The_Golem101
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User ID: 548
I'm very curious on your original assertion, that Ukrainians as a class are bitter on the US forcing them into fighting Russia, when they had no hope and it has gone so badly for them - taking half a million deaths in the process, such that suggesting Ukraine is right to fight and America is right to help them would therefore earn you their hatred. To me that sounds the same probability as "I'm Johnny Walker, from Texas Oblast, and I think that the USA is stupid to provoke the mighty Russian bear" as a being a genuine statement on US citizen's views on foreign policy - that's the inglourious basterds three fingers meme right there on every level. It's just... Russian signaling all the way through. Are you sure these are Ukrainians?
But to be fair, you also asked me a question. These warhawks have been fighting, have family fighting, and broadly support conscription when I asked them, though there was some discussions about draft dodging. Maybe they are foolish or p-zombies, but I myself am British, and so there's something very impressive about people paying a price and are willing to pay it to go fuck you to a fucked up bully even as others think you're foolish (1939-41 were our best and worst years). I do note they've done a lot better than anyone expected, aren't done yet, and have proven that even Russia can really bleed, they've done magnificently. I don't think of them as sheep or conformist, possibly to a fault - one issue of cossacks is they can be like herding cats, but they certainly have a common enemy today (even if they want Zelensky out tomorrow).
Maybe sober reality will make them regret their actions, but honestly, I think the fact Ukraine made itself into a very unwelcome meal for Russia is unlikely to be regretted, and they are proud so far of what their country has done (which includes rolling over the 4th Guards tank div, which is one of the funniest things to have happened to a power that claims to be super in a very very long time, imagine if a US armored division was routed in the Gulf war and their tanks captured to a degree that the Iraqi army could restock vs pre war, the T-80U is now on the endangered species list).
Finally, and this is utterly vital to stress, they also clearly have their own agency. Ukraine chose this, for better or for worse.
I like the fuckers, it's vibes for me, and I think while this is hard pounding, they may well pound the longest. I think it would be good if they do.
The_Golem101
8d ago
Remember these aren't civilian towns anymore, they're warzones, you're supplying soldiers in an area with enough water to survive, alongside food, ammunition, entrenching equipment etc, and taking fresh men in and the wounded etc back. If Russia could stop every truck into a given area, they would control it and quickly occupy it, it's not defensible, same for Ukraine the other way around, their effective actions around Izium mostly involved Russian units panicking as their supply lines were close to being closed and they ran for it.
For a town close to the front you use trucks, for one on the front you use MRAPs and APC/IFVs, for a fighting position on the edge of town you use runners through your trenches, but again interdiction means that you are degrading but not stopping this, which might largely happen at night, under fog etc. It's absolutely not the case that Russia can stop anything like all deliveries even to these contested areas, but it be high cost for the Ukrainians, forcing them back in the end. Here's a video (that's certainly wrong in bits, but gives you an idea) that covers one of these key town sieges: https://youtube.com/watch?v=igFrblANpQk .
Almost none of the civilian infrastructure is working, these places are wrecked, and the utility pipes are shredded. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to degrade utilities to big cities, but they can be repaired, there's some redundancy and defended by AA assets etc. If your assumption as to why Russia is moving too slowly is that they're being far too soft, that almost certainly isn't the case.
The_Golem101
8d ago
I'm skeptical on that number, though I'm sure there are reasonable costs higher than the direct aid due to the sanctions etc you can't take all inflation as a cost and put it all due to the Ukraine war, that guy's speech in 2023 to Singapore isn't exactly a knock down argument...
The_Golem101
8d ago
I am personally acquainted with several dozen Ukrainians, and know several fighting. They're of the exact opposite opinion - I'm not sure how you came to meet so many that seem to support a Russian talking point? I'm genuinely curious, what's their background?
And propaganda or not, they think that Russia is taking far more causalities than they are, and no one seems to be talking about half a million deaths?
The Ukrainian narratives that I know are that they chose to stand up to Russia, are very happy with countries that helped them with equipment (very pro UK for example), and are confused why America is so hot and cold with shipments but still broadly pro US. They were going to fight with or without US/NATO weapons, at the big defeats Russia experienced at the start were mostly with Ukrainian gear, it was much later till the tanks, IFVs, aircraft and static AA started arriving, which allowed them to continue. They are also of the opinion that if Zelensky capitulates (or is seen to) he's gone next election, he was seen as soft on Russia pre war and is being outflanked by more popular warhawks.
The_Golem101
8d ago
Interdiction means that a percentage of logistics entering the town are destroyed/disabled, or can only move under poor weather, at night etc. You don't need running water or electricity to keep a fighting position supplied, you can truck/carry in their water, ammo, etc. but if part of that is being interdicted your logistic burden is just that much higher, X% is lost, alongside Y lives per tonne needed to sustain fighting.
The Russians are naturally going out of their way to starve out every town/fighting position they can, which is often a matter of ammunition not food or water of course.
The_Golem101
1mo ago
Technically this would be an Ordo Malleus call wouldn't it? As it deals with demons? Though, James Workshop is very confusing with how the Inquisition actually operates, and even Ordo Xenos members seem to spend most of their time fighting Chaos in books.
The_Golem101
3mo ago
I think this misses the point myself and others raised in response to your thread. "Killing people" via constant attacks into fortified positions where the only reward is another trench to attack and wire to chew on is the failure state, all doctrine over the last century is basically attempts to create or restore options for maneuver rather than positional warfare as it fundamentally sucks for the attacker. The fact Russia is unable to do so shows the weak position it is in, and the massive losses it must be taking. Breakthroughs are hard, and the developments throughout the war have made them harder, but attacking without a breakthrough always causes huge losses and is always the less preferred option.
Russia still might grind out a victory under such conditions from an overmatch of manpower, but it's not a sign of doing well. Indeed, it's incompatible with a positive casualty ratio, if Ukraine has less manpower and that has been depleted faster than Russias for 3 straight years why haven't they managed to restore that maneuver? When Ukraine found gaps in the line they charged in, and slapped about the 4th Guards tank division so effectively that they captured more armor than Russia wanted to set as a maximum for post war Ukraine in their stupid peace conditions. Losses like those would leave a shadow, we are not seeing that shadow, so it seems very unlikely that the losses are there.
I guess those reading this might have changed some of their opinions, but we are something like a factor of 4 off (2:1 vs 1:2), so I guess we'll just have to see.
The_Golem101
3mo ago
Do you think it's consistent to have A) a 2:1 ratio in favor of Russia, B) Russia possessing a larger military C) Russia unable to achieve an operational breakthrough since early 2022? I think A) can't exist with both B) and C), but I assume you have another thought on that? Is there a precedent for a larger army on the offensive being unable to advance (and even losing ground in mid to late 2022) despite killing at a 2:1 ratio?
There's also A) a 2:1 ratio in favor of Russia, with D) Oryx (or whatever other open source counting wrecks) showing vastly more equipment losses for Russia, but I assume you would discount that as Ukraine being less mechanized, or Russian footage not being available?
However, no worries if you don't want to go into the weeds on this, I really think we can't finally resolve it until the war ends.
The_Golem101
3mo ago
I would be very interested in your estimates, defined as you wish (KIA, KIA+wounded too badly to return to service or whatever) for both sides. What kind of ratio do you think it is?
The_Golem101
3mo ago
Oh, totally misread that. That's actually fairly credible although on the high end as an estimate I would guess, I take back my accusations of them also selling obviously silly numbers. However a full million out of the Russian workforce would leave more ripples than we have seen I would assume, like this interview suggested (from December, but his point about a million losses being impossible to hide presumably still stands): https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/war-deficits-and-the-russian-economy
The_Golem101
3mo ago
*2027 I assume? But you're right, how about this one: https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/04/07/rheinmetall-secures-nitrocellulose-supply-amid-european-ammo-scramble/
I'm a bit annoyed at the Germans and their pace, but Russia's low GDP and sanctions are not great for a war of attrition, and they really have burnt through most of their stored equipment in many categories.
The_Golem101
3mo ago
The CEP and kill chain are very different for the systems, and like you say that's also due to the full GPS/ISTAR package around the systems. I really do think that Ukraine had a clear advantage in precision fires from 2023 at least. But it's a bit of a niche point.
The_Golem101
3mo ago
I think it's reasonable to say that Ukraine has been defending more than on the offensive? And there are plenty of photos of hundreds of Russian vehicles lost in single pushes from early war if you're worried about the losses shown for Ukraine - the high IQ pontooning meme was a direct offshoot of literally 100+ vehicles being lost as an entire BTG funneled into a kill zone like lemmings. Ukraine's offensive was wildly optimistic and took several company size losses of metal, but it was an outlier, one that they stopped and Zaluzhny should be credited for containing once it was clear there was no hole in the lines like at Kharkiv or Kherson.
All I'm saying is that there are several credible reasons why the Ukrainian military would be perfectly plausibly taking fewer casualties than Russia, while still being under a lot of pressure.
Your post seemed to put credibility on the estimate that Ukraine has taken over 300,000k combat KIA/out of the fight? Where would you put it? I'm guessing at that level or higher? Where do you think Russia's are at?
I do note that Syrsky interview isn't dated in your screenshot, but is shortly after his appointment so presumably over a year ago now? Plus, not sure on your economist article, but they have changed their tune more recently: https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/12/02/how-ukraine-uses-cheap-ai-guided-drones-to-deadly-effect-against-russia and I think most estimates don't put Ukraine behind on drone integration.
The balance since then has shifted sharply, and not in Russia's favor https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/04/07/rheinmetall-secures-nitrocellulose-supply-amid-european-ammo-scramble/ (edited to a better link), plus systems like Excalibur and the GMLRS/ATACMS really don't have any qualitative peer in the Russian artillery arsenal (hence why they had to pause and restructure their logistics around them) - I just don't think either of those sources come close to suggesting Russia has and had always a qualitative and quantitative edge that comes close to evening its casualty disadvantage as an attacker. It's also possible that Syrsky was being a slight doomer then to highlight the need for ongoing aid in early 2024...
On the credibility of Russia's claims, they also demand many other things do they not? Some of which include the end to sanctions, rolling back NATO's deployments, the right to veto legislation in Ukraine and more, all of which are still in effect as of their last announcements unless something has really changed behind the scenes (Dmitri suggests not: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/67fb81259a794798c0cc6be5 *(edited to avoid screwing up the link))? That seems highly non credible, and well well beyond what you say, which would themselves require Russia to achieve a breakthrough it has not managed since Spring 2022. For example, taking two oblast capitals, one of which was never theirs and the other behind a now fortified huge river, that they themselves flooded. That is what I mean by non credible.
The_Golem101
3mo ago
There's all kinds floating around - Wikipedia has at least a partial list of official ish ones https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War#Total_casualties which put Ukraine at 80k military KIA as of Feb 2024 and Russia at 160k ish, for low bounds, but the propaganda numbers for each side go up 800k Russian KIA according to the Ukrainians and just under 1,000,000 KIA and wounded for Ukraine as per the Russians.
I think around a 2:1 Russian to Ukrainian deaths seems plausible, though others have disagreed. I don't particularly rate the method linked in the OP, purely because if Ukraine actually had taken that many KIA it would be already collapsing and the evidence would be everywhere. Similarly for Russia - 800k KIA is too high. So, we're reduced to estimates of obituaries, excess deaths etc which are more solid but likely an underestimate, or arguing about likely ratios from casualty clearing, fires ratios, fires accuracy, anecdotes, the fact Russia is on the offensive, equipment deficits and so on - which could give us a plausible estimate if you trust the logic and person doing it, but is super open to accusations of being propaganda or being rigged by both camps.
Not sure if that helps?
I listened to the interview, and it seems like he was misquoted: https://www.1lurer.am/en/2025/04/14/Zelensky-denied-reports-that-he-spoke-about-100-000-dead-Ukrainian-soldiers/1296200
Zelensky has been fairly clear that Ukrainian combat KIA was 46k ish early this year and rising at a steady rate, and if we believe that or not the official Ukrainian government estimate has not changed on that score.
Other estimates put Ukraine's KIA higher, certainly, but I haven't seen a method that compares Russia vs Ukraine like for like without the ratio being in Ukraine's favor. Sure, Russia has a larger population, but I think it's really hard to find credible estimates that can plausibly estimate that A) Ukraine is taking far heavier losses than Russia, while accepting B) Russia has been on the offensive for most of the war (which is always casualty heavy) while barely advancing since 2022.
There's also C) noting the sheer volume of Russian equipment loss footage, the steadily shifting ratio of fires along the line in Ukraine's favor (Rheinmetall clearly took the attempted assassination of the CEO personally), the fact Russian casualty clearing must be abysmal from their own telegrams and the fact that wounded soldiers in their own lines (where evacuation should be routine in most armies) regularly commit suicide, and the fact that they're launching attacks with civilian vehicles (which I've never seen footage of Ukraine doing?). However, the points of C can be denied as Ukrainian propaganda by some I would assume (though I find the above credible points), so we can set them aside if you want.
Potentially Ukraine will still lose a war of attrition, but if it continues to get support it doesn't seem to be soon. Certainly I would be less confident than Russians with Attitude, the Russian economy is showing a lot of strain while Ukraine is being underwritten, and for both sides things can break slowly then fast. We will see.
However, that's all just fog of war, and maybe boring to argue, we can't really know until the dust settles, and I've had discussions on this forum before where we've ended up assuming 1:2 or 1:6 ratios in totally opposite directions without any resolution. I would just drop the following two points for thought:
Has Russia ever come up with peace terms that are close to credible? I haven't seen any, and in the absence of that the war will continue until someone breaks for sure. That seems to suggest confidence from Russia, or desperation, but it seems hard to argue that Ukraine shouldn't fight them to a stalemate if it feels that is possible, which they seem to genuinely do. Maybe they are wrong, but they certainly outperformed marvelously vs predictions in 2022.
Second, Zelensky's political position is a different to the warmonger I've seen put here a few times, at least by my understanding. He was the compromise with Russia candidate, and has that hanging around as a reputation within Ukraine ever since. He's tried to break it by leaning hard into the wartime president role and being tough, but his plausible opponents are all more hardliners (Zaluzhny for one) - it's not the case that Zelensky is forcing the Ukrainians to keep an unpopular war going, he's the one not daring to show weakness in front of them and has no mandate to end the war under the present conditions.
It seems like it is going to last for a while longer, and Ukrainians I know (one who is fighting) have adopted Kipling's The Beginnings, against those whom many of them called brother just recently. I cannot blame them, there's plenty of ruin left in this war, and I would not bet on Russia just yet.
One again, hard pounding this, gentleman, we shall see who pounds the longest.
*Edit: I also wanted to include this as my candidate for Russians with attitude's best tweet https://imgur.com/fK2KhQB . Before bragging about your victory, it is often useful to actually win it
The_Golem101
4mo ago
I worry we're getting lost in defining terms here, possibly my mistake.
Making incorrect statements and sticking by them certainly seems to be one type of brainrot (as per OP), but I think it's fair to broaden it out, and to be clear my definition of brainrot isn't "maximizing for heat", though that's part of it, it's also more generally that many people senior in the US government seem to be basically shitposting on twitter. That seems really odd to me, and I include Vance and Rubio in that shitposting category.
I honestly wanted to discuss with people why that might be the case, and if others agree with the shitposting accusation, but if you don't want to discuss that, that's fair too.
The_Golem101
4mo ago
I mean I'm not impressed with Musk, Rubio or Vance on Twitter, and all of them seem a bit deranged on it - they're suffering from brainrot from the medium it seems to me. Though I did include some other points which are more not liking their priorities and policies, some of that also seems to be them playing to the social media crowd - maybe I'm wrong there however.
The_Golem101
4mo ago
Is Vance not pretty heavily rotted from online discourse too? He seems to have gone a deep end in some ways at least.
I saw his interview on Joe Rogan and thought he was someone who could actually be good: a moderating influence on Trump, an adult who can get some things done while being stabilizing in general versus Trump's more insane flips. I really liked his book too, and thought he might have some of the right instincts. I haven't been impressed so far, and his behavior in the Zelensky meeting and in general on social media have been the opposite at least in my perception, it seems to maximize for heat vs light in the real world.
Twitter shitposting seems to be highly contagious in general, with Rubio recently wading in to shout at Poland, which wasn't my idea of diplomacy. Seems like a clown show in general, rather than showing strength as I assume they intend.
I'm really interested in the opinions of others though... what do you all think?
The_Golem101
5mo ago
Certainly Russia claims Ukraine violated the agreements, and they shouted about it loudly and at every opportunity, but didn't they attack Donetsk airport with heavy regular forces (including TOS-1 thermobarics), which was why Minsk 1 collapsed, and launched cross border artillery strikes plus regular army commitments throughout both agreements (while naturally denying everything even as the craters smoked)?
It seems harsh to describe Ukraine resuming fighting following these breaches and putting the agreed reforms on hold as critical violations, but not mentioning the Russian actions prior that the Ukrainians used as justification (right or wrong). That would be serious memory holing too right?
I certainly agree removing Russian as an official language was a huge own goal. Plus, the reliance on Azov plus other militias due to the weakness of Ukraine's regulars in 2014/15 was very poor optics.
In any case, the real devastation of the population across the Donbass seems to have happened post 2022, with mass conscription into poorly equipped units (the mosin brigades) and people fleeing en masse from the advancing Russians. The region seems pretty much wrecked now, in the arms of Russia but not seen as proper Russians - at least as per Strelkov (though he certainly liked to doompost - hence his arrest).
The_Golem101
5mo ago
It's a fair point that famines are far more complex than straight up shooting your political opponents - but I think you're making a historical error to include things like the Bengal famine and even the Irish potato famine in with the holodomor uncritically - especially using the same term for both Ukraine and Ireland.
The Irish potato famine has lots of history - but basically it was the confluence of the potato blight interacting with a growing industrialization (meaning people no longer had craft activities to fall back on) and pressure from population with limited land rights (their small plots could only grow potatoes on the marginal zones at yields to support their families). The economic and support system at the time was "laissez faire" - although there were some direct transfers from British during the first blights, this dried up later in 1847/48 ish as a liberal government came in during a time of recession (I think, it has been a while since I read about it all here: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781315708522/famines-european-economic-history-declan-curran-lubomyr-luciuk-andrew-newby). Interestingly the areas that kept exporting typically did better: support was paid out of the wealth of local landowners and those who were exporting higher value cash foodstuffs (cattle for example) could afford to cover the cost of importation of famine relief foodstuffs - the exports weren't typically the key issue. The real key issue was the laissez faire attitude of the British in general to social support at the time leading to little support from Westminster, the changing economic model giving people no diversified income and the fact that both the central government and local landowners had little connection to those they ruled. They didn't need their votes (they didn't have any), there was a local surplus of labor and they didn't feel a brotherhood. It was horrible, but not a holodomor - it was pretty medieval attitudes to smallholders and those you rule over hitting industrial realities.
Churchill and the Bengal famine we don't have enough time to cover in detail, but it does seem like he's unfairly smeared - unlike the governor at the time (Victor Hope) who deserves serious sanction for taking the word of others that everything was fine and not being at all proactive. Contrary to routing supplies away, Churchill did the reverse, constantly raising it with Roosevelt, unfortunately the pressure from the Japanese and the ongoing demands of Operation Torch (the US landings in North Africa, which needed huge logistics) meant that he didn't get much help and British shipping was tied up or depleted. However, again it was a case of failing to divert enough aid to the region and act fast enough, rather than requisitioning food out of hungry mouths. The central source (I think only?) for Churchill being a shit in the crisis comes from the private notes of Wavell - who took over and was really annoyed at the lack of action. We only have his account, which might be accurate but it doesn't seem to match up with what we have documented about Churchill's actions and that Wavell didn't know about, for example how much effort was going on behind the scenes to bring grain in - although too little too late.
The Ukrainian Holodomor however is much worse than those two examples above, and represented something between a complete indifference to millions of deaths in order to secure export earnings and a deliberate attempt to use famine to break the resistance of Ukraine and other zones to the Soviet Union. Soviet agriculture was a mess, they wanted to industrialize and needed money for that but the prices they were paying to farmers didn't encourage them to sell, which led to things like the "Scissors" crisis of the early 1920s where they just stopped selling to cities given the prices the Soviets offered and they couldn't be compelled via force, they could hide the food or plant less. On top of that, Ukraine and outlying regions were more anti Soviet, especially in rural areas where industrialization was non existent. Once the Soviet state was powerful enough to force the issue, Stalin collectivized the farmers (pushed them all onto standard plots where output was more legible). This reduced sharply reduced yields for several reasons, but meant that everything was controlled and could be seized, from now on the famines fell on the countryside rather than the cities, and famines became much more common. Then, the real killer was the forced export targets to earn foreign currency, which were impossible to meet in bad years of which there are many.
We can argue if the holodomor was genocide (many of Stalins actions were - like to the Crimean Tartars), but it's using famine as a tool to break political opposition and knowingly creating one to achieve a target of industrialization, unlike those above where it was a failure or indifference of a colonial authority to provide enough aid to a region rather than using famine as a club. Both the Bengal and Irish potato famines were a serious black mark on the British empire, the Irish one was a large rallying cry for independence (Bengal less so, Indian elites at the time looked at their share of the blame and didn't think it tactical to focus on at the time) - but they weren't premeditated like the Holodomor and efforts were taken to offset them, just badly.
However, the colonial cases point to the fact that people who lack representation and who the elites just don't need are in a really shit position famine wise (one of Sen's positions), and conditions like theirs combined with a technological shift can create terrible results. Hopefully never relevant for AI. Hopefully.
The_Golem101
6mo ago
But your Ukrainian deaths are the Russian ministry figure? No one else is close to that - surely ending up at Russia's figure is just trusting them with extra steps as a result given there's no other source?
Mediazona's (that you trust?) confirmed dead estimates are something like 60k for Ukraine and 120-160k for Russia as of Jan 1st 2025, why do you believe their Russian dead but then think they've lowballed the Ukrainians by nearly an order of magnitude? Sure you can claim they're an underestimate and you've added your own research, but aren't all these other organizations doing actual research too? Could that flip a 2:1 ratio in favor of Ukraine to a 1:5 in favor of Russia? Wouldn't you have to bump Russian dead estimates up too anyway on the same logic?
The_Golem101
6mo ago
Thank you for your answer, like you say, we shall see in time once the fog of war lifts. It's certainly interesting how different two different views can be, even with the same events being played out in front of them.
I know this is close to the end of the thread's life, but could I ask why you find the Russian statements and figures to be trustworthy (for example, that they're achieving a 6 to 1 death ratio), while the others are clowns? Why not distrust them as well, if you have serious concerns over the accuracy in information in the war in other cases? What is it about the Russian information that makes it more trustworthy than other sources?
The_Golem101
6mo ago
Yes, there's not the same database of these videos vs say tank kills, but there's at least 70-100 videos of Russians either killing themselves or asking their buddies to kill them (as of a count done in late 2024 ish - I'm going from other forum discussions here) - and that's just where a Ukrainian spotter drone happened to be watching. I'm not sure if I can link them on this forum for obvious reasons - each one has a person dying, often via holding a grenade to their face or chest, but you can find them.
Allegedly some North Koreans killed themselves rather than be captured, but most of these videos are where someone has taken a shrapnel wound and decides to kill themselves. The crazy thing is how fast they make that choice, this isn't people who expect any degree of medical care or support in being evacuated. It really seems like that at least for some Russian units on some sectors if you're badly wounded you're a dead man, and they know it, meaning that their casualty ratios must be WW1 tier for killed vs wounded, or worse.
Obviously we can't know the exact figures, but there hasn't been anything comparable released for the Ukrainian side reported or shown. Russian drone operations are more rudimentary than Ukraine's, so maybe they're just not getting the footage or sharing it, but there does seem to be a serious difference between the two sides in this regard, partly due to NATO support both in and out of country for the wounded. It's certainly telling that when Russian TV showed what they alleged was a Ukrainian killing their buddy they had to use footage of a Russian shooting their friend with the watermarks taken off (https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-killing-soldier-drone-video/33041837.html), they didn't seem to have better footage to show.
His point as I understand was, 1) Ukrainians are bitter, because 2) they only fought because (stressed in all caps above) the USA assured them they would get US support and therefore defeat Russia and 3) this has proved a disaster and Ukrainians regret trusting the US and the war deaths could have been largely avoided had they known the all the above - furthermore these war deaths are half a million as Russia claims.
My point is no Ukrainian I know would express those 3, and they're extremely Russian coded. If No_one wishes to correct this misunderstanding I am all ears. Heaven knows it's hard to be clear on this forum, and I'm feeling a bit confused myself.
I worry there's a motte and bailey here - the motte being "Ukrainians would like more support from the USA, and feel that they're hot and cold which isn't helpful to the war effort" and the bailey being "Ukrainians fought the war because the USA promised them the moon and couldn't deliver, and are very bitter, and the deaths could have been avoided without the US meddling".
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