deadpantroglodytes
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I don't think this responds to my claim, which are that the default human position on kids is "not worth the trouble" and therefore making contraception cheaper, more effective, or more accessible mechanically reduces fertility.
I agree that there are legal regimes, beliefs, and customs that foster fertility. I'm just annoyed whenever people write about what "caused" the fertility crisis. There's no theory that makes sense or matches history apart from "people don't want kids and will take measures to avoid having them" except "mo' better contraception."
Japan didn't get the pill until 1999 but its TFR fell from 5 to 2 between between 1925 and 1960. What happened?
Sparked by the visit of Margaret Sanger to Japan in 1922, and through the dissemination of printed information, and the opening of clinics, birth control became widely understood by the general public.
The article goes on to say "Governmental thinking of population as a marker for national power and international strength, however, remained steadfast and led the Japanese government to ban the sale and use of birth control in the 1930s, considering it harmful to the user." I freely admit that there are innumerable confounding factors, but I'm going to take "the introduction of a new technology did exactly what it promised to" as the null hypothesis. (Also, wow, what shitty prose. Do better, Wikipedia.)
Or read Cremieux's post about Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, "The Fruits of Philosophy". TLDR: family-planning advocates disseminate information out to the English population, fertility craters.
Romania only proves that it's hard to stop people from practicing contraception for long.
The Amish and Haredi communities are interesting and useful, but they don't contradict what I'm saying. In fact, the Amish formally prohibit contraception. People infer that some Amish communities quietly accept contraception use, based on differential fertility rates between communities where more conservative communities have higher fertility rates.
The Haredi might prove me wrong, in some sense, but they are also a world-historical outlier that are not obviously reproducible (pun intended).
At any rate, I'm not saying we shouldn't look at communities and societies that have done better. I'm just pessimistic that we can overcome the default human bias by copying them.
Religious fundamentalists who anathemized contraception will be proven right and their children will inherit the Earth.
There's a reasonable chance this is right. I can't find the comment, but someone here recently summed up that position as "evolution works". Correct! But it just means that negative-fertility species will lose (on a geological timescale), not necessarily that the fundamentalists will win. Most of the fundamentalist groups have a problem keeping children onside, and even their fertility is in decline, with a few notable exceptions.
The discussion is really about how to fix the fertility crisis. Talking about what's caused the fertility crisis is distracting and drives me a little nuts, because the cause simple and obvious: increasing access to safe, cheap, effective contraception depresses fertility.
Imagine if humans, historically, could just choose when to have children. All else being equal, our ancestors never would have made it out of their tiny niche. The only reason we flourished was our sex drive, which obliterates our intentions and exerts irresistible pressure to reproduce. (Hormones, oxytocin, etc. play a complementary role, but couldn't have carried the day alone.)
The solution that suggests is also simple: the Ceaușescu regime demonstrated that outlawing contraception can get the job done: Romania raised TFR, from 2 to 3.5.
Simple, but not sustainable. Ceaușescu also showed how difficult it is to maintain those policies: a sharp decline quickly followed. By the 80s, Romania's TFR was hovering just above replacement-level and trending downward. When the regime fell, so did the restrictions and TFR went down to 1.3. It has recovered, but has not ever reached replacement since.
Where does that leave us? The Romainians offered economic incentives for larger families, but those programs shouldn't get much credit, since they have been tried many other places to little effect. Sure, economic and status incentives can help on the margin: relaxing car seat mandates will improve things a bit, for example, and would be good in itself. Maybe we can even find a few dozen policies like that, which could add up to a measurable but inconsequential boost. Ultimately, though, there's nothing that's going to make large numbers of young people in WEIRD countries to consider their lives and say "yes, a(nother) baby will make my life better". Dreaming of a cultural solution is a dead end: we do not engineer specific outcomes via cultural change. Cultural change and its outcomes are emergent.
But I'm not here to call for a ban on contraception. Restriction proponents are like anti-auto crusaders and other activists unable to accept a new technology. There's no turning back on technologies that profound, immediate positive effects on people's lives, whatever the tradeoffs or externalities. Mail-order Mifepristone is the 3d printed gun of the left.
If there is an answer, it's to go deeper. We have ample survey data that tells us people (well, Americans) want more children. There's some reason to be skeptical of that survey data: we clearly want other things more than children. But at least it suggests a plausible path for the future of humanity. I think the most likely solution involves enlisting human desires instead of restraining them, which means improving fertility-extension technologies is our best hope (and perhaps easing the process of giving birth).
I don't think Yglesias is committing the pundit's fallacy, exactly. Instead, in the intro to his Common Sense Manifesto he writes:
when you lose an election, a leadership void opens up. And that void will be filled — with people and institutions and, hopefully, with ideas — and I would like the ideas that fill the current void to be good.
One way to read that is "my ideas would have won the election and they'll make us popular", but I think he's going for something more like "my ideas are good, so if we take control of the party that already gets 45% of the vote by default, we'll have a shot at making good things happen."
"The suggestion that men would start living in fear was always a bogeyman."
Can it be a mere boogeyman if it's an explicit progressive goal? Here's Ezra Klein's infamous statement on the matter:
"No Means No” has created a world where women are afraid. To work, “Yes Means Yes” needs to create a world where men are afraid.
For that reason, the law is only worth the paper it’s written on if some of the critics’ fears come true.
Klein doesn't make policy, of course, but the people that read him do. His writing is deep inside the progressive Overton window (and when he steps outside it, it's usually because he's making more right-coded points), so I'm inclined to think something close to his vision animates the people writing sexual harassment legislation and policies.
You can make the argument that they have been ineffective or argue that these efforts are unnecessary to make men fearful, like Ozy Brennan did, but that's a big project. To be fair, making the positive claim would be a big project too, to establish that efforts to create a world where men are afraid were effective. But those efforts were not phantasmal.
I agree there are many places where driving is a miserable experience (often enough, at least).
Yet people still choose to drive.
Congestion is a highly visible issue, but that's because it's the problem that's left over after cars solved all the important ones.
Cycling, walking, and transit all have advantages, but cars blow them away for the vast majority of people's normal use-cases. Cars:
- Run on your schedule.
- Allow you to haul more than any other modes of transportation. Not just more, but also more cumbersome things. I cannot bicycle my amplifier to an ad-hoc show at a local block party.
- Collapse space, allowing you to live near work and the beach/mountains/trails/relatives/friends/ultimate frisbee league/your band's rehearsal space/etc./etc. This cuts in multiple directions, working for other people at the same time, putting you in reach of a critical mass of people that share your interests and satisfy your needs.
- Are weather-independent. I salute the hardy souls that commute via bicycle in New England, but there's no timeline where a significant portion of the population follows their lead.
- Allow pets.
And that's just the big, widely-applicable ones. I haven't mentioned comfort, the ability to socialize, or benefits for people with disabilities. I also didn't include the benefits they offer families with kids, which is a massive blindspot for a lot of Marohn-pilled types. You can see it when someone says things like "cars only save you 20 minutes on your commute" ... as a parent, there are days when 20 extra minutes would quadruple my free time.
I'm in favor of transit in principle: a first-rate transit system gets close enough to cars on those points that its other benefits net out. But no one has figured out how to bootstrap a first-rate transit system in a US city from scratch in the twenty-first century.
Edit: fussy formatting. Also, I regret that I did not at least mention pollution, another problem left over after cars solve the others, even though it wasn't at issue in context.
Streets should be built in a way that is adjusted to people and how people use the streets, not cars.
This bit of linguistic gamesmanship is ridiculous: cars don't use anything. It's all just people out there. Anti-auto advocates ought to find a less saccharine and grating slogan.
Can you give me 1 reason why the 'just 1 more lane bro' meme is not valid criticism of car infrastructure ?
Assuming you're talking about the unquenchable thirst for more lanes, that doesn't seem like a criticism at all. It's a ringing endorsement of car infrastructure: people cannot get enough convenient mobility.
Those bullet points are too abstract, too many inferences away from a useful definition of power. Power is the ability to change others, nature, or one's self, and also the ability to resist changes to one's self.
You might laugh and say I'm just repurposing the classic elementary-school-level framework for talking about literature ("man versus man/nature/self"), but it's a firm foundation for thinking about power and I doubt you'll find anything better.
I agree that it would be interesting to see a detailed analysis like that and I realize you aren't saying large QOL improvements would be exculpatory ... but reading your comment made me think about discussions about progressive indoctrination in US schools.
It's plausible that learning progressive manners and beliefs will give children a substantial leg up, socio-economically. Depending on events, graduates of the Evanston, IL public schools system might be on average, better-positioned than those from, say, the Florida suburbs in the US of 2045. But I don't think many parents resisting leftward changes to their public schools would be impressed by that.
The analogy is quarter-baked, but just contemplating it weakens my openness to arguments that material improvements can justify inter-generational dispossession (for lack of a better term)
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This seems correct to me, with two addenda.
First, there's been an explosion of oppressed identities accessible to the majority, in the form of disabilities, queerness, plus esoteric sexualities and genders. This vastly increased the surface of potentially receptive people that would have previously considered themselves targets.
Second, the development of social media, especially Tumblr (as Katherine Dee has documented) provided a vector for the reemergence of political correctness as wokeness.
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