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User ID: 2225

dovetailing


				
				
				

				
2 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2023 February 28 12:06:31 UTC

					

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User ID: 2225

My surprise at seeing a The Last Battle reference here (what fraction of the commenters are familiar enough with it to recognize the reference, I wonder?) was quickly accompanied by confusion at how the analogy is supposed to work. Puzzle is a mostly-unwitting tool of Shift all along, not an independent conman who is superseded by a better one...

Yeah, Christiano is absolutely right here. There are some sorts of problems which have significant components that are comparatively much simpler for machines than humans, for example:

  • Problems that can proceed mostly by only a limited number of steps at any place, but where it's hard to figure out which sequence of steps to pursue and doing a large number of them of them is basically impossible for a human in any reasonable time. A computer can just try them a ton of them, so any improvements in ways to narrow the search space make them even better. A lot of geometry problems are like this.
  • Problems that have a straightforward method of solution which is difficult for humans to execute properly without mistakes. "Just brute force it with Muirhead's Inequality" has been a thing for a long time now and a lot of competitors actually do this on contests even though it is frequently horribly messy. My recollection is that conventional wisdom in this was: if you try this, you'd better not make any mistakes because judges will not award partial credit to brute force solutions with errors. But of course a computer will not have these errors. (Christiano seems to indicate that inequalities that are doable this way don't show up as much anymore, which is a very good thing regardless of AI.)
  • Problems that can be easily solved with a simple trick that is hard to find but easy to execute when you do. E.g. diophantine equations that fall apart with a particular modulus (or two). Humans need well-developed mathematical intuition to find the needle in the haystack; a computer can just try everything.

This is not to say that it's trivial to make a computer be superhuman at these problems. Despite there being aspects that are very machine-friendly, there's still a lot of difficult work to be done to actually get a machine do them. But it shouldn't make you update particularly much; this is not an "AI is now smarter than IMO medalists" moment.

Honestly seeing that card makes me glad I quit playing Magic entirely five years ago, and it has little to do with making Aragorn black (which is stupid and jarring exactly because it makes no sense for reasons already outlined). The card's art is bad (nothing new for Magic, but at least the bad art used to be kind of quirky), the card name is stupid, the flavor makes no sense (the war is basically over when they get married, and they don't fight together), the mechanics are completely uninspired and have little sensible connection to the flavor, and the whole "let's make a boring cash-grab set based on random other fantasy IP" ...ugh. About the only thing that makes sense about the card is the color.

In Middle-Earth there's very little to do with (ordinary human) races. The humans, elves, hobbits, dwarves (and, of course, the orcs and various monsters) are all quite different, but they don't at all map onto race-as-we-know-it, and it would be, uh, pretty racist to try to make them match human races. You might be able to pull a Brandon Sanderson and make the elves be East-Asian but extra tall, but even that is questionable. (You could just race-swap the whole setting en masse and have everyone be the same non-white race, and that would be better, but it still misses that the setting is a fundamentally European mythology.) The problem is that while race (as it actually exists) is a non-issue*, genealogy is definitely not (as you point out), so you can't just have random people be random races.

*There's the well-known exception that the Haradrim are called "swarthy" at one point. But this definitely doesn't make them black and doesn't seem to have much to do with mapping to race-as-it-exists; they're just darker-skinned since they live in sunnier climes further south. If anything, the picture is of North Africans: the Haradrim invading with their Mumakil are probably intended to evoke the Carthaginians under Hannibal, and the Corsairs of Umbar, the Barbary Pirates. And going a bit further afield, the shrunken Gondor holding out against Mordor has shades of the Eastern Roman Empire against the Turks. But again, using race to represent this is a bad idea, not least because these resemblances are just evocative, not allegorical and definitely not intended to reflect on real-world races!

I have, of course, a lot of disagreements with this comment, but in the spirit of explaining things rather than re-waging the Great Internet Atheism-vs-Religion Wars (I was a teenager 20 years ago; I ought to know better now) I wanted to focus on two things that are a bit more meta-level and more relevant specifically to rationality.

All else being equal, a simple hypothesis or prior should be privileged over a more complex one when they are equally as good at explaining the evidence, or predicting the future. That is a basic consequence of probability theory, complexity needs to be justified.

There are two points to be made here. The first is that Occam's razor, the simplicity prior, and the particular formal version based on Kolmogorov complexity, are all assumptions, not inevitable consequences of logic. Probability theory tells you how to update your prior based on evidence (....if, somehow, you can know the probabilities of all your observations conditional on each of the potential hypotheses, which in this context is an unrealistically big ask); it can't tell you what your prior should be. A simplicity prior is not an unreasonable choice in many contexts, but it's (a) not actually practical for many things (do you know all possible hypotheses and their exact complexity?) and (b) it's not the only possible choice.

The second is that it seems likely to be impossible to even evaluate simplicity or conditional probabilities when you are dealing with radically different ontologies, and it's not at all clear that e.g. the claim that physics and the existing physical universe is the brute fact of reality is in any way simpler than the claim that a Person is. Certainly I'll grant that "the physical universe, but also God/supernatural/nonphysical stuff tacked on" is more complicated than pure materialism, but that's explicitly not what the alternative is.

An analogy for those who know about the demoscene: a long, intricate demo certainly looks more complicated than a random short clip on Youtube, but it is much simpler in an information-theory sense, being generated from a small executable. Given that we don't know any real equivalent of "the shortest possible code" for either a materialist or Theistic account of the reality, I don't think it's even in principal possible to judge the complexity of either.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness is a sign that our existing knowledge and theories are insufficient for the task of explaining everything

This misses the point. There are certainly many problems that, when substituted for "the Hard Problem of Consciousness" here, would make this statement a valid criticism. For instance, if someone tried to argue that the fact that science can't account for Abiogenesis is a knock-down argument against materialism, this would be a good point. The fact that we have no good idea how abiogenesis could occur is some evidence against its occurring by natural means, but in the future new evidence or a better understanding of chemistry might turn things around, just as biochemistry did for the properties of organic life as it is now.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness is another matter. The problem is not that current science can't explain it; the problem is that ontological materialism excludes consciousness (in the sense those of us talking about the Hard Problem mean) entirely. There's no way to get an "I", a first-person perspective, in a materialist ontology, any more than it's possible to get moral realism. And I don't know about you, but I'm quite a bit more certain that I exist than I am that the external world exists, let alone of any laws of physics or theories about what other things might or might not exist, simply for the reason I have direct, unmediated observation of the fact of my existence, which I don't have of physical things. Not to go full #DescartesWasRight here, but he's a lot more right about this than many people give him credit for.

To get at something of my frustration here, let me present a fictional dialogue between a normal person "Matt" and a person with a rather odd ontology, "Noah":

Noah: "The whole universe is just a number. Everything is just some digits or properties of this number. All is number!"

Matt: "But this rock isn't a number! It's not even the same sort of thing as a number! It's stuff, matter, not something abstract like a number."

Noah: "What do you mean? How do you know that stuff isn't just properties of a number. After all, you know that atoms can be counted, mass can be measured, positions can be located, as numbers. Numbers are everywhere. We can express everything about your rock as some numbers, and thus, of course, as digits in one Great Number which is the whole universe."

Matt: "Sure, numbers are useful for measuring things. But a rock isn't just its measurements -- it's made of stuff; it has actual existence."

Noah: "I don't know what you mean by 'actual existence', or 'stuff' or 'matter', and I don't think you do either. Sure, I'll grant that there are things about a rock that we don't know how to measure yet, so we don't fully know how it is part of the Great Number. But it's just a matter of time."

Matt: "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"

Whenever I talk to materialists about consciousness, I feel just like Matt talking to Noah. If you actually don't get it, I don't know what to say to you.


And this leads into some final thoughts which are connected to both of these. The elephant in the room here, the simplest ontology that nobody wants no believe -- maybe that nobody can believe: Solipsism. Why believe in the existence of anything external to yourself at all? A universe with just one thing is simpler than any hypothesis other than one with nothing (not tenable for the obvious reason). It can easily account for all your putative observations (i.e. they are not actually observations of anything at all). And yet, despite the talk of Boltzmann brains, which is functionally the same thing (if you are just a brain in the void, why do you think your observations of the laws of physics have any meaning -- and thus why is the fact that QM may permit Boltzmann brains any evidence whatsoever about whether you might be one?), I don't think I've heard people insist that solipsism is the only rational position. Frankly, the reason I'm not a solipsist is not that I have a good argument that it's false; rather, I just can't believe it -- I have an arational certainty -- generously, direct apprehension of a truth -- that solipsism is false and I'm not the only thing that exists.

And if we aren't rationally required to be solipsists, well, isn't that giving the whole game away in terms of trying to evaluate ontologies with the same tools one uses for day-to-day reasoning about more bounded questions?

(A more complete version of this comment would relate this to questions about model uncertainty and why, practically, 10^-9 is no more a "real" credence level than 0 is, but this comment is far too long already.)

I have a lot of thoughts on this topic, as someone who is a natural skeptic and also an Orthodox Christian. Consider this comment an IOU to get back to you with something of an essay in the near future.

You mentioned icons; let's talk about actual icons. Specifically, Christian iconography.

When Christianity spreads to another culture (as it has been continuously doing since the beginning), it faces a problem: how do you represent the major figures, including Christ and the saints? You can take two different approaches here:

  1. Icons are representative, not realistic. So you can (and should) adapt iconography to the ethnic and cultural makeup of the people using them in order to make them more relatable and less foreign. Hence you have black, white, Chinese, etc. icons of Jesus, Mary, and so on.

  2. Icons are representations of real people, so they should picture them as they actually are (as best as we can tell). This entails that Jesus, Mary, the apostles, and so on look eastern-Mediterranean, since that's how they actually looked; if people want icons that look like them, well, there are plenty of saints actually from their ethnicity, or will be soon enough.

Both perspectives are defensible, but if you have perspective (1) you'd be wrong to say that people with perspective (2) are just being racist or ethnocentric.

Now, of course, neither Aragorn nor any other character in Lord of the Rings is a real person. But people frequently have perspective (2) about source material that they are attached to, and I don't think they're entirely wrong!

PS: What amounts to good iconography, especially as it relates to these two perspectives, is apparently a great way to get some scissor statements in Orthodox Christian communities. Is this picture a valid/good icon, or not? Context for those who aren't familiar: this picture is a classic Orthodox icon design, with the Theotokos (Mary) and infant Jesus (the angels are Michael on the left and Gabriel on the right). It's also got all the iconographic writing which is necessary to make something an icon: the "ΜΡ ΘΥ" (which stands for the first and last letters in the Greek for "Mother of God") above her halo, and "ΙC ΧC" (the C's are lunate sigmas; it stands for "Jesus Christ") near the Christ child, and even the "ο ων" (Greek ""He who is", referring to the name for God) on his halo. The problem? It's in a cutesy anime style. (The artist did get the colors wrong; usually Mary has a red outer garment (for holiness) and a blue inner one (for humanity). But it's possible it's imitating a non-standard icon, since those rules are not quite universal.)

Yes. I started having wrist pain about 5 years ago in my right wrist, to the point where it was seriously impacting my work. I did some research and bought a cheap vertical mouse, and my pain went went away in about a week and never came back. Best $25 I ever spent.

If you have larger hands, make sure to get a larger mouse, though. They vary a lot in size and I find smaller ones not nearly as comfortable.

Surely most of that (in the paper, I mean) is selection effects? I expect that there's a substantial barrier to entry for completing SRS at a university hospital (the selection criterion for that paper) and that the barriers are higher for AGPs since they don't match the stereotypical / ideologically acceptable profile. (I also suspect a similar effect causes these studies to underestimate AGP in that population. People who want a thing tend to say what gatekeepers want to hear, and those that don't... don't make it past the gatekeepers as much.)

Of course I'm also saying this as someone who suffers from AGP (though much, much less than I did in my teens / early 20s -- mental habits do make a difference) and also ticks many of the usual boxes: high intelligence, nerdy, family history both of mental illness and of joint hypermobility / connective tissue problems. So make of that what you will.

I mean, progressivism is post-Christian, it didn't develop in a vacuum. Or, to quote G.K. Chesterton:

The modern world is not evil; in some ways the modern world is far too good. It is full of wild and wasted virtues. When a religious scheme is shattered (as Christianity was shattered at the Reformation), it is not merely the vices that are let loose. The vices are, indeed, let loose, and they wander and do damage. But the virtues are let loose also; and the virtues wander more wildly, and the virtues do more terrible damage. The modern world is full of the old Christian virtues gone mad. The virtues have gone mad because they have been isolated from each other and are wandering alone. Thus some scientists care for truth; and their truth is pitiless. Thus some humanitarians only care for pity; and their pity (I am sorry to say) is often untruthful.

He was writing over 100 years ago, but progressivism has been around for a while.

FYI, some of my comments (Including the OP and a reply to @07mk) have taken / are taking many hours to appear for me when I'm not logged in. Possibly it's a new account thing. Edit: all my earlier comments have now appeared.

I wanted to add a few notes that didn't really fit in with the original essay, or that occurred to me afterwards.


  1. I'm not sure how much "autogynephilia" is supposed to overlap with what I've described. Certainly in the "it's a fetish" sense (which seems is the plain meaning, since as far as I'm aware that's how "-philia" is used in this context) it is much more narrow, to the point of being wrong. I suspect some of its proponents might claim that it covers all of the feelings I described, but I disagree, for exactly the same reason that I disagree that affection and "being in love" are the same thing as lust; they are related, but not identical. And at any rate the "it's a fetish" sense seems to be how it is present in popular consciousness.

  2. I hope I did not imply that my analysis is exhaustive. The same end result can have disparate causes, and I can't read others' minds. I do suspect it accounts for a lot, though, and in a better way than the dominant narratives.

  3. I think our culture has a terrible narrative around desires, which seems to be something like, "Desires are good! They are also a fundamental part of you, so if you have especially strong desires, you should build your identity around them! Unless your desires are just obviously evil, in which case you are a bad person for even having them." I find the approach found in ancient Christian thought (and elsewhere) to be much better: "You can have rightly or wrongly ordered desires. You can desire something good, but in a bad way; you can desire something that is good, but less important, more than something that is better and more important; you can desire something that is in fact bad, because you erroneously feel it is good. Having disordered desires is bad, but it's bad in the way that being sick is bad; it's not morally equivalent to acting on those desires. You should strive to rightly order your desires, and in the meantime to not act wrongly on account of them; this will make you better off in the long run."

  4. Rereading, I may have created the false impression that my experience was of this as an all-consuming thing. In reality, though it was a big part of my inner life (I wouldn't have gone out of my way to engage in fantasizing if it wasn't) for a number of years, it was not the biggest or most important part.

  5. Based on a couple of the comments, apparently I was miscalibrated about how obvious my twist at the beginning was. If I'd known, I would have written the reveal differently! For whatever it's worth (and at the risk of overexplaining the joke), here's why I thought people would guess it: (a) the tone of the "stories" was that these were archetypes or composites, created for the sake of illustration, but (b) there were too many incongruous or unique details (at least in the first one), suggestive that these stories were of real people, and that the tone was for the sake of producing a twist; then (c) the details that were included or left out were somewhat complementary, but not technically contradictory, suggesting the "it's the same person" reveal over other twists, (d) the details, at least for the first, are rather intimate and indicate that the author knows the subject really well, so probably it's autobiographical.

Maybe not the right place, maybe better for Sunday, but I'm not in a great mood. What is up with senior software engineering hiring? All the job postings seem to be premised on the idea that you don't learn any transferable skills in your career, only domain-specific ones. If you want a senior position doing X, you'd better have been doing X for multiple years already. I get that makes sense for principal-level jobs where the whole point is to hire a world expert on X, but a senior still has to ramp up as part of a team anyway. Surely this state of affairs is really suboptimal, given (I hear) how hard it is to find good people. Where are the companies hiring smart senior SWEs who have been doing X to do Y and just figuring on an extra bit of ramp-up?

@TheDag @KingOfTheBailey @coffee_enjoyer I, um, wrote a long thing. It's up as a top level post (...and a reply because I ran out of characters) now.

I think there are potentially two things going on here that we should be careful not to conflate:

  1. The X is Good --> I Want to Be X pathway (a good pathway in many cases, by the way); it is my belief that this improperly and strongly activates in sexual matters in many trans people (as well as "trans-adjacent" people like me who ultimately decide that they just have some Issues to work through), leading to the Venus-AGP and Eros-AGP described above.
  2. The tendency to move from "I want to be X" to "I am already X", which is what you seem to be describing.

It might very well be the case that (2) is more prevalent among people who decide they are trans than among those who do not, but I doubt it is a strongly indicative characteristic in the same way as (1). A bunch of (2) is just in the cultural water (particularly in progressive circles); e.g. "if you have written anything, you are a writer [regardless of whether it is published or earns you a living]", referring to anyone who does some math in school as a "mathematician", etc. so I would be surprised if the tendency was that much stronger in trans individuals than in generic progressives.

So, in the CWR thread there was an exchange where @2rafa got a bit piled on for claiming that most men don't have lots of casual sex not because they can't, but because they don't particularly want to compared to competing activities. I'm not interested in relitigating the conversation, but the following bit struck me (conversation massively snipped for the relevant parts):

From @2rafa:

Because most men do, in fact, show a revealed preference for long term relationships. [...] I think most men who don't pursue sleeping with huge numbers of women don't do so because they don't want to, not because they can't.

And from @Amadan:

[Y]our rather touchingly naive view that down deep we're all just looking for our waifu is not really true. [...] But most men who don't do it [have sex with large numbers of women], unless they have strong religious or other reasons not to, absolutely would do it if they had the ability.

Now admittedly I am one of the people with "strong religious ... reasons not to", but this strikes me as off somehow? I mean, sure, most men have some level of desire to have lots of sex with different women, but people have lots of desires, and just because they have a desire doesn't mean they'd preferentially fulfill it, especially if it competes with other ones.

Which leads to my question. What fraction of men (say, in their twenties) are better described as (a) "looking for [their] waifu" - i.e. want to find a good wife (and then, presumably, also have lots of sex with her), with little serious interest in casual sex, or (b) "absolutely would [have lots of casual sex] if they had the ability"?

For (heterosexual) men, which is/was more true of you? For anyone, what fraction of men do you think are are "team find a wife" vs "team casual sex"?

I only perused that subreddit once; perhaps unsurprisingly when it was linked from the Motte a few years back. The impression I got was that the users would interpret every little thing as proof that the author was trans (overwhelmingly MtF). Posts were either in the "I wanted to wear pretty dresses, and I thought about being a girl. I just realized that means I'm 100% trans!" vein, or were point-and-laugh at some internet content and deciding that the creator was totally trans but in denial, with the same standards of evidence. (I think that second one was the purpose of the sub. I don't know why so many subreddits not only engaged in point-and-laugh behavior, but made it their raison d'etre; it's invariably toxic.) The result was trans-maximalist groupthink, I guess?

I hope I didn't create the impression that my experience was the only possible one; I can't see into everyone's heart, of course.

For what it's worth, I don't disagree that there are other options that don't deny consciousness -- my "I'm a Christian because of the Hard Problem" line is certainly a simplification, and my reasons for being Christian in particular are not a clear-cut, single line of reasoning but a bunch of reasons, intuitions, and experiences, many of which could easily be criticized individually and some of which are not really communicable, that together point me in that direction. The Hard Problem of Consciousness (together with a deep-seated conviction that solipsism, the elephant in the room here, is false) is just the biggest piece.

So - what are your recommended solutions to the issue of transgender ideation and other culturally bound issues?

Find susceptible people before they get eaten by the toxic memes, and give them genuine sympathy and counseling, I guess. Tell better stories and offer better philosophies so that they don't latch on to the destructive ones. The cat's out of the bag, which is why this is an issue to begin with, so pure shame or pointed silence is off the table -- they'll just go find groups that tickle their ears. The teenage girl who is uncomfortable with her body needs personal care before she gets convinced that being anorexic would make her special or that she'd be happier as a boy.

I guess this solution is just "Replace the unhealthy cultural memes with healthier ones," but there's really not any other possible solution anyway. This is a cultural problem and you can't just Do Something to solve cultural problems.

Well, there is a first step to replacing the unhealthy memes with healthier ones that doesn't require winning the whole culture, and that's making sure the healthy ones are at least on offer and available to the people who need them. Be the change you want to see in the world?

I too am a member of this club. (Actually, although I quoted Lewis in my top level comment downthread, I'm not sure if I've actually quoted the others in my few Motte posts yet. It's only a matter of time, though.)

What struck me so strongly is that the reference was just dropped in with no explanation, as one might a Biblical or mythological allusion, or a reference to some other ubiquitous cultural touchstone. The implication that the readers would be expected to actually follow the reference absent a citation was... well, about the only place I'd be confident of that landing for most of the audience is in a Lewis society.

Since MtF and FtM are largely different phenomena:

MtF: 1. this seems to pick out the wrong set of people. There are lots of men who seem to believe that women have better lives, and even some who are unhappy enough that they go to very dark places (e.g. incels) but they don't seem to be the ones lining up to be trans. 2. Autogynephilia is a thing, and it would be deeply weird if a condition that is uncommon in the general population but very common among trans people didn't have anything to do with transitioning. 3. A lot of MtF trans people have been willing to go through some really hard stuff (extensive medical treatments) and have blown up their objectively good lives as men in order to try to become women; I suppose you could consider them to be extra deluded, but that doesn't seem to be a parsimonious explanation.

FtM: Here that explanation is somewhat plausible for some of the short-hair-and-guy's-clothes-enby types or for the people who want to get pregnant but still have people pretend they are men, but in general it doesn't seem to work. We have a long history of women pretending to be men in order to enter men's spaces, get more respect, or engage in male-only activities: everything from women taking male pen names, to Mulan (yes, a folktale/myth, but still) or the women who pretended to be men so they could become doctors, up to at least one female Christian saint who pretended to be a man in order to enter a particular monastery. But they appear to be in a totally different category than the girls who want to cut off their breasts, who seem more like the extreme end of "girl is uncomfortable with her body because puberty" intersecting with the pro-trans social environment, and not particularly concerned with e.g. earning more money.

I agree that the things you've outlined (everything is a tournament profession; success at being a man is measured in terms of impossible ideals; the previous masculine success parameters are less attainable than they used to me) are real problems. Probably solving them would mitigate the kind of gender issues that "end on incel forums" (or in suicide, another thing that's been trending up).

But I'm not sure I buy that these are root causes of a substantial fraction of MtF transitions. Are the majority of transitioners really people who have decided they should become a woman because they think they will fail (or have failed) at being a man? I'm curious as to what evidence makes you think that is the case. If you're right, that makes the problem much easier than I think it is, which is a really good thing!

I think a bunch of them are profoundly miserable in a way they wouldn't have been if they had tried to make peace with their reality.

I think I agree with this.

I think there's a subset of them that just wants company for their misery, to drag others down the path they were guided down.

They do say that "misery loves company," and I wouldn't rule out there being some people like that, but... that seems uncharitable? Like, I'd find it more likely that these people have an ideological commitment to a mistaken idea of what's good for them and others than that they are being actively malicious.

From observing some of my acquaintances who have gone down that path, the desire to evangelise has appeared in every single one of them, making "jokes" about slipping pills to people and asking "so when are you going to come out too?"

Joking about slipping pills to people is pretty concerning. The evangelizing thing is interesting; I guess (loose categorization here) there's 3 major (not mutually exclusive) reasons people evangelize for something:

  1. They love it and are super excited to share it.

  2. They think they have a moral imperative to evangelize.

  3. They are themselves uncertain of or insecure in their decision, so they evangelize partly to convince themselves that it's a good idea.

Without, hopefully, trying to mind-read too much, your acquaintances sound like number 3.

Related and potentially even more controversial questions:

  • To what extent does this analysis apply to homosexuality? Are there people who are "homoromantic" without being (significantly) sexually aroused by the same sex, or vice-versa?
  • How about other fetishes? Are there many where an "Eros" aspect is reasonably common?

To be fair, the notions of simplicity at play here are two different ones, so Divine Simplicity is, while not entirely irrelevant, a bit beside the point.

Relatedly, I maintain that the left vs right spectrum are best understood as religious schism within the western enlightment, with the adhearants of Locke and Rousseau on one side and the adhearants of Hobbes on the other.

Which implies that left vs right politics are fundamentally post-Christian.

Drawing this out a bit further: I believe you are right that the alt-right and woke left are, in many ways, cut from the same cloth. But the "red tribe," even the overtly religious part, is just as much a product of modernity and is in many ways post-Christian in outlook, despite the Christian trappings.

I rather think this is a bad thing.

Reading that review/reaction was a bit weird, because while I see where she's coming from (not only is reading about fetishes gross, but a lot of these people do seem to admit to sexist or objectifying attitudes towards women), it really feels like she's somehow getting the causality backwards. While I can't be sure for every case, I strongly suspect that most of these people's specific sexual fantasies of humiliation/sexism/etc are downstream of the memes of sexism in the culture (I hesitate to say "sexist memes", because while some of them are indicative of sexism, others are probably due to the broadcasting of "look at all this sexism women experience" from feminists).

That is, the causal chain runs from the cultural memes (sexist or about sexism) to the sexist fantasies, because what's ground-level arousing/desired is being a woman, and that's what these people either (a) think being a woman is like, or (b) think is proof or evidence of being a woman. If other things were culturally available as "the essence of being a woman", that's probably what they'd fantasize about instead. Whereas Lorelei seems to think that the source of the sexism in these fantasies is in these people's male sex drive, because she thinks that the male sex drive is the source of the sexism in the culture?

Re: drag queen story hour; I'm agreed these are terrible. Though weren't drag queens originally a subculture of gay men, not transvestic fetishists? I'm not familiar with any of the groups involved, so I may be mistaken -- or maybe it's not the same people anymore now?

Edit: Also, does that mean you'd be interested in reading a review, or no?