The_Golem101
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User ID: 548
Total Ukraine Victory or Total Russian Victory?
Your choice, whatever is more interesting.
My interest in writing this post is that we spend so long arguing over which is more likely (which is a very important question) that we don't get into the reasons why one person or the other on this forum hopes for an opposite outcome. Like you say, it ties a lot into your views on the American Empire, but that itself opens up a load of questions and interesting points on what outcomes people actually prefer. For example, Vance, does he want to pivot to China, genuinely dislikes Europe, hates Zelensky, thinks this is hopeless, or something else? I struggle to accurately model and therefore predict his preferences on Ukraine and therefore a lot of other things.
I still think Ukraine can "win" for given value - as in its resistance has led to a far better outcome for the country than unconditional capitulation in 2022, but these conversations are what we have been having here for years to little effect. We simply have to wait for the dust to settle to be sure, and then perhaps a decade or two. Dean's comment that won a quality contribution is probably the gold standard here.
Personally, the bit where Ukraine routed and broke 90% of the fighting power of the 1st Guards Tank Army in 22 was the evidence for me that these boys could fight and Russia was really fucking up hugely - I love the saying "Hard pounding this gentlemen, let us see who pounds the longest" in relation to this war but that day had other good quotes, such as: "The Guard retreats. Save yourself if you can!”. But now we're back stuck with "is" statements.
Out of interest does that mean you're indifferent to Russia and Ukraine winning, whichever is more likely, just that it is over?
I do agree, but my set of "ought" assumptions and values means that is a very good to thing to me, while others seem to both assume that Russia has actually carried out a real geopolitical coup here, and that's a very good thing.
I certainly noticed I was confused, hence this post. Focusing in on the ought is part of that - there's some kind of halo effect where the is and the ought are pretty highly correlated, even where that seems not required, and I was curious about the opposing position.
Sure, but I would put all your statements there in the "is" aisle, the history is central to all of this but has been the topic of a lot of past threads - what might be interesting is what this implies in your view, alongside everything else, for what "ought" to be the outcome? What would you like to see as the outcome as best for the world?
It has been a while since we have had a Ukraine thread, and I thought this time it might be worth crossing the aisle from what is happening (our typical topic) to what we would prefer to see as an outcome – our oughts.
As Hume argued we can’t get from a stack of “is” statements to an ought, and that often leaves our ought assumptions being left implicit rather than discussed when we focus on what is happening day to day. I think one of the really interesting things about this conflict is that it reveals a lot of different ground level preferences and assumptions, and while the war itself is largely limited to Russia fighting in Europe’s eastern fringes it has serious worldwide geopolitical implications.
Imagine it is mid 2026 and you wake up to a final victory by one side or the other, say in the top 90% percentile plus of favourability, however you wish to define it.
For example, on one hand perhaps something like Russia breaks through the Ukrainian lines, takes all four oblasts that it claims (or even up to Lviv, if that’s your expectation), sanctions are rolled back and Russia has arguably gained from the war. NATO is shown to be divided, America is unwilling or unable to intervene in such conflicts and Russia has a clear sphere of influence where it has veto that is starting to put pressure on eastern members of NATO, if it wishes. Meanwhile for Ukraine, it might be Russia being forced back to prewar borders, maybe even Crimea is on the path to being returned conditional on lifting sanctions, on the road to the EU and with clear NATO security guarantees, whatever you want to add or take out for either as their ideal goals.
How would you feel in each of these scenarios: which one would you prefer and thinks leads to a better world on balance?
I’m certainly not saying either of these extremes are equally likely – or even likely at all. If you feel like I’m being unfair or trying to trap you just talk about one or the other for sure, but I think the exercise might show something interesting.
For me, I personally sympathize with the Ukrainians and think that their quality of life will be better should they win, but that’s only a small part of the picture for why I think the Ukrainian victory scenario is pretty much all upside, and the Russian one a serious blow to global flourishing. I worry about a world where wars of aggression are seen to be net positive, and if small countries look upon this and see that the past promises of allies aren’t worth nearly as much as they were expecting they may well scramble for nuclear weapons or launch arms races. Taiwan, South Korea and even Japan might be in this category, and South East Asia may well follow. Should China wish to act on Taiwan, it might both be emboldened by the US pulling back support/western sanctions being weak + transitory and see its window before nuclear weapons are in the picture closing, leading to further conflicts that could go very wrong.
However, many people outside of Russia hope for a Russian victory, and not only bots for sure. Some may simply be pro Russia in the sense of wanting Russia to do well as a terminal end in itself, but that is far from the central reason: a lot of the MAGA/Vance position seems to be something like hoping to get America out of forever wars by showing countries that they can’t use the US as backstop of treasure to unpin their security. A world where America won’t back them up or push them to do so leads to less money spent and be positive for America, either preserving its power for the key fights or stopping the need for it to get entangled abroad altogether, Russia clearly winning can be positive for those advocating this vision. Meanwhile, those who dislike the west itself or its efforts to project its liberal views worldwide might see NATO/the US being shown as unable to win proxy wars or being weaker/more divided than the alliance hopes is a good in itself. I also know some commenters here think that Ukraine was basically pushed into conflict and then left to die by the US establishment/deep state. Maybe a clear Russian victory would make others in future not fall for this and avoid all the pain of further invasions, those in the sphere of Russia and China will have to accept their sovereignty has more asterisks than others and this is clearly better as an equilibrium.
I’m really interested in what others have to say on this though, have I got the “pro” Russia position roughly right for example? Or have I missed something else fairly fundamental that someone wants to add to the ought framing?
That makes an awful lot of sense from my point of view, and I would update my position wherever it differed before to what you've just said - that was a really good summary.
One thing we have discussed less in these threads is the economic pressure Russia is under - selling gold reserves, burning through its foreign currency, losses to its refining capacity and tightening sanctions all seem to be having a rising impact, though it's really hard to judge exactly how much. Putin seems willing to pay a very high cost to make this invasion seem a victory to the domestic population and pro Russians worldwide, possibly as the consequences of embarrassment are possibly deadly, but like you say the really important thing is if the costs are high enough to swing his calculus for another round.
I also find it really interesting how Russia's tank storage is basically empty, Uralvagonzavod is cutting employees by 10% despite the presumably desperate need for equipment, and there have been several strikes on Russia's airforce this year and even this week, hitting vital airframes that they no longer even produce (some of the industry was in Ukraine for a start).
Ukraine is definitely proving a tougher nut to crack than anyone thought, and it's already one of the strangest and most embarrassing wars for what claims to be a major power that I've ever known. 0.2% of NATO GDP spent annually in a proxy war to wreck pretty much the entire stockpile of Soviet equipment would be paid in a heartbeat by the Reagan era Republicans I assume, from my point of view the Ukrainians can keep the change if they want to keep fighting.
Ukraine's workforce is clearly under pressure, but adding 5% of women to a mine/industry (from what I read in your article there) is entry level mobilization shit surely? In the UK in WW1 or WW2 we would call that a Tuesday, and the UK wasn't under a manpower collapse in either war.
Again, Ukraine is clearly under pressure, but if 1 million were out of action from deaths/wounds it would look like the Ukrainian military not existing and Russia strolling forwards, which is not the case (Pokrovsk has been contested for over a year now, and within walking distance of the pre war lines).
Thanks a million, that makes a lot of sense.
Speaking of Texas in your tagline and the Ukraine conflict, did you hear that Mary from Texas Oblast may not actually be from Texas? If twitter always showed locations I bet the bot/shill account founders would have used VPNs and they would all be US/European, not showing locations and then suddenly changing it created the perfect storm of hilarity.
I actually do think that a million Russian dead is clearly too high for the same reason that half a million dead Ukrainians is too high: we would see the evidence everywhere in both economies if that were true. For example, this interview with Russia's former deputy energy minister was a year ago but seems credible where he pushes back on Russia taking a million people out of the economy not being likely at that point https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/war-deficits-and-the-russian-economy . No disagreement there, where we differ as I understand is that I would guess Ukraine is taking 1 casualty for every 2 Russians (which could be an issue, given the 1:3 pop ratio), and you assume it's actually something like 10:1 in favor of Russia? For example, I think this is fairly credible https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/desertions-and-loss-ratios-trends, which was in spring this year, and estimated that Ukraine was trading at 1:1.8, which in itself is not enough to be a central theory of victory for the same reason, they need Russia to run out of money or will or something else before men at that rate if Russia can keep recruiting. Not sure what @Dean 's opinion is, I do not want to put words into their mouth.
I actually do bet on Polymarket, and have been making good money versus those bullish on Russia by putting bets on "no" across a spread of markets where Russia takes city X by date Y. When I win I roll the original sum over and take the winnings, some I lose when the point eventually falls but I'm $5k up on $5k in just over a year thanks to Russia under performing their expectations. https://polymarket.com/event/will-russia-capture-all-of-pokrovsk-by-september-30?tid=1764080674035 Pokrovsk has been particularly good so far, so close but so far for so long. There isn't a market for casualties exactly because it's kind of impossible to resolve (our problem here), plus possibly Polymarket thinks its too spicy, but I would be very interested if there was one. I might bet.
Thanks though for your thoughts on the war, it is very interesting to hear, we disagree but I would guess fundamentally we're all just observers trying to understand. I find this conflict interesting from a cultural perspective: there are two narrative bubbles that are often a bit surprising, and we will have to see where the chips land in the end. I would personally would be surprised if Russia takes Kharkiv or anything past the Dnieper full stop even if the war runs through 2026, and would bet on Polymarket to that effect, but lets see.
Side note, how do I embed links? I look like my father using emails here.
I feel we end up talking in circles discussing casualty estimates that are wide apart, but I'm always interested in the pro Russia (Ukraine skeptic? How would you define it?) side.
Based on the above, would you suggest Putin should sign up to Trump's deal?
Sounds like everything is going all to plan for him based on your assessment, NATO support totally failed to help Ukraine and so annoying the US doesn't move the needle on the conflict, and the Ukrainian army is basically gone based on the estimate above if true: why accept a deal today (even if you're going to break it soon) if you'll win tomorrow?
Of course, Putin could be not really serious about the negotiations and is just running the clock/trying to drive a wedge between the US and Ukraine (which is my opinion too). But based on the pro Russia narrative, the USA doesn't have the power at this point to do much to Russia? US stocks of relevant systems are depleted or earmarked for a fight against China, sanctions aren't working, and past shipments of kit did little. Is that about right?
What would you suggest to Putin? Hold out till you can roll all of Ukraine and dictate terms? What should they be? One poster a few weeks ago suggested annexing everything Ukrainian east of Poland as a demonstration of Russian power, do you think that's the most credible outcome based on the fact that Ukraine is on the ropes in your assessment?
Russia is not fighting the EU, Russia is fighting Ukraine, a country with a tenth of its GDP and a third of its population pre war: your logic is precisely backwards. Why can Russia not defeat Ukraine after nearly four whole years of fighting, what does that say about its military, economy and politics?
This is a way too good joke to be buried this far down the comment chain late in the week, but here goes. Two Russians were sat on a bench in Moscow chatting gravely:
"They say we are fighting the EU and NATO now, but they say Russia is still winning even after nearly four years!
Wow, has the fighting been hard?
Well, we have taken over a million casualties, hundreds of thousands are dead, and we have lost: Tanks (4217, of which destroyed: 3131, damaged: 159, abandoned: 390, captured: 537), Armoured Fighting Vehicles (2321, of which destroyed: 1884, damaged: 38, abandoned: 124, captured: 275), Infantry Mobility Vehicles (411, of which destroyed: 329, damaged: 18, abandoned: 12, captured: 52), Towed Artillery (537, of which destroyed: 333, damaged: 101, abandoned: 5, captured: 98), Self-Propelled Artillery (988, of which destroyed: 820, damaged: 53, abandoned: 7, captured: 108), Rocket and Missile Artillery (535, of which destroyed: 435, damaged: 44, abandoned: 2, captured: 54), Surface-To-Air Missile Systems (352, of which destroyed: 264, damaged: 60, abandoned: 4, captured: 24), Radars (111, of which destroyed: 69, damaged: 32, captured: 10), Aircraft (168, of which destroyed: 146, damaged: 22), Helicopters (166, of which destroyed: 132, damaged: 32, captured: 2), Naval Ships and Submarines (28, of which destroyed: 21, damaged: 7), and Trucks, Vehicles, Jeeps, and Trains (4302, of which destroyed: 3560, damaged: 107, abandoned: 54, captured: 581).
Wow, that's a lot: a big chunk of our reserves held since Soviet times, and a lot of those strategic airframes we do not even make anymore, that is going to take a lot of replacing! How about the EU and NATO? What have they lost?
They haven't turned up yet. However, the USA (the biggest contributor) has been spending about 0.2% of GDP annually. It's about the same for the EU too.
Ha, fucking rekt am I right?"
@Dean seems to have covered everything important, and did a great job doing so, but one last hanging point to not leave any elements unaddressed: How were the police wearing "assault proof plates", why does that even matter, and why do you keep claiming the police were outgunned as a narrative?
It is rare for riot police to wear heavy plates, although some might and I do not see many photos of Berkut in plate carriers or vests at the level 3/4 Russian GOST (that can take a few 7.62 hits before shattering) in the famous photos from the days, it's all soft kevlar stuff so they can move. See for example: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bd/Riot_police_Berkut_on_Euromaidan.jpg .
It's not a central or even relevant point though, why does it even matter what armor people were wearing? Lets say we can prove all Berkut casualties on all days were wearing the thickest plate possible to buy, what changes? We have the deaths 108 for protestors, 12-18 for police - which we all surely agree on, and there was no day where more police died than protestors, often by large margins, which we all presumably also agree on. Something like 50 protestors were shot fatally on that last day (I assume you mean the 20th of Feb?) so far far more died than the police - whatever equipment you give to Berkut/the government none of that changes, this was security forces firing on large numbers of protestors with equipment well below theirs by any narrative, even your own.
I believe that others have called you out on this completely insane narrative around Maidan that is needed to make it into an original sin for Ukraine rather than Russia and Yanukovych fucking up (on the 21st of Jan they sent US$2 billion on condition he cracked down - which he did), I guess it is now my turn:
We have the full list of deaths, and the days they occurred - it's ~108 for the protestors and 12-18 for the police depending on your start and end points. More details emerged in 2023 to fill in the gaps, but some remain. However, the fact there are gaps, does not mean that every area of uncertainty was a CIA op.
The 2x casualties claim of security forces vs protestors is clearly not true as a narrative, unless you cherry pick an exact tiny window, as you have from one source that otherwise highlights how insane and unprovoked the attacks on the protestors were, and only look at casualties not deaths for the three hour window - remember it started with 3 protestors being shot on the 22nd of Jan (plus the tortured body of Yuriy Verbytskyi being found), then on the 18th of Feb you have the police using live rounds to stop a march - 11 protestors and 4 police were killed, then you have the police trying to clear the square - 17 protestors, 5 police died then, including actions by police and "titushky" irregulars. They were certainly not outgunned then, though they failed to break the protestors' lines and clear the square.
The "obviously not very neutral Ukrainian court" records you mention but not cite (https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/114304164 for those who can read Ukrainian) found that 10 protestor deaths could not be attributed clearly to gunfire from police lines (Berkut) over the full period, but that other positions (Alfa in particular) or irrgular titushky fire from government supported could have done it, or perhaps friendly fire, accidents or deliberate protestor action. I do note that the Canadian academic Ivan Katchanovski (who really hates Ukraine, fine he can, but it's his theories being spun as some kind of fact from the court when they are his own supposition and it did not go through peer review) who cites parts of the 2023 verdict left those comments out and jumped straight to the false flag idea and that it was all a trick, despite that not really working - the fighting was already in full swing by that point.
Even best case, that still leaves 98 deaths directly from police and government action, who definitely deserve the blame for starting and escalating each major event in the timeline. They used live ammunition first, attacked the square, disappeared and tortured to death protestors prior and all of this was with Russian support and backing.
There is a citation in my post - RUSI's paper right there. It's open source, and they list where they got the information from where possible. You can disagree (especially where it's author interviews or him with a clearance seeing multiple copies of captured Russian equipment or the same documented instructions), but here you go if you cannot open the link for some reason, it's footnote 70: In Kherson, see BBC News, ‘Inside Russian “Torture Chambers” in Ukrainian City of Kherson – BBC News’, Youtube, https://youtube.com/watchv=AE_45TrZqU8, accessed 18 March 2023; in Kharkiv oblast, see John Ray, ‘Ukrainian Retraces Steps to Torture Chamber where he was “Electrocuted and Beaten for Six Days”’, 22 September 2022, < https://www.itv.com/news/2022-09-22/ukrainian-retraces-steps-to-torture-chamber-where-he-was-beaten-for-six-days>, accessed 18 March 2023; in Kyiv oblast, see Erika Kinetz et al., ‘“Method to the Violence”: Dogged Investigation and Groundbreaking Visuals Document Bucha “Cleansing”’, AP News, 11 November 2022; author observations around Bucha, June 2022 and Kharkiv oblast, October 2022.
In particular, I would also highlight this from right at the start of the war: "The population was divided into five core categories:
- Those deemed leaders of Ukrainian nationalism who were specified for physical liquidation on a high-priority target list, or for capture to enable show trials.
- Those suspected of intending to support acts of resistance who needed to be recruited or suppressed including anyone associated with Ukrainian law enforcement, local government, the military or related to officials that were not actively collaborating.
- Those who were deemed apathetic.
- Those actively collaborating with Russian forces.
- Individuals who were necessary for running critical national infrastructure and had to be controlled.69"
Source 69 above, is: The methodology was set out in an instruction issued by the Russian Presidential Administration and obtained by the Intelligence Community of Ukraine. Author interview with Q (Senior Field Counterintelligence Officer in Ukrainian Agency 4), Ukraine, February 2022; author interview with G; author interviews with R (former head of Ukrainian agency 2), Ukraine, February 2022; author interviews with J (deputy head of Ukrainian agency 5), Ukraine, August and October 2022; see also Erika Kinetz, ‘“We Will Find You:” Russians Hunt Down Ukrainians on Lists’, AP News, 21 December 2022.
I am confused how you missed it? I dug through your AI and the links weren't easy to find - or were not there - but this one was directly next to the text.
*edit: Oh, for others of a paranoid persuasion, that RUSI link is also a good overview of what an occupying force of high levels of brutality but using dumb troops of not high numbers and limited time might do to you and your family if you were ever occupied - and its very readable.
There are a lot of links here, but at least the helicopter one seems to be a Russian psyop - Ukraine used helicopters close enough to the front for Russia to film, with footage released of their landing, this then became claims of helicopters lost in the comments with no footage, instead all I saw was grainy footage of FPV attacks on individual soldiers from another location? Have you got any footage of an actual blackhawk being downed or a clear continuity? Ukraine certainly loves to publish their helicopter kills.
Pokrovsk itself has been fought over for 1 year 3 months now - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pokrovsk_offensive (I hate Wikipedia too, but that start date seems pretty fair, surely?), and while pressure is mounting along the line there's hardly crazy breakthroughs considering Russia is still outside of Bakhmut (which was hoped to open up new offensive options), and the Donbass is ~10% Ukrainian? It seems like Ukraine is launching a limited counterattack, like with the 47th at Andriivka, where they use fresh elites to push up and hold a pocket open, and get the last men out before withdrawing - a pocket it should be stressed that is hardly Stalingrad.
I think it is still unclear how this will end as a war, Ukraine is under a lot of pressure but Russia is seriously underperforming and taking a lot of strategic hits with a base that might come apart over years more fighting (have you seen the refineries campaign? How many haven't been hit at this point?). However, you seem certain that this was all folly, and Ukraine will crumble with a situation worse than surrendering at letting Russia do what they will? This time next year, do you think there's going to be a lasting peace agreement? What broadly would be its terms - unconditional Russian wargoals from day 1?
On the first days Russians fired into random civilian cars, with the BMP engaging pensioners who didn't know they were at war right at the start pretty famous now. This was at the point where it was going to be a 3 day special operation, and at least their command was sure that Ukraine would just fold - then there was Bucha where soldiers ran riot. That was all Feb-March 2022, and things did not get better from there.
There's quite the list of warcrimes now (you may not agree all of these happened, but most Ukrainians would if you're trying to understand their theory of mind: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_attacks_on_civilians_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_war_(2022%E2%80%93present)). In addition, it seems that capture/kill/torture lists were common for the advancing troops. Remember, early on Russia was super confident, and sent in various paramilitaries to remove sections of civil society and kill chunks of them - it seems like they wanted a literal decapitation of civil society so that the puppet regime they installed would last and be able to become another Belarus - (RUSI has a report here: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-russias-unconventional-operations-during-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2022 - in particular there were standardized torture equipment found in trucks, which is brutal as fuck, these are not people who anyone should be indifferent to ruling over them).
Imagine you believe that, like many Ukrainians do - and there is a solid argument that their resistance prevented Buchas across most of the country. Put yourself into that frame, imagine you believed the above. What would you do if that was your country, your home, and you knew people who were killed or tortured? People here reasonably say that one of the key lessons of the 20th century is do not be ruled over by people who hate you - if its true for the red tribe USA than the Ukrainians should be celebrated surely?
I would fight, and I think the situation is far less bleak than @No_one paints it, both now and over all the past times we've seen this argument (we're almost on year 4 of the special operation to de-nazify Ukraine, and with a few more years of this pace Russia will at last have all the Donbas, is this really a situation where Russia is going to occupy the country soon?). For example, I do note that Russia is taking a lot more long range hits this year, to very difficult to replace refining (only one (1) refinery has not been hit, and those cracking towers are not easy to patch) and strategic air assets no less. We're still in the hard pounding, Ukraine might break but it isn't over yet. It's a very interesting war.
His point as I understand was, 1) Ukrainians are bitter, because 2) they only fought because (stressed in all caps above) the USA assured them they would get US support and therefore defeat Russia and 3) this has proved a disaster and Ukrainians regret trusting the US and the war deaths could have been largely avoided had they known the all the above - furthermore these war deaths are half a million as Russia claims.
My point is no Ukrainian I know would express those 3, and they're extremely Russian coded. If No_one wishes to correct this misunderstanding I am all ears. Heaven knows it's hard to be clear on this forum, and I'm feeling a bit confused myself.
I worry there's a motte and bailey here - the motte being "Ukrainians would like more support from the USA, and feel that they're hot and cold which isn't helpful to the war effort" and the bailey being "Ukrainians fought the war because the USA promised them the moon and couldn't deliver, and are very bitter, and the deaths could have been avoided without the US meddling".
I'm very curious on your original assertion, that Ukrainians as a class are bitter on the US forcing them into fighting Russia, when they had no hope and it has gone so badly for them - taking half a million deaths in the process, such that suggesting Ukraine is right to fight and America is right to help them would therefore earn you their hatred. To me that sounds the same probability as "I'm Johnny Walker, from Texas Oblast, and I think that the USA is stupid to provoke the mighty Russian bear" as a being a genuine statement on US citizen's views on foreign policy - that's the inglourious basterds three fingers meme right there on every level. It's just... Russian signaling all the way through. Are you sure these are Ukrainians?
But to be fair, you also asked me a question. These warhawks have been fighting, have family fighting, and broadly support conscription when I asked them, though there was some discussions about draft dodging. Maybe they are foolish or p-zombies, but I myself am British, and so there's something very impressive about people paying a price and are willing to pay it to go fuck you to a fucked up bully even as others think you're foolish (1939-41 were our best and worst years). I do note they've done a lot better than anyone expected, aren't done yet, and have proven that even Russia can really bleed, they've done magnificently. I don't think of them as sheep or conformist, possibly to a fault - one issue of cossacks is they can be like herding cats, but they certainly have a common enemy today (even if they want Zelensky out tomorrow).
Maybe sober reality will make them regret their actions, but honestly, I think the fact Ukraine made itself into a very unwelcome meal for Russia is unlikely to be regretted, and they are proud so far of what their country has done (which includes rolling over the 4th Guards tank div, which is one of the funniest things to have happened to a power that claims to be super in a very very long time, imagine if a US armored division was routed in the Gulf war and their tanks captured to a degree that the Iraqi army could restock vs pre war, the T-80U is now on the endangered species list).
Finally, and this is utterly vital to stress, they also clearly have their own agency. Ukraine chose this, for better or for worse.
I like the fuckers, it's vibes for me, and I think while this is hard pounding, they may well pound the longest. I think it would be good if they do.
Remember these aren't civilian towns anymore, they're warzones, you're supplying soldiers in an area with enough water to survive, alongside food, ammunition, entrenching equipment etc, and taking fresh men in and the wounded etc back. If Russia could stop every truck into a given area, they would control it and quickly occupy it, it's not defensible, same for Ukraine the other way around, their effective actions around Izium mostly involved Russian units panicking as their supply lines were close to being closed and they ran for it.
For a town close to the front you use trucks, for one on the front you use MRAPs and APC/IFVs, for a fighting position on the edge of town you use runners through your trenches, but again interdiction means that you are degrading but not stopping this, which might largely happen at night, under fog etc. It's absolutely not the case that Russia can stop anything like all deliveries even to these contested areas, but it be high cost for the Ukrainians, forcing them back in the end. Here's a video (that's certainly wrong in bits, but gives you an idea) that covers one of these key town sieges: https://youtube.com/watch?v=igFrblANpQk .
Almost none of the civilian infrastructure is working, these places are wrecked, and the utility pipes are shredded. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to degrade utilities to big cities, but they can be repaired, there's some redundancy and defended by AA assets etc. If your assumption as to why Russia is moving too slowly is that they're being far too soft, that almost certainly isn't the case.
I'm skeptical on that number, though I'm sure there are reasonable costs higher than the direct aid due to the sanctions etc you can't take all inflation as a cost and put it all due to the Ukraine war, that guy's speech in 2023 to Singapore isn't exactly a knock down argument...
I am personally acquainted with several dozen Ukrainians, and know several fighting. They're of the exact opposite opinion - I'm not sure how you came to meet so many that seem to support a Russian talking point? I'm genuinely curious, what's their background?
And propaganda or not, they think that Russia is taking far more causalities than they are, and no one seems to be talking about half a million deaths?
The Ukrainian narratives that I know are that they chose to stand up to Russia, are very happy with countries that helped them with equipment (very pro UK for example), and are confused why America is so hot and cold with shipments but still broadly pro US. They were going to fight with or without US/NATO weapons, at the big defeats Russia experienced at the start were mostly with Ukrainian gear, it was much later till the tanks, IFVs, aircraft and static AA started arriving, which allowed them to continue. They are also of the opinion that if Zelensky capitulates (or is seen to) he's gone next election, he was seen as soft on Russia pre war and is being outflanked by more popular warhawks.
Interdiction means that a percentage of logistics entering the town are destroyed/disabled, or can only move under poor weather, at night etc. You don't need running water or electricity to keep a fighting position supplied, you can truck/carry in their water, ammo, etc. but if part of that is being interdicted your logistic burden is just that much higher, X% is lost, alongside Y lives per tonne needed to sustain fighting.
The Russians are naturally going out of their way to starve out every town/fighting position they can, which is often a matter of ammunition not food or water of course.
Technically this would be an Ordo Malleus call wouldn't it? As it deals with demons? Though, James Workshop is very confusing with how the Inquisition actually operates, and even Ordo Xenos members seem to spend most of their time fighting Chaos in books.
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I don't think the core of what you have said is "wrong" and it aligns fine with my text you quoted - it's just a fair chunk of it is obviously true ground level cynicism and missing the higher level logic that actually makes things interesting.
Interstate anarchy is a baseline factor for all relations but it clearly waxes and wanes, pointing to it is not enough - for example the actual cost/benefit calculation of taking territory has moved sharply post industrialization (I actually think this random review of Vicky II is a fairly good overview of some of that in the context of a game's mechanics). My point is that should such wars be seen as more likely to be net positive for one party again we are going to end up with far more stupid expensive wars. WW1 for sure and WW2 in part happened because states (mainly but not just Germany) were assuming that their limited and focused wars could come out as solidly net positive, and led to utter ruin that they did not predict as their assumptions were totally off. That is my ought - it would be good for human flourishing if countries expected wars of aggression to not be net positive at the margin, maybe even for NATO/the US that would be a good lesson too. We ought to avoid making it more positive at the margin.
I also think there's a clear ought with the nuclear dynamics here, which is perhaps easy to miss at the level of "countries will always bully each other, nukes exist, and the tech isn't going away". Schelling was right and a non nuclear world seems impossible without a fundamentally different political reality, but that's the start point of the conversation, not the end. Proliferation fraying and breaking might be inevitable at the margin, but it's still bad for several reasons, and it would be a real failure of the US to prioritize its own selfish long term interests if it accidentally or knowingly creates a nuclear arms race across Asia and the Middle East. The arms control treaties in effect have reduced weapons totals massively, lowering the probability of an accidental launch and limiting the impact of a war should it occur. Conversely, any event that pushes countries to scramble for weapons at short notice creates bad dynamics, and ought to be avoided if possible.
We can chat about the ground level realities, and no "ought" chat in the end can avoid them, but I would be really interested in who you think "ought" to win, who would you prefer, based on what you have written above? Russia, because the liberal order needs to realize that other powers can have preferences and it can't always win?
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