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MadMonzer

If you're talking to me, my preferred pronouns are you/your

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joined 2022 September 06 23:45:01 UTC

				

User ID: 896

MadMonzer

If you're talking to me, my preferred pronouns are you/your

4 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 06 23:45:01 UTC

					

No bio...


					

User ID: 896

Do you mean GME (Gamestop) or GMC (Post-BK General Motors)?

I agree with you that the SEC could have got a conviction for market manipulation against DeepFuckingValue if they wanted it, but equity short sellers are even less popular than market manipulators, so nailing a short seller is safe politically. Both the 1920 Stutz and 2008 Volkswagen corners nailed some of the biggest, best connected players in the market, but there was no interference by the authorities. In both cases the longs ended up running out of cash because in the process of executing the corner they bought the target company for more than it was worth.

Doing that in a commodity futures market, where the shorts include non-financial end users hedging their real-world risk, will get you hauled off in handcuffs.

In a sane world, voting for Jeffries for speaker would get them kicked out of the Republican Conference and lose them their committee assignments, so it would only make sense if they were planning to defect to the Dems (which might be a good idea if the DNCC can credibly promise that they won't face a serious primary challenge from the left). But I suppose the House Republican Conference have already demonstrated that they are living in Clown World.

Can we have societal acceptance of gays without all the other stuff? Maybe. I don't know. It's never been tried before. But we don't need any belief in the supernatural to see that gay marriage is deeply knit into other, mostly negative, societal changes.

Wrong order. The argument against gay marriage failed because it was being made by people who had already accepted most of the other stuff. The schwerpunkt of the culture wars was no-fault divorce, something which most conservative evangelicals in the US ended up supporting (Dalrock has the receipts) and which the US Catholic hierarchy de facto tolerated by running an annulment mill. Francis went squishy on that in Amoris Laetitia.

What happens after that is anyone's guess. In a literal sense we move back to where we were this January and do another election for Speaker.

I can only see two plausible outcomes:

  • There is another round of humiliating chaos for the Republican caucus, ending with them re-electing McCarthy for the same reason they did last time.
  • The 10 or so RINOest RINOs in the caucus put up a RINO for speaker and the Democrats vote for him.

The Freedom Caucus have zero leverage here. The speaker needs to be acceptable to the median Representative, who (a) is a RINO and (b) will lose their seat if they become associated with the unpopular parts of the Freedom Caucus agenda.

There were, in effect, two separate Libor-rigging scandals. There was no regulatory mixed messaging about the Libor-rigging-for-profit that Tom Hayes et al were engaged in - even if you accept the 2nd Circuit's argument that it wasn't fraud, it was clearly a violation of market norms about treating customers fairly. The regulatory mixed messaging was about Libor-rigging-to-prevent-bank-runs in 2008.

Latine would be the correct gender-neutral Spanish form, if Spanish-speaking culture cared about being gender neutral. So I don't think it sounds stupid in Spanish, just like a word only a politically correct person would use. In much the same way that "African-American" is a perfectly cromulent English word, but the group it refers to mostly prefer "Black".

Newsom is aware of the chance that Biden has a senior moment that creates an opening in the primary. If he does end up running for President on a message of "the incumbent is too old", then he won't want to have appointed a 77-year old to the Senate, and particularly not one who is planning to run for a full term that would take her through to 84.

I hope Meghan Markle runs. She would lose so badly that the resulting humiliation would solve a problem for the Royal Family.

Mark to Market was originally conjured up as a way for oil extraction companies to better value their inventory (oil) as daily markets could fluctuate pretty wildly.

Not really. Mark to Market (in technical accountancy terminology, "fair value accounting") first comes in as a way for financial institutions (banks, trading firms, brokerages etc,) with assets whose price varied based on movements in liquid financial markets to better assess their current solvency than historical cost accounting. It was brought in after the S&L crisis - a big part the reason why the S&L crisis got so bad is that you had institutions that were accounting-solvent (because 30-year fixed rate mortgages with interest rates that were now below-market were on the books at par) but clearly could not meet their obligations over a 30-year time horizon, and so they had an incentive to double down with what was in effect other people's money. (SVB was in the same situation, but had a lot of tightly-networked, financially sophisticated depositors with balances over the FDIC limit, so they got taken out by a run).

The thing that made Enron special was that they applied the mark-to-market accounting that made sense for the energy trading division of the firm to things that would not usually be marked to market like long-term contracts for wholesale gas supply, and that this allowed them to recognise revenue and profit earlier than competitors. It also meant that the business model wasn't sustainable because the contracts didn't produce long-term profits, so Andrew Fastow ended up having to double down repeatedly until he ended up ratting on Jeffery Skilling for a light sentence.

I am quite sure that if you take investor’s money, claiming that you’ll use it for building a shipping business, but then lose it all in Vegas, that counts as a breach of fiduciary duty.

As a matter of company law, the objectives of the company in the articles were almost certainly "make money" and the choice of how to do it was protected by the business judgement rule. If FedEx had been a public company at the time, then it might have been securities fraud. But the rules are much laxer for private companies.

The loophole doesn't work. In cities where only taxis can offer rides for hire (including San Francisco at the time Uber started), Uber is an unlicensed taxi, and therefore illegal. Every city that has litigated this point has won, and driven Uber out. The exception is the one that matters - in San Francisco, where it all started, Uber were able to delay for long enough to build up sufficient lobbying power that they could get the California legislature to change the law before the case got to trial.

In cities where pre-booked livery cars (AmE)/minicabs (BrE) are legal, Uber has generally ended up complying with the laws and operating a licensed minicab service.

There are additional rules for livery car services beyond the requirement to book in advance - notably that people driving commercially should have commercial insurance. My understanding was that Uber initially ignored these rules in NYC but eventually ended up complying.

London was a slightly unusual case in that our minicab law was sufficiently flexible that Uber decided to comply from day 1. For the same reason, there was a healthy ecosystem of minicab apps before Uber arrived. Uber outcompeted them on price and convenience by being willing to lose money hand-over-fist. Now that Uber are making a (tiny) operating profit, they have the same prices as traditional minicab firms.

Pretty much everyone who works in quant finance occupies enough legal gray area to worry that they could all be shut down at any time and end up in court.

In HFT (which, admittedly, is not "pretty much everyone who works in quant finance"), the issue is that rules about market manipulation designed for humans operating over timescales of minutes become dangerously vague when applied to computers operating over timescales of hundredths of a second. The rules against spoofing and layering are fundamentally the application to modern markets of the rules against the tape manipulation frauds of the 1920's that were brought in by Joe Kennedy's SEC after the 1929 crash. But those rules define crimes based, at least in part, on dishonest intent (which experienced practitioners can infer from behaviour). Inferring intent from behaviour is harder when one computer is ripping off another computer in a novel way, so it is harder to enforce the rules fairly, and more opportunity for unfairness. There are plenty of people who think that the distinction between what Navinder Singh Sarao was jailed for doing and what Citadel and Renaissance do on a daily basis is Who?, Whom?

The other areas of quant finance (derivatives pricing, risk modelling, quant hedge funds other than HFTs) do not operate in legal grey areas. There are also HFT strategies which do not operate in legal grey areas, such as Jane Street's ETF business.

I don't think the Libor manipulation was being done by quants. The false numbers were being submitted by banks' treasury markets desks The pressure to submit the false numbers was coming from the interest rate derivatives desks (or, in the case of Barclays in 2008, the Bank of England). Both desks employ desk quants to babysit derivatives pricing models (and, increasingly, risk models) but aren't run by quants. (Tom Hayes has the classic quant background, but he was working as a flow trader, not a quant).

The US convictions got overturned on appeal, the UK ones did not. The difference is that the UK appeals court ruled that "What rate can your bank borrow at under the standard LIBOR terms?" is a question with (in principle) a single correct answer, and therefore changing your submission based on pressure from another trading desk implies that you were not submitting your best estimate of the true answer, hence per se fraud. The US appeals court said that there is necessary a range of reasonable answers, that choosing one answer within this range as opposed to another based on pressure from another trading desk is not fraudulent, and that the prosecution did not prove that the rigged LIBOR submissions were outside the reasonable range. I am with the Brits on this - everyone involved in LIBOR rigging knew that what they were doing was wrong (both by conventional ethics and by the situational ethics of well-run financial markets). I expect that they also knew that the market for LIBOR-linked interest rate derivatives could not survive their behaviour being exposed (because clients don't want to be ripped off).

All the crooks are now out of jail having served their sentences. Tom Hayes is still trying to clear his name, but there isn't much sympathy for him among London bankers - even if it is technically not a crime, rigging benchmark interest rates is the sort of thing we need to be seen not to do in order to retain the trust of our clients. London as a centre of interest rate derivative trading is weaker because LIBOR has been discontinued.

The people who I do have some sympathy with (and I note that they were not prosecuted) were the people who made optimistic submissions in 2008 in order to contain the financial crisis. You can argue about whether they were cheating according to conventional ethics, but their behaviour made LIBOR (which was used by the industry as a risk-free rate) closer to what everyone expected it to be, helped preserve financial stability in a crisis, and was what the regulators were fairly clear they wanted to see.

Second is that people always have the wrong idea about just how much work their betters actually do

Given that the first half of the OP is defending landlords, this isn't really relevant. There is an active component to landlording (finding tenants, arranging repairs, etc.) but in the UK market most landlords hire agents to do this for them (and in fact most lenders insist on some degree of professional management of rental property). Collecting land rents is the closest thing to zero-effort moneymaking there is. When most capital was agricultural land, there really was a leisure class that worked less and spent more than the rest of us - see Jane Austen. In the future when most capital is residential land, the same will probably be true - see Thomas Piketty.

Actual capitalists who invest in productive assets have to do a lot of work creating those assets and ensuring they retain their value (and hiring someone to do it for you will cost you 2-and-20 if they know what you are doing, which doesn't leave much for you). But landlording is basically having a piece of paper saying "I, Charles III, by Grace of God and by virtue of my ancestor William the Conqueror having stolen this land in 1066, will cut the head off anyone who deigns to use the land without paying you off first". You need to collect the toll, but the work that makes the land valuable (including the violence incidental to making the promise meaningful, which can get very expensive indeed) is done by Charles's government and the community that support it.

I don't think either of your examples work. The problem of sub-Dunbar thinking certainly exists, but when the stakes are as high as they are in housing or healthcare, actually-existing democracies make better decisions than pure monkey politics would suggest. In both cases, I am happy to defend the policies we are seeing as sane way of pursuing the goals of the median voter (which I do not share in the case of housing). This is an effortpost on the pathologies of UK housing policy that I am structuring as a fisking of your post in order to make it quicker to write rather than because I think your post is bad - I suspect we agree on all the substantive issues and the double crux is about the motivations of our political opponents.

UK housing policy is a simple problem (policy-induced scarcity) with a simple solution (build more houses) that is politically difficult to implement. The various deckchair-rearranging policies to "fix" the housing market while retaining an artificial scarcity of housing are mostly supported by people who know exactly what they are doing, and are likely to succeed at their stated goals within the limits of what is possible by rearranging deckchairs.

The quintessential example I can think of is the problem with rising rents here in the UK. Rents have been going up faster than wages due to decades of underbuilding and general NIMBYism. Things are not quite as bad as say Ireland or Berlin (thankfully we've managed to not fall for the populist poison apple of rent control) but they're still becoming quite the issue with ordinary couples in London spending close to 40% of their take home pay on just shelter.

The problem is MUCH less bad in Berlin than in London - the whining is worse in Berlin because Berliners got used to low rents in prime central neighborhoods during the period when the city was recovering from the Cold-War era partition, but rents in Berlin are about half London and incomes at a comparable skill level are higher. There was a short period when the legal market didn't clear due to rent controls (a quick Google suggests that people willing to pay illegal key money had no trouble finding flats) but they were struck down by the German federal courts.

Recent regulations putting additional burden on landlords and making it harder for them to generate a profit (e.g. energy rating requirements and the removal of mortgage interest deduction from taxes) have led to them selling, further reducing supply more than demand goes down

These rules were brought in by the Conservative government, and the stated purpose was to encourage homeownership at the margin by forcing amateur landlords to sell out to first-time buyers, not to make life easier for marginal tenants. You can say that encouraging homeownership at this margin is a bad idea because homeowners are more likely to under-occupy (FWIW, I disagree with you), but the consequences of this change were thoroughly intended, and popular (partly because the marginal tenants losing out are disproportionately likely to be non-voting immigrants).

This has gotten to the point where there are now over 20 prospective tenants competing over each property, which naturally leads to people having to bid over the landlord's asking price/paying months of rent in advance/submitting references if they want to actually get the place for themselves. This has lead to cries that landlords are "exploiting" poor tenants who have nowhere else to go and that they are capital-B Bad People who society needs to give a stern scolding to so that they go back to acting in pro-social ways.

The UK does not have rent control. If the market isn't clearing, then rents need to rise further until it does. The fact that oversubscribed tenancies are allocated by sealed bids (rather than paperwork races) suggests this is happening.

If you were to point out that the current situation is in part caused by society making it harder to be a profitable landlord and that the correct remedy is to make things easier for landlords to make a profit

Then you would be wrong, as you yourself acknowledge in the next sentence.

(the real correct remedy is to build more, but good luck doing that in NIMBYland)

CORRECT. I guessed you were basically sound. If we don't allow developers to build the homes that there is demand for (and that could be built profitably), then millions of prospective Londoners, who have a reasonable want to live in London, will have to go away. Once you let the NIMBYs win, that becomes a matter of arithmetic and not a policy choice. Neither the free market nor the welfare state can alleviate the pain, because at the relevant margin the pain needs to be bad enough to make people leave. Even Gavin Newsome has started to get this - the fact that the UK in general and Sadiq Khan in particular don't is scary for people who have to live here.

Indeed, they say, we should be playing the world's smallest violin for such hard done up landlords who have hundreds of thousands of pounds to their name.

That passive investment in land is a form of social parasitism is Econ 101, going back to David Ricardo. We tolerate it because (1) it is too hard to distinguish passive investors in land from passive investors in the structures built on the land, who are socially valuable in the same way as other capitalists, and (2) a lot of them are homeowning boomers, who are ludicrously entitled and vote. In England this is explicit - page 1 of every English Land Law text says that English Land Law is based on the doctrine of tenure and the doctrine of estates. The doctrine of tenure is that William the Conqueror stole all the land in England in 1066, King Charles still owns it as William's heir, and whatever rights you may have in your "own" land are based on stolen property.

and the solution is to do something that prevents so much of the hard earned money of your average Joe ending up in their hands, ergo Rent Control.

Apart from the Corbynite usual suspects, I am not seeing a powerful faction in the UK calling for Berlin-style rent controls, largely because there is no powerful faction in British politics who wants a world where people with a long-term stable address rent from private sector landlords. We don't want the landlords to suffer - we want them to stop landlording and invest in new assets rather than bidding up the price of existing ones. The anti-landlord faction of the Conservatives thinks that people with long-term stable addresses should be homeowners and wants to tax landlords until they are forced to sell out to first-time buyers. The dominant faction of the Labour party thinks that poor people with long-term stable addresses should live in social housing, but that allowing an overpriced spot market to exist for the niche of people who need it is, on balance, a good thing (Sadiq Khan did call for rent controls in a vague non-committal way, but he was slapped down by Keir Starmer. The underlying politics of this is that the post-WW2 housing policy was built around social housing for the working class and homeownership for the middle class, to the point where even after the Thatcher-era selloffs the UK has an unusually high percentage of social housing (see p2 of this OECD report), so the political machines running off long-term low-income tenant voters are focussed on social housing and not rent control.

And the way to increase tenant welfare? Increase rental supply in the area that people want to rent so there is competition amongst landlords and tenants are able to command more market power than the mere morsel they have today.

Without the bold word, this is obviously correct. But the supply issue is the supply of housing, not rental housing. Given the way the UK housing market works (and in particular the lack of dedicated rental buildings where a single private landlord owns the whole multifamily building), there is a single market for housing services in which private renting and mortgaged ownership are effectively different financing options. Because of undersupply, the market for housing is a brutal zero-sum competition which someone has to lose. If policy favours mortgaged ownership as the way of financing the purchase of housing, then the competition is rigged in favour of people with stable jobs, good credit scores and parents able to put down deposits for them. If policy favours private renting, then the competition is rigged in favour of people able and willing to live with multiple employed adults per bedroom in order to cover the rent. Which of these groups of people you prefer is a far stronger motivator for which housing policy you support than whether you hate bankers or landlords more (FWIW, the sub-Dunbar idiotarian left seem to hate developers more than either).

I think the goals of AA as now practiced are even less coherent that this - giving a slot to a foreign student from Madrid in preference to one from Paris doesn't achieve any of these goals, but it does increase your "Hispanic" percentage. I suppose at least some of the scholarship Nigerians are going to go the OPT/H1B route and stay in America as technically-Black elites.

As far as I can see, elite institutions in the US now feel obliged to make numbers on diversity without any sense of why they are doing so.

At some point more and more individuals will be caught up in interstate lawfare wars. Trump is just the tip of the iceberg.

Trump isn't a victim of this kind of interstate lawfare. All his legal problems relate to behaviour which (if he did it) is illegal everywhere, and the claims of jurisdiction are pretty clear-cut.

Trump's current legal troubles are:

  • Federal cases with a clear federal cause of action (the Mar-a-Lago documents, the federal Jan 6 case)
  • New York cases where jurisdiction is proper because NY is the Trump Org's principal place of business (the Stormy Daniels payoff, the bank fraud case) or the behaviour alleged took place in New York (the E Jean Carroll rape and defamation lawsuits)
  • A Georgia case relating to interference with a Georgia election.

"This kind of lawfare" strictu sensu - i.e. seeking to regulate the worldwide behaviour of businesses outside your jurisdiction on the basis that they did some business inside the jurisdiction - has been SOP in the US for a very long time. From my perspective as someone who has spent most of my career working in non-US multinationals, the biggest issue is random insane civil verdicts in US state courts, but there are a number of federal policies which are also objectionable - especially sanctions on Cuba and the law attempting to punish companies for participating in the Arab boycott of Israel. Countries other than the US do not do this - for example the UK only attempts to regulate British companies and British-based activity of foreign companies. In general, countries other than the US take the view that, as applied to international trade in goods, this kind of behaviour violates the WTO treaty, which says that countries can only discriminate between identical goods based on whether or not they have a trade deal with the country they were made in, not on who made them.

What Texas is doing is something slightly different in that it ties the requirement to doing business with the Texas government, not to operating in Texas. This is less objectionable from a jurisdictional comity perspective, because the Texan government is acting as a market participant, not a sovereign, and has the right to choose who it does business with in the same way as any other entity (FWIW, I have no idea if the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment does or should regulate States as market participants). This kind of behaviour used to be rare except for mission-driven organisations like charities and political parties - normal people care about what they are buying, may care about how it was made, but do not care about the general ethical record of the people making it. The idea that public sector customers should take an interest as customers in the out-of-jurisdiction activities of the companies they do business with is new - AFAIK it dates back to left-wing campaigns about corporate tax compliance in the noughties.

It will be interesting to see how Texas's attempts to enforce this against Wells Fargo pan out. If this was a term in a contract "Wells Fargo will not discriminate against a firearms entity" then at common law it would probably be unenforceable as a restraint of trade and/or a contract to break the law in a (legally) friendly jurisdiction. But making it a pre-contract enquiry means that Wells Fargo are pretty clearly guilty of a fraudulent misrepresentation.

I feel like this kind of interstate lawfare is exactly what the interstate commerce provisions in the US constitution were meant to prevent.

This is the important point - a world in which every jurisdiction tries to regulate activity outside its territory - particularly if that regulation is driven by idiosyncratic local politics rather than being an attempt to enforce widely-shared norms - is very bad from the point of view of making it legal for normal people to do business normally.

The dynamic where the right always wants to go to war abroad and the left doesn't is mostly an artifact of the Cold War, where the enemy was the communist USSR

It's worth noting that the pro-establishment left was just as committed to the Cold War as the right. Truman, JFK and LBJ all escalated the Cold War. The President who tried hardest to de-escalate it was Nixon. The thing that was different about the Cold War is that the anti-establishment right (the Birchers and McCarthyites) were in favour of it, unlike almost every other "foreign entanglement" (including WW2, the MidEast forever wars, and Ukraine).

Ukraine is peanuts. Biden (who has never been particularly greedy personally) made $15 million in "clean" money from speaking fees and book royalties in the 3 years between leaving office as VP and starting to work full-time on his presidential campaign. He never had the chance to fully monetize the favours he banked as Senator for MBNA, but based on other greedy ex-officials he could have got multiple family members $1 million a year sinecures - possibly more if James Biden went into private equity Jared Kushner style. I think the total Biden family take from US sources if the Bidens had been Clinton-tier greedy would be mid double figures.

The biggest sources of dodgy foreign money in US politics are China and the Gulf Arabs. Hunter Biden took about $5 million in Chinese money (House Republicans say over $8 million, but that includes Devon Archer's share) without trying very hard. As President, Biden has pursued anti-Chinese policies that would cause that flow of money to stop. The Biden family has (unlike the Trumps) made no serious attempt to go after Arab money, but we know from Kushner that a Presidential-tier bribe would run into hundreds of millions.

The House Republicans' estimate for the total Biden family take from Ukraine is $6.5 million. There is third-hand rumour that the real figure is around $10 million. If the Biden administration is for sale, it is more expensive than that.

If the Libyan intervention had worked, it would have involved providing air support to one side in a civil war, such that nobody would have needed to invade Libya. The desired end-state was rapid consolidation of control by a local anti-Gadaffi faction that appeared to be pro-American but was actually lousy with jihadis.

The lesson the American pro-establishment left learned from Afghanistan (which still looked like a partial success at the time) and Iraq (aready fairly obviously a disaster) was that America should rely on proxies to control territory rather than invading countries with US troops. Libya was the first big test of this idea. It failed the test.

The Ukrainians have been deliberately skewing their media operations to appeal to progressives. They appointed a trans as their former military press official. They're moving to legalize gay marriage, which is highly unusual considering the anti-gay sentiment amongst the bulk of the operation.

I don't think the Ukrainians started doing this until they saw that the US domestic political situation meant deepening support within the Blue Tribe had a better chance of working than reaching out to the Red Tribe. Even now, the Ukrainians are waving a lot more EU flags than Pride flags.

I think support for Ukraine is more of a pro/anti-establishment issue than a left-right one. The anti-establishment left (Chomsky, Greenwald, Corbyn etc.) are at best lukewarm in their support for Ukraine and more normally both-sidesist. AOC got in trouble with her hard-left supporters for supporting Ukraine - arguably part of the process where here anti-establishment card is heading for early expiration. The small number of pro-establishment Republicans who are not afraid of a MAGA backlash (e.g. senators McConnell and Graham) and the various centre-right commentators who went NeverTrump in 2016 are fairly strongly pro-Ukraine.

As various people have pointed out in the thread, the pro vs anti establishment lineup on Ukraine is consistent with the pro vs anti establishment lineup on every other foreign policy issue going back to the New Deal era - the establishment supports US hegemony and the "rules-based international order", which in this case means that Putin must lose. The moderate anti-establishment view is that trying to maintain hegemony wastes resources which could be spent domestically and provokes unnecessary conflict. The rabid anti-establishment view is open support for America's rivals on enemy-of-my-enemy grounds.

The main reason it has become partisan because the anti-establishment right has crushed the pro-establishment in intra-right political battles since 2016, and the pro-establishment left has been dominant in intra-left battles since Biden won the primary in 2020. So pro-establishment vs anti-establishment can now look sufficiently like left vs right to trigger a Blue vs Red happy tribal death spiral - the same thing happened with COVID-19 vaccines despite Donald Trump's attempts to promote them as a Trump administration success story. The factions lined up the same way over the Iraq war (Bush/Clinton in favour, Buchanan/Chomsky against) but with the opposite partisan valance because the anti-establishment left had a megaphone and the anti-establishment right did not.

There are also moron-in-a-hurry culture war factors (Putin has been marketing Russia as white Christian country with strong gender roles and no queers for a long time) and dodgy domestic politics reasons (Russia helped Trump with opposition research in 2016, Ukraine refused to in 2019), but I think the pro vs anti establishment angle is a necessary and sufficient condition for support to Ukraine to be partisan in today's climate.

Having checked, you are right. From the UK I had always assumed that Penn State was another "coach sexually abuses athletes" scandal similar to the US gymnastics scandal or the (boys) youth soccer and (girls) swimming scandals going on in the UK at the time.

I agree with you. The whole point I was trying to make was that in a vibes-based discourse trying to make the distinction between different types of sexual misconduct is likely to get you in trouble for minimising/excusing one end of the comparison, but it is actually important if you want to understand what is going on.