@muzzle-cleaned-porg-42's banner p

muzzle-cleaned-porg-42


				

				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users  
joined 2022 September 08 14:27:44 UTC

				

User ID: 1018

muzzle-cleaned-porg-42


				
				
				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 08 14:27:44 UTC

					

No bio...


					

User ID: 1018

It absolutely is a red flag if you are yourself accustomed to sorting and matching your socks when you do laundry.

If you do the laundry, you have to match both your own and the other person's. (And that is going to be difficult if they never do it on their own initiative. Makes also more difficult to match your own socks. Adds entropy.) If you don't do the laundry, expect to find a closet full of mixed socks, and if you don't like it that way and want to have it your way, congratulations, you have now an extra chore because you have to do the laundry.

In my limited experience, any everyday friction items like "how to organize socks" are much more important deal-breakers for a relationship than difference in political opinions or many of the "values".

Have you tried to reproduce a copyrighted photo using only the latent representations stored in your biological network?

While biological networks and computer models have some similarities in abstract, in practice there are crucial differences.

Outside France, I think most of the "apocalyptic" views were more about her being pro-Putin and anti-EU. The immigration is only salient to both extreme pro-immigration and anti-immigration crowd, who make it a central thing about their platform / identity.

I have been upgrading my priors to the effect "more shocking the video, higher likelihood it is AI generated", but this is not shocking enough.

If I were to guess, it is something mundane, and the tables have turned and past stereotypes have become a funhouse mirror: these days it's the Chinese who come from such a well-ordered society that they amaze Westerners with their ability to stand in line waiting for their turn.

yeah. Naive calculation: Suppose Alice has a factory that produces tens of hi-tech bespoke post-Cold war optimized tanks during one year, say 50 units in year. Suppose Bob has several dozens of factories that can produce 500,000 of civilian vehicles each year. Bob needs only engineers to redesign the civilian car production line into something useful in military use -- perhaps, integrate anti-tank guided missile launcher and drone platform and minimal armor against small arms fire -- and then Bob can produce 10,000 modern anti-tank vehicles for each Alice's hi-tech bespoke tank. After the first couple of months, if both realize their current designs are not performing adequately in the field, assuming it takes equal time to come up with a redesign, after the resign and couple of months of production Bob has produced 80,000 upgraded vehicles against 8 Alice's upgraded bespoke units. But frankly, I presume if you have factories producing hundreds of thousands units for civilian consumption, your engineers are much better at setting up production lines, adapting and rolling out new redesigns than if your experience is producing hundreds of bespoke units to a contract.

Am I wrong and maybe sort of paranoid, or is there a concentrated and obvious effort in the Western public

It is a difficult question to settle without any citations to primary evidence than recollections. I have not kept a detailed diary neither, but I thought that looting, poor equipment and logistics were mostly discussed in spring 2022 (when the initial invasion had started showing ever increasing cracks and subsequently Kiev invasion was given up). Russian Kharkov front collapse / retreat, later in the autumn, sounds quite much like poorly trained and equipped soldiers running away ("fleeing in masse"). Retreat from Kherson, muddled picture. Then much debate whether the fight for Bakhmut made sense and was the loss ratio favorable to Ukrainians or Russians. I forget when the Iranian drones entered the picture. Since then there has been much waiting for the grand counter-offensive to yield noticeable results on the map and hand-wringing why is that (all of it keeps reminding me of reading about WW1 trench warfare period after Marne and Race to the Sea, massive battles that result only in small visible changes in the overall picture as civilians reading the news can see); only recently, since August or so, there has been reported changes in lines near Robotyne, which may or may not be a breakthrough (my general feeling is of pro-Ukrainian pundits appearing cautiously optimistic but noncommittal about relevance its success: though that describes the attitude of some pundits already back in May, so no change there).

The world in general and wars in particular are chaotic. I believe pundits often attempt to tell more consistent stories than the reality warrants. Low-quality pundits will reiterate soundbites. It would be quite expected that reported bits of information have changed because the relevant facts on the ground keep changing, may have shifted multiple times, with different information coming from different units with variable experiences. Let's consider the equipment situation of the Russians. It is not uncommon that troops in retreat or soon to start retreating have bad material situation (which necessitates the retreat); this explains reports of very poorly equipped Russians retreating. Yet, one purpose of strategic retreat is to improve the strategical situation, including logistics; who knows, possibly Russians succeeded in improving the situation, explaining there are reports compatible better equipped Russian troops (after the retreat). Likewise, which side has better drone tech and doctrine and relevant parties' perception of their relative strength may have changed several times over.

It is difficult to discuss this kind of question ("am I wrong ... or is there a concentrated and obvious effort ... to retcon") without specific articles and events to discuss. Attempts to litigate is such retcon attempt "obvious"? Even more difficult without such references of who said what and when. Maybe the "Narrative" has switched, or maybe the different voices are more prominent then previously; maybe the overall atmosphere among the audience reading the mostly similar information content has changed, or maybe it is not the overall atmosphere but individual perception.

True enough, if it happened today, or next year. But who knows about 2030, or 2035?

Russo-Georgian war happened in 2008. The war in Donetsk started in 2014. The current war started in 2022. As far as the political climate is concerned, a great many things may change in 6 years.

"Comparatively democratic" is intended to be read literally, as in, comparatively more cratos in the hands of demos than in other parts of Europe. Not as, it was democratic as 20th century had democracies. But lack of serfdom since early Middle Ages, continuous presence of institutions for deliberative, representational decisionmaking, and right to participate (in the said institutions) granted to large part of population, all of that, it is the traditional social capital argument.

Then how your comment is relevant, because the statistics shown in the figure counts investigators (who are sworn officers, not civilians?)

Sanity check from a different source:

https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table-74> 686,665 full time officers in 2018 -> 210 per 100,000, almost exactly the same number as in the linked paper graphs. Even if one included civilians, the US would be massive outlier, and according to data description, one ought not to, because:

The UCR Program defines law enforcement officers as individuals who ordinarily carry a firearm and a badge, have full arrest powers, and are paid from governmental funds set aside specifically to pay sworn law enforcement.

Civilian employees include full-time agency personnel such as clerks, radio dispatchers, meter attendants, stenographers, jailers, correctional officers, and mechanics.

It's pure "this is cool, don't think about it".

He's a bad match for Star Wars.

I agree he wasn't a good match, but "rule of cool" wasn't the reason. Star Wars is a space opera conceived as "WW2 fighter planes, Jidaigeki, and Wild West, ... IN SPACE." In other words, rule of cool. None of the rich details of the exotic universe make sense, they are there because they look cool. Lucas wanted to cast a Japanese period drama samurai star as Obi-Wan Kenobi because of "how cool that'd be". Consistency is maintained in OT and prequels because of inertia and involving a single auteur whose vision of "cool" didn't change too much.

Hiring a "rule of cool" director was a good idea. The mistake of was that Johnson's brand of cool was different. Hiring a director who worships "canon" isn't necessarily a bad idea, it can work for some time, but eventually it will result in milking the original vision empty, producing soulless merchandise.

Doesn’t Ron Desantis disprove your rule that non-elites can’t achieve high office or even Joe Biden?

I agree with MaicTheTrue. Ron DeSantis is one individual. Think of base rates: there is only one Ron DeSantis. Perhaps a handful of other politicians with similar backgrounds. What is the probability your kid is going to be the next one?

Think it in terms of sports. Some individuals become the elite sport stars worth millions of dollars and have a pretty nice life until they retire. it doesn't change the fact that 99.x% of kids who want to become top players in a major league never become one. For a parent of perfectly ordinary good kid with ordinary good talents, it would be very irresponsible to encourage their kids to start on the path of all necessary requirements to become a top athlete (invest heavily in training and start their sports career in their teens). It makes sense if you have a pretty good probability that either your kid is in the top 1/10,000 talent bracket or if you are from gang-ridden favela without any other prospects and there is absolutely nothing to lose. Neither case applies to most people in the first world, where there is a secure career path option.

I believe it is quite the same thing if you want to become an elite political operative. You need right personality, some intellectual capacity, right social talents, in-born ambition, and looks (or charisma, which is often again, the looks). If the kid is not naturally popular in his/her group of kids and demonstrating the instincts of top political operative by age 11, I don't think it would be useful feed them the ambition to be a top politician.

Ambition is good thing, but it is better to direct it to useful pursuits.

Not the bespoke weapons, no. But evidently a modern civilian drone factory can make drones that are effective for military use. I believe a protracted total war, the side with more "Gigafactories" and difficult-to-predict quality of innovativeness and engineering that comes from running the factory will be better equipped to churn out useful equipment. In a massive war, you need massive amount of weapons, and wih current production numbers, it looks possible the West would run out of the bespoke weapons.

If the decisionmakers Alice and Bob realize it, it will affect their calculations of outcomes of protracted total war, such calculations will affect their diplomatic strategies. If either side don't realize it, they will walk into it blindly into the next protracted total war, and it will affect the outcome.

The line of thought goes, simplified, their society had elements that share commonalities with a modern conception of democracy (mid-lower level social landholding had some minor but existent social and economic power, the freemen had rights recognized by everyone in the "everyone knows that everyone knows" way, the ideas how the decisionmaking institutions are supposed to work). Thus it is a confound: perhaps the democratic commonalities contributed to weird by-the-books behavior. And these democratic elements formed social capital (knowledge and preconceived ideas how to do things, transmitted intergenerationally) making it easier to run democracy!20thcentury in ethos, not only rubberstamping the correct procedures in the books approved by philosophers. The idea that ethos part is important in other democratic societies is not exactly a new idea. ^1

Naturally all this is comparative. From what I gather, they Nordics were corrupt (still are corrupt, just less in comparison than some other countries), the amount of corruption waxed and waned depending on the politics. Also, we know of the corruption because the peasants suffering from its effects mounted numerous legal complaints registered in the legal system, existence of which is somewhat positive sign.

Or do you think Ben would nod approvingly if Mexico went full Carolus Rex

I don't know about Ben. I would grant the possibility that Mexico could be a better place after 200 years the state running the show as the supreme gangboss, not tolerating other bosses that those serving him, applying principles of consistent governance, basing his powerbase on the free small-mid-sized enterprises against the high capital. But 200 year long experiments are difficult to run and the economic situation of the lucrative narcotics trade is difficult to square.

Narcotics is bit like the resource curse: You get lots of profit that don't require investments to rest of the local economy which would result in long-term benefit to rest of the society. Not only that, the resource curse profits are much higher and more concentrated than what others can made from rest of economy. The outsized profit, concentrated, makes it possible to hire armed enforcers to enforce control and continuation of profitable business in the hands of its current owner, and make any problems to go away.

^1: Tocqueville writes about the mores of American democracy:

The manners of the Americans of the United States are, then, the real cause which renders that people the only one of the American nations that is able to support a democratic government; and it is the influence of manners which produces the different degrees of order and of prosperity that may be distinguished in the several Anglo-American democracies. Thus the effect which the geographical position of a country may have upon the duration of democratic institutions is exaggerated in Europe. Too much importance is attributed to legislation, too little to manners. These three great causes serve, no doubt, to regulate and direct the American democracy; but if they were to be classed in their proper order, I should say that the physical circumstances are less efficient than the laws, and the laws very subordinate to the manners of the people. I am convinced that the most advantageous situation and the best possible laws cannot maintain a constitution in spite of the manners of a country; whilst the latter may turn the most unfavorable positions and the worst laws to some advantage. The importance of manners is a common truth to which study and experience incessantly direct our attention. It may be regarded as a central point in the range of human observation, and the common termination of all inquiry. So seriously do I insist upon this head, that if I have hitherto failed in making the reader feel the important influence which I attribute to the practical experience, the habits, the opinions, in short, to the manners of the Americans, upon the maintenance of their institutions, I have failed in the principal object of my work.

Also Nordics/Protestants being stuck up by-the-book types was a stereotype well before Europe started moving towards democracy.

Less decisive historical observation than one may think, as the confound of comparatively democratic power structures in the Nordics goes all the way back before the French revolution. Things were meetings of free men since before the middle ages. When the Swedish realm adopted European style Riksdag of estates, they had a fourth estate of free land-owning peasants.

I think there is a deterrent effect, and there should be deterrent effects for all punishment, but that the deterrent isn't strong enough for capital punishment to justify it, and it is mostly about revenge and satisfying vindictiveness.

I think the "anti-revenge" argument proves too much. It ultimately depends far too much on how much deterrent effect there is.

Most acts of violence are done in heat of the moment or otherwise irrational decisions: thus deterrence effect must be small, as the people who are committing illegal violence are not weighing their options and consequences rationally. And in fact, despite the all might of the (Western, developed) judicial system, most (Western, developed) countries have still some amounts of criminality. I acknowledge it is a point of contention, but let's assume for the sake of the argument that deterrence effect is small-to-negligible. Thus, any punishment worth its name is unjustified as deterrence, as deterrence doesn't happen to meaningful extent.

If there is no meaningful deterrence, and the idea of revenge is verboten, what reason remains to administer any punishment at all? If we are talking about a criminal who is a high-risk repeat offender, there is still argument that we should incapacitate to prevent them committing further crimes. However, not all people are like that. Some want to commit one, specific murder. Or some goody-shoes comes and argues they have a very good method to "rehabilitate" them (or prevent committing any more crimes, which is functionally same thing), and it involves electronic monitoring ankle bracelet, perhaps sniffing their internet traffic, and perhaps soon, AI. (Thus, they'd have a system of no other punishment than what is necessary to monitor they won't do it again.)

Thinking about this, I came to conclusion that justice as a concept must involve retributive elements, that is, a form of revenge, or it is not justice. A method that prevents the perpetrator from committing more crimes does nothing to the victim of their previous crimes. It is fully defenseless in the face of fait accompli: when crime has been committed, it can no longer be prevented. There either can be retribution or no retribution: admittedly is retribution is weak of ghost of justice as it can not make the crime undone, but it is still more than nothing, because acknowledges the pain of the victim (as it is administered in relation of the crime) whereas preventive methods won't ( as they focus on the future of the perpetrator), neither do deterrent methods (because they are concerned only with deterring other people, and the method of deterring crimes may turn out to be unrelated to the crime itself).

Finally, the system of no justice that I outlined is not fantasy, but the Nordic model slightly exaggerated. Yet it is proving impossible. According to their stated principles, Norwegians should let Anders Behring Breivik out as soon as their relevant officials are reasonably sure he is no longer danger to society or rendered harmless, as he has already sit the 10 year mandatory sentence they had in the books. Practically, by their stated philosophy, they should: after a hypothetical release, Breivik would be under constant monitoring, probably would not have chance to commit nor organize any further acts of terrorist violence, and he is getting pretty old. Yet they can't bear themselves to do it, and twist themselves into all kinds of legal knots that are not very believable as written but taken seriously because everyone involved deep-down knows it would act of injustice to let him walk free again. (I agree that he should sit for life, or should have faced capital punishment long ago. The Norwegian unwillingness to administer their law according to its written intentions shows they apparently also think their chosen system is illegitimate, in this case. And if it doesn't fit in this case, why not the other cases?)

Rand had a paper to the effect that The golden ratio for hostile occupations of conquered people is 1 soldier per 50 civilians... that's what was used in Germany after WW2 and Kosovo, America's 2 successful occupations.

Agreed with the general direction of your argument, but nitpick concerning post-war Germany: Firstly, the presence of the Soviet zone with Soviet occupation methods provided an additional "good cop/bad cop" dynamic. Secondly, it's not like the West German state was built ex nihilo without any relation to pre-war regime (probably it would have been impossible as everyone who strove to be someone had no option than associate with pre-war regime or become resistance fighter, a heroic but also often a dead-end career choice; random google result.)

The point is, replicating the feat that was "post-war Germany" would require more than 1 to 50 ratio of soldiers, but also a big stick in form of a "worse option" (better yet, a common enemy) and a buy-in from the prominent members of civil society and state apparatus. The case for post-war Japan had many similarities; less sure about post-war South Korea, but they had a military dictatorship. Conclusion: If wants to run an occupation with sheer force only, counting sufficient soldiers, one would need to study other case studies, from someone else's books. Maybe Soviet methods, which generally worked for maintaining the Soviet control for some time (at a cost which they finally were no longer willing to pay, thus not lasting a full century).

And all of the above is ignoring the difference between fighting a state or a polity (who have state-like-goals) and fighting a drug enterprise (which have other kind of goals). What good is sending 2m soldiers to fight the War on Drugs in the enemy territory if the enemy general's reaction is "many potential customers have moved closer to supply, saving on the logistics costs"?

Being a good pundit is difficult and requires specialization and probably some sort of (formal or informal) support organization. But being a pundit that gets interviewed a lot? Making a career out of it? That is quite different skillset.

Putin has been president since 2000. Two decades should be enough to build an organization -- from doctrine to senior appointed personnel -- that gives if not accurate, then directionally truthful reports. Ukraine built a fighting army in 8 years. In the meantime, Russia has had an epidemic of people falling out of window.

In great power politics, the wars are sufficiently rare that anomalies also count. (The French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were anomalous in their scale. WW1 was, again, anomalous.)

Predicting the outcomes of wars is unpredictable business. Before the 1st Gulf War, very few people knew for certain it was going to be a quick, decisive victory against inferior conventional force. If American strategy calls for small wars in the Middle East or quick decisive naval wars in Asia, what Washington is going to do when faced with an adversary who is perfectly aware of the American strategy and thus presents something that is neither?

And anyway, the current nuclear stockpiles are a fraction of what it was in the 1980s. During the Cold War, the end-of-the-world thought stopping does-not-compute aspect was heavily colored by fiction and propaganda. After the nuclear exchange, a world will end, but the world will not.

modern military stuff is more like a custom bespoke piece, where each individual tank/ship/airplane/whatever requires tons of individual workers to pore over it and custom assemble it

"Bespoke crafting" sounds true, that is how the hardware has been ordered for past few decades, but at the same time, it looks like such mode of production is not working very well when put into a test of a large-scale war (Ukraine). What seems to count is the ability to mass-produce hundred to thousands of missiles, thousands of cheap drones, and millions of artillery shells. Nobody seems to able to produce hundreds or thousands of tanks and airplanes, but if either side possessed such ability, it might decide the war.

Critics of the hereditarian hypothesis have posted critiques of the study, but, to my knowledge, no clear alternative hypotheses or explanations for the genetic model fitting basically perfectly.

Erm, I think your links present a very clear alternative hypotheses. To quote the Vince Buffalo tweet thread you yourself linked:

On the Clark paper: correlation functions often decay over various distances (genetic, environmental, spatial, etc). Observing a correlation that varies over genetic relatedness is not evidence that the cause is genetic, since many other processes create correlations that decay.

Fitting a parametric model for the rate of decay, as he does, is one way to check the plausibility of a model. However, many correlation functions have very similar forms. A good fit is not evidence of the right causal model.

His model has 2 degrees of freedom: heritability (h²) and corr. due to assortative mating (m). The genetic trait correlation function ρ(k) = h²((1+m)/2)ᵏ will fit data from many different non-genetic processes very well, which we know would also be decreasing over distances.

So, my take is the dataset is interesting, and yes the "genetic" model fits. But so would many, many alternative models that aren't in the paper. That the genetic model fits is not evidence genetics is the cause of the good fit. Many models with 2 df fit decay in correlations.

To put it bit more bluntly: If I measure how many Christmas postcards people send to each other (during 90s when people sent Christmas postcards), I would be surprised if I did not observe excellent fit for a genetic model with two free parameters for correlations of much postcards people send to each other: parents and children send more frequently postcards to each other, siblings quite and grandchildren and grandparents quite often , uncles and aunts less, cousins and other more distant relations less, decaying more and more as relations become more distant. It is not due to genetics causing postcard-activity (in a Platonian state, where children won't know their parents, sending postcards to them would quite difficult indeed!). It is because we intentionally organize ourselves socially in a way that closely mirrors our genetic relationship (for various good reasons), barring some random accidents.

Or here is what Turkheim says:

"Except for wealth"? Isn't wealth the alternative hypothesis? And that is what the modeling does: observes surprising persistence of family effects out to fourth cousins, for which there are at least two hypotheses: environmental family effects (C) and assortative mating (AM). /1

The models don't include C, by fiat. They just show that if you are willing to push AM up high enough, you can get a genetic model that fits the data. Kind of like doing a twin study, observing rDZ=rMZ, and concluding that it fits an additive genetic model with enough AM. /2

Assortative mating covers a huge amount of territory here, basically lumping all stratification processes-- genetic, environmental or phenotypic-- under a single rubric with an implausibly high value. Ignoring family environment is justified post hoc. /3

If you had told me a year ago that 2023 was going to bring a wave of maximalist genetic explanations of social structure, I would have said you were alarmist. Now? In a progressive era of surprisingly thin GWAS findings? But here we are. More soon. /end

To be scientifically more convincing, the study would need is a setup that could falsify a genetically determined environmental explanation. Lack of it is quite surprising because the object of the study is social status in the UK. Social status of king Charles is hereditary, yet not caused by any action attributable his genes themselves. I am surprised hereditarians would put so much stock on this study -- there are much better other evidence for a hereditarian positions, such as GWAS studies which usually attempt to control for this sort of thing (usually including principal components of genotype as covariates in regression models, which doesn't necessarily always work convincingly but probably results in directionally better estimates than no control at all). The Clark study, despite the impressive N, is quite weak evidence: if there is other more convincing evidence (that can rule out genetically-correlated social environment), then it is only confirmatory observation. If there is no such evidence, it won't convince a critic on its own merits.

A great deal of things that dudes in their 20s do, consciously or unconsciously, are about getting laid. Whether you want a culture where members of the meet up is acceptable or frowned upon depends on what you're aiming for, but I think there are a number of cases, e.g recruiting more casual members, where you'd want it to be acceptable.

While this is not untrue, thinking of it like it is either acceptable or frowned upon sounds a bit too binary. What they should strive for is an environment where as far as cultural expectations of romantic and sexual shenanigans go, what happens (if it happens) is classy. The memetic "be attractive, don't be unattractive" is surprisingly apt if you add in a time dimension, too: "as far as anyone is concerned, you continue to be attractive and remain not unattractive afterwards, too".

Should EA take in to account the "dudes in their 20s consciously or subconsciously" effect or take advantage of it for recruitment and yet keep their eyes on the nominal target (longtermism and other grand causes), they should develop adequate cultural antibodies. Dudes who make attempts at romance need to those who can dance successfully, that those who can't, do not. Those who dance, should dance in a way that mitigates the reputational risk.

There are also the practical adaptations: Do not admit that it is a factor, nor do not create a situation where people would have to notice it is a factor, at least not any more than in any other high status well-respected professional endeavor. Doing one thing while not admitting doing it to avoid not-spoken thing to become too prominent is not maybe 101 level social skills, more like 201 or 301, but a successful organization may need to operate above the 101 level.

It's the idea that attempting to convince someone that they should date you (or otherwise change their sexual preference/behavior) is inherently wrong and abusive.

I don't understand in which situation it would be right either.

There is a mating dance: flirting. Either party can gracefully back off. Usually, "attempt to convince" sounds a bit wrong kind off approach, no room for graceful exit or positive atmosphere afterwards. I suppose you can have a playful argument with flirtatious undertone, but it sounds a bit too much like a thing that works in a TV script but not in a real life. People can become distracted by the argument. (Big romantic gestures are a bit similar. Maybe one could pull it off, but one should be aware that attempting to initiate a 19th century courtship dance in a different time and place where likely nobody knows how to respond, it just might not work.)

In most situations, person doing the convincing would usually make a fool of themselves. If they appear to hold some leverage (social, professional or otherwise), or person being convinced is a bit too meek, it can become quite creepy and manipulative.

The link you posted is a short post, mostly speculation by a NR political correspondent, who appears to be mostly a regular journo. His analysis substantially equal to what we have here on the Motte already (it would serve the US interests to blow it up); he doesn't cite any named or anonymous insiders. Did you intend to post something else? Sikorski you refer to, in turn appears to be ex-Finance minister of Poland, which again doesn't sound like a credible insider. (IIRC there is an Israeli ex- minister of defense who proclaims aliens are visiting Earth on regular basis: showcases the quality of ex-ministers.)

making it impossible

Do we have any estimates how much time and money it would take to repair the damaged portion to the pipeline? Only thing I have seen is an estimate that will take up to couple of weeks before the area is safe and clear for investigation. It certainly does not appear impossible, by googling I can find companies that advertise case studies of providing gas pipeline repairs at depths of several thousands ft, though usually it is smaller scale leaks in production.

They are Russian ethnically and live in a region historically called Novorossiya.

"Historically" is less impressive if one looks at the history: Novorussiya originates from the 18th century, roughly contemporary with Voltaire. Not yesterday but neither Ye Olde Times.