberts: Yes. (Page 13)

Sotomayor: This is especially true in cases where there is civil liability, as that's the only avenue. Further, he represents the people, so all the people have an interest. Additionally, the Executive Branch has an interest in bringing about prosecutions of criminal law, so you're preventing that.

Roberts: says nothing.

Roberts: The immunity Trump requested is larger than that recognized: he wanted immunity from anything that he was not impeached over (32).

Sotomayor: No, Trump only asked for immunity for the unimpeached. You want immunity regardless. (page 22)

My thoughts: Overall, I think Roberts wins on the criminal liability being worse, but I'm not sure. The second point, that the interest is greater, he concedes, and that is one reason the immunity might not be absolute. The third, as to which is stronger, I mean, both have a case?

Conduct within his exclusive sphere:

Sotomayor: This has some sense, if it were relevant. But that doesn't involve the actions in question. But the majority reads it too broadly, including "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," which includes all sorts of conduct. (23-24)

Barrett: I don't read the majority opinion that way. (page 2)

Sotomayor: The majority holds him absolutely immune from prosecution involving conversations with the justice department. That expands the category beyond recognition. (page 24)

Barrett: It being part of the core executive power fits with our separation of powers precedent. (page 2)

Roberts: The Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion involving these matters, per precedent (page 20).

Sotomayor: You can't pretend that the Government agrees with you on that; its vision of it was smaller.

My thoughts: I think Barrett reads what's going on here better than Sotomayor.

Evidence:

Sotomayor: This deprives prosecutions of any teeth. And it's strange to say that a speech couldn't be used as evidence of a mens rea. (page 26)

Barrett: Yeah, I agree this makes it too hard (page 6).

Sotomayor: This has no basis in law. The first amendment allows use of it as evidentiary, but not criminal. (page 26)

Roberts: This would eviscerate the immunity, inviting the jury to consider acts for which the president is immune. (page 31)

Sotomayor: But you could just instruct the jury? (page 26, Barrett agrees, page 6)

Roberts: But people have strong feelings, this would still bias things. (page 31)

Barrett: But it's already the case that evidence can be excluded when prejudicial or confusing? Why not just stick to the usual thing (pages 6-7) (Sotomayor says the same on page 26.)

My thoughts: The majority seems wrong here? The other approach just obviously seems better?

Concerns about the majority's approach:

Sotomayor: The majority, declared some things official, but refuses to declare things unofficial. Likewise, they declare some things immune, but refuse to recognize anything as prosecutable. (pages 27-29)

Jackson: Yeah, this leaves it in the court's hands, an arrogation of power to the judiciary. (Pages 13-16)

Barrett: I think the elector things were unofficial. (page 3). I also think the Court should have said that they had presumptive immunity, not left it undecided between that and absolute (pages 1-2).

Roberts, scathingly: We've had no briefing, and it's been expedited. One of you (Sotomayor) wants us to declare everything unofficial, and the other (Jackson) wants us to "exhaustively define every application of presidential immunity." Stop pretending that we're infallible. We decide what is needed, and remand, as per time-tested practices. (page 41)

Sotomayor: That's what you claim, but you still wrote more than lower courts even considered, or any parties briefed, regarding what is official. It's judicial activism in designating some conduct as official, but saying nothing about the rest.

My thoughts: The majority decision looks like a compromise between some justice who wanted absolute immunity, and others who wanted more moderate things. They said what they could agree on, and remanded the rest, reproducing the reasoning available to each side. So Roberts is probably not really being fully honest as to the motivations here (though some of the questions are genuinely tricky, like whether a speech is official), but neither is Sotomayor in representing this as plainly being that they're biased towards the one side.

Fears:

Sotomayor: The President will be immune for ordering assassinations, coups, bribes for pardons, etc. (pages 29-30)

Roberts: Your chilling doom is disproportionate to what was decided (page 37). You are just fearmongering with extreme hypotheticals and a future where the President feels free to violate criminal law. (page 40) You need to be more concerned about an executive branch that cannibalizes itself with prosecution.

My thoughts: Disrespect is a legitimate concern. I'd imagine, though, that assassinating rivals, or attempting a coup would be something that the court would rule as beyond the President's authority. This would probably defuse a lot of the online complaints about this opinion. The bribes for pardons thing is weird, because it deals with something agreed to be within the exclusive powers, even by the government.

And that's the end of Sotomayor's opinion.

Some closing thoughts:

I think overall the responses to Sotomayor were mostly sufficient (excepting the evidence part). That said, this particular opinion of hers was actually not bad (except the last page or so); far more compelling than the Grants Pass one.

Barrett's opinion definitely was the most compelling to me.

Thoughts? Did any of your assessments differ?

I'll probably get around to reading and writing on the two remaining cases from Monday at some point, and maybe I'll write something on any insights I've gleaned overall about how the justices operate, if I can think up enough to make a post about.

The concern is that not having any immunity would allow frivolous criminal cases to proceed, which would seriously limit the bold action that the founders would have wanted a president to take. In such things, the dangers of intrusion on the executive branch must be considered

Right, and this is why the whole thing is so weird. The CW aspect has always been "deep state blob trying to charge Trump on whatever" and yet the decision (as you point out) has nothing about that whatsoever.

For that reason, I think the decision is fairly sensible. If the President gets to appoint ambassadors, Congress cannot say "it's a felony not to appoint So-and-So as ambassador to France before August 1". How that ended up as a CW lightening rod is totally beyond me.

For that reason, I think the decision is fairly sensible. If the President gets to appoint ambassadors, Congress cannot say "it's a felony not to appoint So-and-So as ambassador to France before August 1".

Is it okay for Congress to say "It is a felony to appoint an ambassador in exchange for a bribe"?

Given that the vast majority of prosecutions of elected office-holders for official acts after leaving office have been for bribery, and that the Court claimed they were making a rule for the ages, I think this point deserved more attention than it got. My read is that the majority opinion makes it effectively impossible to prosecute the President for bribery if the bribe-service falls within the express Constitutional powers (a pardon, an appointment, the surrender of a fort to the enemy etc.) and extremely difficult if the bribe-service is some other official act, such as the award of a federal contract.

Is it okay for Congress to say "It is a felony to appoint an ambassador in exchange for a bribe"?

At this point, after the Americans spent the better part of the last century and more doing just that for campaign donors? It'd be rather weird and imply a good deal of criminalizing bipartisan normal behavior, which itself would imply an intent for arbitrary and selective enforcement.

That is an interesting question, but I think it's clear that before we do interesting questions we should strive to get the uninteresting ones correct.

And truth be told, I'm not sure if Congress can regulate that criminally or must do so via the impeachment process. I could be convinced that it's proper to prosecute that criminally after he leaves office, but I could also be convinced that saying "you can't appoint an ambassador in exchange for a bribe" is not too far from saying "you must appoint an ambassador based only on X,Y,Z criteria".

Certainly I think the surrender of a fort to the enemy was already beyond the reach of the courts on a number of other grounds.

Well the president’s power does not include the power to receive a bribe. Therefore there would be no immunity. The harder part is the evidentiary burden. But I think getting say bank records would be permissible. By the way cushy ambassadorships are already sold off for donors. There is just no explicit quid pro quo.

Well the president’s power does not include the power to receive a bribe.

No, but if the bribe-service isn't admissible in evidence, then there is no way to distinguish a bribe from a gift.

By the way cushy ambassadorships are already sold off for donors.

Legally, there is an important distinction beween a donation to a politician's campaign, and a cash payment to the politician. We can argue about how relevant this is, but it is the law and it does reflect the way the American political elite behaves. I don't think the existence of unofficial quid pro quos for campaign donations is a good argument for legalising direct bribery.

I noted the evidentiary problem.

And yes there is a difference between today’s unofficial quid pro quo and literal quid pro quo. I’m just making the point there is already a degree of corruption going on.

Memorably, Trump appointed as Ambassador to the EU in 2018 a hotel businessman named Gordon Sondland who had donated $1 Million to Trump’s Inaugural Committee

Sondland ended up being a key figure in the Ukraine impeachment imbroglio, which is the only reason this was considered notable. I remember thinking at the time that i) $1M is not all that much money and becoming an ambassador seems readily achievable; and ii) that absolutely nobody seemed to care about this obvious bribe (again, the payment was to the Inaugural Committee, not even the campaign)

Dan Rooney became the ambassador to Ireland for supporting Obama and fundraising for him. Similar deal.

It's worth noting that what you list would seem to fall within the core powers portion, whereas immunity for official acts more broadly is where there is more disagreement.

Arguably, things not core powers would have authority shared between Congress and the Executive, and so it might be more plausible that Congress could have some forms of regulation of the actions of the President there.

It doesn’t fall within the core powers. First, receiving bribes is not with the core power. Second, it is clear that Congress has the constitutional power to punish the president for receiving bribes so at best it falls within the second category.

This ruling, like the Trump v. Anderson ruling, were not adequately justified. Trump v. Anderson was far worse, failing to consider that states have discretion to choose their own bodies of electors essentially however they wish, per the Constitution (Here's a length complaint about it, though nowhere near as lengthy as his arguments leading up to that point.).

I mean, Trump v. Anderson was very much a pragmatic, "please don't explode the country" ruling; ruling that Colorado's actions were AOK would likely have ended Very Badly. One must give it at least some credit for that.

Oh, certainly. I don't disagree that Trump v. Anderson's result had better consequences than the contrary. It just wasn't good legal reasoning.

Well, hmm. I guess I misspoke. Finding that states could disqualify candidates on their own initiative wouldn't directly blow things up, but it almost certainly indirectly would via the inevitable tit-for-tat and the resulting non-popular-vote-based election eating legitimacy. Finding that Trump was disqualified but states couldn't disqualify candidates would probably only have blown up everything if there was a relevant vote-split between the Republican candidate and a Trump-Anyway write-in, which the Republican Party could probably have avoided by nominating Donald Trump junior (though who knows if they'd have done that). Finding that Trump was definitely not disqualified, per curiam, wouldn't have blown everything up, but presumably Jackson and Sotomayor would have dissented and if one of them had written a "please defy this ruling" dissent then Megumin casts Explosion.

All of this seems to make investigation/prosecution of the Hunter/Big Guy stuff much more difficult -- what are your feelings on that aspect?

I think that was regarding while Biden was vice president, which they've made no ruling on.

They also seem to be willing to regulate bribery for presidents, which this would be related to. But really, the actual harm that people are trying to get to with that is to reduce electability, which wouldn't be impacted; it's not like any of this governs what the media is allowed to do.

Allowing that VP might not be considered similar to the President in this regard (why not?), [i]what we know[/i] about Biden family influence peddling seems to implicate the period where Joe was VP -- but I see no reason to assume that the influence peddling would not tend to [i]intensify[/i] once he was in the driver's seat.

Who would investigate this in the event that there is no possibility of charging him?

[i]what we know[/i]

Markdown formatting.

Enclose in single asterisks for italics. Double asterisks for bold.

  • Space asterisk Space for bulleted lists.
    • More leading spaces = deeper bullet level.

I have no idea how they'd rule on vice presidents. I assume they'd give some immunity, but I have no idea how much, at least, when not acting as president.

I imagine reporters might still be interested in doing some digging, even if prosecution is impossible.

For italics, I use asterisks on each side; themotte turns them into italics.

They would give zero immunity. Read the first line of article II. The power is vested in the president; not the vice president. The latter does not implicate separation of powers.

This is weak; reporters don't have subpoena power or anything like that; don't you think that corruption is a thing that should be investigated by some legal authority?

I haven't read the judgement itself yet but my general reaction from commentary about it (including yours) is pretty similar. Barrett's position is the best one. The majority opinion goes too far specifically in disallowing official acts from being used as evidence of intent. Sotomayor's dissent is pretty good.

Great thoughts and great read. A lot of work! My initial two reactions to the decision were basically, 1) the whole thing about official acts not being able to be used as evidence just seems so... flagrantly stupid? Despite the rest seeming reasonable. I viewed this as an explicit help-Trump flag rather than a genuine desire to get at the law. And after thinking about it a little more and reading the arguments, 2) yeah, under this majority arrangement, bribes for pardons is... almost bulletproof legal, or de facto absolutely non-prosecutable, which is absolutely batshit crazy. I mean, I'm sure they felt that pardons were enough of a 'different topic' that maybe they didn't want to touch that hot potato, but it seems strange to discuss the whole issue of presidential criminality without talking about it. And it's even more aggravating that bribes for pardons is most likely to occur at the end of a President's term, when impeachment basically is not on the table anymore, at least according to a number of arguments we heard back around Trump's impeachment.

I'm impressed by Barrett in her time on the court so far. Not knowing how the Court decisions work exactly, are judges allowed to hew directly to Barrett's view, since without her there is no majority opinion?

  1. the whole thing about official acts not being able to be used as evidence just seems so... flagrantly stupid?

It's not flagrantly stupid. It's the Court reacting to factors that this particular Court usually pretends does not exist -- that lower courts and prosecutors will simply ignore, deliberately misinterpret, and work around its decisions, and that juries may be politically biased:

That proposal threatens to eviscerate the immunity we have recognized. It would permit a prosecutor to do indirectly what he cannot do directly—invite the jury to examine acts for which a President is immune from prosecution to nonetheless prove his liability on any charge

Allowing prosecutors to ask or suggest that the jury probe official acts for which the President is immune would thus raise a unique risk that the jurors’ deliberations will be prejudiced by their views of the President’s policies and performance while in office. The prosaic tools on which the Government would have courts rely are an inadequate safeguard against the peculiar constitutional concerns implicated in the prosecution of a former President.

Yeah, I'm kind of worried that that was a motivation, but I'm not sure. I know the evidence was talked about at the oral arguments, but surely it shouldn't have been enough to get five justices to sign onto it, with that level of reasoning? I imagine there was some cajoling to get what level of agreement they had.

My question about pardons was closer to that if pardons are one of the core powers, over which the executive has conclusive and preclusive authority, as the majority says, wouldn't that mean that he would be absolutely immune from criminal prosecution (but not impeachment) in the exercising of that power? But it's more complicated than that, as Barrett and Roberts have an exchange (page 6 or so for Barrett and maybe 32 or so for Roberts, if memory serves me) over bribery, where he thinks pointing to the record of the official act would be permitted? I really didn't understand what he was saying there. But it seems like he considers bribery distinct from the act itself.

I've also been impressed by Barrett. She's more principled than Kavanaugh and Roberts, is good at statutory interpretation, and I think I also like her approach to originalism and history the best out of the justices.

Joining her opinion: yes, you can join concurrences. In this case, the main effect of that, assuming the sets of things they joined was the same as her, would be that there would not be enough justices for the evidence portion to be an official holding of the court, as it would not have enough justices, but the rest would be.

In some hypothetical where it was joining opinions in such a way that nothing commands a majority, the rule is that they decide the outcome of the case based on what has a majority (e.g. to rule in favor of one party), and whoever has the narrowest position is taken as the precedent to be followed by lower courts. Yes, that's not always the most clear.

One noteworthy example of that happening was in Regents v. Bakke, where four justices were for affirmative action, four justices against it, and one not okay with racial preferences in themselves, but only for the sake of racial diversity. The latter position was followed, later reaffirmed, and is how we eventually ended up with diversity becoming the justification for racial preferences.

Are judges allowed to hew directly to Barrett's view, since without her there is no majority opinion?

Roberts's opinion is endorsed by six justices except for section III-C, and by five justices in section III-C. Five is a majority of nine.

Oh, oops, duh. That's a pity. Does it work like that in general, though (say one other joined her instead of the majority)?

She joined the majority, except in the one section, so most of it is not an instead, except for the evidence part.

"My ingroup is relentlessly oppressed by the supposedly neutral authorities, who are actually in the pockets of my enemies. The outgroup is highly organized and relentlessly hateful of people like me. If my side loses a battle, that's just further proof that I'm right and the whole thing is rigged. If my side wins a battle, it's also evidence of how right I am because the only way we'd win against such odds is by being twice as correct as the enemies. My side is the victim. It's all a conspiracy rigged against us."

Freddie De Boer recently posted an article on "The Political Era of Paranoid Delusion". It details how both sides have converged on mirroring ideas of victimization and oppression. The names each side uses might be different, but the conclusions are largely similar. It's only 4 paragraphs long, so I'll post the entire thing here:

President Joe Biden was interviewed last night, his first since his much-discussed debate performance. If you check around online, you will find two simultaneous narratives about this interview, passionately held: that the interviewer George Stephanopoulos and his employer ABC News were bent on embarrassing and attacking Biden, and that the interviewer George Stephanopoulos and his employer ABC News were bent on lionizing Biden and papering over his flaws. It was a hit job; it was a puff piece. The questions were unduly harsh; the questions were softballs. They avoided the hardest topics for Biden to discuss, unless they steered directly towards those questions over and over again. Stephanopoulos was too combative, or was he not combative enough? They taped the piece so that they could surreptitiously edit out Biden’s gaffes and stumbles; they designed the lighting so that it would make Biden look sickly and old. And now The Media™ is reacting to the interview by fixating on Biden’s weaknesses, or maybe they’re treating those weaknesses with kid gloves. What both sides are sure of is that, however the fallout from the interview breaks, it breaks because of dirty tricks, because of chicanery, because of a conspiracy against their side. There is no other option, no alternative. If my side loses, ever, the game was rigged. It’s a conspiracy, and they’re all in on it.

If I had to choose between these two tendencies I would obviously have to choose the blue MAGA over the red. Doing so would protect abortion and environmental regulations and the NLRB, among many other things. It’s not a contest, for me. But of course I’d prefer to choose neither. Blue MAGA is very, very real; the paranoid style has spread like a coronavirus from Republicans to Democrats. Put “The New York Times” into the Twitter search bar on any given day and you’ll find relentless, enraged invective coming from Democratic loyalists who insist that the paper of record is on a mission to reelect Donald Trump. They used to laugh at Republicans when they groused about “skewed polls,” but now they do the exact same thing - any poll that emerges that suggests Biden is losing is a conservative op, run by a firm with a well-known Republican bias. Hacks! That Nate Silver, you know, he’s on the Trump payroll. And while this phenomenon is most pronounced on the streets, Democratic elites have embraced it too. Look at Bruce Bartlett, look at Joy Ann Reid, look at Aaron Rupar, look at Josh Marshall, look at Rachel Maddow. They’re all sure: the narrative that we shouldn’t give another four and a half years to Joe Biden, an octogenarian who looks and acts like the 81-year-old he is, can only be the product of corruption. No sincere heart could look at that man on the debate stage with anything but awe and admiration.

Of course, conservatism is now built on a foundation not of Christianity or free markets but on the belief that elites are screwing you, that it’s all a conspiracy against you and your way of life. That is the bedrock. That is the new covenant - paranoia, obsession, revenge. “They’re all out to get you,” says Trumpism, “and I will destroy your enemies.” You don’t even need me to tell you that.

This, it seems, is where we are: two warring political tribes who share the foundational principle that anything that goes wrong for them is the product of a rigged system. Two angry players, too busy working the refs to concentrate on the game, looking for some higher authority to declare that the other side broke the rules. This isn’t fair. They’re breaking the rules. I’m telling the teacher. They’re denying us what we’re owed. Today the parties are united only in their belief that, on a neutral field and playing a clean game, they cannot lose. If a single voter endorses the opposition, their opponents must be cheating. How could it be otherwise? Surely only conspiracy could defeat us. Surely only The Man could pull the wool over the eyes of millions. This was much more of a Republican thing, and I know that people hate any argument that sounds like “both sides.” But both sides, in fact, are now operating this way. The notion that Democrats cannot fail in a clean election, cannot stumble but through illegitimate outside force, is now fully enculturated into the party. They hate Trump so much they’ve adopted his signature contribution to American politics. And I don’t know how you get out of this without violence, at this point. I really don’t.

The article, in an effort to analyze their outgroups pathologies, manages to highlight a different pathology. It's noteworthy in this case since I think it's very much shared by a lot of people around these parts.

Today the parties are united only in their belief that, on a neutral field and playing a clean game, they cannot lose.

The presupposition of a "neutral field" or a "clean game" is pretty much the default hypothesis for every 'centrist' minded person. Just like the 'radicals' seem to chase the unfairness that keeps them from power, the 'moderate' chases the notion of fairness that keeps the 'radicals' out of power.

I don't think there's any sense in trying to gleam some object level truth from these expressions. There are surely plenty of cases where the system was rigged and where the system was not. But these pathological expressions exist all the same. The only folly is presuming that your particular pathology is the cause whenever things matter to you.

Any person who supports persecuting people likes to portray his outgroup as paranoid delusionals while dong so.

I don't buy in the self description of liberals who hostile the right and claim to be moderate neutrals.

De Boer is not an outside participant neither, but like many people saying that stuff, someone who dislike right wingers and openly says he agrees with 90% of the woke.

Fundamentally leftists who dislike right wingers and have some heterodoxies, are both denying and supporting the persecution of the right by an establishment that they are much more friendly towards than the neutral observers they try to portray themselves as.

I wouldn't consider leftists who support the left persecuting the right and oppose right wingers opposing thier persecution, or even acknowledging it, as sufficiently distinct with other leftists who claim that the right is actually persecuting the left.

Both the claim that the left and its tribes are persecuted, and that the right, and whites, conservatives aren't persecuted are wrong.

I understand it is convenient for the left to dismiss through claimed both sidesism, the persecution of the right, but it lacks intellectual merit, and is an example of the problems of how partisanship can breed extremism and denial of reality.

I also highly dislike on any faction, the postmodernist irrationalist dismissal of valid ways of discourse. In general this is lacking intellectual merit and promotes sophistry and postmodernist irrationality. Of course, it is presumptuous to assume that any groups claims are false, or true by default. Which can include complaints of mistreatment.

People who have valid reasons to distrust others because they are out to get them, and people who don't but have a continuous culture of doing just that because such culture has given them gains can get things wrong too. The later far more than a first. Plus, in an election, you are going to get people who interpret things through bias.

There is a journolist. There is both coordination, owners of media who fire employees who don't push the line, and journalists, and a lot of groupthink and conformism and people in the hivemind going along with their bias. Not to mention any influence of intelligence services and intelligence agents including of Israeli intelligence officers. There are networks, donors, and a lot more where the direction is comprehensible.

The bias and influence moves in certain directions, and it isn't a direction that is only for the Democrats. It is possible influential zionists might want Trump to win, for example.

It is more messy than just everything being an anti-right wing plot, but on the general sense, the rightist claim is correct based on the facts and that is dismissed by people who are against the right wingers and motivated by such opposition like De Boer. Significant credit must be given to right wing skepticism and opposition towards those who genuinely are hostile to them. While treating them as paranoid and delusional, and demanding they accept that it isn't happening, is a demand that is actually indecent.

I do find it interesting that whenever I venture into left-wing spaces, they have a very similar mindset to the right-wing ones re:

  • the uniparty is neutering politics, pretending to hold our ideology whilst throwing us under the bus at every opportunity (citing e.g. the lack of long-lasting legal change despite the Floyd riots)
  • even when our guys are popular the moderates in our party close ranks to keep them out (Bernie Sanders, attempted with Jeremy Corbyn)
  • mainstream media lies to build complacency and takes every opportunity to identify us with the worst of our movement (e.g. the /r/antiwork interview, the UK media's treatment of Corbyn)
  • the opposition wants us gone permanently, and any election risks them finally getting enough power to manage it

I think that conservatives have a much stronger leg to stand on here: the illiberal centre is left-wing and actively persecutes right-wingers; the fact that it's not quite left-wing enough for the radicals doesn't fill me with sympathy.

But I think that the paranoia on both sides is basically driven by structural problems:

  1. An oligarchic form of government that is unaffected by election results (the Deep State, the Civil Service)
  2. The professionalisation of politics (almost all politicians come from a very similar and unusual background and are beholden to the Overton window amongst people of that background).
  3. An increasingly weighty cruft of legal systems and regulations that have got ever more tangled and impenetrable over time and prevents movement. This (and the production of 'clients') produces a 'ratchet' model of politics where losses like Brexit are often permanent.
  4. Genuine ethnic and moral tribalism vastly reducing the space of beliefs that are shared by a supermajority of people.

The result is that

"My ingroup is relentlessly oppressed by the supposedly neutral authorities, who are actually in the pockets of my enemies. The outgroup is highly organized and relentlessly hateful of people like me. If my side loses a battle, that's just further proof that I'm right and the whole thing is rigged. If my side wins a battle, it's also evidence of how right I am because the only way we'd win against such odds is by being twice as correct as the enemies. My side is the victim. It's all a conspiracy rigged against us."

is essentially true for anyone except the most anodyne of the centre-Left. It hasn't escaped my notice that much of recent right-wing thought (conflict theory, the long march through the institutions, the Cathedral, who/whom) is very much from a left-wing critical tradition, because they are used to being political outcasts and have more mental tools for dealing with that. Often it literally comes from (former) communists - people like Brendan O'Neill, Peter Hitchens, Freddie de Boer.

I think horseshoe theory is overrated, but dissident/complacent is often a useful axis to go alongside left/right and authoritarian/liberal when you want to model how groups will behave.

I kind of agree with their points, but I feel the overton window is sufficiently skewed towards the Left (along with the Left not really being able to understand the sheer breadth of the political spectrum) that these discussions are being had by like 95th percentile Left people and 40th percentile Right People in the grand scheme of things.

I mean, what are the broadly popular left-aligned ideas which are outside the overton window? Marijuana legalization is the only example I can think of in recent history, but I'm sure there must be other examples.

True. Cultural victory to the point that even the most frothingly-left stuff will be treated more as 'awww that's impractical but we understand the dream'

But I think that the paranoia on both sides is basically driven by structural problems:

It's not driven by structural problems, it's driven by the fact that radical wings are ... radical wings. They are weirdos and of course, to them, everything looks like "the uniparty is keeping us down".

Bernie bros were genuinely the worst about this.

We have seen radical wings not do these things. Anti-abortion people don’t do this. They just win thru institutions. Milton Friedman is as much of a weirdo as any of those people. Even today the very libertarian people are the weirdos. And he crushed his competition over decades which is completely provable because you can go on Reddit and stop in neoliberal and see that his enemies adopted his labels (before undermining).

I'm saying that the uniparty is keeping them down. Combine that with the fact that radical wings are growing rapidly in America and Europe for the structural reasons I give and it's no surprise that the amount of paranoia is also growing.

If someone is agitating for fringe views, and the country is even roughly representational, then keeping them down is the expected behavior.

You're right that they are growing though, but even a growing fringe can still be anathema to ~2/3 of the population -- that was more or less what the French election just showed.

If the country is roughly representational, and someone is requesting unpopular actions, then not necessarily giving them what they want is natural and appropriate. The charge - increasingly true, I think - is that active methods are being taken to discredit and weaken those broadcasting non-majority views along the lines I described in reply to OP.

Which I can understand but it's somewhat distasteful at best and causing the very problem it's meant to prevent at worst.

I'm not sure I get the distinction between you're drawing here about "active methods".

Sticking with left wing examples for now, let's say there's a movement advocating for a wealth tax.

Saying, "no, only 10% of people want that," is appropriate.

Saying, "no, only 10% of people want that," and then going through that movement to find the one member who said something stupid ten years ago and bringing it up incessantly whenever people talk about wealth taxes is what I would call "active methods". An active attempt to damage and (further) discredit movements that are not popular in order to prevent that movement from ever becoming more popular.

That kind of seems like regular politics. Possibly unpleasant, but not some kind of illegitimate thing. Parties do it to each other all the times -- the left wing broadcasts MTG in their fundraisers all the time. Right wing blasts the squad.

What's more relevant to me is the question: if a movement never becomes popular, how do we distinguish between "we were discredited" from "our ideas were never palatable to more than 10% of voters"? Because I feel that many losing movements declare that, and it can't be universally the case.

More comments

There is something I uniquely hate about using “radical wing” as a term. It’s just feels like you are implying they are crazy people.

In Europe the right is rising. But I don’t like calling them “radical”, they would be normies for most of history. Today’s neoliberal establishment of “open borders” were the radicals until about 1980. I feel like labeling something radical is just means to lazily call a side as not worth considering their ideas.

At some point all the political groups have been the establishment and in power. Even the Pride and a lesser extent the pedophiles found themselves in the establishment since 2020 but were far outside of it in 2000.

Especially when the "radical fringe" are actually the majority: https://www.themotte.org/post/900/culture-war-roundup-for-the-week/192912?context=8#context

For me, it's "extreme/ist/ism." It's the dumbest and most obvious boo-light ever ("anti-abortion extremists! open borders extremists! Tea Party extremism! Extreme political views!"). Extreme relative to what, exactly? I think its use could have been slightly (but only slightly) more excusable a century or so ago when there was a broader social and political consensus, but now those words are just used to exploit the lingering but fast fading memory of Normal and Decent Times in the minds of inattentive readers.

I also hate the term centrists which some people like to claim. It comes off as people who want to claim they are moderate, but I guess I think it can only be has no opinion. The Overton window moves so if you are a centrists I guess you are a npc. Wherever the window is at the moment you’re in the middle. I don’t think it would be a popular political philosophy if you explained it like that.

De Boer might be the only one who actually fits the radical label. But only in the American context. That is the establishment in a few places. I’d probably label him a failed ideology over radical (might even be a maximizing ideology in an AI world since the price system might be replaceable).

If America didn’t have black people Bernie Sanders would probably be the dead center of American politics. And that might actual be the short term utility maximizing position (I think bad for growth, but homogenous tribes like sharing much more with each other).

To me it's encouraging that, I think, most regular people don't feel either of these ways. They mostly call it like they see it.

Several months ago, I decided not to renew my paid subscription for deBoer's Substack, having grown frustrated with how thin-skinned and unnecessarily combative he is, and his evasiveness and hypocrisy on specific issues.

Nonetheless, I agree with him here. Election night, November 2016. Trump wins. Almost immediately, there's liberal caterwauling and rending of hair. "There's no way this election result can be legit - it must be Russian interference!" Followed by 3+ years of investigations and vague gestures towards "evidence" ultimately amounting to a whole lot of nothing. Me and everyone else here correctly recognised this for the pathetic cope it was.

Then, November 2020 rolls around. Biden wins. Almost immediately, there's conservative caterwauling and rending of hair. "There's no way this election result can be legit - the Democrats must have hacked the voting devices!" Followed by 3+ years of investigations and vague gestures towards "evidence" ultimately amounting to a whole lot of nothing (as exhaustively catalogued by @ymeskhout).

There were many people who correctly identified "Russiagate" as a cope, but think that the 2020 election was fraudulent. They would surely have rubbished any similar claims about a fraudulent election had the boot been on the other foot. No, it's worse than that - many if not most of these people did rubbish similar claims when the boot was on the other foot four years earlier. If you somehow still think Russiagate was legit, but the 2020 fraudulent election claims were bullshit, you are the person deBoer is talking about in this post. If you still think the 2020 fraudulent election claims are legit, but that Russiagate was bullshit, you are the person deBoer is talking about in this post.

I agree, and when you actually ask ‘2020 was fraud’ proponents here about the arguments, the smarter ones will typically concede the practical points but then argue that there was just a general air of illegitimacy, a kind of stench of it, perhaps due to mail-in ballots or some shenanigans in a few counties, or maybe ‘the media propaganda manipulated people’ into voting a certain way (if that made a vote illegitimate, then no democratic election in history has been legitimate). Of course voter fraud occurred, as it has in every election since 1789. But the evidence that it was much more fraudulent than 1968 or 2000 or 1932 or whatever is very thin and largely self-serving. I’m also curious whether the claims will be retracted if Trump wins this year, since presumably that would be the deep state choosing to allow him to become president again, right?

I’m also curious whether the claims will be retracted if Trump wins this year, since presumably that would be the deep state choosing to allow him to become president again, right?

Why would a sincerely curious person have reason to believe a 2024 Trump victory would negate or disprove beliefs of deep state opposition to Trump?

The core argument on the idea of a deep state is that it exists and is organized and has power that it utilizes for a cause, not that it is all-powerful and all-determining. There is no requirement for some Nybbler-level nihilism that the deep state determines all and resistance is futile because the deep state determines all. The premise of a deep state is that it is still a state, and while people frequently have unclear ideas of the limits of states they are also very aware that there are limitations of a state and their ability to fail if key actors are opposed (the basis of politically organizing against a vague group of interests) or fall out (divisions within the private coordination mechanisms causing visible turmoil). Even the most famous examples of deep states of contemporary history, including some of the ones that popularized the term like the Pakistani deep state, can have both clear power and clear limits and failures to their attempts to influence. For a somewhat more public version, the current fallout over Biden that is breaking the Democratic coalition apart is a failure of system, not evidence of that Biden's new critics are secretly pro-Trump. The non-public Democratic coordination mechanisms are still anti-Trump, they just are in disagreement as to how.

Organizations- public or secretive- can simply try and fail. Their failure does not imply they were secretly for the other side the entire time. This is particularly true when the reasons for their failures are the over-use of increasingly ineffective/discredited tools that have become less effective with time and over-use.

From the smarter deep conservatives I know IRL, there's either margin of fraud issues('Trump only won by five points but republicans need ten') which might not happen this time, or the political machines that are actually rigging the elections aren't as onboard with Biden as they were, or 2020 was exceptional and the deep state dropped the ball on faking a global pandemic this time, etc.

You can have as many epicycles about history as you want. What matters is epicycles about the future. You can believe that the the JFK assassination never happened, that the moon got where it is as an alien death star to wipe out an advanced ancient civilization, stonehenge was built by aliens, there was an ancient nuclear war that destroyed Mohenjo-Daro, the Nazis built pyramids in Antarctica before their base was destroyed by American nuclear weapons disguised as a test, cats were domesticated by the Annunaki to implant cameras in and spy on the progress of civilization, the earth is 6,000 years old, the printing press was invented in 800 AD but suppressed by the inquisition until Gutenberg, the last prince of Wales reached north America and that's why the Cherokee are white-looking, the Incas were regularly in contact with China, Atlantis had a Mars colony, the Olmecs were the original black people who colonized west Africa, Eleanor Roosevelt was transgender, whatever, and still be a smart, well functioning person who accurately predicts what's going to happen in the future, even on related subjects. And the guy who told me the cats theory was a physics professor. Why? Because those are matters of fact, not function. Kind of like scientific theories- it's a term to describe processes. Denying whats doesn't matter. You're simply factually wrong about something that happened once, and it probably doesn't affect your day to day life if black people originated in Mexico instead of Africa, nor does it really affect anything in the future. Denying hows does. If you believe elves built your car you can still fix it. If you believe elves power your car by running in hamster wheels inside of it in exchange for gasoline, you can't.

Elections are a lot like that. It's not hard to come up with a just-so story as for why the deep state can rig the election in 2020 but not 2024. It doesn't even have to make sense. What's important is that it doesn't impinge on future processes.

Honestly I am beginning to drift towards the position you described in your last paragraph. Deep State rigging for Biden in 2020, Deep State rigging for Trump in 2024. I think the Deep State might have decided it’s better to get Trump in the Oval Office to get middle America on board for World War III. They would have to undertake some maneuvers to get Trump personally on board for a war, and to contain his domestic political impulses, but I think they believe they can do that. That might be easier for them to manage than the French Revolution nightmare scenario of a simultaneous existential foreign war plus a hot civil war at home.

I always thought the insinuation that the federal civil service was near-uniformly Democrat was unlikely. Academia? Sure. Journalism? Definitely. But DC is filled with ex-military and other middle aged straight white guys in senior positions in the federal government who live in the suburbs and who, statistically, are at least substantially (say, 50%) Republican. Especially in the CIA, full of Mormons anyway, and in the Pentagon. These people aren’t revolutionaries, probably consider Trump vulgar, but that doesn’t make them Democrats.

https://www.fedsmith.com/2021/02/12/political-donations-and-federal-employees/

Sure, I don’t dispute that, but even that article suggests that in many of the most important departments like State, 30-35%+ of employees are Republicans. Also, since Dems in the federal government are likely more committed than Republicans it doesn’t tell us everything about the ratio of employees.

Also, since Dems in the federal government are likely more committed than Republicans

what makes you think that they are more commited?

I mean we did have real fraud in 2020. It’s just people ignore the obvious frauds.

The expanse of mass-mail in voting is considered fraud by historical Democratic principals. Trump wins in a landslide without that.

At this point it is beyond proven that the FBI interfered with social media with regards to the Hunter Biden laptop. They knew it was real the entire time. The CIA helped cover that up.

These things aren’t conspiracies. They are proven and changed the election.

I don’t know why we are doing both-sides here.

Now I agree the right has gone too far. I know people who never rational think thru issues anymore and just assume they are being lied to.

mass mail-in voting is considered fraud by historic democratic principles

I disagree. At worst, by weakening the secret ballot, it makes more opportunities for fraud. That’s different.

Regardless, to get from there to “Trump wins in a landslide,” you have to have a chain of beliefs.

  1. MMIV allowed more fraud.
  2. More fraud gave an advantage to Democrats.
  3. Such an advantage was needed to overcome Trump’s natural lead.

Sure, #1 seems obviously true. But proponents have consistently failed to bring evidence for #2 or #3. Where are the legions of dead or duplicate voters? The confessions of Democrat strongmen who went door to door coercing Biden votes? The sob stories from would-have-been Trump voters?

If the Democrats successfully weaponized MMIV, there should be more evidence. Same goes for Trump’s hypothetical lead. Polling (then or now) doesn’t suggest that he has massive support. Either there is a powerful conspiracy hiding and weakening the evidence, or it doesn’t really exist.

The average voter hasn’t committed fraud. He also knows that his neighbors and teammates haven’t committed fraud, haven’t talked about the option, haven’t been visited by team officials in the dead of night. He correctly concludes that his team is not benefiting from fraud. He fails to extend this conclusion to everyone else.

The expanse of mass-mail in voting is considered fraud by historical Democratic principals. Trump wins in a landslide without that.

And if the expanse of mass mail-in voting had caused him to win in a landslide, you'd be saying the election was illegitimate and stolen from Biden, yes?

At this point it is beyond proven that the FBI interfered with social media with regards to the Hunter Biden laptop. They knew it was real the entire time. The CIA helped cover that up.

I agree, and this was an outrage, and I said so repeatedly at the time and since. But this doesn't prove that the election was fraudulent - as pointed out by @2rafa, if media propaganda manipulating people to vote a particular way makes an election illegitimate, then every election since the invention of democracy was illegitimate. We'll never know the counterfactual where the Hunter Biden laptop story is allowed to freely circulate on social media - it might have swung the election, it might not. There are obvious parallels with Russiagate truthers constantly asserting that Trump only won because of sketchy Facebook ads from Russian accounts!!! targeting swing voters, something something Cambridge Analytica.

But this doesn't prove that the election was fraudulent -

What's this un-fraud of the gaps(analogous to god of the gaps)?

I don't get it

“And if the expanse of mass mail-in voting had caused him to win in a landslide, you'd be saying the election was illegitimate and stolen from Biden, yes”

  • yes. I’m autistic. I’ve flipped on positions before when the data points in that direction. Which does include flipping from Trump is a bad clown show POTUS only doing decent because McConnell is good to believing Trump has great judgement.

“There are obvious parallels with Russiagate truthers constantly asserting that Trump only won because of sketchy Facebook ads from Russian accounts!!! targeting swing voters, something something Cambridge Analytica.“

  • Perhaps I am wrong on this but when I looked at the data the Russian troll farms did not reach a lot of people and the people they did reach were mostly core MAGA. I don’t believe the quant argument is strong that it could flip the election.

This is also different because it’s external versus internal. It’s different when Russia plays some games we don’t have the tools to prevent and our own CIA decides to back candidate X. The CIA interfering in an election is bad. Especially when they are spreading known false information. They have done this during war times but during an election is different.

The expanse of mass-mail in voting is considered fraud by historical Democratic principals. Trump wins in a landslide without that.

In what possible sense? Oregon has had vote-by-mail for a while now, I think it's hardly sensible to claim that all elections in Oregon are fraudulent by any sensible principle.

Now sure, maybe mail-in voting could induce or enable fraud. But you seem to be suggesting that the means of voting is itself fraudulent, even if the result is generally reflective of the indicated preference of valid and eligible voters.

The expanse of mass-mail in voting is considered fraud by historical Democratic principals

Oregon has had vote-by-mail for a while now, I think it's hardly sensible to claim that all elections in Oregon are fraudulent by any sensible principle.

Oregon didn't expand mail-in voting. The fact that they've done it for years doesn't mean every other state in the union can implement the same voting methods in months.

At least address what's being said before accusing people of a gish gallop.

It's not (inherently) fraudulent in Oregon -- it was fraudulent in 2020 in the states where it was banned by statute and 'worked around' by various illegal policies implemented by Democrat-aligned administrators without going through the proper legislative process. (eg. Wisconsin (IIRC?) with their expansion of 'indefinitely confined')

Jesus, the Gish Gallop distributed Motte & Bailey of rotating arguments. First it was inherently fraudulent[1]. Then it was fraudulent-by-method-of-adoption[2]. Then it there-exists-fraud-in-fact via stuffed ballots or water leaks[3].

In any event, do you think the result in Wisconsin numerically reflect the intended desire of the eligible voters?

I'm not responsible for whatever other arguments people are making -- mine is true.

If by 'eligible voters' you mean 'the ones that voted in accordance with State law', then no, probably not. If you mean something else, you should be working towards legislative reform to make it easier for people to (legally) vote -- as in Oregon I suppose.

For the sake of reducing confusion, if you’re replying to their thread, it helps to distinguish.

And by eligible voters, I mean those which are entitled and not otherwise forbidden to vote.

For the sake of reducing confusion, if you’re replying to their thread, it helps to distinguish.

I think it's quite obvious that opinions I state in a thread are mine and not somebody else's -- do I need to add a disclaimer?

And by eligible voters, I mean those which are entitled and not otherwise forbidden to vote.

If an otherwise eligible voter submits his ballot in the form of a homemade crayon-drawing, it is not a legal ballot and should not be counted. Same goes for mailins, in jurisdictions where the legislature has not passed a law allowing them and defining the procedures for their acceptance.

More comments

That’s not a Gish gallop.

At worst, jkf is defending a different position than sliders. Call it sanewashing, or maybe distributed motte-and-bailey?

Also, I'll add, that JKF is defending a different position that sliders, but he could also clarify it because he's responding to a thread of comments relating to sliders.

For example, if he is advancing fraudulent-by-method-of-adoption[2] then he could also write "VBM is legitimate when properly adopted but not when adopted via procedurally-invalid means, hence I believe in Wisconsin it is illegitimate because ".

That would probably elicit a very different response. It would also clarify what is the crux of JKFs argument.

[ And if JKF believes that VBM is illegitimate even when adopted via procedurally-proper means, then clarify that would also be helpful! I don't mean to say he can only adopt the position above. ]

Yeah, I think your question about Wisconsin is a good way to clarify.

I put my own objection to sliders here. “Fraud was plausible” is very easy to defend. “Fraud changed the result,” not so much.

That is fair. I accept the correction and have edited it.

I live in Washington; we've had universal vote-by-mail for a while now too.

I don't know if all our elections are fraudulent. They're doing a lot of good things to secure them, but there're still inherent gaps. And I'm very uncomfortable about that.

Secret ballot principles are violated. It’s been when discussed here. Every organization that defines what makes a good Democracy before 2020 said mail-in ballots had issues. After 2020 it’s all good.

We probably do have the technology today to make mail-in voting fine. You could have an IPhone do facial ID and watch you vote in secret.

That is a tendentious appeal to consensus that doesn't exist. Oregon has been doing vote-by-mail since 1996.

FYI, I think my comment is what @sliders1234 is referring to when he says that it's been discussed here before. In that comment, I survey international pro-democracy organizations which set out what it means for an election to be fair and free. It is clear that a consensus did exist across these organizations. That some locations have been bucking that consensus and that some groups have now turned entirely against that consensus does not mean that the consensus did not exist.

The consensus that you point to is for a different topic than the one you are claiming.

You are trying to manufacture a consensus against VBM by pointing to universal support for the notion of secret ballots. The core of the disagreement is whether VBM (especially optional-VBM where anyone that wishes can go in person if they choose!) is sufficiently protective of the right to a secret ballot.

If anything, the point that one can derive from this is that mandating VBM is not good policy. On that, sure, we can easily agree.

The core of the disagreement is whether VBM (especially optional-VBM where anyone that wishes can go in person if they choose!) is sufficiently protective of the right to a secret ballot.

Those cites were pretty clear that the only consistent way to ensure the secret ballot and voter faith in such is in-person voting, with only one person being allowed in the voter booth at a time. They explicitly call out weaknesses of VBM in these terms. I am manufacturing nothing. It's there, in black and white, preserved by the beauty of the internet.

More comments

Ok then I assume you don’t believe the secret ballot is important to free and fair elections.

No issue if spouses pressure their partners or children fill out ballots for grandparents with dementia.

Sure perhaps saying it was considered the standard pre-2020 is an appeal to consensus, but I agree with the logic the experts were using in before 2020.

Sometimes I think it’s fine to reference prior work and assume people have familiarity with it. You don’t need to rewrite every argument.

Bruh, this idiotic “so I guess (a bunch of crazy shit I don’t believe)” is tiresome.

Yes I believe in the secret ballot. I do not believe that the option to do mail in seriously erodes that.

Less antagonism. You've been warned about this repeatedly. Next time is going to catch you a ban.

More comments

And if we defund the police. Crime won’t skyrocket. If we get rid of the SEC - no one will insider trade. If the MLB isn’t enforcing bans on steroids then even those who don’t want to do steroids will (like Barry Bonds a later user) because the players getting ahead are cheating. Maybe I just know more people who are willing to cheat that if you remove the enforcement preventing cheating that people will cheat.

If you remove the enforcement even if society is 99.5% trustworthy those who abuse the commons are going to rise in power.