ToaKraka
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Funny translation decision from Reuters:
When US President Donald Trump last week conditioned a hefty financial bailout of Argentina on President Javier Milei triumphing in upcoming midterm elections, he handed the country's opposition a new rallying cry.
On social media, #PatriaOColonia—motherland or colony—trended after Trump's comments, which came during a press conference with Milei at the White House.
More specifically, the prosecution is forbidden from introducing the defendant's criminal history if that history is more prejudicial than probative.
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The fact that the defendant has been convicted of robbery twice in the past has no bearing on whether he committed this specific robbery, and will only prejudice the jury against the defendant.
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The fact that (1) in two past robberies of which he was convicted the defendant stubbed out his cigarette on the victim's cheek, and (2) the perpetrator in this case did the same thing, may be highly relevant in determining whether the defendant is the perpetrator in this case.
The people that the defendant had to fear weren’t the police, but rather the jury.
Trust in juries is 58 percent. But the jury doesn't matter if the police destroy or hide exculpatory evidence, or the prosecutor or the judge doesn't let you present exculpatory arguments. (I'm not suggesting that such fears are reasonable.)
According to other surveys, trust in the state courts is 63 percent, but trust in the judiciary as a whole is 35 percent. So I guess the numbers are all over the place.
Should "all firefighters experience this, and usually it does not result in their quitting with PTSD" be a sufficient argument to deny compensation?
According to the state supreme court:
Abandoning the distinction between normal and abnormal working conditions would eliminate the element of causation. It would destroy the fundamental principle underlying the scheme of the Workers' Compensation Act—that, in order to be compensable, an injury must be work-related. Otherwise, a claimant would have to establish only that the employee suffered from a mental illness while employed and that the illness was a condition created or aggravated by that employee's perception of the conditions of his employment. That would reduce workers' compensation benefits to nothing more than a disability or death benefit payable only because of the employee status of the claimant—and not because the injury was caused by his employment.
There is a degree of uncertainty inherent in any employment situation, as in life itself, such that an employee’s individual, subjective reaction to ordinary vicissitudes is not the type of condition which the legislature intended to require compensation for because it is not, in the common understanding, an injury.
Does that mean that, in cases like those radioactive watch face painters, where everyone in a line of work was exposed to a perhaps underappreciated probabilistic risk by convention, those who did get struck by it (the people who got cancer) have no claim to compensation?
This standard is applicable only to psychological injuries, not to physical injuries.
A person has been employed as a firefighter by a municipal government since year 2001, and also was a volunteer firefighter before 2001. First in 2018, and again in 2021, he is called upon to perform CPR on a baby, but the baby dies anyway. As a result of these two events, he develops PTSD, quits, and files for workers' compensation.
The municipal government does not dispute that the two baby deaths led directly to the firefighter's PTSD. However, it does dispute the firefighter's claim that baby deaths constitute "abnormal working conditions" that give rise to a valid workers' compensation claim, rather than being merely part and parcel of working as a firefighter.
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The workers' compensation board finds that the baby deaths in question are not "abnormal working conditions" for a firefighter, so the plaintiff is not entitled to workers' compensation. The trial judge affirms. But the appeals panel reverses.
We agree [with the municipal government's expert (Claimant's boss, a firefighter with 36 years of experience)] that, standing on its own, performing CPR on an individual, witnessing death, or responding to an emergency involving a child might each be an unfortunate but expected working condition for a firefighter. However, we must consider the specific factual scenario faced by Claimant, and we do not do so by looking to "unrelated component parts, where each part, standing on its own, might be safely determined to be a 'normal' working condition". Such a review would render our discussion a "potentiality with no relation to what happened in this case".
The reality of Claimant's situation was that he performed CPR on, and witnessed the deaths of, two infant children within a 16-month period. It was the compounded effect of these two incidents that caused Claimant's disabling PTSD. There can be little doubt that firefighters experience a high amount of stress in their jobs. Nonetheless, we must recognize that certain events, even in high-stress professions, may rise to the level of abnormal working conditions. Claimant did not simply witness death at a usual call involving a fire or a motor-vehicle crash. Claimant was actively involved in attempting to resuscitate two separate unresponsive babies and witnessing each of their deaths. We cannot agree that Claimant's experience in this regard was a "normal" or "expected" consequence of being a firefighter. Indeed, in Claimant's 20 years' experience in firefighting service before the first event, Claimant had never before had to perform CPR on an infant. There is no evidence in the record that suggests firefighters in [this municipality] or even in [this state] routinely or normally perform CPR on infant children or witness the deaths of infant children. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, of the three instances in which Employer called upon the county's Critical Incident Stress Decreasement Team between 2018 and 2022, two of those calls were in response to these two incidents involving Claimant and the infants. Certainly, this highlights both the rarity of these events and the potential for substantial psychological impact to the participants, which is further magnified by the fact that the same person, Claimant, administered CPR on infants on each occasion.
Series of court opinions:
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On a road with one lane in each direction, a posted speed limit of 55 mi/h (90 km/h), an "extremely wide" shoulder, and heavy motor-vehicle traffic, a bicyclist decides to ride at 15 mi/h (25 km/h) in the middle of the lane. A police officer gives him a ticket for obstructing traffic. At trial, the bicyclist boldly asserts that he had "no legal obligation" to avoid obstructing traffic, and claims that the shoulder was unsafe. The trial judge disagrees, finds him guilty, and imposes a fine of 25 dollars. The appeals panel affirms.
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The state supreme court vacates and remands. The lower courts have been using a standard under which a bicyclist who is obstructing motor traffic always is required to get out of the way. However, when compared with the statute, which requires that bicyclists "use reasonable efforts so as not to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic", this standard is overly rigid. Instead, whether it is reasonable for a bicyclist to temporarily move to the shoulder (rather than, e. g., merely moving to the right edge of the lane) is fact-specific and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. But a bicyclist does have a duty to make a "serious, fair attempt" to avoid obstructing motor-vehicle traffic. (Two of the seven justices dissent. They think that the majority's new standard is too vague to give to bicyclists reasonable notice of what specific activity is lawbreaking, so in practice bicyclists will move to the shoulder in all circumstances, just as under the previous standard, due to fear of prosecution.)
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On remand, the appeals panel affirms again. The police officer's dashcam video clearly shows: (1) the shoulder was perfectly safe; and (2) the bicyclist did not even once look backward at the cars whose passage he was obstructing, from which behavior the panel can infer that the bicyclist had no interest in making the "reasonable efforts" or "serious, fair attempt" to avoid obstruction that the law requires.
Court opinion with possible culture-war implications:
Morales-Torres and Rivera drive to Almodovar's house in Morales-Torres's truck, and do not return. Worried, Morales-Torres's romantic partner drives by Almodovar's house, sees Almodovar with bloodstains on his shirt and Morales-Torres's truck still in the driveway, and calls 911. Several hours later, Morales-Torres's truck is found elsewhere, on fire and with Morales-Torres's and Rivera's bullet-riddled corpses inside it. Almodovar is charged with two murders.
Almodovar claims that he only defended himself from an attempt by Morales-Torres and Rivera to rob him of 20 k$ of drug money, and he had a cousin (who later died while committing a robbery) burn the corpses because he thought no one would believe the self-defense story. But the jury disbelieves the self-defense story and convicts Almodovar on both counts.
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Almodovar appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find the "specific intent to kill" that a conviction of murder requires. But the appeals panel affirms.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, we find that the jury rationally concluded Almodovar's account was false. Almodovar's argument relies on the fact that his testimony was mostly unrebutted. Of course, that is largely because Almodovar covered up the crime. That this case involves a claim of self-defense does not detract from the principle that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to meet the Commonwealth's burden, and Almodovar's argument fails to account for the inferences that may be drawn from his testimony that he covered up the crime. It is well-established that efforts to conceal wrongdoing may be considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt. [Citing a 1988 decision of the state supreme court:]
Evidence of [the defendant]'s disposal of the body supplied important proof relative to whether she acted with malice. Human experience teaches that persons who commit justifiable homicides, without malice, do not ordinarily feel compelled to destroy the victim's body. Rather, it is those who harbor a guilty conscience, believing their acts not to have been justified, who are most likely to conceal evidence of their deeds.
Thus, even setting aside the implausibility of Almodovar's testimony of how the shootings unfolded, we conclude that his post-shooting actions are more than sufficient circumstantial evidence establishing that the victims were not the aggressors. Indeed, his concealment and destruction made it impossible to test, for example, the firearm destroyed in the fire. Moreover, the pathologist could not fully test the bodies for evidence like gunshot residue or conduct a complete autopsy. Accordingly, the circumstantial evidence readily supports the jury's finding that Almodovar specifically intended to kill both men.
But is the state supreme court's pronouncement of "the wicked flee when no man pursueth" truly applicable in the modern age? According to a recent poll, in 2023 confidence in the police was only 49 percent among whites and a pitiful 31 percent among nonwhites in the US. Those numbers recovered to 54 percent and 44 percent (respectively) in 2024, but even that is a bit lower than one might expect. Should a defendant's distrust of the police be held against him in court?
Mary Peltola is the one and only Democrat to be against gun control in 2025.
A cursory search for "firearm" on Congress's website indicates a few more who may count.
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Jared Golden of northern Maine joined 188 Republicans in cosponsoring a bill that would force all states to grant concealed-carry reciprocity.
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Henry Cuellar of southern Texas joined 35 Republicans in cosponsoring a bill that would force the District of Columbia to grant concealed-carry reciprocity to congresspeople (but not to other people), and joined 17 Republicans in cosponsoring a bill that would "broaden the authority for certain law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms across state lines".
I still dont know the rules here
The rules are linked in the front page's sidebar (which annoyingly is hidden by CSS if the window is narrower than 992 pixels).
The justices did address that complaint. tl;dr: States are sovereign, counties are not.
Much has been written since our decision in Baker v. Carr about the applicability of the so-called federal analogy to state legislative apportionment arrangements. After considering the matter, the court below concluded that no conceivable analogy could be drawn between the federal scheme and the apportionment of seats in the Alabama Legislature under the proposed constitutional amendment. We agree with the District Court, and find the federal analogy inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting schemes. Attempted reliance on the federal analogy appears often to be little more than an after-the-fact rationalization offered in defense of maladjusted state apportionment arrangements. The original constitutions of 36 of our States provided that representation in both houses of the state legislatures would be based completely, or predominantly, on population. And the Founding Fathers clearly had no intention of establishing a pattern or model for the apportionment of seats in state legislatures when the system of representation in the Federal Congress was adopted. Demonstrative of this is the fact that the Northwest Ordinance, adopted in the same year, 1787, as the Federal Constitution, provided for the apportionment of seats in territorial legislatures solely on the basis of population.
The system of representation in the two Houses of the Federal Congress is one ingrained in our Constitution, as part of the law of the land. It is one conceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of our federal republic. Arising from unique historical circumstances, it is based on the consideration that, in establishing our type of federalism a group of formerly independent States bound themselves together under one national government. Admittedly, the original 13 States surrendered some of their sovereignty in agreeing to join together "to form a more perfect Union." But at the heart of our constitutional system remains the concept of separate and distinct governmental entities which have delegated some, but not all, of their formerly held powers to the single national government. The fact that almost three-fourths of our present States were never, in fact, independently sovereign does not detract from our view that the so-called federal analogy is inapplicable as a sustaining precedent for state legislative apportionments. The developing history and growth of our republic cannot cloud the fact that, at the time of the inception of the system of representation in the Federal Congress, a compromise between the larger and smaller States on this matter averted a deadlock in the Constitutional Convention which had threatened to abort the birth of our Nation. In rejecting an asserted analogy to the federal electoral college in Gray v. Sanders, we stated:
We think the analogies to the electoral college, to districting and redistricting and to other phases of the problems of representation in state or federal legislatures or conventions, are inapposite. The inclusion of the electoral college in the Constitution, as the result of specific historical concerns, validated the collegiate principle despite its inherent numerical inequality, but implied nothing about the use of an analogous system by a State in a statewide election. No such specific accommodation of the latter was ever undertaken, and therefore no validation of its numerical inequality ensued.
Political subdivisions of States—counties, cities, or whatever—never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions. As stated by the Court in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, these governmental units are "created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them," and the "number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [them]… and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State." The relationship of the States to the Federal Government could hardly be less analogous.
It was slated on release
Slayed? Panned?
If someone wants to tell me how to format a table
There is a link to "formatting help" directly underneath the comment preview.
| State | Representatives |
|---|---|
| California | 205 |
| Texas | 151 |
| Florida | 112 |
| New York | 105 |
| Pennsylvania | 67 |
| Illinois | 66 |
| Ohio | 61 |
| Georgia | 55 |
| North Carolina | 54 |
| Michigan | 52 |
| New Jersey | 48 |
| Virginia | 44 |
| Washington | 40 |
| Arizona | 37 |
| Massachusetts | 36 |
| Tennessee | 35 |
| Indiana | 35 |
| Maryland | 32 |
| Missouri | 32 |
| Wisconsin | 30 |
| Colorado | 30 |
| Minnesota | 29 |
| South Carolina | 26 |
| Alabama | 26 |
| Louisiana | 24 |
| Kentucky | 23 |
| Oregon | 22 |
| Oklahoma | 20 |
| Connecticut | 18 |
| Utah | 17 |
| Iowa | 16 |
| Nevada | 16 |
| Mississippi | 15 |
| Kansas | 15 |
| Arkansas | 15 |
| New Mexico | 11 |
| Nebraska | 10 |
| West Virginia | 9 |
| Idaho | 9 |
| New Hampshire | 7 |
| Hawaii | 7 |
| Maine | 7 |
| Delaware | 5 |
| Rhode Island | 5 |
| Montana | 5 |
| South Dakota | 4 |
| North Dakota | 4 |
| Alaska | 3 |
| Vermont | 3 |
| Wyoming | 3 |
Connestoga
It would be nice if you were to stop consistently misspelling "Conestoga".
You might be able to make a reductio ad absurdum argument for the most extreme straw-man YIMBY, but the "official" YIMBY position is more like "revise model zoning codes to allow triplexes where duplexes are now allowed".
To be fair, the linked page also includes tenets that go along with the reductio ad absurdum.
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"Permit backyard cottages (ADUs, accessory dwelling units) in all residential zones." The same organization's The Housing-Ready City document does not clarify, but the International Zoning Code imposes on ADUs a minimum area of 190 ft2 or half of the main house's area, whichever is higher.
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"Legalize starter homes in all residential zones." The Housing-Ready City clarifies that that means eliminating minimum floor-area requirements, so that houses of 400–800 ft2 can be built. Such requirements are not in the IZC, but I personally have lived in a zone where the minimum area was 1200 ft2.
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"Eliminate minimum lot-size requirements in existing neighborhoods." The Housing-Ready City does not clarify, but the IZC generally imposes a minimum lot size of 1/6 acre (7260 ft2—e. g., 70 ft × 104 ft), plus setbacks ranging from 5 ft to 20 ft.
So, even with a charitable perspective, this organization can be interpreted as advocating residential zones that are composed of 30 ft × 55 ft (1/26-acre) lots (with 5-ft setbacks on all sides), each containing a 400-ft2 (20 ft × 20 ft) house and a 200-ft2 (14 ft × 14 ft) ADU—and that's without even looking at duplexes and triplexes.
Yet somehow people still can't spell it properly…
Now I'm looking for another game to use my shiny new GPU with. Something I can beat before EU5 comes out in November. Any recommendations?
The ancient abandonware platforming game Claw is suitable to be played on a keyboard by a controller-hating curmudgeon such as you.
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Haley is rear-ended by Kruti.* Haley suffers severe neurological symptoms, and is diagnosed with concussion and cervical and lumbar disk herniation.
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Haley sues Kruti. Kruti concedes liability for the crash, leaving for the jury to decide only liability for the injury and damages resulting from the injury. Due to evidence issues, the judge excludes past medical expenses from damages that can be awarded, but Haley's expert witness estimates future medical expenses at 393 k$. The jury decides that Kruti caused the injury, but awards to Haley future medical expenses of only 16 k$, and awards absolutely zero damages for Haley's pain and suffering.
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The appeals panel affirms the award of 16 k$ for future medical expenses, but vacates and remands for a new trial regarding pain and suffering. It is against the weight of the evidence for the jury to find that Kruti is liable for medical expenses but not for the pain and suffering on which those medical expenses logically must be predicated.
*It isn't clear from the names, but they're both women. (Should I have typed Haley (♀) and Kruti (♀) instead of adding this footnote? I think I saw somebody suggest many years ago that such a practice might be preferable to specifying pronouns. ;-) )
Major split among Anglican Communion announced
GAFCON, the movement of conservative, biblically orthodox Anglicans, has announced that it will no longer recognise the authority of the Archbishop of Canterbury. It has also told provinces to remove any reference to being in communion with the See of Canterbury and the Church of England.[3]
In what has been viewed as a major split in the Anglican Communion and a snub to the Church of England, the GAFCON primates have issued a statement which said the Anglican Communion will be “reordered” and provinces of the Global Anglican Communion won’t take part in meetings called by the Archbishop of Canterbury.
Anglicans who hold traditional biblical views have long rallied against the Church of England’s stance on issues such as sexuality and gender.
The statement published on Thursday came almost two weeks after Rt Rev Dame Sarah Mullally was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury–designate, becoming the first ever female to hold the role.[2]
Earlier this year, the Church in Wales also elected Most Rev Cherry Vann, who is in a same-sex relationship, as Archbishop of Wales.[1]
Archbishop Laurent said the new structure will now comprise a fellowship of autonomous provinces and be known as the Global Anglican Communion.
The Global Anglican Communion will celebrate its formation at the upcoming G26 Bishops Conference in Abuja, Nigeria, in March 2026.
[1]
By celebrating this election and her immoral same-sex relationship, the Canterbury Communion has again bowed to worldly pressure that subverts God’s good word.
[2]
Though there are some who will welcome the decision to appoint Bishop Mullally as the first female Archbishop of Canterbury, the majority of the Anglican Communion still believes that the Bible requires a male-only episcopacy. Therefore, her appointment will make it impossible for the Archbishop of Canterbury to serve as a focus of unity within the Communion.
However, more concerning is her failure to uphold her consecration vows. When she was consecrated in 2015, she took an oath to “banish and drive away all strange and erroneous doctrine contrary to God’s Word.” And yet, far from banishing such doctrine, Bishop Mullally has repeatedly promoted unbiblical and revisionist teachings regarding marriage and sexual morality.
In 2023, when asked by a reporter whether sexual intimacy in a same-sex relationship is sinful, she said that some such relationships could, in fact, be blessed. She also voted in favour of introducing blessings of same-sex marriage into the Church of England.
[3]
The first Global Anglican Future Conference (GAFCON) gathered in 2008 in Jerusalem to prayerfully respond to the abandonment of the Scriptures by some of the most senior leaders of the Anglican Communion, and to seek their repentance.
In the absence of such repentance, we have been prayerfully advancing towards a future for faithful Anglicans, where the Bible is restored to the heart of the Communion.
Today, that future has arrived.
A 4channer claims that GAFCON represents about half of the Anglican Communion's membership. Wikipedia appears to support this statement (1 2).
Interesting article: Renault–Geely engine unit speeds up as EV shift stutters
When French carmaker Renault and China's Geely carved out their combustion-engine operations in 2022, the venture looked like a footnote to an outdated technology. Now, Horse Powertrain has a new lease of life.
The joint venture aims to become the world's top engine maker by 2035, betting that legacy carmakers pivoting to EVs will still need suppliers to make combustion engines for them as the energy transition stutters.
Pitching itself as a one-stop shop for automakers, producing everything from hybrid engines to the small combustion units that extend range in plug-in EVs, Horse is targeting annual revenue of 15 billion euros (17 billion dollars) by 2029, up 80 % from 2024, according to a Reuters analysis.
Giannini says Horse is currently the world's no. 3 engine maker, with 17 engine and transmission factories previously run by Renault, Geely Holding, and Geely unit Volvo Cars, including eight in China.
Horse's [CEO Matias] Giannini expects 50 % of new cars to be EVs in 2040. Others predict more. But, even then, tens of millions of new hybrid cars will still need engines.
"Let automakers concentrate on their transition to EVs… while we support them with highly efficient hybrid engines and transmissions," Giannini said.
Renault expects to save 2 billion euros in engine development by 2030 via outsourcing to Horse, and Giannini is pitching those savings to new customers.
Horse currently produces over eight million engines and transmissions annually for more than 15 automakers, including Renault, Dacia, Volvo Cars, Nissan, Mitsubishi, and Mercedes-Benz.
According to a source close to the matter, Horse is pursuing about 100 projects across all its products and markets—from cars to boats, construction equipment, and drones.
Geely and Renault own 45 % of Horse each. Oil producer Saudi Aramco owns the remaining 10 %.
Horse itself is betting on new technologies, including plug-in hybrids (PHEVs). It has also launched a suitcase-sized combustion engine for extended-range electric vehicles (EREVs), which use a small engine to boost an EV's range.
According to the Consumer Expenditure Survey of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (size of consumer unit by income before taxes: one person: income before taxes < 15 k$/a), living on 27 k$/a is perfectly feasible.
Of course, cost of living will vary depending on location, inside (scroll down to "local standards", which are tabulated by county) or outside the US.
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You've got a rather bad typo in that heading.
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