@Primaprimaprima's banner p

Primaprimaprima

Aliquid stat pro aliquo

3 followers   follows 0 users  
joined 2022 September 05 01:29:15 UTC

"...Perhaps laughter will then have formed an alliance with wisdom; perhaps only 'gay science' will remain."


				

User ID: 342

Primaprimaprima

Aliquid stat pro aliquo

3 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 01:29:15 UTC

					

"...Perhaps laughter will then have formed an alliance with wisdom; perhaps only 'gay science' will remain."


					

User ID: 342

I've never perceived the Socratic dialogue to have much of a point at all.

If we're confining ourselves specifically to the works of Plato, then the point is to explore a particular philosophical problem, and typically, to outline a solution to it. The dialogue I quoted from, The Sophist, attempts to explore and solve a series of paradoxes related to the concept of non-existence. See here for a gloss on the dialogue's central arguments.

As for why Plato chose to present his works in dialogue form rather than a more traditional "scholarly" form, the reasons are multifaceted. I would point out, for example, that we would have never seen the beautiful drama of Callicles's accusations against Socrates (that he was wasting his life on philosophy) if Plato had not chosen the dialogue form.

The vast majority, including and especially the classics like this one, are shallow and pointless.

You're going to look me in the eyes and tell me that this is shallow and pointless?

Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days? For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just, profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear someone exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? Or, suppose them to have no care of human things -- why in either case should we mind about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by 'sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.' Let us be consistent then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. 'But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.' ‘Yes, my friend’, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.

On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? When, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honour justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there should be someone who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be someone whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the truth -- but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.

The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice -- beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men of our own time -- no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but everyone would have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations; for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired indeed for their results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes -- like sight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good -- I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

It’s pretty characteristic of Plato’s style in general.

There is a lot of back-and-forth debate in the Platonic dialogues, no doubt. But also there are a lot of times where Socrates is just monologuing while the other person interjects with “yes, quite, it is as you say, Socrates”.

Sure.

Name whoever you want, I doubt it will change anything.

Not on my watch.

The House adopts a resolution honoring the life of Charlie Kirk; 95 Democrats voted "yes", 58 voted "no", 38 voted "present".

Were I in a position to do so, would I vote to acquiesce to the left's request to honor one of their slain heroes? A George Floyd or a Joseph Rosenbaum, or perhaps a historical figure like Lenin or Mao? It seems that two distinct answers are in order.

The first answer is: yes, of course, "by default". I would be happy to vote yes "by default", with a taciturn attitude, as an expression of my own amiable and magnanimous nature, and out of a want of avoiding the appearance of pettiness. I can't deny that such a gesture would be a matter of pride, an attempt to introduce my own form of "unruliness" into the proceedings...

But supposing we wanted something more than a "default" course of action, something we could fully assent to in good conscience? Supposing then?

I admit to possessing a certain degree of permeability; there is hardly a passion amongst my enemies that cannot inspire a concomitant passion within me, if it is expressed and held rightly (allowing that "rightly" for me is "wrongly" for a great many others). I want to know that it means something to you. I want to know that anything at all means anything to you. Then we can walk together, if only for a time. It is not the expression of raw untrammeled sentiment, nor is it the expression of a rational program of means and ends, but rather it is something that threads the needle of navigating the Scylla and Charybdis and excavates the unnameable space between them. (Don't take this as an invitation to pen your own panegyrics; I have not the talent to evaluate them, I'm in no state to hear confessions, not me... the most I can do for anyone is to remind them of the proper standards of decorum, to gesture insistently that the question must be treated with an appropriate amount of respect...)

The primary distinction for me is not between good and evil, or purity and corruption, but between the ensouled and the soulless. The indifference with which this concept is often treated is simply more proof to me that the distinction has, in fact, latched onto something real. Undoubtedly, many of my enemies and I walk the same path; and conversely, anyone on my "side" who lacks the requisite sense of aesthetics is an ally of convenience only, and not someone who could be counted on to genuinely relieve me of my loneliness.

The dialogue I quoted from was written by Plato...

People have been complaining that normies are dumb for at least 2,400 years:

STRANGER: Should we not say that the division according to classes, which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the business of the dialectical science?

THEAETETUS: That is what we should say.

STRANGER: Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.

THEAETETUS: Quite true.

STRANGER: And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true?

THEAETETUS: Who but he can be worthy?

STRANGER: In this region we shall always discover the philosopher, if we look for him; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason.

THEAETETUS: For what reason?

STRANGER: Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true?

THEAETETUS: It seems to be so.

STRANGER: And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine.

THEAETETUS: Yes; that seems to be quite as true as the other.

STRANGER: Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered by us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist must clearly not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him.

THEAETETUS: Very good.

No, it really is much closer to 50%. That’s the only way to explain the absolute deluge of support among leftists for Kirk’s murder. It’s a statistical argument. The only reason you’re hearing this many people who support it is because there are even more who don’t. Otherwise you’d have to believe that almost every person who supports Kirk murder has been vocal about it on the internet, which is implausible.

10 steps forward 2 steps back, Moloch always swims left, ineluctable Brazilianization, etc.

I don’t see any reason to celebrate a couple individuals getting fucked over if it doesn’t change the calculus at a societal level. In fact I find it regrettable. I don’t actually want leftists to suffer just for being leftists.

If you're still largely unfamiliar with his original works, then you have a very special and unique experience waiting in store for you. For those who only know Nietzsche through reddit /r/atheism soundbites, the beautiful subtlety of his thought is reduced to caricature. Few other thinkers in history so reward careful and prolonged meditation, and few others were so thoroughly opposed to quick and easy answers. (Jung described Nietzsche as a "devious mind who laid many traps for unsuspecting intruders" in the catacombs of his soul.)

One thing that all readers of Nietzsche can agree on is that questions of nobility, of distinctions of rank, of ascendancy and degeneration, were at the forefront of his mind, so you'll find plenty to reflect on there.

Academic commentaries on Nietzsche are largely useless. Just dive in and enjoy the ride.

A reading from the scriptures:

The more a psychologist – a born, inevitable psychologist and unriddler of souls – turns to exceptional cases and people, the greater the danger that he will be choked with pity: he needs hardness and cheerfulness more than anyone else. The ruin, the destruction of higher people, of strangely constituted souls, is the rule [emphasis mine]: it is horrible always to have a rule like this in front of your eyes. The manifold torment of the psychologist who discovered this destruction, who first discovered and then kept rediscovering (in almost every case) the whole inner “hopelessness” of the higher person, the eternal “too late!” in every sense, throughout the entirety of history, – this torment might make him turn bitterly against his own lot one day and try to destroy himself, – to “ruin” himself. In almost every psychologist, you find a telling inclination and preference for dealing with normal, well-ordered people. This reveals that the psychologist is in constant need of a cure, of a type of forgetting and escape from the things that make his insight and incisiveness, that make his “craft” weigh heavily on his conscience. It is characteristic of him to be afraid of his memory. He is easily silenced by other people’s judgments: he listens with an unmoved face to how they honor, admire, love, and transfigure what he has seen, – or he keeps his silence hidden by expressly agreeing with some foreground opinion.

Perhaps the paradox of his condition becomes so horrible that the masses, the educated, the enthusiasts, develop a profound admiration for the very things he has learned to regard with profound pity and contempt, – they admire the “great men” and prodigies who inspire people to bless and honor the fatherland, the earth, the dignity of humanity, and themselves, “great men” who are pointed out to young people for their edification . . . And who knows if this is not just what has happened in all great cases so far: the masses worshiped a God, – and that “God” was only a poor sacrificial animal! Success has always been the greatest liar, – and the “work” itself is a success. The great statesman, the conqueror, the discoverer – each one is disguised by his creations to the point of being unrecognizable. The “work” of the artist, of the philosopher, is what invents whoever has created it, whoever was supposed to have created it. “Great men,” as they are honored, are minor pieces of bad literature, invented after the fact; in the world of historical values, counterfeit rules. These great authors, for example, this Byron, Musset, Poe, Leopardi, Kleist, Gogol, – they are, and perhaps have to be men of the moment, excited, sensual, and childish, thoughtless and sudden in trust and mistrust; with souls that generally hide some sort of crack; often taking revenge in their work for some inner corruption, often flying off in search of forgetfulness for an all-too-faithful memory, often getting lost in the mud and almost falling in love with it until they become like the will-o’-the-wisps around swamps and pretend to be stars (then people might call them idealists), often fighting a prolonged disgust, a recurring specter of unbelief that makes them cold and forces them to pine for gloria and to feed on “faith in itself” from the hands of drunken flatterers. What torture these great artists and higher people in general are for anyone who has ever guessed what they really are! [...]

Mars rock