The_Golem101
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User ID: 548
The_Golem101
20d ago
Hey an actual pro Russian, we're low on those since @No_one left, and @ABigGuy4U is more ironic as far as I can tell and mostly thinks that smaller countries shouldn't mess with their local superpower. If Russia is revealed to be a poorly performing regional power rather than super, he might not be on your team anymore, but that's up to him of course.
Do you have a source for that table? It doesn't seem to match much else, but it could be accurate. Stranger things have happened, I just can't remember when.
Certainly the equipment losses gap has closed, but that appears to be because Russia is critically low on much of its kit and now sends handfuls of men on foot to infiltrate and try to take ground, anything bigger died or is being held back from Ukraine's kill zone. However, I think the table might just be wrong.
Could I check, why do you think that the rate of Russia's advance has collapsed this year? Do you think Ukraine hitting the refineries and rear logistics lines with new drones are a concern? Do you think the pro Russia military bloggers who are saying the situation has deteriorated to the point that either mobilization must occur or peace be signed by fall are deluded?
The_Golem101
20d ago
Apologies, I meant that I don't think they'll realistically be the final terms Ukraine accepts absent a big change in the battlefield situation (and the lack of that is why we're here) or a loss of European support. Terms like that have a lot of Russian hopium baked in - especially seeing as that's pretty much the list Russia put forwards when they were stalling negotiations by being way too optimistic. I do however think it's realistic that that's a list of things Russia would like and could possibly sell internally if accepted.
Interestingly there has also been a reported leak of the internal messaging Russia was planning on using to sell a climb down from their maximalist war goals to their population and supporters in the west. It seems plausible as a document, and has a few interesting elements.
First - their expected terms of peace:
Format. A framework peace agreement. Likely US–Russia and US–Ukraine.
Territories. All of the DPR and LPR transfer to Russia. Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts split along the line of contact. Russian forces withdraw from Sumy and Kharkiv.
Demilitarization. Neutral status. A buffer zone.
Denazification. Symbolic, limited.
Sanctions. The US lifts theirs. European sanctions stay in place.
Money. Part of the frozen assets goes to rebuilding war-affected territories — both in Ukraine and in Russia.
We also have some good quotes on how they will message, including:
The peace Putin achieved is a huge victory. Putin made the West bend. We thwarted the West’s plans to expand and prolong the conflict.
Victory over whom? Over international imperialism and globalism. Not Ukrainian nationalism — a far stronger, more skilled, more powerful enemy: the united West.
The whole world has now seen who is right and who is wrong. We showed that we are tougher, taller, better, more humane. The Ukrainian Nazis showed they really are Nazis, sadists, and moral degenerates. The Ukrainian elites had a full coming-out.
Know when to stop. Going too far is defeat. Continuing the SMO would be a Pyrrhic victory.
Promoting the right behavioral track for SMO veterans — public-service ads, blogs, news, artistic formats. On the model: “NN became a respected member of the community / bought a Russian car / rebuilt his house / started his own manufacturing or service company / hotel / got into a prestigious university. His fellow soldier, meanwhile, drank away everything he earned / killed himself / wound up in prison.” Promote the norm, not the extremes; push new heroes and opinion leaders to the front.
Lowering the temperature on radicalism and bellicosity. Limiting the media presence of the “nuclear-option” turbo-radicals. Reorienting or marginalizing the most uncompromising of them.
An amnesty in honor of victory. A tradition and a marker. Russia has practiced this since the end of the Crimean War. Above all for those who spoke out in support of peace. Rehabilitation (decriminalization) of the word “peace” and of the concept itself. A peace-loving disposition is part of our character and our traditions — we have always strived for peace and continue to do so. Emphasis on Russia’s peacemaking acts throughout history — historical excursions.
I'll leave it to the audience here to decide if those peace terms seem realistic (*edit - realistically acceptable to the Ukrainians and likely to end the war if proposed) - they don't for me, however this does seem to suggest that Russia is hurting enough to consider actually negotiating rather than just pretending to in order to keep Trump on side.
Meanwhile, following the very serious drone developments this year where Ukraine is now killing more Russians than are mobilized/replaced and stalling out their attacks, we have pro Russian military channels like notes_veterans saying
The situation on the Ukrainian front today is such that this fall there will either be a mobilization or a move towards signing a peace treaty. There simply can't be a third option.
The situation is still very serious for Ukraine, and the timeline seems to be that the war will last at least into late this year, but Russia seems to be on the horns of a real dilemma here - take peace negotiations seriously, and accept that they are negotiating with Ukraine and not Trump, meaning they will need to make that deal sweet enough that Ukraine actually wants it. Or, option two, mass mobilize and try to break the Ukrainians somehow before that shakes apart the social contract.
Or, do a classic Putin procrastination, and end up in the same dilemma but a weaker position this time in the autumn/fall. I honestly think that might be what happens until something on one side or the other finally snaps.
The_Golem101
2mo ago
I know right... I assume some of that difference might be crews who were recovered by neutral countries/landed on coasts where they were not captured/interred afterwards. But there might be a fair number of crews in that total that never were on a sunk U-boat in the end, for example they were on leave, training, rotations or whatever and didn't get a uboat posting again when they returned after they were all sunk, bombed or too low on resources to run in the late war.
I think that's also true on the Kamikazes, not all died as they didn't all get planes or missions by the end, and some tried and failed to find a target (you got a few chances to return before on like the 5th one or something you were assumed to be a coward and shot? However, some later versions of the planes couldn't even land, so you were committed).
The_Golem101
2mo ago
The total death rate of Uboat crews was something in the order of 70% over the war, and half of the survivors were captured - the highest for any of the German branches at least. Peak operations were 118 or so boats out at one time, but then they lost 43 in a single month - Black May. I think @ChickenOverlord might be slightly misremembering the history here, the peak attrition was brutal and their scaling back of operations was after this point to prevent a collapse of the force and reassess tactics etc.
The_Golem101
4mo ago
Russia certainly isn't the Soviet Union, it's a weird larp of all the things you accuse Europe of there - high divorce, high crime, high immigration, 10-15% actually practicing Orthodox, high Muslim % and growing rapidly thanks to its war, massive drug abuse and HIV/AIDs, and I'm really confused why you seem to like them or find them in any way preferable to the Danes, who actually have done a lot right and are just chill friends happy to let the US take the lead mostly. 80s Reganite Christians also wouldn't presumably be into the whole weird postmodern 4Chan Pol larp thing of based and cucked and cringe that comes out nowadays and would have recognized where satan sits in the balance of Russia vs Ukraine, but that's an aside.
Anyway, you got what you want surely, the US funding to Ukraine is now tiny and the weapons/all the subsidies are paid for by the EU, isn't that directly opposite to your core point of Europe never carrying any weight? That's the key bit here right?
Then you cucked out
Who is this you in the room? I'm British, but Denmark and the rest of NATO went on all your adventures until pretty late, when the US wrapped everything up and let the sand wash back over all we did in Afghanistan (mostly the US) for better or worse (and there certainly is an argument that it was better to cut our loses). How is that anyone cucking out, other than maybe the US?
By the way, what is the attraction of using the term cucked for international diplomacy? I can never understand it myself.
The_Golem101
4mo ago
I assume you mean that around half of the equipment sent to Ukraine has a US origin, but paid for by EU money under Trump? Direct US funding has fallen to basically zero under his administration, so I guess that is a win for those seeking to disengage from paying for the conflict directly - the total funding of which was around 0.2% of GDP annually when it was actually being sent in past years. Regan would have died laughing if that was the bill to cause this much of a headache to the Soviet Union.
However, the US could certainly do all kinds of very painful things to further undermine European security and Ukraine in particular for sure, like forbidding the EU from paying the US for weapons, stopping intelligence sharing or pulling out of NATO full stop. Europe is dealing with a reorientation in our relationship with the US, which is certainly likely to leave us all poorer - with only the reward of staying out of future US led entanglements.
You didn't need to call on Article 5 post 911, but you did and found it useful in so many ways, and were the only NATO country to do so. Lets hope for America's sake it never needs to enact it under this Trump presidency, for this is the stupidest prize to burn all that for - Greenland, really? You already had it in everything but name for as many investments and bases as you wanted, and the Danes were paying the subsidies needed to maintain the island into the bargain. This is insanity and the reckless arrogance of Trump spending on America's checkbook of massive power built by saner, stabler minds over a century. The Republican party deserves much better.
The_Golem101
5mo ago
No no not at all, I absolutely assumed that it must be true that PTSD has been with us everywhere before I read Bret's argument, and maybe someone here has something that in convincing the other way - for what it is worth I am not a historian and I assume that PTSD symptoms must have emerged before WW1 more commonly than reported, but that does seem to be the big break when it became impossible to ignore - followed by later developments like Vietnam that Scott discusses.
In many ways I find its relative absence more interesting in many ways, and it might give us clues as to why people experience it if we can explain the reason it emerged.
The_Golem101
5mo ago
I always love a good conquistador story - in some ways they're the closest thing we have to experiencing actual alien invasions and both Mexico and Peru saw stories that are better than most fiction. I would advise everyone to read the Peru one for sure - literally a few hundred men with a few horses soloed tens of thousands of soldiers with no native support - it's fairly wild.
Back to your point, I think this is where the clinical definitions of PTSD come in that I linked to before. PTSD is not being afraid, or guilty, or experiencing agitation seeing your comrades get sacrificed one by one by people you cannot stop and then going to fight them anyway. I am not a psychiatrist, but as I understand it PTSD goes much much beyond that, it's post for a start, and your Spaniard exhibits fear during a multi day battle in the Mexican capital that he masters and fights on to victory in the campaign. He meets critera A - experiencing trauma, but that's kind of a baseline of being in combat. However, the others are clearly not met, remembering an old fear during a multi day battle as a soldier is extremely far from PTSD and I encourage the reader to run down the list for themselves to see the stark differences. I see no "Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning after the traumatic event(s) occurred" exactly the opposite there, he's discussing it and saying I was afraid, it was correct to be, but we overcame. Also, no "Negative alterations in cognitions and mood associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning or worsening after the traumatic event(s) occurred, as evidenced by two (or more) of the following:" for an extended period afterwards, and the same for all the other markers - this is someone overcoming an understandable fear in the immediate term, not PTSD.
I would also caution you to read Bret's admonition again about defining the strength of evidence you would need prior to your search - you are going to see historical evidence of people following battles, near misses, sieges etc. being on edge and jumpy, especially if the danger/war is still present. That is not PTSD, it is being a sensible human, unless it goes into the clinical territory above. Civilians following a siege would be prime material for PTSD, but as far as I understand we do not see it nearly as much as in modern times (Malta being a classic too where it is absent), and the silence is very very interesting. Certainly SOME must have met the threshold for PTSD, the Siege of Vienna would be a prime candidate to cause it and I would assume that rates climbed well before WW1, but there is still a hole where the evidence would be if it was in any way common.
The_Golem101
5mo ago
Interestingly this seems not to be the case, which I think perhaps raises far more questions than it closes. See my post above here for the full argument - but on Herodotus:
... There is one very frequently cited account in Herodotus (Hdt. 6.117) of a man named Epizelos experiencing what is generally understood as ‘conversion disorder’ (which used to be badly labeled ‘hysterical blindness’) in combat. Without being wounded he went blind at a sudden terror in battle and never recovered his sight. Herodotus terms it a θῶμα – a ‘wonder’ or ‘marvel,’ a word that explicitly implies the strange uncommonness of the tale. Herodotus is concerned enough about how exceptional this sounds that he is quick not to vouch for its veracity – he brackets the story (beginning and end) noting that it was what he was told (by someone else) that Epizelos used to say happened to him. In short, this was uncommon enough that Herodotus distances himself from it, so as not to be thought as a teller of tall-tales (though Herodotus is, in fact, a teller of tall tales).
This one example ... is remarkable not because it is typical, but because it is apparently very unusual (also, it is my understanding – with the necessary caveat that I am not an expert – that while conversion disorder is a consequence of emotional trauma, it is not clear that it is associated with PTSD more generally). Meanwhile, in the war literature of the Romans, in their poetry (including that by folks like Horace, who fought in quite terrible battles), in the military literature of the Greeks, in the reflections of Xenophon (both on his campaigns and his commands), in the body of Greek lyric poetry…all of it – nothing. It is simply not there – not as a concern that such a condition might befall someone, nor a report that it had done so. Nothing. The lacuna baffled me for years.
I don't mean to deny the reality of PTSD, symptoms of which were recorded in the medical literature as far back as ancient Greece, as a mechanistic biological response to extreme injury.
This is often raised as a point (alongside the Herodotus quote that is used to back it up for evidence) but the reality is far more interesting - there doesn't seem to be compelling evidence for the existence of PTSD in anything other than highly rare cases in the ancient and even medieval periods. PTSD is real, but it is not a simple correlation between experiencing death/danger -> PTSD, which raises some really interesting points about the nature of human trauma and experience that might tie into your argument.
I'm paraphrasing the arguments of Bret Devereaux here, who did a far better review of the evidence and lack thereof in this post, which is well worth a read for further detail, but anyway in summary:
First, PTSD is a very serious diagnostic term, which goes beyond experiencing grief or shame about a past event or an anxiety around entering a dangerous situation. PTSD requires:
one intrusion symptom (involuntary and instrusive memories, dreams, flashbacks, marked physiological reactions) and persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and two negative alterations in cognition and mood associated with the trauma and two marked alterations in arousal and reactivity associated with the trauma.
If you go looking for something in history, you'll find stories that could resemble the above here and there, the most famous being Herodotus' one. Quoting Bret:
... One thing you learn very rapidly as a historian is that if you go into a large evidence-base looking for something, you will find it. That’s not a species of research positivity – it’s a warning about confirmation bias, especially if you do not establish a standard of proof before your investigation. It is all too easy to define down your definition of ‘proof’ until the general noise of the source-base looks like proof. In this case, we have to ask – before we go looking – what would evidence of PTSD in ancient societies (I’m going to start there because it is where I am best informed) look like?
... There is one very frequently cited account in Herodotus (Hdt. 6.117) of a man named Epizelos experiencing what is generally understood as ‘conversion disorder’ (which used to be badly labeled ‘hysterical blindness’) in combat. Without being wounded he went blind at a sudden terror in battle and never recovered his sight. Herodotus terms it a θῶμα – a ‘wonder’ or ‘marvel,’ a word that explicitly implies the strange uncommonness of the tale. Herodotus is concerned enough about how exceptional this sounds that he is quick not to vouch for its veracity – he brackets the story (beginning and end) noting that it was what he was told (by someone else) that Epizelos used to say happened to him. In short, this was uncommon enough that Herodotus distances himself from it, so as not to be thought as a teller of tall-tales (though Herodotus is, in fact, a teller of tall tales).
This one example – cited endlessly and breathlessly in internet articles – is remarkable not because it is typical, but because it is apparently very unusual (also, it is my understanding – with the necessary caveat that I am not an expert – that while conversion disorder is a consequence of emotional trauma, it is not clear that it is associated with PTSD more generally). Meanwhile, in the war literature of the Romans, in their poetry (including that by folks like Horace, who fought in quite terrible battles), in the military literature of the Greeks, in the reflections of Xenophon (both on his campaigns and his commands), in the body of Greek lyric poetry…all of it – nothing. It is simply not there – not as a concern that such a condition might befall someone, nor a report that it had done so. Nothing. The lacuna baffled me for years.
Taking a step back, if PTSD was common this seems impossible. A majority of adult free males in many of these societies experienced combat for several century periods in our sample (during the Second Punic war, only a few thousand out of a body of 150,000 eligible men avoided serving). It's unlikely that such societies would put any possible PTSD symptoms in their victory speeches, but we have a huge body of other material where symptoms might appear if they are common (medical texts, private texts, histories where the conquered are discussed, candid advice for Abbots dealing with knights retiring to monasteries etc.) and there is... nothing. Societies might not want these stories front and center, but plenty of things that were embarrassing were still recorded. If PTSD occurred at modern rates it should be everywhere and impossible to brush under the carpet (like in WW1), instead there is simply very little to suggest PTSD was anything more than incredibly rare in a world where violence was very common.
There are a few theories as to why. I think it might be something along the lines of how violence was considered at least for part of the period - a necessary part of masculinity and a good thing and uplifting, rather than a burden that some must carry for society - but that can't be all of it. Possibly the universality of the experience of combat in peers helped (if you fought, it was highly likely you had a lot of peers that did too that you could relate to), and the positive social status of veterans (no Vietnam war protests in Republican Rome, and again combat was viewed as a positive source of virtue not a pollutant of the soul). Interestingly, they also commonly had rituals for entering and exiting military modes to civilian ones, which perhaps allowed some compartmentalization. It might also be the nature of modern combat - artillery, ambush, IED, long periods on the front in danger but not quite sure when, but this is also difficult to be certain on - sieges had a fair amount of the above and were the modal form of warfare for periods. We kind of just do not know why it was so low.
However, I do think it's very interesting in general - I would say that PTSD as a response to trauma is certainly not a sign of moral failing (it's closer to altitude sickness, a bit of a dice roll - I have ancestors who fought in both WW1 and WW2 and loved combat despite repeated wounds), but rates can change and we don't understand so much about it. Pushing people away from it at the margin without returning to a warrior society like Rome seems an achievable goal, but that would require a big change in lots of our thinking - I'm really interested how we might do so though.
The_Golem101
5mo ago
I don't think the core of what you have said is "wrong" and it aligns fine with my text you quoted - it's just a fair chunk of it is obviously true ground level cynicism and missing the higher level logic that actually makes things interesting.
Interstate anarchy is a baseline factor for all relations but it clearly waxes and wanes, pointing to it is not enough - for example the actual cost/benefit calculation of taking territory has moved sharply post industrialization (I actually think this random review of Vicky II is a fairly good overview of some of that in the context of a game's mechanics). My point is that should such wars be seen as more likely to be net positive for one party again we are going to end up with far more stupid expensive wars. WW1 for sure and WW2 in part happened because states (mainly but not just Germany) were assuming that their limited and focused wars could come out as solidly net positive, and led to utter ruin that they did not predict as their assumptions were totally off. That is my ought - it would be good for human flourishing if countries expected wars of aggression to not be net positive at the margin, maybe even for NATO/the US that would be a good lesson too. We ought to avoid making it more positive at the margin.
I also think there's a clear ought with the nuclear dynamics here, which is perhaps easy to miss at the level of "countries will always bully each other, nukes exist, and the tech isn't going away". Schelling was right and a non nuclear world seems impossible without a fundamentally different political reality, but that's the start point of the conversation, not the end. Proliferation fraying and breaking might be inevitable at the margin, but it's still bad for several reasons, and it would be a real failure of the US to prioritize its own selfish long term interests if it accidentally or knowingly creates a nuclear arms race across Asia and the Middle East. The arms control treaties in effect have reduced weapons totals massively, lowering the probability of an accidental launch and limiting the impact of a war should it occur. Conversely, any event that pushes countries to scramble for weapons at short notice creates bad dynamics, and ought to be avoided if possible.
We can chat about the ground level realities, and no "ought" chat in the end can avoid them, but I would be really interested in who you think "ought" to win, who would you prefer, based on what you have written above? Russia, because the liberal order needs to realize that other powers can have preferences and it can't always win?
Total Ukraine Victory or Total Russian Victory?
Your choice, whatever is more interesting.
My interest in writing this post is that we spend so long arguing over which is more likely (which is a very important question) that we don't get into the reasons why one person or the other on this forum hopes for an opposite outcome. Like you say, it ties a lot into your views on the American Empire, but that itself opens up a load of questions and interesting points on what outcomes people actually prefer. For example, Vance, does he want to pivot to China, genuinely dislikes Europe, hates Zelensky, thinks this is hopeless, or something else? I struggle to accurately model and therefore predict his preferences on Ukraine and therefore a lot of other things.
The_Golem101
5mo ago
I still think Ukraine can "win" for given value - as in its resistance has led to a far better outcome for the country than unconditional capitulation in 2022, but these conversations are what we have been having here for years to little effect. We simply have to wait for the dust to settle to be sure, and then perhaps a decade or two. Dean's comment that won a quality contribution is probably the gold standard here.
Personally, the bit where Ukraine routed and broke 90% of the fighting power of the 1st Guards Tank Army in 22 was the evidence for me that these boys could fight and Russia was really fucking up hugely - I love the saying "Hard pounding this gentlemen, let us see who pounds the longest" in relation to this war but that day had other good quotes, such as: "The Guard retreats. Save yourself if you can!”. But now we're back stuck with "is" statements.
The_Golem101
5mo ago
Out of interest does that mean you're indifferent to Russia and Ukraine winning, whichever is more likely, just that it is over?
The_Golem101
5mo ago
I do agree, but my set of "ought" assumptions and values means that is a very good to thing to me, while others seem to both assume that Russia has actually carried out a real geopolitical coup here, and that's a very good thing.
I certainly noticed I was confused, hence this post. Focusing in on the ought is part of that - there's some kind of halo effect where the is and the ought are pretty highly correlated, even where that seems not required, and I was curious about the opposing position.
The_Golem101
5mo ago
Sure, but I would put all your statements there in the "is" aisle, the history is central to all of this but has been the topic of a lot of past threads - what might be interesting is what this implies in your view, alongside everything else, for what "ought" to be the outcome? What would you like to see as the outcome as best for the world?
The_Golem101
5mo ago
It has been a while since we have had a Ukraine thread, and I thought this time it might be worth crossing the aisle from what is happening (our typical topic) to what we would prefer to see as an outcome – our oughts.
As Hume argued we can’t get from a stack of “is” statements to an ought, and that often leaves our ought assumptions being left implicit rather than discussed when we focus on what is happening day to day. I think one of the really interesting things about this conflict is that it reveals a lot of different ground level preferences and assumptions, and while the war itself is largely limited to Russia fighting in Europe’s eastern fringes it has serious worldwide geopolitical implications.
Imagine it is mid 2026 and you wake up to a final victory by one side or the other, say in the top 90% percentile plus of favourability, however you wish to define it.
For example, on one hand perhaps something like Russia breaks through the Ukrainian lines, takes all four oblasts that it claims (or even up to Lviv, if that’s your expectation), sanctions are rolled back and Russia has arguably gained from the war. NATO is shown to be divided, America is unwilling or unable to intervene in such conflicts and Russia has a clear sphere of influence where it has veto that is starting to put pressure on eastern members of NATO, if it wishes. Meanwhile for Ukraine, it might be Russia being forced back to prewar borders, maybe even Crimea is on the path to being returned conditional on lifting sanctions, on the road to the EU and with clear NATO security guarantees, whatever you want to add or take out for either as their ideal goals.
How would you feel in each of these scenarios: which one would you prefer and thinks leads to a better world on balance?
I’m certainly not saying either of these extremes are equally likely – or even likely at all. If you feel like I’m being unfair or trying to trap you just talk about one or the other for sure, but I think the exercise might show something interesting.
For me, I personally sympathize with the Ukrainians and think that their quality of life will be better should they win, but that’s only a small part of the picture for why I think the Ukrainian victory scenario is pretty much all upside, and the Russian one a serious blow to global flourishing. I worry about a world where wars of aggression are seen to be net positive, and if small countries look upon this and see that the past promises of allies aren’t worth nearly as much as they were expecting they may well scramble for nuclear weapons or launch arms races. Taiwan, South Korea and even Japan might be in this category, and South East Asia may well follow. Should China wish to act on Taiwan, it might both be emboldened by the US pulling back support/western sanctions being weak + transitory and see its window before nuclear weapons are in the picture closing, leading to further conflicts that could go very wrong.
However, many people outside of Russia hope for a Russian victory, and not only bots for sure. Some may simply be pro Russia in the sense of wanting Russia to do well as a terminal end in itself, but that is far from the central reason: a lot of the MAGA/Vance position seems to be something like hoping to get America out of forever wars by showing countries that they can’t use the US as backstop of treasure to unpin their security. A world where America won’t back them up or push them to do so leads to less money spent and be positive for America, either preserving its power for the key fights or stopping the need for it to get entangled abroad altogether, Russia clearly winning can be positive for those advocating this vision. Meanwhile, those who dislike the west itself or its efforts to project its liberal views worldwide might see NATO/the US being shown as unable to win proxy wars or being weaker/more divided than the alliance hopes is a good in itself. I also know some commenters here think that Ukraine was basically pushed into conflict and then left to die by the US establishment/deep state. Maybe a clear Russian victory would make others in future not fall for this and avoid all the pain of further invasions, those in the sphere of Russia and China will have to accept their sovereignty has more asterisks than others and this is clearly better as an equilibrium.
I’m really interested in what others have to say on this though, have I got the “pro” Russia position roughly right for example? Or have I missed something else fairly fundamental that someone wants to add to the ought framing?
The_Golem101
6mo ago
That makes an awful lot of sense from my point of view, and I would update my position wherever it differed before to what you've just said - that was a really good summary.
One thing we have discussed less in these threads is the economic pressure Russia is under - selling gold reserves, burning through its foreign currency, losses to its refining capacity and tightening sanctions all seem to be having a rising impact, though it's really hard to judge exactly how much. Putin seems willing to pay a very high cost to make this invasion seem a victory to the domestic population and pro Russians worldwide, possibly as the consequences of embarrassment are possibly deadly, but like you say the really important thing is if the costs are high enough to swing his calculus for another round.
I also find it really interesting how Russia's tank storage is basically empty, Uralvagonzavod is cutting employees by 10% despite the presumably desperate need for equipment, and there have been several strikes on Russia's airforce this year and even this week, hitting vital airframes that they no longer even produce (some of the industry was in Ukraine for a start).
Ukraine is definitely proving a tougher nut to crack than anyone thought, and it's already one of the strangest and most embarrassing wars for what claims to be a major power that I've ever known. 0.2% of NATO GDP spent annually in a proxy war to wreck pretty much the entire stockpile of Soviet equipment would be paid in a heartbeat by the Reagan era Republicans I assume, from my point of view the Ukrainians can keep the change if they want to keep fighting.
The_Golem101
6mo ago
Ukraine's workforce is clearly under pressure, but adding 5% of women to a mine/industry (from what I read in your article there) is entry level mobilization shit surely? In the UK in WW1 or WW2 we would call that a Tuesday, and the UK wasn't under a manpower collapse in either war.
Again, Ukraine is clearly under pressure, but if 1 million were out of action from deaths/wounds it would look like the Ukrainian military not existing and Russia strolling forwards, which is not the case (Pokrovsk has been contested for over a year now, and within walking distance of the pre war lines).
The_Golem101
6mo ago
Thanks a million, that makes a lot of sense.
Speaking of Texas in your tagline and the Ukraine conflict, did you hear that Mary from Texas Oblast may not actually be from Texas? If twitter always showed locations I bet the bot/shill account founders would have used VPNs and they would all be US/European, not showing locations and then suddenly changing it created the perfect storm of hilarity.
The_Golem101
6mo ago
I actually do think that a million Russian dead is clearly too high for the same reason that half a million dead Ukrainians is too high: we would see the evidence everywhere in both economies if that were true. For example, this interview with Russia's former deputy energy minister was a year ago but seems credible where he pushes back on Russia taking a million people out of the economy not being likely at that point https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/war-deficits-and-the-russian-economy . No disagreement there, where we differ as I understand is that I would guess Ukraine is taking 1 casualty for every 2 Russians (which could be an issue, given the 1:3 pop ratio), and you assume it's actually something like 10:1 in favor of Russia? For example, I think this is fairly credible https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/desertions-and-loss-ratios-trends, which was in spring this year, and estimated that Ukraine was trading at 1:1.8, which in itself is not enough to be a central theory of victory for the same reason, they need Russia to run out of money or will or something else before men at that rate if Russia can keep recruiting. Not sure what @Dean 's opinion is, I do not want to put words into their mouth.
I actually do bet on Polymarket, and have been making good money versus those bullish on Russia by putting bets on "no" across a spread of markets where Russia takes city X by date Y. When I win I roll the original sum over and take the winnings, some I lose when the point eventually falls but I'm $5k up on $5k in just over a year thanks to Russia under performing their expectations. https://polymarket.com/event/will-russia-capture-all-of-pokrovsk-by-september-30?tid=1764080674035 Pokrovsk has been particularly good so far, so close but so far for so long. There isn't a market for casualties exactly because it's kind of impossible to resolve (our problem here), plus possibly Polymarket thinks its too spicy, but I would be very interested if there was one. I might bet.
Thanks though for your thoughts on the war, it is very interesting to hear, we disagree but I would guess fundamentally we're all just observers trying to understand. I find this conflict interesting from a cultural perspective: there are two narrative bubbles that are often a bit surprising, and we will have to see where the chips land in the end. I would personally would be surprised if Russia takes Kharkiv or anything past the Dnieper full stop even if the war runs through 2026, and would bet on Polymarket to that effect, but lets see.
Side note, how do I embed links? I look like my father using emails here.
The_Golem101
6mo ago
I feel we end up talking in circles discussing casualty estimates that are wide apart, but I'm always interested in the pro Russia (Ukraine skeptic? How would you define it?) side.
Based on the above, would you suggest Putin should sign up to Trump's deal?
Sounds like everything is going all to plan for him based on your assessment, NATO support totally failed to help Ukraine and so annoying the US doesn't move the needle on the conflict, and the Ukrainian army is basically gone based on the estimate above if true: why accept a deal today (even if you're going to break it soon) if you'll win tomorrow?
Of course, Putin could be not really serious about the negotiations and is just running the clock/trying to drive a wedge between the US and Ukraine (which is my opinion too). But based on the pro Russia narrative, the USA doesn't have the power at this point to do much to Russia? US stocks of relevant systems are depleted or earmarked for a fight against China, sanctions aren't working, and past shipments of kit did little. Is that about right?
What would you suggest to Putin? Hold out till you can roll all of Ukraine and dictate terms? What should they be? One poster a few weeks ago suggested annexing everything Ukrainian east of Poland as a demonstration of Russian power, do you think that's the most credible outcome based on the fact that Ukraine is on the ropes in your assessment?
The_Golem101
7mo ago
Russia is not fighting the EU, Russia is fighting Ukraine, a country with a tenth of its GDP and a third of its population pre war: your logic is precisely backwards. Why can Russia not defeat Ukraine after nearly four whole years of fighting, what does that say about its military, economy and politics?
This is a way too good joke to be buried this far down the comment chain late in the week, but here goes. Two Russians were sat on a bench in Moscow chatting gravely:
"They say we are fighting the EU and NATO now, but they say Russia is still winning even after nearly four years!
Wow, has the fighting been hard?
Well, we have taken over a million casualties, hundreds of thousands are dead, and we have lost: Tanks (4217, of which destroyed: 3131, damaged: 159, abandoned: 390, captured: 537), Armoured Fighting Vehicles (2321, of which destroyed: 1884, damaged: 38, abandoned: 124, captured: 275), Infantry Mobility Vehicles (411, of which destroyed: 329, damaged: 18, abandoned: 12, captured: 52), Towed Artillery (537, of which destroyed: 333, damaged: 101, abandoned: 5, captured: 98), Self-Propelled Artillery (988, of which destroyed: 820, damaged: 53, abandoned: 7, captured: 108), Rocket and Missile Artillery (535, of which destroyed: 435, damaged: 44, abandoned: 2, captured: 54), Surface-To-Air Missile Systems (352, of which destroyed: 264, damaged: 60, abandoned: 4, captured: 24), Radars (111, of which destroyed: 69, damaged: 32, captured: 10), Aircraft (168, of which destroyed: 146, damaged: 22), Helicopters (166, of which destroyed: 132, damaged: 32, captured: 2), Naval Ships and Submarines (28, of which destroyed: 21, damaged: 7), and Trucks, Vehicles, Jeeps, and Trains (4302, of which destroyed: 3560, damaged: 107, abandoned: 54, captured: 581).
Wow, that's a lot: a big chunk of our reserves held since Soviet times, and a lot of those strategic airframes we do not even make anymore, that is going to take a lot of replacing! How about the EU and NATO? What have they lost?
They haven't turned up yet. However, the USA (the biggest contributor) has been spending about 0.2% of GDP annually. It's about the same for the EU too.
Ha, fucking rekt am I right?"
Well, I guess we'll have to wait and see for the next quarterly update then, or another couple, to resolve much of our differences.
Has anything recently made you update in favor of Ukraine? You were making very strong predictions that they were on the ropes, and they should be collapsing around now right? Pokrovsk fell, they lost their key logistics hub by your analysis, but Russia is literally stuck there. Anything at all updating you away from your maximalist Russia will take Lviv pitch? Russia seems to be seeking terms well below that, and are messaging internally to that effect, maybe they know something you do not?
And, I can reply to all you posted above if you care, but on a specific point you must know it's pure distilled cope that Russia's doctrine now of tiny foot infiltration is anything other than desperation and a lack of any other choice? Like, you posted:
That's not even close to Soviet nuclear doctrine, which was deeply mechanized (the BMP was designed for their conception of a nuclear battlefield, famously) and focused on rapid maneuver of units at least at battalion strength, though moving at greater dispersion prior to contact and concentrating again before the attack. I know that, others reading know that, and you must know that. Why bother posting it?
On a lighter note, any predictions for the next Dune movie, after the trailer dropped? I really liked part 1 as a Dune fan, agreed with you that part 2 massacred the character of Chani, and now they have to be back in love? Would have worked better having her be a true believer for sure. Plus, Messiah is a brutal book to adapt, seeing it's mostly politics, monologues and inner thoughts. I do love me some Dennis though, maybe he can cook up something still.
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