OliveTapenade
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User ID: 1729
OliveTapenade
1d ago
I wonder if there's a cycle - there was a phase, I thought, of really Catholic science fiction, works like A Canticle for Leibowitz, or A Case of Conscience, and prominent Catholic authors; Gene Wolfe springs to mind. Apparently some people think there's something there even today, though to my untrained eye the golden age of Catholic science fiction was in the past.
So maybe just different subcultures or groups get into particular genres every now and then. There may not be that much to it.
There's probably a worthwhile discussion there, right?
Sanderson, Card, Correia, and Meyer are all Mormons. Now as it happens I don't count Mormons as Christians, but that aside - it is interesting that all these examples are from the same religion. Are Mormons in general punching well above their weight in science fiction and genre spaces?
OliveTapenade
6d ago
I feel like it is worth noting here that the results of any valid scientific investigation don't depend on patriotism?
I can understand how, particularly in the humanities, the results of any given study can be more pro or anti America, or whatever other nation. A subject like history is as much about framing a narrative of the past as it is about objective facts, so you might have great reason to worry about bias.
But science or mathematics, at least if they are carried out in any kind of reasonable good faith, are hard to skew like that. It doesn't matter whether such-and-such the physicist is a rootless cosmopolitan because the results of theories of physics do not depend on the character or values of the theoretician. The maths work out or don't work out regardless, and a country that deprives itself of genuinely useful knowledge because of concerns about the character of scientists is needlessly crippling itself.
OliveTapenade
13d ago
What stands out to me on Wikipedia is the insistence that the islands have an indigenous population that the British lied about and deported. The Chagos Archipelago article includes the introduction "the UK falsely claimed that the Chagos had no permanent population", and the page on the islanders themselves has as its second sentence "Under international law, they are the indigenous people of the Chagos archipelago".
Read on, however, and it becomes clear that this 'indigenous population' is a melange of people from many different regions brought to the islands by Europeans as workers in the 19th century, and that when the British deported them in the 60s and 70s, they moved around a thousand people, who were mostly workers on failing, unprofitable plantations that would have been closed in the near term anyway. This is probably not what most people have in mind when they think of colonial genocides of indigenous peoples. The Chagossians are a relatively recent polyglot of diverse origins, not people with an ancient connection to the islands, and seem likely to have had found more opportunities away from the islands anyway. I'm not asserting that the deportation was therefore morally unproblematic - I'm just saying that it doesn't seem like a very central case of the violations it's being presented as. Wikipedia doesn't technically lie - "the UK falsely claimed" and "under international law they are X" seem like claims that are at least arguably true - but it presents those claims in ways that strike me as calculated to produce a misleading impression.
OliveTapenade
16d ago
I'd tend to think that any pleasure endlessly reiterated would become contemptible. There is something disconcerting or even pathetic about obsessive repetition. That's part of why we find the Skinner box so repulsive.
I would agree that it would be bad for a person to be incompetently trying to interfere with work done by a superior, though for me I don't find the superintelligence hypothetical particularly illuminating. The world is already full of examples of competent and incompetent people. It would be absurd for me to try to insert myself into, say, the cockpit of an aeroplane - I know nothing about piloting and the attempt would only embarrass me.
What would constitute a good life in a world where there is genuinely nothing that needs to be accomplished? I'm not particularly sure. I do not expect such a world to ever occur in this life - sorry, I'm pessimistic about artificial superintelligences - so for me that question seems most relevant as a question about heaven, and there I'm happy to admit to ignorance. Right now I'm not so much pushing for any particular answer as just saying that endless self-pleasure seems insufficient, as an answer, to me.
OliveTapenade
17d ago
That's an interesting, because it is very alien to my intuitions. Is a pleasure more morally worthy if it is more subtle or complex, or takes more intellectual capacity to appreciate? That doesn't seem obvious, to me. That would imply that, for instance, a young child's pleasure at a bowl of ice cream for dessert is among the unworthiest of all pleasures. Or that my pleasure at a fresh breeze on a beautiful day is particularly contemptible. It seems to be that the complexity or subtlety of a pleasure does not reliably correlate with its moral worthiness. There are some very simple, even child-like pleasures that strike me as paradigmatically worthy (a beautiful sunset, a tasty meal, a smile from someone you love), and some very complex pleasures that strike me as worthy (contemplating advanced mathematics, stellar physics), and some that I struggle to rank (meditating on the nature of God, say). Likewise, however, I can think of very simple pleasures that seem obviously unworthy (wireheading is the classic example), as well as complex pleasures that seem unworthy (anything you've ever been tempted to call intellectual masturbation).
When I judge particular pleasures or joys as worthy or unworthy, my intuitions do not seem to clearly correlate with its complexity, or the intelligence required to enjoy it. It seems like other criteria are involved.
More important than that, though, is the question of, regardless of the quality of the pleasure sought, whether pleasure-seeking by itself is sufficient to make a life morally good. Enjoying pleasures is definitionally going to be more pleasant than doing boring office-work, but the defence of office-work would presumably be in terms of its flow-on effects. Office-work, assuming it's a real job and not just make-work, is aimed at in some way serving others or producing something for others - self-gratification is not the goal, as it is with entertainment. Does that make a difference? We might also ask about character formation. Filling in expenses reports may not be as fun as playing your favourite game, but it may have different impacts on one's character.
Ultimately my position is not that pleasure is inherently unworthy or bad to experience, or that humans should not enjoy pleasurable activities, but it is that a life dedicated wholly to seeking pleasures is morally empty and contemptible. It even strikes me as something unlikely to successfully produce great pleasures, in many cases; I tend more to the school of thought that says that pleasures come alongside or as the byproducts of other endeavours, which must be sought for their own sake. I wouldn't want to follow that principle off a cliff - I don't think there's anything wrong with, say, going to see a film because you want to enjoy yourself - but in terms of the overall direction of a person's life, I think it is helpful.
If you were offered the opportunity to remove 40 IQ points and half your lifespan, would that help in any way? Is there a particular reason the status-quo is privileged?
I didn't say that we shouldn't seek that kind of power. I'm not arguing that it's bad. I'm arguing that it's irrelevant to the moral question I posed.
The question of whether a morally good human life can be found in merely entertaining one's self does not seem like one that's particularly changed by the intelligence of the human being in question. Whether you live to 40 or 80 or 200 does not seem to have any bearing on it.
I understood you to be suggesting that something about posthuman entertainments would change the nature of the answer - that perhaps it would be bad for you or me to spend our lives self-amusing with video games, but that it might be good for us to spend our lives self-amusing with video games, if we were much more intelligent or powerful.
I'm willing to entertain the possibility, but I think you need to spell out the difference for me. Why would that make any difference?
My moral intuitions, at least, are that it wouldn't make much difference. To take a fictional example: in the setting Exalted, the gods occupy themselves by playing the Games of Divinity, which appear to be extremely entertaining and may be contributing to the gods' quality of life. Nonetheless my intuition is that the Games are contemptible, or that by choosing to amuse themselves in this way (especially when they might otherwise be engaged in other tasks, such as repairing or improving Creation, or caring for their mortal followers) the gods are in some way moral failures. The vastly superior power, knowledge, and immortality of the gods does not seem to redeem the Games, at least to me. So if I consider a scenario in which we were the gods with the super-games, it seems similar to me.
OliveTapenade
18d ago
I'm still not sure how any of that changes the question any?
I didn't mention death at all, so I don't know why you bring it up, and everything else there is just... irrelevant. Okay, sure, the posthumans can have bigger numbers. We can posit that the experience is arbitrarily more entertaining. How does that change any of the ethical questions? What ethical difference does it make whether we're talking about playing Crusader Kings or an arbitrarily more complex super Crusader Kings? What is the relevant ethical difference between regular tennis and nuclear tennis? It seems like zero to me.
You can, as you do at the end of your post, just dismiss the question and assert an answer. But why should that answer be compelling? If your position is that there are no external criteria for a good life and the only thing that matters is self-approval, I think it's reasonable to reflect a bit on why you feel that's the case.
OliveTapenade
18d ago
I'm not sure AI or LLMs are the issue here - shaming or building consensus is against the rules here, but I have to admit I was tempted to just reply to the top-level comment with, "Dude, you read too much porn."
The point is that I think this isn't a technological issue so much as a social issue. People can produce pornographic fiction and will seek out or buy pornographic fiction for all the usual reasons. The social regulation of that desire is just as important if not more so than the technological regulation thereof.
OliveTapenade
19d ago
I don't think many people would disagree with the idea that it would be great to have all sorts of power, but I'm not sure I see that as addressing the issue raised? The question isn't so much about raw ability as it is about the sorts of life-contexts that make those lives morally worthwhile.
As empowered posthumans we probably could entertain ourselves endlessly with exotic video games, but then, today people are entirely capable of entertaining themselves endlessly with video games. Posthumanity adds nothing to the moral question. Is it a good life if you dedicate your life to video games? On what terms could such a life be considered good? Does it make a difference whether we're talking about gaming as competition (i.e. devoting your life to pro gaming, to excellence in a particular competitive endeavour), gaming as entertainment (i.e. something like a streamer, the gamer as professional entertainer for an audience), or just gaming for pure private enjoyment? I think the moral questions one asks there are the same regardless of whether we're talking about you or I today or whether we're talking about superpowerful virtual demi-gods.
OliveTapenade
19d ago
I have come to find most vegans, including my past self, as annoying as you: there is a lack of real reflection as to what the goals of the movement are, and if the individual actions that vegans advocate are actually effective at accomplishing those goals. Total cessation of animal suffering is as impossible as it would be totalitarian (some vegans advocate for GMOing away all predators).
I'm going to take this as an invitation to go off on a tangent, I think.
I have run into reflections on the idea of using genetic engineering to eliminate predation in the past. Predation plausibly causes suffering, at least for prey animals. If you could modify all carnivores to become herbivores, should you do it?
There's an interesting tension I see sometimes around what the goal of environmental conservation should be. In many cases we seem to instinctively idealise 'the wild' or natural conditions. The goal of conservation is to minimise human impact on the environment and return animals to something as much like their natural environment as possible. But as with vegans, or some EA types, we sometimes see a different idea - that the most ethical goal is rather to minimise suffering, including animal suffering.
These two goals seem in tension. The wild includes quite a lot of suffering. Which goal should win out?
I was recently watching a documentary about a wildlife rescue in Tasmania. The hosts visited a man who runs a sanctuary that rescues, raises, and breeds injured or endangered animals. He releases some of those animals back into the wild, while some stay in the sanctuary for all their lives. It occurs to me to wonder what some of those animals would have preferred. It seems plausible that, if a Tasmanian devil could talk, it might prefer to stay in the sanctuary, where it has safe and clean places to sleep, has food provided at regular intervals for minimal effort on its part, and even has breeding opportunities orchestrated for it. If it makes sense to talk about a Tasmanian devil's quality of life, this devil's quality of life seemed to go down as a result of being released into the wild. So, having built animal-utopia, should we push animals out of it? Why?
Well, we might cite lots of instrumental reasons, like wanting these animals as part of the wild ecosystem long-term, or even practical ones, like not having the resources to look after all animals all the time and wanting instead to rotate animals through care on the basis of need. However, in practice I think we have some sort of teleological belief. It is right for Tasmanian devils to hunt on their own and make their lives independently in the wild. It is, for lack of a better term, their nature. It is thus in many circumstances morally better that a creature be exposed to risk and suffering than that it not be.
And if we embrace that conclusion, does that tell us anything about what we think about morality for human beings? You may, if you wish, insert some science-fictional speculation here about whether it would be good for humans to be pampered by more powerful beings, perhaps artificial intelligence, in the way that we have the capacity to pamper rescued animals. Is our own case different from that of the animals?
OliveTapenade
20d ago
He has mentioned declining subscriptions and revenue. I wonder if he's re-running a few of his 'greatest hits' to see what still strikes a chord?
He may have suffered the sad fate of many pundits, though - he's run out of things to say. He can either re-run older points he's made in increasingly angry or provocative ways, as he is here, or he can pivot to increasingly niche content, as I think you can see in some of his other recent essays.
OliveTapenade
21d ago
Didn't Sarah Palin do that? She discovered in 2008 that her child, prior to birth, had Down syndrome, and publicly chose to keep the baby. She was wealthy, it was relevant to the 2008 election campaign so I think it's fair to say she was, at least in part, signalling her strongly pro-life views, and she was certainly white. She's the highest profile example I can think of.
OliveTapenade
22d ago
I would be shocked if ThomasdelVasto is a fan of Elon Musk.
The mottezien is immunized against all dangers: one may call him a cuck, nazi, bigot, fascist, it all runs off him like water off a raincoat. But call him a resentful prole and you will be astonished at how he recoils, how injured he is, how he suddenly shrinks back, calls you egregiously obnoxious, and then bans you from the forum.
Er, but... you're the one using 'resentful prole' as an insult.
You're banned, so you can't answer this, unfortunately, but it's unclear to me why being a member of the proletariat would be at all bad, and if you do in fact believe that wealthy urban leftists are bad (contemptible, leading America down a bad path, etc.), resenting them seems like a reasonable response. So shouldn't the answer here just be the chad "Yes"?
(Well, it may not be accurate in my case depending on what you mean by those terms. I work for a wage, so I suppose in the Marxist sense I'm a proletarian, but generally when I hear 'prole' I think 'industrial working class' or something, which I am not. Nor do I think I'm particularly resentful, since I did in fact go to a fancy big city university. But that's just quibbling facts. I would certainly be much more offended if you called me a Nazi or fascist.)
OliveTapenade
22d ago
I've come to think of Avatar mostly as a passion project for James Cameron. He likes the blue aliens and the dumb 90s environmentalist message, and he's already made a bajillion dollars and has the credibility to do whatever he wants, so he's just doing what he likes.
I don't particularly like it myself, and I don't think it makes much sense or bears up to scrutiny, but he likes it, and that's all that matters. Probably this all resonates with something deeply personal and relevant to Cameron as an individual in a way that doesn't land for anyone else.
Well, there are worse things for an eccentric and wealthy director to do in the final phase of his career. Good for you, James. I sincerely hope he's enjoying yourself.
OliveTapenade
24d ago
It is true that the US is a strong ally of Israel and spends money on Israel, and it is also true that the US government strongly opposes anti-semitism, including giving grants to some groups dedicated to fighting it.
It's not clear that 1) being critical of either of those things is anti-semitic, 2) that a university punishing a student who harassed a Jewish student is evidence of either of those things or is convincing other people that they are true, or 3) that this is convincing people to be anti-semitic in some further or additional sense.
That is, to the first, it is wholly possible to believe that the US alliance with Israel is wrong and that the US shouldn't spend money on minority issues without being anti-semitic. So even if this incident influences people to believe those things, it's not clear that increases anti-semitism, or reveals the criticisms made by anti-semites to be true.
Presumably anti-semites oppose money being spent on combating anti-semitism, even though it's possible to believe that money shouldn't be spent on combating anti-semitism for non-anti-semitic reasons. But you should not jump from that coincidental agreement to the conclusion that more people are supporting anti-semitism itself.
Here it might be worth the sober reminder that American rejection of anti-semitism appears to be rising, not falling. Per page 5, in 2021 60% of US adults say that anti-semitism was either a somewhat serious or very serious problem, which then rose to 68% in 2022, 74% in 2023, and then fell slightly to 72% in 2024. Noticeably this is not a significantly partisan issue - Democrats are somewhat more likely to say that anti-semitism is a serious issue, but it has equalised recently, and in 2024 70% of Republicans and 74% of Democrats say that it's a problem. Most also believe that anti-semitism has increased in recent years. This makes it at least superficially plausible, to me, that US institutions are coming down harder against anti-semitism because that reflects the genuine popular will of the country.
So the thesis that institutional crackdowns on anti-semitic actions is causing people to become more sympathetic to anti-semitism just seems contrary to the available data. It looks like the American people are becoming more concerned about and more opposed to anti-semitism.
How can the American people be getting more opposed to anti-semitism even while, at the same time, they believe that anti-semitism is becoming a bigger problem? Probably there is a range of understandings of the term (e.g. a Republican might say that anti-semitism is a big problem while thinking of pro-Palestinian protests; Zohran Mamdani says that anti-semitism is a "crisis" that "we have to tackle" but presumably does not have those protests in mind). But it's also possible - in fact, I think likely - that the very small number of militant anti-semites in America has become bolder and more assertive lately, and taken more actions. Thus it can simultaneously be true that anti-semitism, at least as measured in anti-semitic incidents, is increasing even as opposition to anti-semitism increases even more rapidly.
Thomas is Orthodox. I believe there isn't a formal Orthodox dogma on this, in the same way as the Catholics, but it would be fair to say that there is a high degree of Orthodox skepticism around IVF and similar technologies. If that piece from 2008 is representative, the attitude seems to be very cautious. They would not support any process that involves destroying or discarding fertilised embryos, but assistive technology in principle is not forbidden. The whole article I linked includes a section noting that the embryo has the ethical rights to its unique human identity, to life, and to eternity and immortality. More pertinently to this subject, Metropolitan Nikolaos writes:
Preimplantation embryo testing is connected with the application of IVF (see e.g. Ehrich et al., 2008). When the aim of testing is therapeutic or preventive intervention, then it is compatible with classic medical perception. However, at present, not only are therapeutic cases very few, but they also carry all related IVF consequences. In fact, when the tests are positive – namely, when a genetic disorder has been diagnosed – the affected embryo will not be transferred. If no unaffected embryos are produced, then the chance of a pregnancy is prevented.
Moreover, preimplantation testing could eventually lead to selection of special traits (e.g. gender, colour of hair or eyes), or even to destruction of embryos bearing undesired traits; consequently, it may generate a eugenic perception of life.
Although preimplantation testing forms a modern diagnostic method that is very promising, the Church ought to maintain Her explicit reservations.
Though I am not Orthodox myself, I am happy to endorse the above position.
He goes on to write:
Undoubtedly, modern technology has greatly contributed to health research and promises even more achievements. This is considered an exceptional blessing from God. Nevertheless, its irrational use threatens to ‘desacralize’ man and treats him as a machine with spare parts and accessories.
Although man regulates technology, he could ultimately be governed by it, unless he is prudent. He may be easily enchanted by technological achievements and, consequently, may become subjugated by them. He risks destroying his own freedom in the name of the freedom of scientific and technological progress that aim at expanding human dominance over nature.
The use of technology and human intervention, to the extent that it safeguards and assists in the sacredness of human fertilization, is not only acceptable but also desirable and pleasing to God. However, technological progress is not considered successful when it imposes choices contrary to nature, affects family unity, interrupts the co-operation of spiritual and natural laws and replaces God. Success is not only the discovery of a new revolutionary technique within the wide context of genetic engineering; it is also the effective confrontation of numerous problems (genetic, psychological, social, ethical, financial, etc.) that emerge from an irrational practice, particularly in the field of invasive fertilization.
The Church is not afraid of changes, neither is She against novel discoveries. Nevertheless, She firmly rejects disrespect for creation and the human person as well as desecration of the institution of family. Fertilization forms the holy altar of life; therefore, entering inside it, requires respect and fear of God.
[...]
The Church embraces pain, illness and disability within the context of man’s fall. At the same time, however, She respects medicine. Although She blesses every ethically acceptable medical human attempt to restore health, She entrusts the final outcome in each different case to God’s love for every person separately. The epitome of Her mentality can be found in the Ecclesiasticus (Book of Sirach, 1952 edition): ‘My son, in thy sickness be not negligent: but pray unto the Lord, and he will thee whole’. She faces everything with patience, humility and faith. She does not differentiate trials from the love of God, but views them as opportunities for salvation and sanctification.
The Church avoids specific rules or excommunications when dealing with bioethical matters, including those concerning assisted reproduction. Basically, She leaves them open, while, at the same time, She indicates the direction and ethos of approaching each specific case. She does give a generalized definition of God’s will, but offers everyone the opportunity to detect it in his or her own life.
This seems well put to me. 17 years since have passed since that was written and today we might wish for a firmer statement, but I think the Catholics have shown the benefits but also the dangers of declaring too many explicit rules too swiftly. For most ethical issues I respect the approach of giving a general direction, and a clear ethical framework, but not presuming to declare the correct action in every individual circumstance.
OliveTapenade
24d ago
This is an act of desperation, it's going to increase antisemitism because wildly disproportionate responses like this reveal the underlying criticisms made by "anti-semites" to be true.
What criticisms have you made that this shows to be true?
OliveTapenade
24d ago
The difference is that we Jews don't demand that everyone else should subscribe to our metaphysics. Now, Christians do, and while they don't think that someone who doesn't believe in the trinity is anti-Christian, they do believe he is the next best thing.
1 John aside, I would suggest that the standard Christian approach is to distinguish non-Christian from anti-Christian, such that 'non-Christian' means not being within Christianity or disagreeing with Christianity to some extent, and 'anti-Christian' means possessed of specific, active malice towards Christianity.
(If you read all of 1 John, that letter appears to be talking about schisms within a particular community. 1 John 2:18-19 would seem to indicate that the 'many antichrists' are those who 'went out from us'. The 'liars' in 2:22 are presumably then those who were part of the Johannine community but who have since gone around denying the constitutive dogmas of that community.)
This approach seems consistent with how we talk about other religious groups as well. As I am a Christian, I naturally disagree with parts of Judaism and parts of Islam. I sincerely believe that religious Jews and Muslims are, ipso facto, in error about certain facts. This does not make me anti-semitic or anti-Islam/Islamophobic, just as I do not consider those Jews or Muslims to be anti-Christian. We distinguish between disagreement and malice.
The whole criticism of trans activism here is that they are treating disagreement as malice. There's no 'neutral' position. You either affirm the whole platform or you are a transphobe.
OliveTapenade
24d ago
I don't see how that relates? In fact, it seems like an instance of the same mistake?
Both genetic screening and treating someone differently after DNA modification seem like genetics-based discrimination. In both cases the correct approach is the same, which is to say that people or their worth cannot be reduced to genetics. Genetics do not encode personhood.
OliveTapenade
24d ago
Editing and screening are two different things, though I'm not particularly supportive of either.
In principle I have no objection to genetic medicine. If we could alter somebody's genes so as to end or remove illnesses, that would be a good thing. However, the line between medicine and enhancement is, in practice, pretty murky. If we could use gene editing to genuinely cure Down syndrome, that would be good, but in practice I suspect that if we had that technology it would inevitably be used for enhancement - that is, in an attempt not to improve the lives of actually existing people, but to manufacture better people. I think the risks of instrumentalising human life that way are considerable.
Screening is a step beyond that, isn't it? Screening is the equivalent of aborting an infant with Down syndrome prior to birth, only quicker and more efficient. So all moral objections there would apply.
OliveTapenade
25d ago
I confess I'm pessimistic here. If I had my way we would just declare this whole field a crime against humanity and end it there, but the human race has generally been pretty bad at putting genies back in bottles. We mostly managed the first time with eugenics, but we may not a second time.
I don't have a whole lot to say about the Scott Alexander article either other than that this is another of the sporadic posts that remind me that, while I like some of his writing, I occasionally need to remind myself that he is, for lack of a better term, a moral alien.
OliveTapenade
25d ago
I don't disagree with anything you've said. In fact, I would have thought that "big tech is evil" is pretty much conventional wisdom - though that might be a product of the circles I move in. Nonetheless I would be shocked if most people on the Motte have positive opinions of Google, Meta, or Apple.
OliveTapenade
26d ago
I've muddled around with LLMs enough to see the outlines of how someone could fall for one, but I always find that after half an hour or so, their fundamental shallowness kicks in and I either get bored, or I feel a kind of self-disgust or self-loathing for having even gone this far with them. I find it hard to imagine any genuine 'oneshotting' - they're just too tawdry.
Hm, it wouldn't be that surprising, I suppose, if the materialist Mormon cosmos, and relatively creaturely God, lends itself to a very different type of science fiction story than the Catholic cosmos.
I might need to unpack that a bit further to myself, though, and since we've rolled over into the next week's thread, I'll leave that here for now.
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